Banque nationale de Belgique SA · EURONEXT:BNB
Banque nationale de Belgique SA — presentatie erceg
91 slides from Banque nationale de Belgique SA's investor presentation, October 2012
Slide 1: Fiscal Consolidation in a Currency Union: Spending Cuts Vs. Tax Hikes
Fiscal Consolidation in a Currency Union: Spending Cuts Vs. Tax Hikes Christopher J. Erceg and Jesper Lindé Federal Reserve Board October, 2012 Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 1 / 27
Slide 2: Motivation
Motivation Deteriorating public …nances has spurred …scal consolidation plans The global …nancial crisis and slow recovery have put severe strains on …scal positions Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 2 / 27
Slide 3: Motivation
Motivation Deteriorating public …nances has spurred …scal consolidation plans The global …nancial crisis and slow recovery have put severe strains on …scal positions Between 2007 and 2011, debt/GDP ratios climbed by 25 to 30 percent in many industrial countries; e.g. United Kingdom, France, and Spai
Slide 4: Motivation
Motivation Deteriorating public …nances has spurred …scal consolidation plans The global …nancial crisis and slow recovery have put severe strains on …scal positions Between 2007 and 2011, debt/GDP ratios climbed by 25 to 30 percent in many industrial countries; e.g. United Kingdom, France, and Spai
Slide 5: Motivation
Motivation E¤ects of …scal austerity in current environment uncertain In designing a …scal consolidation plan, policymakers must make a number of key decisions including: Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 3 / 27
Slide 6: Motivation
Motivation E¤ects of …scal austerity in current environment uncertain In designing a …scal consolidation plan, policymakers must make a number of key decisions including: size of the desired improvement in debt/GDP ratio Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 3 /
Slide 7: Motivation
Motivation E¤ects of …scal austerity in current environment uncertain In designing a …scal consolidation plan, policymakers must make a number of key decisions including: size of the desired improvement in debt/GDP ratio composition between spending cuts and tax increases Erceg and Lindé (Federal Re
Slide 8: Motivation
Motivation E¤ects of …scal austerity in current environment uncertain In designing a …scal consolidation plan, policymakers must make a number of key decisions including: size of the desired improvement in debt/GDP ratio composition between spending cuts and tax increases speed of implementation Erc
Slide 9: Motivation
Motivation E¤ects of …scal austerity in current environment uncertain In designing a …scal consolidation plan, policymakers must make a number of key decisions including: size of the desired improvement in debt/GDP ratio composition between spending cuts and tax increases speed of implementation An
Slide 10: What we do
What we do Instruments and model environment Positive analysis of the e¤ects of large spending- and revenue-based …scal consolidations on output and government debt using a dynamic general equilibrium model Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 4 / 27
Slide 11: What we do
What we do Instruments and model environment Positive analysis of the e¤ects of large spending- and revenue-based …scal consolidations on output and government debt using a dynamic general equilibrium model Fiscal instruments: Government consumption cuts and labor income tax hikes Erceg and Lindé (F
Slide 12: What we do
What we do Instruments and model environment Positive analysis of the e¤ects of large spending- and revenue-based …scal consolidations on output and government debt using a dynamic general equilibrium model Fiscal instruments: Government consumption cuts and labor income tax hikes Environment: An op
Slide 13: What we do
What we do Instruments and model environment Positive analysis of the e¤ects of large spending- and revenue-based …scal consolidations on output and government debt using a dynamic general equilibrium model Fiscal instruments: Government consumption cuts and labor income tax hikes Environment: An op
Slide 14: What we do
What we do Instruments and model environment Positive analysis of the e¤ects of large spending- and revenue-based …scal consolidations on output and government debt using a dynamic general equilibrium model Fiscal instruments: Government consumption cuts and labor income tax hikes Environment: An op
Slide 15: What we do
What we do Instruments and model environment Positive analysis of the e¤ects of large spending- and revenue-based …scal consolidations on output and government debt using a dynamic general equilibrium model Fiscal instruments: Government consumption cuts and labor income tax hikes Environment: An op
Slide 16: What we do
What we do Two di¤erent monetary environments We study South consolidation under two alternative assumptions about monetary policy Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 5 / 27
Slide 17: What we do
What we do Two di¤erent monetary environments We study South consolidation under two alternative assumptions about monetary policy First, we assume that CU monetary policy is unconstrained, so monetary accommodation by CU central bank feasible Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolida
Slide 18: What we do
What we do Two di¤erent monetary environments We study South consolidation under two alternative assumptions about monetary policy First, we assume that CU monetary policy is unconstrained, so monetary accommodation by CU central bank feasible Second, we study the e¤ects when CU is in a liquidity tr
Slide 19: What we do
