Deutsche Goldmesse Spring 2024: Panel 2

0:00 How do you get the most interesting conversation? How do you get the most interesting conversation? Good afternoon, everybody. This is going to be, well, my opinion, most interesting conversation. I'm a little bit biased, though, but it's going to be the most interesting conversation today. We're talking about, the title says, shareholder activism leading to success in progress. And this is going to be about a Wally Resources. This is indeed why I say success in progress, is because the story's not done yet. So Awali Resources is listed on the Ventures Exchange, and I'll take a symbol, A-R-I-C, so that'd be A-R-I-C.

0:42 And the other company just recently got turned around, it went from, what about a $3.5 million market cap to now 40 at a certain point, 80-ish, I think, almost. Yeah, something like that, right? So there's a lot to talk about how that even came to be because the company was headed from 3 and a half not to 80 but to 0 and so Let's start with you Debra mute you're a person who brought it to all of our raters. How did that come to be? So I actually found the company through a drilling contractor, which was providing drilling services to exploration companies in Africa. And they would receive payment from certain companies in shares instead of cash. So you'd have to think, seeing this in the portfolio, you think, OK, at that time, this is in 2021, I didn't know too much about the business, but I could tell that, okay, if they're willing to take equity in this company, there has to be something there.

1:39 So I looked at it, but it didn't seem to really hold together that well. It was mostly orogenic, more narrow vein stuff. So I just kind of passed on it for them. And then I was following it still. And at some point, they come out with a news release detailing some higher grade stuff over a broader interval and maybe a theory on some IOCG mineralization. So that looked interesting. I was like, OK, IOCGs, you're looking at something more exotic, maybe more about tonnage potential. And then there was this surface anomalism for copper and gold that came out, which looked really, really big to me. And you hear people like Rick Rule talking about, oh, you should really swing for the fences with big projects, things with big potential. And this was a part of the world where modern exploration has basically not been done in that corner of Ivory Coast. You had the Civil War. You had stuff like that, which prevented

2:30 modern exploration from being done. So a lot of the low-hanging fruit, perhaps, is still there. So you look at that, and you see this high-grade, large surface anomalism. You know that it hasn't been combed over with modern exploration methods. So you think, OK, Maybe there's something here. And I talked to a bunch of people, but there was a lot of skepticism.

2:51 Me going over the company, I think, OK, there's Mariana Resources people involved, so there's maybe some credibility here. I actually, while going through this, I meet the CEO. Because it just so happens that, OK, I live in Malta, a very small country, which you wouldn't expect anyone in the mining business to be in. But the COO at the time, Andrew Chubb, happened to live there. And I messaged him on LinkedIn. This was my third time going through his profile. And we message. I meet him in person. We develop a rapport. Then Neumann comes in, in May of 22, with a joint venture on the project. So I'm like, okay, maybe this really is serious and I eventually brought it to vocation I was like man, this this looks like a legit project and then something happened Which was the Suriname deal?

3:38 That's a very interesting point. That's actually what Pushed us to to shareholder activism. I suppose that Suriname deal right? Yeah, so you see interesting part though you talk a lot about geology. There's a lot of people here who say, oh, forget the rocks. You want to see the people. You want to like the people first. You want to like the commodity first. You want to think that the dollar is going to 0 and gold's going to $25,000 a gram. And that's when you get involved in stories. But then you take it from the geology. What did you see in Edvocation? Because you take it from the bottom up perspective as well. Right, right. Well, the first thing that Devin told me was, okay, this looks huge, but first you need to look at this plan view, right? And we share our investment philosophy mostly. And I didn't need more than 4 minutes to get solved in the project.

