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Banque nationale de Belgique SA — Technical Presentation (November 2012)
41 slides from Banque nationale de Belgique SA's technical presentation, November 2012
Slide 1: A Macroeconomic Framework for Quantifying Systemic Risk
A Macroeconomic Framework for Quantifying Systemic Risk Zhiguo He, University of Chicago and NBER Arvind Krishnamurthy, Northwestern University and NBER November 2012 He and Krishnamurthy (Chicago, Northwestern) Systemic Risk November 2012 1 / 36
Slide 2: Financial Crisis in the Model
Financial Crisis in the Model Sharpe ratio 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 scaled intermediary reputation e Note: Capital constraint binds for e < 0.44 He and Krishnamurthy (Chicago, Northwestern) Systemic Risk November 2012 2 / 36
Slide 3: Objective
Objective Develop a macroeconomic model to evaluate systemic risk. Systemic risk: risk (probability) of a state where financial intermediation is disrupted Why is this valuable? Can ask, what is the probability of systemic states based on an initial condition. Can ask how that probability will incre
Slide 4: Outline
Outline 1 Nonlinearity in model and data I The crisis state affects non-crisis states through anticipation effects I Match conditional moments of the data, conditioning on negative (i.e., recession), but not crisis states 2 Extrapolate the model to state where constraint is binding to see how well a
Slide 5: Innovation Relative to Much of Literature
Innovation Relative to Much of Literature We study a model with occasionally binding financial constraint Typical models (e.g., Kiyotaki-Moore (1997),...) linearize around steady state where constraint binds. I Cannot talk about 1) likelihood that intermediation is disrupted (its always disrupted...
Slide 6: Agents and Technology
Agents and Technology Two classes of agents: households and bankers I Households: »Z ∞ – ` y ´1−φ “ h ”φ E e −ρt ct ct dt , 0 Two types of capital: productive capital Kt and housing capital H. Fixed supply of housing H ≡ 1 I Price of capital qt and price of housing Pt determined in equilibrium He an
Slide 7: Agents and Technology
Agents and Technology Two classes of agents: households and bankers I Households: »Z ∞ – ` y ´1−φ “ h ”φ E e −ρt ct ct dt , 0 Two types of capital: productive capital Kt and housing capital H. Fixed supply of housing H ≡ 1 I Price of capital qt and price of housing Pt determined in equilibrium Produ
Slide 8: Agents and Technology
Agents and Technology Two classes of agents: households and bankers I Households: »Z ∞ – ` y ´1−φ “ h ”φ E e −ρt ct ct dt , 0 Two types of capital: productive capital Kt and housing capital H. Fixed supply of housing H ≡ 1 I Price of capital qt and price of housing Pt determined in equilibrium Produ
Slide 9: Aggregate Balance Sheet
Aggregate Balance Sheet ' $ Loans to Capital Producers it & % 6 Intermediary Sector Household Sector Financial Wealth Capital qt Kt Equity Et Wt = qt Kt + pt H Housing Pt H Debt Wt − Et He and Krishnamurthy (Chicago, Northwestern) Systemic Risk November 2012 7 / 36
Slide 10: Aggregate Balance Sheet
Aggregate Balance Sheet ' $ Loans to Capital Producers it & % 6 Intermediary Sector Household Sector Financial Wealth Capital qt Kt Equity Et HH Y Wt = qt Kt + pt H HH H H (1 − λ)W t Housing Pt H Debt Wt − Et λWt = "Liquid balances" He and Krishnamurthy (Chicago, Northwestern) Systemic Risk November
Slide 11: Aggregate Balance Sheet
