Banque nationale de Belgique SA · EURONEXT:BNB

Banque nationale de Belgique SA — presentatie erceg

91 slides from Banque nationale de Belgique SA's investor presentation, October 2012

  1. Slide 1: Fiscal Consolidation in a Currency Union: Spending Cuts Vs. Tax Hikes

    Fiscal Consolidation in a Currency Union: Spending Cuts Vs. Tax Hikes Christopher J. Erceg and Jesper Lindé Federal Reserve Board October, 2012 Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 1 / 27

  2. Slide 2: Motivation

    Motivation Deteriorating public …nances has spurred …scal consolidation plans The global …nancial crisis and slow recovery have put severe strains on …scal positions Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 2 / 27

  3. Slide 3: Motivation

    Motivation Deteriorating public …nances has spurred …scal consolidation plans The global …nancial crisis and slow recovery have put severe strains on …scal positions Between 2007 and 2011, debt/GDP ratios climbed by 25 to 30 percent in many industrial countries; e.g. United Kingdom, France, and Spai

  4. Slide 4: Motivation

    Motivation Deteriorating public …nances has spurred …scal consolidation plans The global …nancial crisis and slow recovery have put severe strains on …scal positions Between 2007 and 2011, debt/GDP ratios climbed by 25 to 30 percent in many industrial countries; e.g. United Kingdom, France, and Spai

  5. Slide 5: Motivation

    Motivation E¤ects of …scal austerity in current environment uncertain In designing a …scal consolidation plan, policymakers must make a number of key decisions including: Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 3 / 27

  6. Slide 6: Motivation

    Motivation E¤ects of …scal austerity in current environment uncertain In designing a …scal consolidation plan, policymakers must make a number of key decisions including: size of the desired improvement in debt/GDP ratio Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 3 /

  7. Slide 7: Motivation

    Motivation E¤ects of …scal austerity in current environment uncertain In designing a …scal consolidation plan, policymakers must make a number of key decisions including: size of the desired improvement in debt/GDP ratio composition between spending cuts and tax increases Erceg and Lindé (Federal Re

  8. Slide 8: Motivation

    Motivation E¤ects of …scal austerity in current environment uncertain In designing a …scal consolidation plan, policymakers must make a number of key decisions including: size of the desired improvement in debt/GDP ratio composition between spending cuts and tax increases speed of implementation Erc

  9. Slide 9: Motivation

    Motivation E¤ects of …scal austerity in current environment uncertain In designing a …scal consolidation plan, policymakers must make a number of key decisions including: size of the desired improvement in debt/GDP ratio composition between spending cuts and tax increases speed of implementation An

  10. Slide 10: What we do

    What we do Instruments and model environment Positive analysis of the e¤ects of large spending- and revenue-based …scal consolidations on output and government debt using a dynamic general equilibrium model Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 4 / 27

  11. Slide 11: What we do

    What we do Instruments and model environment Positive analysis of the e¤ects of large spending- and revenue-based …scal consolidations on output and government debt using a dynamic general equilibrium model Fiscal instruments: Government consumption cuts and labor income tax hikes Erceg and Lindé (F

  12. Slide 12: What we do

    What we do Instruments and model environment Positive analysis of the e¤ects of large spending- and revenue-based …scal consolidations on output and government debt using a dynamic general equilibrium model Fiscal instruments: Government consumption cuts and labor income tax hikes Environment: An op

  13. Slide 13: What we do

    What we do Instruments and model environment Positive analysis of the e¤ects of large spending- and revenue-based …scal consolidations on output and government debt using a dynamic general equilibrium model Fiscal instruments: Government consumption cuts and labor income tax hikes Environment: An op

  14. Slide 14: What we do

    What we do Instruments and model environment Positive analysis of the e¤ects of large spending- and revenue-based …scal consolidations on output and government debt using a dynamic general equilibrium model Fiscal instruments: Government consumption cuts and labor income tax hikes Environment: An op