4:23 The first question I had was when I saw the plan view was, and this was after the target generation that the company had done, meaning that they did the surface work and generated like 5 targets on the project. So they already had the ICG theory, but what I had in mind was, where is this? That's like the first question. So if you showed something like that to me in BC, I would have many more questions. But once he told me, hey, this is Ivory Coast, I was like, yeah, I'll buy this stock. So it took like 4 minutes to get convinced fundamentally. Of course, there were other nitty-gritty details with regards to geology you want to know before you think about actually buying shares. But the rocks were kind of there, right? And pertinent to Devon's comments on the Rick Rule philosophy, big stuff usually yields big surprises.

5:20 And they are usually good. So that was kind of the starting point. But you guys brought the conversation towards the Suriname deal, which was kind of the straw that broke the camel's back with the company back then. So to put a long story short in this regard, the previous CEO tried to do an all equity deal with a private company that was partially owned by him and some other people, trying to introduce a completely needless project into a wallet's portfolio under the guise of the usual stuff, generating shareholder value and all the usual flaskers that you do here. So if that had been done, it would have resulted in nothing else but 55%, 50% shareholder dilution to, at the time, existing Ovale shareholders.

6:15 And it would only end up in the management at that time, and primarily the previous CEO, going from, say, about 9% ownership of the company to roughly doubling.

6:27 And given his banking background, I was trying to get into to understand what he was thinking. And so my idea was, OK, maybe he actually knows what's on the joint venture with Newmont. And his idea was, I'm going just to sell this ASAP. And how do I figure out a way to cheaply acquire more equity in the thing that I'm going to sell. Because realistically, the Surinam project that they put up, and actually,

6:54 they had it first in the presentation, which was weird. So he was basically using it as a vehicle to acquire more. And my idea was that he wanted to sell it as soon as possible.

7:09 So Derim and I were really not happy about it. But at the time, I wasn't even a shareholder. So in December 23, irrespective of that, I bought some shares. 2022. Sorry, yes. Yes, December 22, but early days of 23 as well. And so in January 23, we had the first real core from the big quotes here, but from the porphyry part of the project. And we talked to one of the previous directors, who is a pretty good geologist. And he, in layman's terms, explained what he was seeing and some analogs from his earlier work in the industry. So that was, at least for me, that was the point when I got 100% sold on the project.

7:58 And by the way, the Suriname deal was kind of still hanging in the air, but we had already started agitating to the board and telling them and to the CEO as well that that deal is not something that should be accepted. So the board ended up agreeing. The deal was stopped, but the company stayed in the same shape that it had been for a good year and a half or so. It was actually so bad that some people didn't even receive paychecks. So the guy who was running it couldn't raise any money. And it was looking like the situation was going to end up in Neumod getting the project for free. So we, actually you, Antonio, put us in touch with a pretty famous CEO in the industry, who we're not going to bring up the name, but he helped tremendously.

8:53 We were wondering what we could do about it, because we had really felt strongly about the rocks. And so the gentleman told us, guys, you have 2 options if the management side of the equation is going to be fixed. You have 2 options. You can go the shareholder route, which is usually the ugly way and ends up in voting and doesn't end up that well in most cases. And the other way is go through the board. So as I mentioned, we already had some good relationship with the board. And so I decided that essentially to approach the board and propose a solution, We needed money, which is not something that, you know, we didn't have that amount at the time, which was about 1.5 million Canadian, you know, for the industry, a small amount, but it was enough to clean up the balance sheet, you know, toss off the liabilities and, you know, keep your head above the water while Neumont is funding the project.

9:53 So I wrote up a paper, and I kind of got it to pretty much anybody I knew. And as luck would have it, Stephen rebranded one of his companies at the time into what is, and Stephen is going to explain it better, but what is essentially an investment vehicle in the industry. So I wrote up an email after reaching out to more than a couple other parties who weren't interested. Understandably so. It's too much work. And can get ugly, admittedly. Steven saw my paper. I titled it, A Long Shot idea, completely understanding how maybe off-mark it was. And after reading the paper, and by the way, I suspect that he's one of the few guys who actually read it and looked at the project. So he got interested.