Aggregate Balance Sheet ' $ Loans to Capital Aggregate bank reputation Et Producers it & % 6 Intermediary Sector Household Sector Financial Wealth Capital qt Kt Equity Et HH Y Wt = qt Kt + pt H Constraint:H EtH≤ Et H H (1 − λ)W t No constraint Housing Pt H Debt Wt − Et λWt He and Krishnamurthy (Chic
Slide 12: Single Bank/Banker
Single Bank/Banker Capital qt kt equityt Housing Pt ht debtt qt kt Portfolio share in capital: αkt = equity t P t ht Portfolio share in housing : αht = equity t Borrowing (no constraint): debtt = qt kt + Pt ht − equityt = (αkt + αht − 1)equityt Return on bank equity: d R̃t = αkt dRtk + αht dRth − (α
Slide 13: Single Bank/Banker
Single Bank/Banker Properties Capital qt kt equityt · (k , h) scales with equity Housing Pt ht debtt · (k , h) increasing in Et [dR − r] · (k , h) decreasing in Vart [dR] qt kt Portfolio share in capital: αkt = equity t P t ht Portfolio share in housing : αht = equity t Borrowing (no constraint): de
Slide 14: General Equilibrium (1)
General Equilibrium (1) Intermediary Sector Household Sector Capital qt Kt Equity Et XXX y Financial Wealth XX Et ≤ Et Constraint: XXX Housing pt H Debt Wt − Et X Wt = qt Kt + pt H Portfolio share in capital: αkt = qEt Kt t = min[Et ,(1−λ)W qt K t t] Portfolio share in housing: αht = PEt H = min[E ,
Slide 15: General Equilibrium (2)
General Equilibrium (2) Intermediary Sector Household Sector Capital qt Kt Equity Et XXX y Financial Wealth XX Et ≤ Et Constraint: XXX Housing pt H Debt Wt − Et X Wt = qt Kt + pt H Portfolio share in capital: αkt = qEt Kt t = min[Et ,(1−λ)W qt K t t] Portfolio share in housing: αkt = qEt Kt = min[E
Slide 16: Capital Constraint
Capital Constraint Single bank has “reputation" (skill, etc.) t linked to intermediary performance (constant m) d t = md R̃t . t I Poor returns reduce reputation: Flow-performance relationship (Chevalier-Ellison, 1997) I Or, t can be interpreted as “net worth" of bankers fluctuating with performance
Slide 17: Capital Constraint
Capital Constraint Single bank has “reputation" (skill, etc.) t linked to intermediary performance (constant m) d t = md R̃t . t I Poor returns reduce reputation: Flow-performance relationship (Chevalier-Ellison, 1997) I Or, t can be interpreted as “net worth" of bankers fluctuating with performance
Slide 18: Equity Capital Constraint
Equity Capital Constraint Benchmark capital structure: λWt of Debt, (1 − λ)Wt of Equity. I if there is no capital constraint (Et is infinite)... He and Krishnamurthy (Chicago, Northwestern) Systemic Risk November 2012 15 / 36
Slide 19: Equity Capital Constraint
Equity Capital Constraint Benchmark capital structure: λWt of Debt, (1 − λ)Wt of Equity. I if there is no capital constraint (Et is infinite)... Intermediary equity capital: Et = min [Et , (1 − λ)Wt ] Suppose a −10% shock to real estate and price of capital: Wt ↓ 10% (Household wealth = aggregate we
Slide 20: Micro foundation of Capital Constraint
Micro foundation of Capital Constraint We develop theory in He-Krishnamurthy (2012, Restud), and applied to MBS market in He-Krishnamurthy (2012, AER forthcoming) Two-agents endowment economy, Households with wealth Wth cannot hold MBS assets but can delegate their money to Bankers with wealth Wt Wi
Slide 21: Modeling details (1): Bankers
Modeling details (1): Bankers Banker die at a Poisson rate of η, which is effective discount rate Banker makes portfolioR decision to maximize his/her present value of ∞ expected reputation: E 0 e−ηt ln t dt I Bankers do not consume goods, “representative household” framework I Convenient to get int
