AOL Inc

AOL — Proxy Contest (May 2012)

96 slides from AOL's proxy contest presentation, May 23, 2012

  1. Slide 1: Investor Presentation AOL, Inc.

    Investor Presentation AOL, Inc. May 23, 2012

  2. Slide 2: Overview of Starboard Value LP

    Overview of Starboard Value LP Starboard Value LP is a deep value oriented investment firm that specializes in investing in underperforming companies and analyzing alternative strategies to unlock value for the benefit of all shareholders. – Our approach to investment research begins with a deep fun

  3. Slide 3: Why we are involved with AOL

    Why we are involved with AOL We first invested in AOL because our research indicated that an opportunity existed to create significant value for AOL shareholders based on actions within the control of management and the Board of Directors. Our involvement in AOL over the past 6 months has been const

  4. Slide 4: Why we are involved with AOL

    Why we are involved with AOL Shareholders require and deserve representation on the AOL Board. – We currently have approximately $129 million of capital invested in AOL, and own 5.3% of the Company. We are highly incentivized to increase value for all shareholders and have a much greater economic mo

  5. Slide 5: Real change is required at AOL

    Real change is required at AOL The current Board has overseen an extended period of underperformance and real change is necessary now Poor historical stock price and operating performance. Aggressive investments in its money-losing Display business with little, if any, visibility for an acceptable r

  6. Slide 6: Real Change Is Necessary Now

    Real Change Is Necessary Now 6

  7. Slide 7: Dramatic stock price underperformance

    Dramatic stock price underperformance Prior to Starboard’s first public letter to the Company on December 21, 2011, AOL’s stock price had materially underperformed both the broader equity markets and its Peer Groups over almost any measurement period since its spin-off from Time Warner Inc. Summary

  8. Slide 8: Weak historical financial performance

    Weak historical financial performance From 2009 to 2011, AOL’s revenue declined nearly twice as fast as total operating expenses, causing EBITDA and free cash flow to decline by a staggering $700 million and $575 million, respectively. Revenue ($ in millions) Total Operating Expenses (1) ($ in milli

  9. Slide 9: Weak financial performance relative to peer groups

    Weak financial performance relative to peer groups A sharp increase in operating expenses as a percentage of sales have resulted in AOL’s EBITDA margins declining from 34% in 2009 to 16% in 2011 and falling substantially below peer levels. Total Operating Expenses as % of Revenue (1) AOL Independent

  10. Slide 10: AOL's historical challenge has been a decline in Access and Search

    AOL’s historical challenge has been a decline in Access and Search Although AOL’s core Access and Search businesses generate significant and valuable cash flow, these businesses are in decline. Access and Search Revenue and Estimated EBITDA (1) ($ in millions) $2,500 $1,999 $2,000 $1,556 $1,452 $1,5

  11. Slide 11: AOL's solution has been to try to grow its Display business

    AOL’s solution has been to try to grow its Display business From 2009 to 2011, AOL has spent approximately $900 million on acquisitions and investments to grow its Display advertising business in an attempt to offset the decline in Access and Search. Select Acquisitions and Investments (1,2) ($ in m

  12. Slide 12: Display business is not growing and continues to lose money

    However, the reality has been that the Display business is not growing and continues to lose a significant amount of money While AOL’s goal has been to offset the decline in Access and Search by investing in Display, the reality has been far different. EBITDA Goal (1) EBITDA Reality (1) Display EBIT

  13. Slide 13: Display strategy has resulted in approximately $1.7 billion in value destruction

    We believe AOL’s Display strategy has resulted in approximately $1.7 billion in value destruction To pursue its Display strategy, AOL spent $903 million on acquisitions and investments from 2009 through 2011. Yet, enterprise value declined by 59% or $1.7 billion over this period. Historical Acquisit

  14. Slide 14: Display business is losing over $500 million per year

    Currently, we believe the Display business is losing over $500 million per year AOL has used the valuable cash flows generated by its declining Access and Search businesses to fund what we believe are massive losses of more than $500 million per year in its Display advertising business in pursuit of

  15. Slide 15: Losses in Display do not appear to be getting better

    And the losses in Display do not appear to be getting better Despite significant acquisitions and investments, we believe the losses in the Display business have increased from $428 million in 2009 to $545 million in 2011. Display Estimated EBITDA (1) ($ in millions) $0 ($100) ($200) ($300) ($400) (