10:49 And from that point, that was when his technical team took over. So actually, the decision to move and assemble the entire deal with the board and get rid of the previous CEO was, of course, contingent upon the technical guys and the guys with big industry experience actually vetting the rocks. So that was the point when Steven came in. Yeah, we'll definitely get to that. It's kind of funny when you mentioned the person you're referring to is someone who's had very good success in the industry already. And the main point was, guys, it's doable, but just don't do it. He said, I remember it vividly, he said, I have a special, I'll try to clean it up a little bit, but he said, I have a special point in my body that each time when I think of these kind of deals, that it hurts.

11:41 And it was in the lower part of the body. Anyways,

11:46 At that point, we're thinking, okay, so what do we do about it? Are we actually going to do something about it? And that's even when you came in and you looked at this and you're like, oh, there's something to be done here. And you were right. But you didn't know that before. So kind of a leap in the dark or not? How did you even, I mean what pushed you over the edge to put that much money?

12:08 Well I guess it was Vukashin ultimately in his paper. That's how it all began and he sent sent us the paper, read it, it was detailed. I suppose he had some credibility with me in the year or so that I knew him before. I believe he is or was a shareholder in one of our companies called QC Copper. And I had seen his commentary online on Twitter. And I thought this guy's a young sharp guy. And so that just got my attention and he wrote this paper which was detailed but also concise and laid out the problems. And when we evaluate an opportunity and we evaluate our group, we're part of our group, we approached this particular challenge.

12:55 And one of our portfolio companies called Orkap. And when we're looking at a project, it all starts with the rocks. And then we have to see,

13:07 and we're very selective. And generally speaking, we don't go outside of Canada, but this was certainly in Africa, which I thought was a bridge too far for us. But as it happens, one of our geologists spent a lot of time in the 90s in the Carajás in Brazil, which is an IOCG district. And he was sort of a part of that. And for those who don't know, those 2 continents used to be 1. And so the geology in West Africa,

13:33 and call it East Brazil, there's a lot of similarities. And so he understood the rocks instantly after not only reading the paper, but speaking with Eric Roth, the former director, as well as Andrew Trubb, who is now the CEO, who we appointed. And so we recognized the opportunity. Nobody thought we were gonna drill, well, we certainly hoped we had the potential to drill 45 grams over 32 meters, but literally I don't think that was in anybody's mind. We just saw a lot of potential

14:06 and then we saw valuation. It's all about getting a risk-adjusted return. It was a 3 million dollar company at the time. You don't want to say it can't go to 0 but the downside is somewhat limited. And when you're talking about district scale opportunities, to get in at $3 million while Newmont is paying your bills, it was attractive. And so then the second aspect becomes, which is almost as hard as the rocks, is the opportunity actionable? So rarely are they actionable because management tends to be entrenched. Antonio just mentioned, do you want to go to the shareholders or do you want to go to the board? I've done both routes in my career, and I assure you going to the board is vastly easier. Shareholder, while I've done hostile situations and proxy battles and actually won them, we beat the odds and usually but usually the lawyers just win in that circumstance. So if you can go to the board and do so in a friendly way,

15:06 then it's actionable. And in this instance, it was actually actionable. And the majority of the board, because that's what you need, you need the majority of the board, were on side for making changes. And the changes that we deemed were absolutely necessary were a change in management, having more representation, and allowing us to make a material investment so that we would get paid for our time and effort. And so ultimately, it all came together relatively quickly. Usually, deals take a long time.

15:37 But I don't remember the time frame. About a month. I was going to say 2 months, maybe. But it was pretty quick. And I found the board, the surviving board, to be very amenable. Because I think the company at the time was in a tough spot. The whole market was in a tough spot. I mean, it was just, you know, the access to capital was sparse.