What we do Two di¤erent monetary environments We study South consolidation under two alternative assumptions about monetary policy First, we assume that CU monetary policy is unconstrained, so monetary accommodation by CU central bank feasible Second, we study the e¤ects when CU is in a liquidity tr
Slide 20: Presentation outline
Presentation outline Model Parameterization E¤ects of South consolidation in normal times E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Mixed strategies Concluding remarks Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 6 / 27
Slide 21: Model
Model Key features DSGE model similar to EGG (2006) with two regions within the currency area, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 7 / 27
Slide 22: Model
Model Key features DSGE model similar to EGG (2006) with two regions within the currency area, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Nominal and real rigidities CEE (2005), SW (2003, 2007): Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fisc
Slide 23: Model
Model Key features DSGE model similar to EGG (2006) with two regions within the currency area, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Nominal and real rigidities CEE (2005), SW (2003, 2007): Staggered price and wage contracts, dynamic
Slide 24: Model
Model Key features DSGE model similar to EGG (2006) with two regions within the currency area, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Nominal and real rigidities CEE (2005), SW (2003, 2007): Staggered price and wage contracts, dynamic
Slide 25: Model
Model Key features DSGE model similar to EGG (2006) with two regions within the currency area, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Nominal and real rigidities CEE (2005), SW (2003, 2007): Staggered price and wage contracts, dynamic
Slide 26: Model
Model Key features DSGE model similar to EGG (2006) with two regions within the currency area, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Nominal and real rigidities CEE (2005), SW (2003, 2007): Staggered price and wage contracts, dynamic
Slide 27: Model
Model Key features DSGE model similar to EGG (2006) with two regions within the currency area, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Nominal and real rigidities CEE (2005), SW (2003, 2007): Staggered price and wage contracts, dynamic
Slide 28: Model
Model Key features DSGE model similar to EGG (2006) with two regions within the currency area, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Nominal and real rigidities CEE (2005), SW (2003, 2007): Staggered price and wage contracts, dynamic
Slide 29: Model
Model Key features DSGE model similar to EGG (2006) with two regions within the currency area, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Nominal and real rigidities CEE (2005), SW (2003, 2007): Staggered price and wage contracts, dynamic
Slide 30: Model: Households
Model Households Optimizing households maximize an intertemporal utility functional; the period utility function depends separably on a composite consumption good (external habit), leisure and real balances (with satiation point, rationale behind ZLB) Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal C
Slide 31: Model: Households
Model Households Optimizing households maximize an intertemporal utility functional; the period utility function depends separably on a composite consumption good (external habit), leisure and real balances (with satiation point, rationale behind ZLB) We assume that a fraction ς of households are pu
Slide 32: Model: Households
Model Households Optimizing households maximize an intertemporal utility functional; the period utility function depends separably on a composite consumption good (external habit), leisure and real balances (with satiation point, rationale behind ZLB) We assume that a fraction ς of households are pu
Slide 33: Model: Government
Model Government Spend gt on the …nal consumption good (leakage); make lump-sum net transfers (tr ) to “O” and “HM” households Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 9 / 27
Slide 34: Model: Government
Model Government Spend gt on the …nal consumption good (leakage); make lump-sum net transfers (tr ) to “O” and “HM” households Government collect revenues from consumption (τ C ), capital (τ K ) and labor income taxes (τ N ,t ) Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2
Slide 35: Model: Government
Model Government Spend gt on the …nal consumption good (leakage); make lump-sum net transfers (tr ) to “O” and “HM” households Government collect revenues from consumption (τ C ), capital (τ K ) and labor income taxes (τ N ,t ) Monetary policy follows rule it = max f i, (1 γi ) (γπ π̃ t + γx x̃t ) +
Slide 36: Model: Government
Model Government Spend gt on the …nal consumption good (leakage); make lump-sum net transfers (tr ) to “O” and “HM” households Government collect revenues from consumption (τ C ), capital (τ K ) and labor income taxes (τ N ,t ) Monetary policy follows rule it = max f i, (1 γi ) (γπ π̃ t + γx x̃t ) +
Slide 37: Parameterization of model
Parameterization of model South 1/3 or currency union Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 10 / 27
Slide 38: Parameterization of model
Parameterization of model South 1/3 or currency union Import shares inspired by intra-Euro trade data for 2006-08 for PIGIS. South import share of output 14%, while North import share 7%, respectively. Import intensity of consumption 3/4 that of investment Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fis
Slide 39: Parameterization of model
Parameterization of model South 1/3 or currency union Import shares inspired by intra-Euro trade data for 2006-08 for PIGIS. South import share of output 14%, while North import share 7%, respectively. Import intensity of consumption 3/4 that of investment Fiscal ‡ows; G /Y = .23, Net transfers .2 o