  15. Slide 15: What we do

    What we do Instruments and model environment Positive analysis of the e¤ects of large spending- and revenue-based …scal consolidations on output and government debt using a dynamic general equilibrium model Fiscal instruments: Government consumption cuts and labor income tax hikes Environment: An op

  16. Slide 16: What we do

    What we do Two di¤erent monetary environments We study South consolidation under two alternative assumptions about monetary policy Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 5 / 27

  17. Slide 17: What we do

    What we do Two di¤erent monetary environments We study South consolidation under two alternative assumptions about monetary policy First, we assume that CU monetary policy is unconstrained, so monetary accommodation by CU central bank feasible Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolida

  18. Slide 18: What we do

    What we do Two di¤erent monetary environments We study South consolidation under two alternative assumptions about monetary policy First, we assume that CU monetary policy is unconstrained, so monetary accommodation by CU central bank feasible Second, we study the e¤ects when CU is in a liquidity tr

  19. Slide 19: What we do

    What we do Two di¤erent monetary environments We study South consolidation under two alternative assumptions about monetary policy First, we assume that CU monetary policy is unconstrained, so monetary accommodation by CU central bank feasible Second, we study the e¤ects when CU is in a liquidity tr

  20. Slide 20: Presentation outline

    Presentation outline Model Parameterization E¤ects of South consolidation in normal times E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Mixed strategies Concluding remarks Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 6 / 27

  21. Slide 21: Model

    Model Key features DSGE model similar to EGG (2006) with two regions within the currency area, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 7 / 27

  22. Slide 22: Model

    Model Key features DSGE model similar to EGG (2006) with two regions within the currency area, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Nominal and real rigidities CEE (2005), SW (2003, 2007): Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fisc

  23. Slide 23: Model

    Model Key features DSGE model similar to EGG (2006) with two regions within the currency area, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Nominal and real rigidities CEE (2005), SW (2003, 2007): Staggered price and wage contracts, dynamic

  24. Slide 24: Model

    Model Key features DSGE model similar to EGG (2006) with two regions within the currency area, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Nominal and real rigidities CEE (2005), SW (2003, 2007): Staggered price and wage contracts, dynamic

  25. Slide 25: Model

    Model Key features DSGE model similar to EGG (2006) with two regions within the currency area, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Nominal and real rigidities CEE (2005), SW (2003, 2007): Staggered price and wage contracts, dynamic

  26. Slide 26: Model

    Model Key features DSGE model similar to EGG (2006) with two regions within the currency area, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Nominal and real rigidities CEE (2005), SW (2003, 2007): Staggered price and wage contracts, dynamic

  27. Slide 27: Model

    Model Key features DSGE model similar to EGG (2006) with two regions within the currency area, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Nominal and real rigidities CEE (2005), SW (2003, 2007): Staggered price and wage contracts, dynamic

  28. Slide 28: Model

    Model Key features DSGE model similar to EGG (2006) with two regions within the currency area, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Nominal and real rigidities CEE (2005), SW (2003, 2007): Staggered price and wage contracts, dynamic

  29. Slide 29: Model

    Model Key features DSGE model similar to EGG (2006) with two regions within the currency area, each produces a single …nal good by aggregating a continuum of domestically-produced intermediate goods Nominal and real rigidities CEE (2005), SW (2003, 2007): Staggered price and wage contracts, dynamic

  30. Slide 30: Model: Households

    Model Households Optimizing households maximize an intertemporal utility functional; the period utility function depends separably on a composite consumption good (external habit), leisure and real balances (with satiation point, rationale behind ZLB) Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal C

  31. Slide 31: Model: Households

    Model Households Optimizing households maximize an intertemporal utility functional; the period utility function depends separably on a composite consumption good (external habit), leisure and real balances (with satiation point, rationale behind ZLB) We assume that a fraction ς of households are pu