15:58 The company had announced a financing and it was hung, meaning, you know, they couldn't fill the book. And the price had depreciated relative to the announced pricing. To me, that was an opportunity. We came in there. Orcap wrote, I think, a million dollars And then me and Charles and a couple other guys wrote the other 500,000, cuz I typically co-invest personally alongside Orcap at the same terms, just so I have my money where my mouth is alongside my shareholders. And so, at any rate, we made that bet and the bet was this is a district. We knew about the Newmont deal, but we also knew that Newmont had only about 30% of their land claims, which is huge,

16:42 under the joint venture, and we knew that we could leverage Newmont's capital to drill out and prove that this is an IOCG district and if they're successful in doing it we've got 70% of this land package completely unencumbered. We'd be first movers in this new district which Andrew Chubb,

17:02 the CEO who we appointed, deserves all the credit for doing. I mean, he's the visionary here. It's not like nobody has explored on these parts before. In fact, this is an old Rangould property. But nobody looked at it in the context. Nobody had his geologic model, the IOCG, which just has implications on how you look for these things. So he deserves all the credit. And anyways, long story short, it was a year, more or less, trying to turn around the company. There was a lot of work to do, both on the ground, but also at the corporate level. Excuse me, I've lost my voice. Spot speaking, pitching too much this week. But then of course, we were pleasantly surprised to see, We had, I think we started to really get good looking drill results in January on the BBM zone. We had some really great intersections.

17:54 But the market just shrugged its shoulders and really didn't do anything. And then it wasn't until, what was it, March where a second round of drill results came out on the BBM, which were giving us 2.4 meters, excuse me, 2.4 grams of gold over 72 meters, along with 3 other holes that were not quite as good, but in that category. And I said, geez, that's starting to look like a mine and it's all shallow. And this is a sheer zone-hosted deposit, and we have 8 kilometers of that strike. And I was like, this is going to turn out all right. And then a week later, we hit that hole that I've just never seen. Well, I've seen better holes. I would be lying if I said I didn't, but I've certainly never been associated with a hole that had a nearly 1,500 gram meter intersection, which was 45 grams over 32 meters. Just incredible. Now, I'll be

18:42 the first to tell you that a drill hole doesn't make a mine, but that's a hell of a good start, and especially when you're in a big system like we are that has the BBM up there and Charger and Empire and Scepter and all sorts of stuff that Vukashin probably knows as well as anybody short of Andrew Chubb. So I feel privileged that I did take that risk. I'm grateful to these 3 guys here who were in the story long before I was and probably showed it to everybody who all said no and then finally I was at the bottom of the barrel and was dumb enough to take the risk, but I'm happy I did. So It's interesting to see your guys' threshold. So for Devrim, it was enough that the CEO was living in Malta. He's like, oh, he makes out, I'll buy the stock. Keshin wanted to see the rocks. He liked it. Stephen, you wanted to see the right rocks at the right price.

19:27 But you were iffy on the jurisdiction, you said. And that's one part of the story that when I'm telling people about it, they're like, oh, West Africa? Let's talk about something else. Obviously, Cote d'Ivoire, way different. What did you see in it that you said, it's OK, let's do it? Well, I went to Wikipedia. And I looked at how bad it was, and I did some rudimentary research, and then I just called some people, and look, it's Africa, and it's foreign to me. And we tend not to, if you look at all of our investments, every single one of them, which are extensive, are inside of Canada. Why? Because we understand Canada. I like to say that if there's a problem, it's usually 1 phone call away, sometimes 2 phone calls. We can generally solve or really understand a problem in Canada. When you have a problem in, say, Brazil, where they speak Portuguese, or of course in Cote d'Ivoire, where it's French, where I speak sort of modest French, but certainly don't know the lay of the land. Problems are difficult to solve.

20:21 And so it's critical that you have local people in place. Maybe not local people always, but people who understand the lay of the land. And Andrew Chubb spent 15 years in West Africa.