Slide 40: Parameterization of model
Parameterization of model South 1/3 or currency union Import shares inspired by intra-Euro trade data for 2006-08 for PIGIS. South import share of output 14%, while North import share 7%, respectively. Import intensity of consumption 3/4 that of investment Fiscal ‡ows; G /Y = .23, Net transfers .2 o
Slide 41: Parameterization of model
Parameterization of model South 1/3 or currency union Import shares inspired by intra-Euro trade data for 2006-08 for PIGIS. South import share of output 14%, while North import share 7%, respectively. Import intensity of consumption 3/4 that of investment Fiscal ‡ows; G /Y = .23, Net transfers .2 o
Slide 42: Parameterization of model
Parameterization of model South 1/3 or currency union Import shares inspired by intra-Euro trade data for 2006-08 for PIGIS. South import share of output 14%, while North import share 7%, respectively. Import intensity of consumption 3/4 that of investment Fiscal ‡ows; G /Y = .23, Net transfers .2 o
Slide 43: Parameterization of model
Parameterization of model South 1/3 or currency union Import shares inspired by intra-Euro trade data for 2006-08 for PIGIS. South import share of output 14%, while North import share 7%, respectively. Import intensity of consumption 3/4 that of investment Fiscal ‡ows; G /Y = .23, Net transfers .2 o
Slide 44: Effects of South consolidation in normal times
E¤ects of South consolidation in normal times Nature of the …scal experiment Assume South debt target bGt +1 follows bGt +1 bGt = ρd1 (bGt bGt 1 ) ρd2 bGt + εd ,t , Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 11 / 27
Slide 45: Effects of South consolidation in normal times
E¤ects of South consolidation in normal times Nature of the …scal experiment Assume South debt target bGt +1 follows bGt +1 bGt = ρd1 (bGt bGt 1 ) ρd2 bGt + εd ,t , By setting ρd1 = 0.935 and ρd2 = 0.0001, this speci…cation implies that distance to new target level is reduced by half after 3 years,
Slide 46: Effects of South consolidation in normal times
E¤ects of South consolidation in normal times Nature of the …scal experiment Assume South debt target bGt +1 follows bGt +1 bGt = ρd1 (bGt bGt 1 ) ρd2 bGt + εd ,t , By setting ρd1 = 0.935 and ρd2 = 0.0001, this speci…cation implies that distance to new target level is reduced by half after 3 years,
Slide 47: Effects of South consolidation in normal times
E¤ects of South consolidation in normal times Nature of the …scal experiment Assume South debt target bGt +1 follows bGt +1 bGt = ρd1 (bGt bGt 1 ) ρd2 bGt + εd ,t , By setting ρd1 = 0.935 and ρd2 = 0.0001, this speci…cation implies that distance to new target level is reduced by half after 3 years,
Slide 48: Effects of South consolidation in normal times
E¤ects of South consolidation in normal times Nature of the …scal experiment Assume South debt target bGt +1 follows bGt +1 bGt = ρd1 (bGt bGt 1 ) ρd2 bGt + εd ,t , By setting ρd1 = 0.935 and ρd2 = 0.0001, this speci…cation implies that distance to new target level is reduced by half after 3 years,
Slide 49: Effects of South consolidation in normal times
E¤ects of South consolidation in normal times Comparing the e¤ects in a CU and with independent monetary policy We now consider a decrease in the long-run debt target by 25 percent of trend GDP Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 12 / 27
Slide 50: Effects of South consolidation in normal times
E¤ects of South consolidation in normal times Comparing the e¤ects in a CU and with independent monetary policy We now consider a decrease in the long-run debt target by 25 percent of trend GDP To understand the role of CU membership, we also present results when South is assumed to have monetary in
Slide 51: Effects of South consolidation in normal times
E¤ects of South consolidation in normal times Comparing the e¤ects in a CU and with independent monetary policy We now consider a decrease in the long-run debt target by 25 percent of trend GDP To understand the role of CU membership, we also present results when South is assumed to have monetary in
Slide 52: Effects of South consolidation in normal times
E¤ects of South consolidation in normal times Comparing the e¤ects in a CU and with independent monetary policy We now consider a decrease in the long-run debt target by 25 percent of trend GDP To understand the role of CU membership, we also present results when South is assumed to have monetary in
Slide 53: Effects of South consolidation in normal times
E¤ects of South consolidation in normal times Comparing the e¤ects in a currency union with monetary independence Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 13 / 27
Slide 54: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap
E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Baseline scenario which drives currency union into a liquidity trap To study the e¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap, we need to construct a baseline scenario Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 1
Slide 55: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap
E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Baseline scenario which drives currency union into a liquidity trap To study the e¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap, we need to construct a baseline scenario We assume that South and North are hit by common negative consumption demand
Slide 56: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap
E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Baseline scenario which drives currency union into a liquidity trap To study the e¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap, we need to construct a baseline scenario We assume that South and North are hit by common negative consumption demand
Slide 57: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap
E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Baseline scenario which drives currency union into a liquidity trap To study the e¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap, we need to construct a baseline scenario We assume that South and North are hit by common negative consumption demand
Slide 58: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap
E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Baseline scenario which drives currency union into a liquidity trap To study the e¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap, we need to construct a baseline scenario We assume that South and North are hit by common negative consumption demand
Slide 59: Baseline Scenario in model
Baseline Scenario in model Paths when interest rates are unconstrained and subject to ZLB Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 15 / 27
Slide 60: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap
E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Consolidation in CU in a liquidity trap and in normal times Against this background, we assume the government is assumed to adopt a lower debt target ( 25%) the …rst period the ZLB binds Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations O
Slide 61: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap
E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Consolidation in CU in a liquidity trap and in normal times Against this background, we assume the government is assumed to adopt a lower debt target ( 25%) the …rst period the ZLB binds Compute impact of lower debt target as scenario (baseline shock
Slide 62: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap
E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Consolidation in CU in a liquidity trap and in normal times Against this background, we assume the government is assumed to adopt a lower debt target ( 25%) the …rst period the ZLB binds Compute impact of lower debt target as scenario (baseline shock
Slide 63: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap
E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap E¤ects in a liquidity trap and in normal times when South is a CU member Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 17 / 27
Slide 64: Contributions to South debt dynamics
Contributions to South debt dynamics Debt dynamics in normal times and liquidity trap for spending cuts in CU Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 18 / 27
Slide 65: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap
E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap E¤ects depend importantly on the consolidation size In our framework with endogenous liquidity trap duration, the impact of austerity importantly depends on its size (Erceg and Lindé, 2010) Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidation
Slide 66: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap
E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap E¤ects depend importantly on the consolidation size In our framework with endogenous liquidity trap duration, the impact of austerity importantly depends on its size (Erceg and Lindé, 2010) To show this, we study di¤erently-sized debt target reductio
Slide 67: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap
E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Comparing three spending-based debt target reductions; 5, 15 and 25 (benchmark) p.p. Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 20 / 27
Slide 68: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap
E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Marginal output and debt multipliers depend importantly on expected liquidity trap duration Results show that the large consolidation size is key why spending-cuts are self-defeating in the near term in our setup. Explanation: Erceg and Lindé (Federa
Slide 69: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap
E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Marginal output and debt multipliers depend importantly on expected liquidity trap duration Results show that the large consolidation size is key why spending-cuts are self-defeating in the near term in our setup. Explanation: Adverse impact of small
Slide 70: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap
E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Marginal output and debt multipliers depend importantly on expected liquidity trap duration Results show that the large consolidation size is key why spending-cuts are self-defeating in the near term in our setup. Explanation: Adverse impact of small
Slide 71: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap
E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Marginal output and debt multipliers depend importantly on expected liquidity trap duration Results show that the large consolidation size is key why spending-cuts are self-defeating in the near term in our setup. Explanation: Adverse impact of small
Slide 72: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap
E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Marginal output and debt multipliers depend importantly on expected liquidity trap duration Results show that the large consolidation size is key why spending-cuts are self-defeating in the near term in our setup. Explanation: Adverse impact of small
Slide 73: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap
E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Output and gov’t debt marginal multipliers as function of liquidity trap duration Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 22 / 27
Slide 74: Mixed Strategies
Mixed Strategies Assessing the e¤ects of consolidations involving both spending and taxes So far, we have assumed that South pursue either pure spending- or tax-based consolidation strategies Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 23 / 27
Slide 75: Mixed Strategies
Mixed Strategies Assessing the e¤ects of consolidations involving both spending and taxes So far, we have assumed that South pursue either pure spending- or tax-based consolidation strategies Now, we assess the merits of two alternative “mixed strategies”, involving both spending-cuts and tax hikes
Slide 76: Mixed Strategies
Mixed Strategies Assessing the e¤ects of consolidations involving both spending and taxes So far, we have assumed that South pursue either pure spending- or tax-based consolidation strategies Now, we assess the merits of two alternative “mixed strategies”, involving both spending-cuts and tax hikes
Slide 77: Mixed Strategies
Mixed Strategies Assessing the e¤ects of consolidations involving both spending and taxes So far, we have assumed that South pursue either pure spending- or tax-based consolidation strategies Now, we assess the merits of two alternative “mixed strategies”, involving both spending-cuts and tax hikes
Slide 78: Mixed Strategies
Mixed Strategies Assessing the e¤ects of consolidations involving both spending and taxes So far, we have assumed that South pursue either pure spending- or tax-based consolidation strategies Now, we assess the merits of two alternative “mixed strategies”, involving both spending-cuts and tax hikes
Slide 79: Mixed Strategies
Mixed Strategies Assessing the e¤ects of consolidations involving both spending and taxes So far, we have assumed that South pursue either pure spending- or tax-based consolidation strategies Now, we assess the merits of two alternative “mixed strategies”, involving both spending-cuts and tax hikes
Slide 80: Mixed Strategies
Mixed Strategies E¤ects of “Mixed Strategies” Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 24 / 27
Slide 81: Concluding remarks
Concluding remarks Our analysis points towards an important short- and long-term trade-o¤ between spending- and tax-based consolidations in CU, especially when a large subset of members undertakes large consolidations in a long-lived liquidity trap Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Cons
Slide 82: Concluding remarks
Concluding remarks Our analysis points towards an important short- and long-term trade-o¤ between spending- and tax-based consolidations in CU, especially when a large subset of members undertakes large consolidations in a long-lived liquidity trap Spending based approach preferable in the long-run,
Slide 83: Concluding remarks
Concluding remarks Our analysis points towards an important short- and long-term trade-o¤ between spending- and tax-based consolidations in CU, especially when a large subset of members undertakes large consolidations in a long-lived liquidity trap Spending based approach preferable in the long-run,
Slide 84: Concluding remarks
Concluding remarks Our analysis points towards an important short- and long-term trade-o¤ between spending- and tax-based consolidations in CU, especially when a large subset of members undertakes large consolidations in a long-lived liquidity trap Spending based approach preferable in the long-run,
Slide 85: Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis Assessing the e¤ects of endogenous sovereign spreads So far, we have assumed that government and banks borrow at the same rate (it ) in both South and North Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 26 / 27
Slide 86: Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis Assessing the e¤ects of endogenous sovereign spreads So far, we have assumed that government and banks borrow at the same rate (it ) in both South and North We now explore the consequences of assuming that government and banks in South is subject to the following premium itS it
Slide 87: Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis Assessing the e¤ects of endogenous sovereign spreads So far, we have assumed that government and banks borrow at the same rate (it ) in both South and North We now explore the consequences of assuming that government and banks in South is subject to the following premium itS it
Slide 88: Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis Assessing the e¤ects of endogenous sovereign spreads So far, we have assumed that government and banks borrow at the same rate (it ) in both South and North We now explore the consequences of assuming that government and banks in South is subject to the following premium itS it
Slide 89: Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis Assessing the e¤ects of endogenous sovereign spreads So far, we have assumed that government and banks borrow at the same rate (it ) in both South and North We now explore the consequences of assuming that government and banks in South is subject to the following premium itS it
Slide 90: Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis Assessing the e¤ects of endogenous sovereign spreads So far, we have assumed that government and banks borrow at the same rate (it ) in both South and North We now explore the consequences of assuming that government and banks in South is subject to the following premium itS it
Slide 91: Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis E¤ects of endogenous sovereign spreads when Small South consolidates Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 27 / 27