Transatlantic Holdings Inc

Transatlantic — Merger or Acquisition (August 2011)

45 slides from Transatlantic's merger presentation, Aug 22, 2011

  1. Slide 1: Setting the Record Straight: Validus' Superior Proposal

    Slide 1: Setting the Record Straight: Validus' Superior Proposal

    August 1, 2011 Setting the Record Straight Validus’ Superior Proposal and the Questionable Judgment of Transatlantic’s Response FILED BY VALIDUS HOLDINGS, LTD. PURSUANT TO RULE 425 UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND DEEMED FILED PURSUANT TO RULE 14a-12 UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 SUB

  2. Slide 2: Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-looking Statements

    Slide 2: Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-looking Statements

    Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-looking Statements This presentation may include forward-looking statements, both with respect to Validus and its industry, that reflect Validus' current views with respect to future events and financial performance. Statements that include the words "expect," "inte

  3. Slide 3: Additional Information and Participants in the Solicitation

    Slide 3: Additional Information and Participants in the Solicitation

    Additional Information and Participants in the Solicitation Additional Information about the Proposed Transaction and Where to Find It: This presentation relates to the Exchange Offer by Validus to exchange each issued and outstanding share of common stock of Transatlantic for 1.5564 Validus voting

  4. Slide 4: Note on Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    Slide 4: Note on Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    Note on Non-GAAP Financial Measures In presenting Validus' results herein, management has included and discussed certain schedules containing diluted book and tangible book value per common share that are not calculated under standards or rules that comprise U.S. GAAP. Such measures are referred to

  5. Slide 5: The Transatlantic Board is Failing its Stockholders

    Slide 5: The Transatlantic Board is Failing its Stockholders

    The Transatlantic Board is Failing its Stockholders Unwilling to Enter into Discussions with Validus

  6. Slide 6: Validus is Fully Committed to a Transaction with Transatlantic

    Slide 6: Validus is Fully Committed to a Transaction with Transatlantic

    Validus is Fully Committed to a Transaction with Transatlantic On July 12, 2011, Validus announced its Superior Proposal for a combination with Transatlantic and sought to engage with Transatlantic’s board Creation of a global reinsurance leader Higher market value than Allied World’s (“AWAC”) infer

  7. Slide 7: The Transatlantic Board is not Aligned with its Stockholders

    Slide 7: The Transatlantic Board is not Aligned with its Stockholders

    The Transatlantic Board is not Aligned with its Stockholders We believe the Transatlantic board: 7 Validus believes that the Transatlantic board's actions have not served Transatlantic stockholders’ best interests Has rushed into the inferior and ill-advised AWAC takeover with lower market value and

  8. Slide 8: Sorting Out the Winners and Losers in an AWAC Takeover

    Slide 8: Sorting Out the Winners and Losers in an AWAC Takeover

    Sorting Out the Winners and Losers in an AWAC Takeover of Transatlantic 8 Transatlantic stockholders will decide the outcome, not the Transatlantic board Who Wins AWAC, although smaller, acquires a genuine franchise at a lower price Six handpicked Transatlantic board members, who would continue on a

  9. Slide 9: What Transatlantic Stockholders Would be Subject to with AWAC

    Slide 9: What Transatlantic Stockholders Would be Subject to with AWAC

    What Transatlantic Stockholders Would be Subject to with AWAC The Questionable Value of AWAC and its Weak Long-Term Prospects

  10. Slide 10: The Questionable Value of AWAC and its Weak Long-Term Prospects

    Slide 10: The Questionable Value of AWAC and its Weak Long-Term Prospects

    The Questionable Value of AWAC and its Weak Long-Term Prospects 10 Struggled to establish itself as an independent entity Been growing into a soft U.S. casualty market to maintain volume Not created a leading U.S. franchise A stagnant international business and is irrelevant in the global market Bal

  11. Slide 11: AWAC's Formative Years

    Slide 11: AWAC's Formative Years

    AWAC’s Formative Years AWAC was formed in November 2001 by an AIG-led investor group, including Goldman Sachs, Chubb and Swiss Re In its initial years through 2005, AWAC’s function was to provide capacity for AIG like a “sidecar” “[AWAC distributed] products in the United States primarily through su

  12. Slide 12: AWAC Has Struggled to Establish Itself as an Independent Entity

    Slide 12: AWAC Has Struggled to Establish Itself as an Independent Entity

    AWAC Has Struggled to Establish Itself as an Independent Entity AWAC has struggled to manage its separation from AIG 2004 consolidated GPW was $1,708 million, and it has taken AWAC six years for consolidated GPW to return to that level The original business produced by AIG was far more profitable an