  32. Slide 32: Model: Households

    Model Households Optimizing households maximize an intertemporal utility functional; the period utility function depends separably on a composite consumption good (external habit), leisure and real balances (with satiation point, rationale behind ZLB) We assume that a fraction ς of households are pu

  33. Slide 33: Model: Government

    Model Government Spend gt on the …nal consumption good (leakage); make lump-sum net transfers (tr ) to “O” and “HM” households Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 9 / 27

  34. Slide 34: Model: Government

    Model Government Spend gt on the …nal consumption good (leakage); make lump-sum net transfers (tr ) to “O” and “HM” households Government collect revenues from consumption (τ C ), capital (τ K ) and labor income taxes (τ N ,t ) Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2

  35. Slide 35: Model: Government

    Model Government Spend gt on the …nal consumption good (leakage); make lump-sum net transfers (tr ) to “O” and “HM” households Government collect revenues from consumption (τ C ), capital (τ K ) and labor income taxes (τ N ,t ) Monetary policy follows rule it = max f i, (1 γi ) (γπ π̃ t + γx x̃t ) +

  36. Slide 36: Model: Government

    Model Government Spend gt on the …nal consumption good (leakage); make lump-sum net transfers (tr ) to “O” and “HM” households Government collect revenues from consumption (τ C ), capital (τ K ) and labor income taxes (τ N ,t ) Monetary policy follows rule it = max f i, (1 γi ) (γπ π̃ t + γx x̃t ) +

  37. Slide 37: Parameterization of model

    Parameterization of model South 1/3 or currency union Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 10 / 27

  38. Slide 38: Parameterization of model

    Parameterization of model South 1/3 or currency union Import shares inspired by intra-Euro trade data for 2006-08 for PIGIS. South import share of output 14%, while North import share 7%, respectively. Import intensity of consumption 3/4 that of investment Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fis

  39. Slide 39: Parameterization of model

    Parameterization of model South 1/3 or currency union Import shares inspired by intra-Euro trade data for 2006-08 for PIGIS. South import share of output 14%, while North import share 7%, respectively. Import intensity of consumption 3/4 that of investment Fiscal ‡ows; G /Y = .23, Net transfers .2 o

  40. Slide 40: Parameterization of model

    Parameterization of model South 1/3 or currency union Import shares inspired by intra-Euro trade data for 2006-08 for PIGIS. South import share of output 14%, while North import share 7%, respectively. Import intensity of consumption 3/4 that of investment Fiscal ‡ows; G /Y = .23, Net transfers .2 o

  41. Slide 41: Parameterization of model

    Parameterization of model South 1/3 or currency union Import shares inspired by intra-Euro trade data for 2006-08 for PIGIS. South import share of output 14%, while North import share 7%, respectively. Import intensity of consumption 3/4 that of investment Fiscal ‡ows; G /Y = .23, Net transfers .2 o

  42. Slide 42: Parameterization of model

    Parameterization of model South 1/3 or currency union Import shares inspired by intra-Euro trade data for 2006-08 for PIGIS. South import share of output 14%, while North import share 7%, respectively. Import intensity of consumption 3/4 that of investment Fiscal ‡ows; G /Y = .23, Net transfers .2 o

  43. Slide 43: Parameterization of model

    Parameterization of model South 1/3 or currency union Import shares inspired by intra-Euro trade data for 2006-08 for PIGIS. South import share of output 14%, while North import share 7%, respectively. Import intensity of consumption 3/4 that of investment Fiscal ‡ows; G /Y = .23, Net transfers .2 o

  44. Slide 44: Effects of South consolidation in normal times

    E¤ects of South consolidation in normal times Nature of the …scal experiment Assume South debt target bGt +1 follows bGt +1 bGt = ρd1 (bGt bGt 1 ) ρd2 bGt + εd ,t , Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 11 / 27