20:32 So after getting to know him, I had some comfort there, but still, I mean, it is Africa. I think Africa's, there are obviously, Africa usually gets painted with 1 brush and that's not fair. But I also think it is a fair statement to say that any country in Africa is safe until it isn't. And so it's almost a function of time before something happens. I hope it doesn't happen, but it's likely to. But I'll also note that there is no safe jurisdiction. I can tell you that from being an operator in Canada. I've had projects shut down on the whim of somebody. So it's just the risks are just different. And you have to know how to manage those risks and again come in at the right price, which is fundamental to our evaluation, is the risk versus the reward. And we're going for it.

21:23 Our reward expectations start at 10 to 1. Otherwise, we're just taking way too much risk. The question for you was kind of the opposite. Like you saw it and you're like, where is this? It's in West Africa. Oh, I'm going to buy it. Right. You mentioned it as a positive, which I've started agreeing with you on over time, but I suppose most people here wouldn't. So why do you see it as a positive? Well from the commercial point of view, it's a place where mines get built in a reasonable time frame. Of course, that has nothing to do with security. But the more important part for me is whatever happened, and I might have missed some headlines, right? But whatever happened in the last 10 to 15 years in West African countries,

22:06 coups, confrontations, bad headlines, mining never stopped. And the fact that mining never stopped, OK, royalties have gone up. The governments are probably going to want to take more money, especially if gold goes up, right? But the operations on the ground actually never stopped. So if active operations never stopped, Why would you be afraid of exploration? So, logic is pretty simple there. Yeah. What now? Again, I mean, this says activism leading to success and I had to correct it to success in progress because that's what I think it really is. I would assume, obviously all of us bias, we still obviously own shares, so we think there's more upside.

22:55 But what now? Where is the upside now here? Is it the geology? Is it the price? Is it the jurisdiction? Well, define success. Everybody's got a different definition. I suspect you've made 5678 times your money. Is that success?

23:09 Yeah. I would suggest it is. I have a different viewpoint. I'm on the board. I have a more material position, I believe. So success isn't me getting in and out. I could walk away right now and take my big gains, but my philosophy is not necessarily just about making money. Obviously, it's an important factor, but really, we approach every project, success for us is being a part of something that will go into production. I think if we start there, then the money will follow and success accordingly. So I think that it's still early days, But there's an awful lot of promise. The company is now well financed to explore its own 100% claims. Newmont is drilling 25,000 meters on the joint venture. So I really do think that this has the potential to go the distance.

24:01 The distance is putting something into production, potentially. I don't want to be too boisterous, but maybe this has tier 1 potential. I mean, I'd suggest that Newmont wouldn't make an investment

24:12 in any company if they didn't see tier 1 potential. It has to move the needle for a big boy like that. So that's why I say I feel, I mean, what an exciting year, 2 months it's been. So I'm going to continue on for the ride here and continue to push forward with the company and make sure everything's running nice and smoothly and put as much meters into the ground as we possibly can because that's how we mitigate our risk. And everything was running nice and smoothly up until we recently hit a speed bump. And I know I don't want to speak for you, Stephen, but for Vukasin and Devrim, we talk a lot about this, right? So obviously none of us were happy with the speed bump that we're going through, but you guys are still holding. Devrim, you actually went in the stock before Neumann did. Yeah. So for you guys, what now, I mean, as we're going through this speed bump?

25:06 I would have to agree with Steve and I think this district does have genuine tier 1 potential and the valuation where it's at, I don't think that's fully reflected. Despite the speed bump, I have confidence that. You look at the valuation, I mean, it's only, I mean, we've only appreciated what, $25 million US after a drill hole that I haven't seen, certainly in West Africa, in decades.

25:32 So I don't think that even the discovery alone is fully valued. One could argue that it is fully valued because of Wally has 25% of that joint venture so you can multiply it by 4 and say the market cap, you know, reflected in the imputed market cap is 150,200, something like that, but that means they're getting absolutely 0 value for the stuff that I really got interested in, was the exploration projects, which are completely unencumbered. There may be a royalty here or there, but by and large, they're unencumbered completely and 100% owned by a Wally. And now Wally's got about, or soon, we'll have $12 million where it's gonna go out and explore these lands. With the IOCG model, And again, these deposits tend to happen in clusters.