  13. Slide 13: AWAC Has Been Growing Into a Soft U.S. Casualty Market

    Slide 13: AWAC Has Been Growing Into a Soft U.S. Casualty Market

    AWAC Has Been Growing Into a Soft U.S. Casualty Market to Maintain Volume 13 Premiums in Bermuda declined ... replaced by aggressive growth in U.S. Note: Based on gross written premiums by geographic location Source: Company filings Gross Premiums Written – Bermuda Gross Premiums Written – U.S. $mm

  14. Slide 14: AWAC's U.S. Business is Not a Leading Franchise

    Slide 14: AWAC's U.S. Business is Not a Leading Franchise

    AWAC’s U.S. Business is Not a Leading Franchise In the U.S., AWAC holds itself out to be a leading specialty professional liability and healthcare insurer Despite huge expenditures, AWAC fails to rank in the top tier of any of the lines it writes 14 AWAC U.S. Market Share1 FY 2010 DPW ($mm) Market S

  15. Slide 15: AWAC's Non-U.S./Bermuda Premiums have Stagnated

    Slide 15: AWAC's Non-U.S./Bermuda Premiums have Stagnated

    AWAC’s Non-U.S./Bermuda Premiums1 have Stagnated and Lack Meaningful Market Share 15 15 Gross Premiums Written1 2010 AWAC Market Share2 Singapore 0.24% Hong Kong 0.30% Europe 0.03% 1Based on gross written premiums by geographic location as disclosed by AWAC 2AWAC 2010 gross premium written divided b

  16. Slide 16: AWAC's Expense Problem: Expenses have Ballooned

    Slide 16: AWAC's Expense Problem: Expenses have Ballooned

    AWAC’s Expense Problem: In Chasing U.S. Business, Expenses have Ballooned Sources: SNL, Company filings 16 AWAC Expense Ratio Growth Expense Ratio “We believe that our operating platform is one of the most efficient among our competitors due to our significantly lower expense ratio as compared to mo

  17. Slide 17: AWAC Has Relied on Ever-Increasing Reserve Releases

    Slide 17: AWAC Has Relied on Ever-Increasing Reserve Releases

    AWAC Has Relied on Ever-Increasing Reserve Releases for Earnings ... Sources: SNL, Company filings 17 $mm Reserve Development as % of Net Income Before Taxes 0% 0% 19% 41% N.M. 25% 26% 159% 39% 44% Prior Period Reserve Releases

  18. Slide 18: AWAC's Reserve Releases Have Come From the AIG Years

    Slide 18: AWAC's Reserve Releases Have Come From the AIG Years

    ... Yet AWAC’s Reserve Releases Have Come Largely From the AIG Years ... 1Includes unfavorable reserve development of $25.0 million in U.S. insurance segment for the 2006 loss year Source: Company filings 18 Accident Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 CY Total CY Original Loss Ra

  19. Slide 19: Rate Adequacy is Significantly Lower than the Hard Market AIG Years

    Slide 19: Rate Adequacy is Significantly Lower than the Hard Market AIG Years

    ... And Rate Adequacy is Significantly Lower than the Hard Market AIG Years Source: The Council of Insurance Agents and Brokers (http://www.ciab.com/resources.aspx?id=53) 19 Average Commercial Rate Change by Line

  20. Slide 20: AWAC Revealed its Weaker Financial Prospects in its Projections

    Slide 20: AWAC Revealed its Weaker Financial Prospects in its Projections

    AWAC Revealed its Weaker Financial Prospects in its Projections 1 Diluted tangible book value per share from 12/31/2005 through 12/31/2010. Validus believes dividends are an important source of shareholder value 2 See page 64 of AWAC’s merger proxy statement for AWAC’s internal financial forecasts f

  21. Slide 21: AWAC's Stated 9.0% ROAE Goal

    Slide 21: AWAC's Stated 9.0% ROAE Goal

    21 1 See page 61 of AWAC’s merger proxy statement 2 Q1 2011 AY ex cat underwriting profit of $12mm, annualized and divided by average equity of $3.0bn – underwriting leverage of 44.5% of average equity 3 Q1 2011 investment income of $50mm, annualized and divided by average equity of $3.0bn – investm

  22. Slide 22: AWAC's Investment Leverage Exposes its Equity to Interest Rates

    Slide 22: AWAC's Investment Leverage Exposes its Equity to Interest Rates

    ...And AWAC’s Investment Leverage Exposes its Equity to a Spike in Interest Rates 1 The changes in market values as a result of changes in interest rates is determined by calculating hypothetical March 31, 2011 ending prices based on yields adjusted to reflect the hypothetical changes in interest ra

  23. Slide 23: AWAC Has an Acquisition Record of Destroying Book Value

    Slide 23: AWAC Has an Acquisition Record of Destroying Book Value

    AWAC Has an Acquisition Record of Destroying Book Value Sources: SNL, Company filings 23 Despite its acquisition record of destroying book value, AWAC still maintains that book – not market – value is what should matter to investors P / TVBPS (12.0%) in TBVPS Book Value Per Share Darwin Professional