Slide 22: Modeling details (2): Deposit demand
Modeling details (2): Deposit demand Representative household enters time t with financial wealth Wt The household splits wealth: (1 − λ) Wt to “equity households,” λWt to “bond households” I Equity households have portfolio choice: invest their portion of wealth as equity of intermediaries, subject
Slide 23: Equilibrium and State Variables
Equilibrium and State Variables The definition of equilibrium is standard Markov equilibrium with state variables (Et , Kt ) Scale invariance. Unidimensional state variable Et et = , Kt with endogenous evolution det = µe dt + σe dZt φ Housing price P = Kp (e), as housing rental 1−φ Ct is scaled with
Slide 24: Boundary Conditions
Boundary Conditions When e = ∞, Et > (1 − λ) Wt always, frictionless economy I We solve for p(∞), q(∞) analytically As e → 0, intermediaries’ portfolio volatility, i.e. Sharpe ratio, rises New bankers enter if e = e (Sharpe ratio hits γ, exogenous constant) I Entry increases aggregate E but requires
Slide 25: Calibration: Baseline Parameters
Calibration: Baseline Parameters Parameter Choice Targets (Unconditional) Panel A: Intermediation m Performance sensitivity 2 Average Sharpe ratio λ Debt ratio 0.67 Average intermediary leverage η Banker exit rate 17% Good model dynamics γ Entry trigger 6.5 Highest Sharpe ratio β Entry cost 2.34 Ave
Slide 26: Results(1)
Results(1): State variable is et = KEtt Sharpe ratio interest rate 7 0.1 6 0.05 5 0 4 −0.05 3 2 −0.1 1 −0.15 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 2 4 6 8 10 scaled intermediary reputation e scaled intermediary reputation e q(e), capital price investment I/K 1.03 0.105 1.02 1.01 0.1 1 0.99 0.98 0.095 0.97 0.96
Slide 27: Results(2)
Results(2) p(e), scaled housing price q(e), capital price 0.9 1.03 0.8 1.02 1.01 0.7 1 0.6 0.99 0.5 0.98 0.4 0.97 0.3 0.96 0.2 0.95 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 return volatility of housing steady state distribution 0.03 1.2 0.025 1 0.02 0.8 0.015 0.6 0.01 0.4 0.2 0.005 0 0 0 1 2 3
Slide 28: Impulse Response: -2% Shock
Impulse Response: -2% Shock (= σdZt ) VARdata Investment Sharpe ratio Land price −0.022 0.7 −0.04 −0.023 crisis 0.6 crisis crisis normal normal −0.06 normal −0.024 0.5 −0.08 −0.025 0.4 −0.1 −0.026 0.3 −0.12 −0.027 0.2 −0.14 −0.028 0.1 −0.029 0 −0.16 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 quarter quarter quar
Slide 29: Nonlinearities in Model and Data
Nonlinearities in Model and Data Model: Distress states = worst 33% of realizations of e (e < 2.14) Compute variances, covariances of intermediary equity growth with other key variables Data: Distress states = worst 33% of realizations of credit spread I We use Gilchrist-Zakrajsek (2011) as credit s
Slide 30: Distress Classification
Distress Classification Distress Periods NBER Recessions 1974Q3 - 1975Q4 11/73 - 3/75 1982Q3 - 1982Q4 7/81 - 11/82 1985Q4 - 1987Q3 1988Q4 - 1990Q1 7/90 - 3/91 1992Q4 - 1993Q2 2001Q2 - 2003Q1 3/01 - 11/01 2007Q3 - 2009Q3 12/07 - 6/09 He and Krishnamurthy (Chicago, Northwestern) Systemic Risk November
Slide 31: Covariances in Data
Covariances in Data EB NBER Recession NBER+,-2Qs EB, Drop Crisis Panel A: Distress Periods vol(Eq) 31.48 32.40 31.78 22.19 vol(I) 8.05 8.79 7.44 4.56 vol(C) 1.71 1.54 1.59 0.95 vol(PL) 21.24 23.34 21.07 7.91 vol(EB) 60.14 93.59 74.57 28.69 cov(Eq, I) 1.31 1.08 0.84 0.37 cov(Eq, C) 0.25 0.16 0.13 0.0