  16. Slide 16: AOL appears solely focused on its status quo strategy

    Yet, AOL appears solely focused on its status quo strategy Despite the estimated massive losses in Display, AOL appears solely focused on continuing to pursue its high-cost, value-destroying status quo strategy. AOL’s Status Quo Plan Use the valuable cash flows generated by the core Access and Searc

  17. Slide 17: We do not believe Display is being operated efficiently

    We do not believe Display is being operated efficiently 17

  18. Slide 18: AOL has built one of the largest online content destinations

    AOL has built one of the largest online content destinations Through acquisitions and investments, AOL has built one of the largest online content destinations, generating over 100 million unique visitors and 127 billion page views. Number of Unique Visitors, December 2011 Number of Page Views, 2011

  19. Slide 19: We do not believe AOL is operating these assets efficiently

    However, we do not believe AOL is operating these assets efficiently Despite the well-recognized brands and attractive scale of AOL’s Display assets, we estimate that these businesses are collectively losing more than $500 million per year.(1) Further, excluding Patch and the acquisition of The Huff

  20. Slide 20: Other similarly-sized premium content sites are highly profitable

    Other similarly-sized premium content sites are highly profitable As just one example, in 2011, WebMD Health was highly profitable on a similar-sized revenue base. WebMD provides health information services to consumers, physicians, and other healthcare professionals in the US. Given that the majori

  21. Slide 21: Smaller sized premium content sites are also highly profitable

    Smaller sized premium content sites are also highly profitable CNET Networks serves as evidence that a display business can be highly profitable on a smaller revenue base than AOL has today. CNET, prior to its acquisition by CBS Corporation in 2008, provided online information, product reviews, and

  22. Slide 22: Display business has scale and can be run profitably

    AOL’s Display business has scale and we believe can be run profitably Instead, management is choosing to operate with excessive costs and only hoping that significant revenue growth will offset losses. While the revenue in AOL’s Display business is similar to that of the revenue of WebMD and CNET pr

  23. Slide 23: Display business is not profitable because of high cost strategy

    AOL’s Display business is not profitable because it is pursuing a high cost strategy We believe the poor performance of AOL’s Display business is the direct result of its lack of focus and the Company’s expensive operating cost structure. AOL owns over 50 different content brands.(1) We question how

  24. Slide 24: Changes at The Huffington Post excessive cost increases

    Changes at The Huffington Post are a prime example of AOL’s excessive cost increases By implementing its high operating cost strategy at The Huffington Post, we believe AOL has eroded the business model that made The Huffington Post successful pre-acquisition: low-cost content generation. Pre-Acquis

  25. Slide 25: Expenses outpacing revenue growth

    AOL’s strategy has led to expenses outpacing revenue growth From 2010 to 2011, AOL spent approximately $2.59 for every $1.00 of incremental Display revenue.(1,2,3) Change in AOL Display Revenue and Costs – 2010 to 2011 ($ in millions) In 2011, AOL added $61 million of $75 incremental Display revenue

  26. Slide 26: We do not believe Patch is a viable business

    We do not believe Patch is a viable business 26

  27. Slide 27: What is Patch?

    What is Patch? Patch is a collection of 863 different news and information websites for small towns across the US.(1) 27 (1) Number of Patches reported by the Company as of year end 2011.

  28. Slide 28: Patch is the largest single contributor to losses in Display

    We believe Patch is the largest single contributor to losses in Display AOL acquired Patch, a company that AOL’s Chairman and CEO Tim Armstrong co-founded, for $7.0 million in cash from an investment company that Mr. Armstrong also founded. Since then, Patch lost approximately $75 million in 2010 an

  29. Slide 29: Patch business model is flawed and will not succeed

    We believe the Patch business model is flawed and will not succeed Patch is a high cost business model that is not scalable. Local advertisers want direct response ads that have an attractive measurable ROI, which we believe Patch ads do not provide.(1) National advertisers do not appear to value hy

  30. Slide 30: Patch is not a scalable business model

    We do not believe Patch is a scalable business model Each individual Patch requires substantial fixed costs to operate. Patch’s fixed operating costs include:(1) A dedicated local editor in each town writing 100 or more articles per month. Several freelance journalists in each town writing an additi