  24. Slide 24: AWAC's Capital Management has Not been Open to All Shareholders

    Slide 24: AWAC's Capital Management has Not been Open to All Shareholders

    AWAC’s Capital Management has Not been Open to All Shareholders 24 1 Aggregate capital returns from IPO through 1Q 2011, including stock and warrant repurchases and dividends Source: SNL, company filings AWAC has concentrated its capital management efforts on privately-negotiated repurchases from it

  25. Slide 25: Setting the Record Straight on AWAC and Transatlantic's Misleading Statements

    Slide 25: Setting the Record Straight on AWAC and Transatlantic's Misleading Statements

    Setting the Record Straight on AWAC and Transatlantic’s Misleading Statements

  26. Slide 26: The Fallacy of the Tax Inefficiency Argument

    Slide 26: The Fallacy of the Tax Inefficiency Argument

    The Fallacy of AWAC and Transatlantic’s Tax Inefficiency Argument AWAC and Transatlantic claim that Validus’ Superior Proposal is tax inefficient – yet it is hard to see the logic in their argument Is the supposed “inefficiency” caused by provision of $8.00 cash to Transatlantic stockholders? Is the

  27. Slide 27: Why Validus is Willing to Increase its Leverage

    Slide 27: Why Validus is Willing to Increase its Leverage

    AWAC and Transatlantic Mischaracterize the Reason Validus is Willing to Increase its Leverage On a standalone basis, Validus has lower leverage than both Transatlantic and AWAC1,2 The incremental leverage in Validus’ Superior Proposal only arises through Transatlantic stockholders receiving $8.00 pe

  28. Slide 28: AWAC's and Transatlantic's Ownership Argument is Self-Serving

    Slide 28: AWAC's and Transatlantic's Ownership Argument is Self-Serving

    AWAC’s and Transatlantic’s Ownership Argument is Self-Serving and Hypocritical The Transatlantic board denigrates Validus’ Superior Proposal because Transatlantic stockholders would have a 48% ownership interest on a fully diluted basis Yet Transatlantic entered into an agreement with AWAC that requ

  29. Slide 29: AWAC and Transatlantic are Misstating Ratings Agency Reactions

    Slide 29: AWAC and Transatlantic are Misstating Ratings Agency Reactions

    AWAC and Transatlantic are Misstating Ratings Agency Reactions 29 “There's a lot still pending,” said John Andre, Group VP in the property/casualty rating area of the rating agency A.M. Best Co. Inc. in Oldwick, N.J. “We see both Validus and AWAC as strong partners for Transatlantic, however it work

  30. Slide 30: AWAC is Attempting to Compete with Most of Transatlantic's Customers

    Slide 30: AWAC is Attempting to Compete with Most of Transatlantic's Customers

    AWAC is Attempting to Compete with Most of Transatlantic’s Customers Sources: SNL 30 Transatlantic’s 2010 Reinsurance Premiums Assumed – Top 20 Relationships Validus believes AWAC’s strategic rationale for the takeover of Transatlantic is flawed and could lead to diminishment of Transatlantic’s fran

  31. Slide 31: Casualty-on-Casualty: A Deeply Flawed Strategic Rationale

    Slide 31: Casualty-on-Casualty: A Deeply Flawed Strategic Rationale

    Casualty-on-Casualty – A Deeply Flawed Strategic Rationale Illogical Business Case A casualty-on-casualty combination does not bring diversification benefits2; rather it magnifies the risks inherent in the casualty pricing cycle and potential for claims inflation AWAC attempts to compete with most o

  32. Slide 32: Lower Risk Appetite Doesn't Mean Lower Losses

    Slide 32: Lower Risk Appetite Doesn't Mean Lower Losses

    Despite AWAC’s Empty Assertions, Lower Risk Appetite Doesn’t Mean Lower Losses 32 Validus’ leadership in the global cat market is based on superior analytics and risk management What AWAC Claims... 1:250 PML as % of Equity 1 Q1 2011 Japan cat net loss ($365mm) adjusted for 35% tax rate divided by Tr

  33. Slide 33: Validus' Superior Proposal is No More Conditional than AWAC's

    Slide 33: Validus' Superior Proposal is No More Conditional than AWAC's

    Validus’ Superior Proposal is Effectively No More Conditional than AWAC’s Takeover 33 1 Not intended to be exhaustive list of conditions 2 Pre-closing dividend relates to merger 3 Although not an express condition in the merger agreement, it is a covenant, and AWAC has not disclosed how it would clo