Slide 32: Matching State-Dependent Covariances
Matching State-Dependent Covariances Distress Non Distress Data Baseline Data Baseline vol (Eq) 31.48% 31.2 17.54 6.4 vol (I) 8.05% 5.4 6.61 4.8 vol (C) 1.71% 1.8 1.28 2.4 vol (LP) 21.24% 22.1 9.79 9.8 vol (EB) 60.14% 71.1 12.72 8.7 cov (Eq, I) 1.31% 0.90 0.07 0.3 cov (Eq, C) 0.25% 0.0 0.03 0.1 cov
Slide 33: Matching State-Dependent Covariances: No Housing
Matching State-Dependent Covariances: No Housing Distress Non Distress Data Baseline φ=0 Data Baseline φ = 0 vol (Eq) 31.48% 31.2 23.3 17.54 6.4 4.0 vol (I) 8.05% 5.4 4.7 6.61 4.8 4.3 vol (C) 1.71% 1.8 2.6 1.28 2.4 3.8 vol (LP) 21.24% 22.1 9.79 9.8 vol (EB) 60.14% 71.1 31.3 12.72 8.7 0.2 cov (Eq, I)
Slide 34: Matching Recent Crisis
Matching Recent Crisis !" ! Based on realized equity return we uncover fundamental shocks to K 07QIII 07QIV 08QI 08QII 08QIII 08QIV 09QI 09QII 09QIII 09QIV -3.1% -5.5 -3.0 -1.4 -0.8 -2.2 -2.3 -2.2 -1.0 -1.0 Total -19%. Capital constraint binds after 08QI—systemic crisis I In the model (data), land p
Slide 35: Probability of Systemic Event
Probability of Systemic Event Starting from 2007Q2, probability of hitting crisis 1.12% in next 2 years 9.12% in next 5 years 20.73% in next 10 years He and Krishnamurthy (Chicago, Northwestern) Systemic Risk November 2012 31 / 36
Slide 36: Probability of Systemic Event
Probability of Systemic Event Starting from 2007Q2, probability of hitting crisis 1.12% in next 2 years 9.12% in next 5 years 20.73% in next 10 years Small... VIX was low early 2007 Financial sector aggregate leverage fixed at 3 in model Currently, -13% shocks move you to crisis boundary. If leverag
Slide 37: Stress testing
Stress testing Input: Description of a relevant scenario Output: Loss in terms of equity of the financial sector (ROE). How can a model help: General equilibrium response to equity loss (Brunnermeier, Gorton and Krishnamurthy (2011)) Mapping scenario into probability of systemic states He and Krishn
Slide 38: Stress testing example
Stress testing example Key step: Need to map from stress scenario into underlying shock, dZt . Naive partial eqbm approach. Suppose stress scenario ⇒ -30% Return on equity With leverage of 3, σ(Zt+0.25 − Zt ) = −30/3 = −10%. Feed in −10% shock into the model over one quarter. Result: Beginning at e
Slide 39: Probability of Systemic Event
Probability of Systemic Event Probability of capital constraint being binding 1 in next 2 years 0.8 in next 5 years in next 10 years 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 0 1 2 3 4 starting value einit He and Krishnamurthy (Chicago, Northwestern) Systemic Risk November 2012 34 / 36
Slide 40: Conclusion
Conclusion We develop a fully stochastic model of a systemic crisis, with an equity capital constraint on the intermediary sector The model quantitatively matches the differential comovements in distress and non-distress periods Is able to replicate 2007/2008 period with only intermediary capital sh
Slide 41: Nonlinearity: VAR in data
Nonlinearity: VAR in data IR A: Distress Periods Panel Equity to Equity EBP (credit risk premium) to Equity Investment to Equity 0.2 0 0.05 −1 0.04 0.15 −2 0.03 0.1 −3 0.02 0.05 −4 0.01 0 −5 0 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 Panel B: Non Distress Periods Equity to Equity EBP (credit risk premium) to E
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