26:19 So it's early days, and we're going to see what happens. Right. What about for you, Stephen, with Orcap, now that you've gone through this experience, if you will, is that something you want to do more of? Does it sound reasonable for you to even chase specifically doing that going forward? That being new opportunities? More activism. Well, activism, I mean, you know, certainly. Rather, I'd be to, an activism or active, basically, I'm just not a passive investor. That's what I want to emphasize. We don't write checks into private placements and say good luck, let us know how it happens. We want to have a say. We look for problems, basically. And when we were approached with the Wally, the problem was management and lack of capital.

27:04 And we changed those 2 things and gave new life to the company. And the result is what you've seen these last few months. So we're always looking for problems we believe we can solve with a little bit of elbow grease and some capital. So yeah, ORCAP is a, call it an OR group by its nature over the past 10 plus years has been a special situation investment group where we Either play the cycle, so we'll buy when uranium is $19. We invested heavily at the time and now uranium's pulled back a little bit, but up 4 or 5 times since those times. Same thing with copper. Right now, what's in the doghouse? Nickel. Everybody hates nickel. That means we like nickel. So expect us to evaluate some nickel with a long term view on when that will turn around because nickel's gonna have uses, but it's probably gonna take some time, you gotta be patient.

27:59 But this is when the groundwork is laid. But aside from the commodity aspects, we look for people who can't raise money. There's a million problems in this industry that we've identified. We have a long list of projects that we're working on actively, but as I said, for them to be actionable. For the counterparties wanting us to come in at our terms. We're not unreasonable, but we need to be paid and we need to have a certain amount of control. That's the hard part. Vikash, what about you? We talked about what now would both of them, personal level, corporate level. I mean, what do you make of Oali right now, given where the program is? The company is now gonna have more than $10 million in I think $12 million after this is done potentially. I think we did a napkin mat.

28:45 If you get the warrants exercised, you would be maybe 18 million Canadian, right? That's like fully diluted. And with more than $10 million in that part of the world, you can do a lot. Drilling is, I believe, $200 per meter at the most, and that's for deeper holes. So there's a lot of runway, but I will start here from the base case, and that is the joint venture and the meat of the story, where I'm going to be slightly more reckless here and say, if all of the targets work out, or even without 1 target of the 5 or 6, that you're probably looking at a tier 1 asset. For some people, a tier 1 jurisdiction, and for some people, an investable, but in a place where I don't think if it should be argued that if it's a place where a mine can get built.

29:39 So that blue sky potential is on the table, and I don't think it's nowhere near reflected in the valuation share price or the market cap. So that would be the base case. But another part of the entire story that had me believe that there is something that could be done on the corporate end was the entire portfolio of, actually, the ground that the company has. So once you look at the claim maps of Ivory Coast in a catastrophe, you realize that Awali basically owns the entire northwestern part of the country. And even if you just played strategy games when you were younger, you just look at it, and it reminds you of that. You basically own the entire northwestern part of the country.

30:27 And most of it was never drilled. I believe that this small part of the joint venture, which was owned by Rangold, was also never drilled. They had some just mapping data, some geochem, and that's it. So that is the upside that I saw that could attract anybody, a serious party who would want to build a serious exploration business. And so one thing with pitching deals and ideas is that you mustn't think about yourself only. And you have to put yourself in the shoes of the other party and try to understand what they want and what do they see that you might not. So this is, for me at least, when I was trying to pitch the idea, I would say a crucial part of the upside, where, hey, you're not just sitting twiddling your thumbs waiting for new ones to find your work and, quote unquote, save you.