  31. Slide 31: AOL has underestimated the costs of operating Patch

    We believe AOL has consistently underestimated the costs of operating Patch Management Estimates of Annual Patch Costs Q1 2010 Call: “And I think we are still probably disclosing $50 million ($ in millions) [of investment in Patch] and we’ll continue on that path until we see a need to change that n

  32. Slide 32: Monetization and profitability have remained elusive

    And monetization and profitability have remained elusive Patch Financials (1) ($ in millions) Q2 2010 Call: “…on the monetization of Patch… I would just say when we started the product in general, we started it without $40 monetization in mind….” – CEO Tim Armstrong, 8/4/10 $13 (emphasis added) $20

  33. Slide 33: Patch has failed to sell ad slots to local advertisers

    Patch has failed to sell a meaningful portion of its ad slots to local advertisers Despite Patch’s target of selling 80% of its ad slots to local advertisers, less than 20% of ad placements on Patch are filled by local businesses.(1) Local Ads as a % of Total Patch Ad Placements (1) We believe Patch

  34. Slide 34: Majority of local advertisers do not renew

    The majority of local advertisers do not renew their contracts Based on interviews with former Patch employees, approximately 70% of local advertisers who advertise on Patch do not renew when their 6-12 month contracts expire.(1) Patch Local Advertiser Renewal Rate (1) Based on Patch’s lack of an at

  35. Slide 35: Local businesses can bypass Patch's high rate cards

    Local businesses can bypass Patch’s high rate cards Even if local businesses wanted to advertise on Patch, they could bypass Patch’s high rate card pricing by using Google AdWords. Google AdWords allows advertisers to specify on which sites they want their advertisements to appear, including placing

  36. Slide 36: AOL fills Patch ad slots with remnant inventory

    It appears AOL fills Patch ad slots with remnant AOL ad inventory We believe the majority of Patch’s ad slots are being filled with remnant AOL ad inventory at very low CPMs. This inventory could be placed on any AOL property, yet we believe it is pushed to Patch in order to justify continued invest

  37. Slide 37: National advertisers do not value Patch

    It appears national advertisers do not value Patch Given the substantial percentage of ad slots on Patch that we believe are sold at steep discounts to rate card pricing, we would also question whether national advertisers value Patch. As part of the assignment, L.E.K. Consulting contacted national

  38. Slide 38: Additional surveys confirm national advertisers do not value Patch

    We believe additional surveys confirm that national advertisers do not value Patch In order to provide shareholders with a more comprehensive analysis of the value of Patch to national advertisers, we engaged L.E.K. to conduct additional surveys of national advertisers. National Advertiser Survey Re

  39. Slide 39: Is Patch a viable business model?

    So, is Patch a viable business model? Below are Patch’s rate card prices to advertise on its homepage and its internal pages.(1) Homepage Options Internal Page Options Homepage A Homepage B Internal Page A Internal Page B $560 $560 $2,400 $2,400 $300 $300 $1,680 $1,680 $710 $75 $2,400 $75 $460 $2,00

  40. Slide 40: We do not believe Patch is a viable business model

    We do not believe Patch is a viable business model Even at AOL’s target revenue model of selling 80% of ad slots to local advertisers near rate card pricing, we estimate that Patch would still lose approximately $20 million to $60 million per year.(1) Patch is currently selling less than 20% of its

  41. Slide 41: Revenue guidance of $40-50 million in Patch is not satisfactory

    AOL’s recently issued revenue guidance of $40-50 million per year in Patch is not satisfactory At a revenue run rate of $40-50 million per year, we estimate that Patch would still lose approximately $79 million to $133 million per year. Patch P&L at $40-50 Million of Revenue(1) ($ in millions) Low H

  42. Slide 42: Question how much of Patch's revenue is from demand for Patch

    We also question how much of Patch’s revenue is actually derived from demand for Patch Introducing VON VONNI: VON VONNI is an online retailer that sells women’s clothing. According to VON VONNI’s customer service department, it has no physical retail stores. While we have not spoken directly to some