  45. Slide 45: Effects of South consolidation in normal times

    E¤ects of South consolidation in normal times Nature of the …scal experiment Assume South debt target bGt +1 follows bGt +1 bGt = ρd1 (bGt bGt 1 ) ρd2 bGt + εd ,t , By setting ρd1 = 0.935 and ρd2 = 0.0001, this speci…cation implies that distance to new target level is reduced by half after 3 years,

  46. Slide 46: Effects of South consolidation in normal times

    E¤ects of South consolidation in normal times Nature of the …scal experiment Assume South debt target bGt +1 follows bGt +1 bGt = ρd1 (bGt bGt 1 ) ρd2 bGt + εd ,t , By setting ρd1 = 0.935 and ρd2 = 0.0001, this speci…cation implies that distance to new target level is reduced by half after 3 years,

  47. Slide 47: Effects of South consolidation in normal times

    E¤ects of South consolidation in normal times Nature of the …scal experiment Assume South debt target bGt +1 follows bGt +1 bGt = ρd1 (bGt bGt 1 ) ρd2 bGt + εd ,t , By setting ρd1 = 0.935 and ρd2 = 0.0001, this speci…cation implies that distance to new target level is reduced by half after 3 years,

  48. Slide 48: Effects of South consolidation in normal times

    E¤ects of South consolidation in normal times Nature of the …scal experiment Assume South debt target bGt +1 follows bGt +1 bGt = ρd1 (bGt bGt 1 ) ρd2 bGt + εd ,t , By setting ρd1 = 0.935 and ρd2 = 0.0001, this speci…cation implies that distance to new target level is reduced by half after 3 years,

  49. Slide 49: Effects of South consolidation in normal times

    E¤ects of South consolidation in normal times Comparing the e¤ects in a CU and with independent monetary policy We now consider a decrease in the long-run debt target by 25 percent of trend GDP Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 12 / 27

  50. Slide 50: Effects of South consolidation in normal times

    E¤ects of South consolidation in normal times Comparing the e¤ects in a CU and with independent monetary policy We now consider a decrease in the long-run debt target by 25 percent of trend GDP To understand the role of CU membership, we also present results when South is assumed to have monetary in

  51. Slide 51: Effects of South consolidation in normal times

    E¤ects of South consolidation in normal times Comparing the e¤ects in a CU and with independent monetary policy We now consider a decrease in the long-run debt target by 25 percent of trend GDP To understand the role of CU membership, we also present results when South is assumed to have monetary in

  52. Slide 52: Effects of South consolidation in normal times

    E¤ects of South consolidation in normal times Comparing the e¤ects in a CU and with independent monetary policy We now consider a decrease in the long-run debt target by 25 percent of trend GDP To understand the role of CU membership, we also present results when South is assumed to have monetary in

  53. Slide 53: Effects of South consolidation in normal times

    E¤ects of South consolidation in normal times Comparing the e¤ects in a currency union with monetary independence Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 13 / 27

  54. Slide 54: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap

    E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Baseline scenario which drives currency union into a liquidity trap To study the e¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap, we need to construct a baseline scenario Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 1

  55. Slide 55: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap

    E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Baseline scenario which drives currency union into a liquidity trap To study the e¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap, we need to construct a baseline scenario We assume that South and North are hit by common negative consumption demand

  56. Slide 56: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap

    E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Baseline scenario which drives currency union into a liquidity trap To study the e¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap, we need to construct a baseline scenario We assume that South and North are hit by common negative consumption demand

  57. Slide 57: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap

    E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Baseline scenario which drives currency union into a liquidity trap To study the e¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap, we need to construct a baseline scenario We assume that South and North are hit by common negative consumption demand

  58. Slide 58: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap

    E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Baseline scenario which drives currency union into a liquidity trap To study the e¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap, we need to construct a baseline scenario We assume that South and North are hit by common negative consumption demand

  59. Slide 59: Baseline Scenario in model

    Baseline Scenario in model Paths when interest rates are unconstrained and subject to ZLB Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 15 / 27