31:27 You're actually building a serious exploration business in a place that's unexplored. And I don't think anybody would argue that it's not prospective. So I definitely have that in mind as well. And I don't think the 100% owned upside with more than enough funding is price 10. Right. Good. Well, guys, thank you for taking me on the ride along with you. Stephen, thank you for saving us all with this, whatever was happening before. I hope you don't have that spot in your body at the end of this, like the guys told us. We've been over time for a while now, but everyone is still sitting. So let's do a couple of questions maybe. I'm sure there's going to be questions from the audience. Any? Pete? Well, maybe first congrats to Fukushima.

32:13 I think 99.99% of investors would look at the opportunity and just pass on and go to the next one. If you really took it up to you to try and change which would take effort and efficiency, so that's nice. I think we know a lot of companies that are mismanaged in this sector or think that they are mismanaged. Do you think there's a business model on being more activism and look out for the good assets and then just try, as you did now, wiggle in good money, good team, and try to revamp some of these good projects in the wrong hands? It's like Stephen mentioned, a lot of teams are entrenched, they have their options, they have their salary, it's going nicely, why would they do more? If there is a business model, maybe too big of a question to answer right off the bat. But there certainly are opportunities.

33:07 You can identify a bunch of companies that you could see a deal between the 2 where a lot of the DNA would be cut. The assets would make a lot more sense if they were joined together. You can see project portfolios in junior companies that can't raise enough capital to advance even one of them. And they may be some, it's usually older guys with a pretty good project portfolio that has been sitting doing nothing, but they're not really good stewards of capital, let's put it that way. And so There definitely are a lot of opportunities. But if it is a business model, I'm not entirely sure. And this ties to Steven's point.

33:54 Sure, you can see opportunities on paper in theory. But is it actionable? So maybe you're not factoring the human part of the equation there hard enough. So I don't know. The correct answer is I don't know. There is a business. Maybe a follow-up question then on the human side, with the speed bump, as you call it, pretty often. Did you miss out, do you think, in cleaning up the company? No, because of the set speed bump that you're bringing up, the cleanup wouldn't be possible. So the funny part is that the speed bump in the company exists because the guy who got removed actually introduced the speed bump into the company.

34:39 So no. It was just the nature of the situation. Trevor. I know Steve can't comment on who can never. I'd like to know what he would like to see happen after the speed bump and how to get through it. Oh, as shareholders. I think that's pretty obvious. And you would expect just board replacements, nothing else. Any other questions? Could you elaborate on speed build? Because I don't think everybody knows the story. I don't know if everybody knows the story, but it would be nice to lay out what the problem was. Sure. Do you call it a problem? Well, there's a financing.

35:28 Right. So you have money. Having money is not necessarily a problem. At least we have some kind of a similar lining in the situation, right? But if you, sorry, go on. You were about to say something. Yes, I'm not only talking about the capital raise. I'm talking about the sales and forth. Right, Right. The problem is that you can't claim anything for sure. But if you take all the information that you can access publicly, and if you take it into context, you can form your own opinion of what was actually done and under what circumstances the Canaccord deal was completed. LinkedIn is a helpful tool in doing that. You can look up the board members, you look at their past, you start connecting to stuff, You look at who sold what, when, specifically for the CEO's occasion, that's someone who was not properly compensated for years doing way more work than he should be doing going down to Cote d'Ivoire on his own dime and whatnot. So yeah, He sold some shares.

36:32 So he did a cashless exercise of warrants that were about to expire, and he sold a little bit on top of that. I don't think anybody blames him for that. But again, LinkedIn is a great tool in doing some of that research to figure out exactly what's going on. Yeah, I'm pretty sure you're connected to that. Any more questions, guys? Gales? OK. Good. Well, all of us are actually available for it, too, if you ever want to speak to us. We're on the floor here. Stephen, you have a booth? I do have a booth, but I also have a train to catch. OK. Well, you follow Stephen along the way to the train, if you want. I'm at resource talks on YouTube. Devrim and Vukasin are both on Twitter. If you just look him up, you're going to find him. Thank you so much for listening to us.