  43. Slide 43: AOL pushing ads to Patch to inflate revenue

    AOL appears to be pushing ads to Patch that could have been used on other AOL properties to inflate Patch revenue and justify continued investment AOL.com Shopping Celedonia Wisconsin Patch Taylors South Carolina Patch Bethwood Connecticut Patch Ankeny Iowa Patch Northfield Minnesota Patch 43 Source

  44. Slide 44: A strategy of "hope" for Patch is not acceptable

    A strategy of “hope” for Patch is not acceptable On the Q1 2012 earnings call, Tim Armstrong stated that he “hopes” AOL can achieve over $40 million of revenue at Patch in 2012.(1) – Even at that revenue level, we estimate Patch will still lose approximately $79 million to $133 million per year.(1)

  45. Slide 45: Losses in the Display business must be analyzed independently

    We believe losses in the Display business must be analyzed independently 45

  46. Slide 46: Losses in each Display business must be independently analyzed

    We believe losses in each of the Display businesses are unacceptable and, in our view, must be independently analyzed by the Board immediately As we have highlighted, we believe AOL is currently losing over $500 million in its Display business, including losses of approximately $150 million in Patch

  47. Slide 47: Owned content properties do not drive search on AOL.com

    AOL’s owned content properties do not drive search on AOL.com AOL generates the vast majority of its search revenue from AOL.com. However, based on our analysis of industry data on visits to AOL.com, less than 2% of visits are originated from AOL’s other owned content properties.(1) Instead, the maj

  48. Slide 48: Patch does not drive search on AOL.com

    Patch certainly does not drive search on AOL.com As a local community website, Patch is used as a destination to learn about specific community news and events. AOL.com, on the other hand, provides mostly national news as well as information within targeted verticals, such as Entertainment, Finance,

  49. Slide 49: Does owning content actually improve Search?

    We seriously question whether owning content actually improves Search We believe engagement may drive search, yet owning and producing content in-house does not necessarily drive engagement. Length of Stay on Website (1) Prior to the acquisition of The Huffington Post by AOL (Minutes) in March 2011,

  50. Slide 50: Why would users reading outsourced sports content search less?

    Why would AOL users reading outsourced, un-owned sports content on AOL.com be less interested in search on AOL’s toolbar? Why would AOL users reading sports on AOL.com be any less interested in searching on AOL.com’s toolbar simply because AOL does not own its sports content? We believe AOL has alre

  51. Slide 51: What actually drives search on AOL.com?

    What actually drives search on AOL.com? “If you look at where search comes from on the AOL properties, majority of it comes from the homepage client and from AOL.com.” – CEO Tim Armstrong, 2Q10 conference call, 8/4/10 “… AOL’s search business is intimately linked to the Access business. Content isn’

  52. Slide 52: Decision to invest in Display should be viewed independently

    We believe any decision to invest in Display should be viewed independently We believe AOL’s decision to continue to invest in each of its Display businesses should be viewed by the Board entirely independent from the rest of AOL’s businesses, particularly given its massive losses.(1,2) CY 2011 Oper

  53. Slide 53: Concerns with AOL's executive compensation practices

    We have serious concerns with AOL’s executive compensation practices 53

  54. Slide 54: Independent compensation consulting firm analysis of peer group

    Starboard hired a leading independent compensation consulting firm to analyze AOL’s Peer Group and compensation practices Key findings include: “AOL’s existing peer group, which serves as the foundation for benchmarking executive compensation, consists of companies that are too large.”(1) – Over 80%

  55. Slide 55: Proxy advisory firms concerns with peer group and compensation

    Leading independent proxy advisory firms have also expressed serious concerns with AOL’s Peer Group and compensation practices AOL has consistently compared itself to some of the world’s largest companies, many of which seem to not only be outside of the range recommended by these leading independen

  56. Slide 56: ISS concerns about pay for performance practices

    ISS has raised serious concerns about AOL’s pay for performance practices In 2010, ISS cited concerns with the Compensation Committee’s decision to approve bonus payments despite missing performance targets. ISS recommended shareholders vote against the members of the compensation committee of the B

  57. Slide 57: Glass Lewis rated compensation structure as Poor

    Glass Lewis rated AOL’s compensation program structure as “Poor” In 2011, the structure of AOL’s compensation program was rated “Poor” by Glass Lewis. Specifically, Glass Lewis noted several concerns, including: (1) no performance-based long-term incentive awards; (2) an excessively large peer group