  34. Slide 34: What AWAC and Transatlantic Have Not Told Investors

    Slide 34: What AWAC and Transatlantic Have Not Told Investors

    What AWAC and Transatlantic Have Not Told Investors Transatlantic’s year-end carried net loss reserves proved to be inadequate when re-estimated at December 31, 2010 for each year from 2000 through 2008, according to the loss development triangle in the most recent Transatlantic Form 10-K Regardless

  35. Slide 35: What Investors Should Ask AWAC and Transatlantic

    Slide 35: What Investors Should Ask AWAC and Transatlantic

    What Investors Should Ask AWAC and Transatlantic AWAC and Transatlantic seem fixated on book value. When was the last time AWAC shareholders have been able to sell their shares at or above book value? Given that a critical component of AWAC’s growth in book value per share has come from reserve rele

  36. Slide 36: Validus' Superior Proposal to Create a Global Reinsurance Leader

    Slide 36: Validus' Superior Proposal to Create a Global Reinsurance Leader

    Validus' Superior Proposal to Create a Global Reinsurance Leader Superior Current Value and Future Upside Potential

  37. Slide 37: Superior Market Value for Transatlantic Stockholders

    Slide 37: Superior Market Value for Transatlantic Stockholders

    Validus Validus AWAC Consensual Exchange Takeover Proposal Offer Offer Share Price (7/29/11) $26.59 $26.59 $54.45 x Exchange Ratio 1.5564 1.5564 0.8800 Equity Per Transatlantic Share $41.38 $41.38 $47.92 + Pre-Closing Transatlantic Cash Dividend $8.00 - - + Cash - $8.00 - Total Consideration per Tra

  38. Slide 38: Validus has Outperformed AWAC on a Total Returns Basis

    Slide 38: Validus has Outperformed AWAC on a Total Returns Basis

    Validus has Outperformed AWAC on a Total Returns Basis since Validus IPO 38 1 Total shareholder return based on closing prices from 7/25/2007 to 6/10/2011 (last trading day prior to AWH / TRH announcement) and assumes dividends are reinvested Source: SNL +55% +24% % Total Shareholder Return Since Va

  39. Slide 39: Validus Trades at a Book Value Premium to AWAC

    Slide 39: Validus Trades at a Book Value Premium to AWAC

    Validus Has an Established Record of Trading at a Book Value Premium to AWAC 1 Quarterly Price / Diluted Book Value Per Share shown for 1/1/2009 through 7/12/2011 – point value based on share price on day immediately following release of relevant quarter’s earnings Source: Company filings and SNL 39

  40. Slide 40: Post-Combination Business Plan

    Slide 40: Post-Combination Business Plan

    Post-Combination Business Plan Combined company will be a global, committed leader in reinsurance1 Maximize underwriting profitability to achieve superior growth Short-tail reinsurance lines are the core of Validus' current strategy Best priced segments of the reinsurance market Long-tail lines offe

  41. Slide 41: Validus Would be in the Top Six Reinsurance Companies Worldwide

    Slide 41: Validus Would be in the Top Six Reinsurance Companies Worldwide

    Post-Transaction, Validus would be in the Top Six Reinsurance Companies Worldwide, as well as a Market Leader in the U.S. and Bermuda Pro Forma Reinsurance Market Position – By 2009 Net Premiums U.S. Rankings Company 2009 Net Reinsurance Premiums Written ($mm) Berkshire Hathaway Life National Indemn

  42. Slide 42: Validus' Leadership in Property Cat will be Further Enhanced

    Slide 42: Validus' Leadership in Property Cat will be Further Enhanced

    Validus' Leadership in Property Cat will be Further Enhanced 42 3 $mm 2 2010 Property Catastrophe Premium1 4 1 Based on Property Catastrophe GPW for 2010, except TRH and ACGL which are NPW 2 Pro forma for Validus ($572mm), Transatlantic ($431mm) and AlphaCat Re 2011 ($43mm) 3 Includes RNR ($630mm),

  43. Slide 43: What You Get With Validus

    Slide 43: What You Get With Validus

    What You Get With Validus Higher market value for your Transatlantic stock today, superior long term prospects Board and management devoted to maximizing shareholder value, not premium volume Leading franchise positions in Bermuda and at Lloyd’s Deeply experienced reinsurance management team Proven

  44. Slide 44: Appendix: Reconciliation of Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    Slide 44: Appendix: Reconciliation of Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    Appendix Reconciliation of Non-GAAP Financial Measures

  45. Slide 45: Book Value & Tangible Book Per Share Reconciliation

    Slide 45: Book Value & Tangible Book Per Share Reconciliation

    Book Value & Tangible Book Per Share Reconciliation 45 Validus Holdings, Ltd. Non-GAAP Financial Measure Reconciliation Book Value & Tangible Book Value Per Share (Expressed in thousands of US Dollars, except share and per share information) At March 31, 2011 Equity amount Shares Exercise Price (a)

Source: SEC EDGAR · 425 filed Aug 22, 2011

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