  58. Slide 58: Determining the right peer group is critical

    We believe determining the right peer group is critical because it represents the foundation upon which compensation planning and relative performance is measured ISS Best Practices on Peer Group: Commentary (1) Guidelines (1) “Comparison groups are intended…to help evaluate the Revenues between 0.4

  59. Slide 59: 2010 Peer Group violated ISS and Glass Lewis guidelines

    AOL’s 2010 Peer Group selection violated ISS and Glass Lewis guidelines Revenue $8,000 $75,000 AOL’s 2010 Peer Group for compensation purposes was made up of companies with market caps and revenue that were on average 18.3x and 7.0x greater than AOL’s, respectively.(1) $6,000 Further, only 1 of the

  60. Slide 60: 95% of 2010 Peer Group outside guidelines

    95% of the companies AOL selected for its 2010 Peer Group do not fall within the peer group guidelines of both ISS and Glass Lewis Within ISS Within Glass Lewis AOL 2010 Multiple of AOL Multiple of AOL Recommended Recommended Peer Group (1) Market Cap (2) Revenue Guideline?(3) Guideline?(3) Apple 94

  61. Slide 61: 2010 Peer Group included some of the world's largest companies

    AOL’s 2010 Peer Group included some of the world’s largest companies AOL’s compensation peer group even included some of the largest companies in the world, such as Apple, Microsoft, and Google, whose market caps ranged from 66 to 94 times larger than AOL’s. Select Companies from AOL’s 2010 Peer Gro

  62. Slide 62: Glass Lewis: 80% of 2010 Peer Group outside market cap range

    In 2011, Glass Lewis commented that 80% of AOL’s 2010 Peer Group was outside of its recommended market cap range “…we believe a peer group should range from 0.5 to 2 times the market capitalization of the Company. In this case, Glass Lewis has identified 16 peers outside this range, which represents

  63. Slide 63: 2011 Peer Group selection still violates best practices

    Despite concerns expressed by ISS and Glass Lewis on compensation, AOL’s 2011 Peer Group selection still violates best practices Revenue $8,000 $75,000 AOL changed its Peer Group in 2011, yet it was comprised of companies with average market caps and revenue that were 19.1x and 5.6x greater than AOL

  64. Slide 64: 89% of 2011 Peer Group outside guidelines

    89% of the companies AOL selected for its 2011 Peer Group do not fall within the peer group guidelines of both ISS and Glass Lewis Within ISS Within Glass Lewis AOL 2011 Multiple of AOL Multiple of AOL Recommended Recommended Peer Group (1) Market Cap (2) Revenue Guideline?(1) Guideline?(3) Microsof

  65. Slide 65: 2011 Peer Group still includes some of the world's largest companies

    AOL’s 2011 Peer Group still includes some of the world’s largest companies AOL’s 2011 Peer Group still includes Microsoft and Google, whose market caps were 98 times and 119 times larger than AOL’s in 2011. Select Companies from AOL’s 2011 Peer Group (1,2,3) Market Cap Revenue EBITDA Notes Microsoft

  66. Slide 66: Independent compensation firm constructed a more appropriate peer group

    The independent compensation consulting firm we engaged constructed a far more appropriate peer group for AOL The independent compensation consulting firm constructed an “Independent Peer Group” for AOL that they believe more accurately reflects the reality of AOL’s business in terms of scope and sc

  67. Slide 67: Independent Peer Group similar in scope and scale

    The Independent Peer Group is comprised of companies that are similar in terms of scope and scale of the business Revenue The Independent Peer Group is $8,000 comprised of companies with mean and median market caps of 2.0x and 1.4x of AOL’s market cap, respectively, and $7,000 mean and median revenu

  68. Slide 68: Independent Peer Group aligned with ISS and Glass Lewis best practices

    Unlike AOL’s Peer Group, the Independent Peer Group for AOL is closely aligned with ISS and Glass Lewis best practices The Independent Peer Group’s median market cap and revenue are well within both ISS and Glass Lewis guidelines.(1) AOL Peer Groups relative to ISS and Glass Lewis Guidelines (1,2,3,

  69. Slide 69: AOL's short term pay misaligned with performance

    Compared to the Independent Peer Group, it appears AOL’s short term pay is significantly misaligned with performance A significant portion of AOL’s bonus compensation is based on EBITDA and free cash flow.(1) However, AOL’s EBITDA and free cash flow growth are substantially worse than peer medians w

  70. Slide 70: Total cash compensation as a percentage of EBITDA higher than peers

    AOL’s total cash compensation as a percentage of EBITDA is significantly higher than the Independent Peer Group AOL’s CEO and CFO total cash compensation as a percentage of EBITDA of 1.7% is significantly higher than the Independent Peer Group median of 1.0%.(1) CEO and CFO Total Cash Compensation a

  71. Slide 71: CEO and CFO realized value from stock and options higher than peers

    CEO and CFO realized value from stock and options have been higher than the Independent Peer Group despite the worst stock price performance AOL’s CEO and CFO have realized substantially more value from restricted stock and options than the Independent Peer Group despite AOL having the worst stock p

  72. Slide 72: Compensation peer group and pay practices are unacceptable

    We believe AOL’s compensation peer group and pay for performance practices are unacceptable We believe that determining the right peer group at any company is critical because it represents the foundation upon which compensation planning and relative performance is measured. Despite concern from ISS

  73. Slide 73: New pay package for Tim Armstrong

    AOL recently approved what appears to be another lucrative pay package for Tim Armstrong On March 28, 2012, approximately one week prior to the announcement of the patent transaction with Microsoft, the Compensation Committee approved a new Employment Agreement with Tim Armstrong and the grant of ce

  74. Slide 74: Our nominees have a better plan to enhance shareholder value

    Our nominees have a better plan to enhance shareholder value 74

  75. Slide 75: Substantially improve the profitability of Display

    Substantially improve the profitability of Display Our nominees would exercise stringent financial discipline in the Display business by taking the following actions: Fully allocate the costs for each content property and vertical to determine true profitability. – Based on conversations with manage

  76. Slide 76: Take action on Patch immediately

    Take action on Patch immediately We believe Patch is currently losing approximately $150 million per year.(1) We believe Patch cannot be profitable, even in the best case scenario, because its business model is flawed.(2) – We believe Patch is a high cost business model that is not scalable. – We be

  77. Slide 77: Evaluate other opportunities for value creation

    Evaluate other opportunities for value creation Examples include, but are not limited to: Intellectual Property – Following the sale of over 800 of its patents to Microsoft, AOL continues to own a significant portfolio of over 300 patents and patent applications spanning core and strategic technolog

  78. Slide 78: Ask the difficult questions to improve profitability and value

    Ask the difficult questions to focus the Company on dramatically improving profitability and value for all shareholders If elected, our nominees would ask the right questions regarding the key issues facing AOL. Some of these questions would include: 1. What is our core competency? – Where do we hav

  79. Slide 79: Starboard's involvement has been positive for shareholders

    Starboard’s involvement has been positive for shareholders Since Starboard wrote its first public letter to the Company on December 21, 2011, AOL’s stock price has significantly outperformed both the market and its peers. Summary Returns, 12/20/11 to 5/18/12 (1) AOL Stock Price Chart from 12/20/11 t

  80. Slide 80: Actions taken by AOL have only been reactionary

    We believe actions taken by AOL have only been reactionary to Starboard’s involvement While AOL’s patent sale for $1.056 billion in cash was a significant driver of the positive stock price performance since our involvement, we believe it was merely a direct reaction to Starboard’s involvement. Star

  81. Slide 81: Other recent statements by AOL are also reactionary

    Other recent statements by AOL are also highly reactionary Recent statements by AOL are nothing more than a direct reaction to concerns highlighted by Starboard. Starboard Suggestions AOL Prior Statements AOL Latest Statements Starboard Concerns Commit to specific operating targets • “AOL cannot com

  82. Slide 82: AOL's actions have not addressed losses in Display

    We believe AOL’s actions and statements have done nothing to address the losses in the Display business CY 2011 Operating Performance (1,2) ($ in millions) Adjusted Adj. EBITDA Revenue EBITDA Margin Access $803 $643 80% Search 357 261 73% Advertising Network 384 21 6% Display - Free Premium Content

  83. Slide 83: Our Nominees are Better

    Our Nominees are Better STARBOARDWQALUE, 83

  84. Slide 84: Serious concerns as to true independence of AOL's Board

    We have serious concerns as to the true independence of AOL’s Board The many interrelationships between AOL’s Board members and Tim Armstrong are alarming and raises serious concerns about the true independence of AOL’s Board members. with Films a rd of Snag of AOL on Bo Served hairman Em eritus AOL

  85. Slide 85: Independent Board members own only 0.1% of shares

    Collectively, AOL’s “independent” Board members own only 0.1% of AOL’s outstanding shares outright Not only do we have serious concerns about the independence of AOL’s Board, but AOL’s “independent” Board members have little vested interest in the performance of the Company. Name Total Shares Open M

  86. Slide 86: Questions regarding AOL's incumbent Board members

    We have serious questions regarding AOL’s incumbent Board members Leading proxy governance firms have raised serious concerns with regard to AOL’s compensation practices, led by James Stengel, Chairman of AOL’s Compensation Committee. James Stengel: As Chair of AOL’s Compensation Committee, Mr. Sten

  87. Slide 87: Questions regarding AOL's incumbent Board members

    We have serious questions regarding AOL’s incumbent Board members Leading proxy governance firms have also raised serious concern about compensation practices at Motorola, during Mr. Stengel’s tenure as a member of its compensation committee. ISS recommended shareholders vote AGAINST James Stengel i

  88. Slide 88: Questions regarding AOL's incumbent Board members

    We have serious questions regarding AOL’s incumbent Board members We believe that Alberto Ibargüen and Patricia Mitchell have limited relevant industry and operational experience. Name Industry/Operational Experience Starboard Concerns Alberto Ibargüen 2005-2012: CEO of John S. and James L. Knight F

  89. Slide 89: Starboard nominees have strong relevant experience

    Starboard nominees have strong relevant experience Dennis A. Miller Former General Partner at Spark Capital, a leading venture capital firm that manages approximately $1 billion, since its inception through 2011. – Spark Capital investments included Twitter, Tumblr, Square, CNET, AdMeld, Omgpop, 5mi

  90. Slide 90: Starboard nominees have strong relevant experience

    Starboard nominees have strong relevant experience Jeffrey C. Smith Managing Member, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Investment Officer of Starboard Value, one of the largest shareholders of AOL. As Chief Investment Officer of Starboard Value, Mr. Smith has significant experience evaluating compan

  91. Slide 91: Starboard nominees have strong relevant experience

    Starboard nominees have strong relevant experience James A. Warner Former Executive Vice President of Avenue A / Razorfish from 2004 until 2008 and member of the executive committee of aQuantive, the parent company from 2000 until 2008. – aQuantive was sold to Microsoft in 2007 for approximately $6

  92. Slide 92: Appendix

    Appendix Director nominees – Dennis A. Miller – Jeffrey C. Smith – James A. Warner 92

  93. Slide 93: Director Nominees

    Director Nominees Dennis A. Miller Dennis A. Miller, age 55, has been a consultant to Lionsgate Entertainment since August 2010, and has been focused primarily on investing at the intersection of media and technology. Previously, Mr. Miller was a General Partner at Spark Capital since its inception

  94. Slide 94: Director Nominees

    Director Nominees Jeffrey C. Smith Jeffrey C. Smith, age 39, has served as Managing Member, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Investment Officer of Starboard Value LP (“Starboard Value”) since its inception in February 2011. Prior to founding Starboard Value, Mr. Smith was a Partner Managing Directo

  95. Slide 95: Director Nominees

    Director Nominees James A. Warner James A. Warner, age 58, has been the principal of Third Floor Enterprises, an advisory firm specializing in digital marketing and media since January 2009. Previously, Mr. Warner was with Avenue A | Razorfish (now known as Razorfish Inc.), one of the world’s larges

  96. Slide 96: This presentation is for discussion and general informational purposes only

    THIS PRESENTATION IS FOR DISCUSSION AND GENERAL INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. IT DOES NOT HAVE REGARD TO THE SPECIFIC INVESTMENT OBJECTIVE, FINANCIAL SITUATION, SUITABILITY, OR THE PARTICULAR NEED OF ANY SPECIFIC PERSON WHO MAY RECEIVE THIS PRESENTATION, AND SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS ADVICE ON THE MERIT

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