  60. Slide 60: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap

    E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Consolidation in CU in a liquidity trap and in normal times Against this background, we assume the government is assumed to adopt a lower debt target ( 25%) the …rst period the ZLB binds Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations O

  61. Slide 61: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap

    E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Consolidation in CU in a liquidity trap and in normal times Against this background, we assume the government is assumed to adopt a lower debt target ( 25%) the …rst period the ZLB binds Compute impact of lower debt target as scenario (baseline shock

  62. Slide 62: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap

    E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Consolidation in CU in a liquidity trap and in normal times Against this background, we assume the government is assumed to adopt a lower debt target ( 25%) the …rst period the ZLB binds Compute impact of lower debt target as scenario (baseline shock

  63. Slide 63: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap

    E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap E¤ects in a liquidity trap and in normal times when South is a CU member Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 17 / 27

  64. Slide 64: Contributions to South debt dynamics

    Contributions to South debt dynamics Debt dynamics in normal times and liquidity trap for spending cuts in CU Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 18 / 27

  65. Slide 65: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap

    E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap E¤ects depend importantly on the consolidation size In our framework with endogenous liquidity trap duration, the impact of austerity importantly depends on its size (Erceg and Lindé, 2010) Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidation

  66. Slide 66: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap

    E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap E¤ects depend importantly on the consolidation size In our framework with endogenous liquidity trap duration, the impact of austerity importantly depends on its size (Erceg and Lindé, 2010) To show this, we study di¤erently-sized debt target reductio

  67. Slide 67: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap

    E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Comparing three spending-based debt target reductions; 5, 15 and 25 (benchmark) p.p. Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 20 / 27

  68. Slide 68: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap

    E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Marginal output and debt multipliers depend importantly on expected liquidity trap duration Results show that the large consolidation size is key why spending-cuts are self-defeating in the near term in our setup. Explanation: Erceg and Lindé (Federa

  69. Slide 69: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap

    E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Marginal output and debt multipliers depend importantly on expected liquidity trap duration Results show that the large consolidation size is key why spending-cuts are self-defeating in the near term in our setup. Explanation: Adverse impact of small

  70. Slide 70: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap

    E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Marginal output and debt multipliers depend importantly on expected liquidity trap duration Results show that the large consolidation size is key why spending-cuts are self-defeating in the near term in our setup. Explanation: Adverse impact of small

  71. Slide 71: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap

    E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Marginal output and debt multipliers depend importantly on expected liquidity trap duration Results show that the large consolidation size is key why spending-cuts are self-defeating in the near term in our setup. Explanation: Adverse impact of small

  72. Slide 72: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap

    E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Marginal output and debt multipliers depend importantly on expected liquidity trap duration Results show that the large consolidation size is key why spending-cuts are self-defeating in the near term in our setup. Explanation: Adverse impact of small

  73. Slide 73: Effects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap

    E¤ects of South consolidation in a liquidity trap Output and gov’t debt marginal multipliers as function of liquidity trap duration Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 22 / 27

  74. Slide 74: Mixed Strategies

    Mixed Strategies Assessing the e¤ects of consolidations involving both spending and taxes So far, we have assumed that South pursue either pure spending- or tax-based consolidation strategies Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 23 / 27

  75. Slide 75: Mixed Strategies

    Mixed Strategies Assessing the e¤ects of consolidations involving both spending and taxes So far, we have assumed that South pursue either pure spending- or tax-based consolidation strategies Now, we assess the merits of two alternative “mixed strategies”, involving both spending-cuts and tax hikes

  76. Slide 76: Mixed Strategies

    Mixed Strategies Assessing the e¤ects of consolidations involving both spending and taxes So far, we have assumed that South pursue either pure spending- or tax-based consolidation strategies Now, we assess the merits of two alternative “mixed strategies”, involving both spending-cuts and tax hikes

  77. Slide 77: Mixed Strategies

    Mixed Strategies Assessing the e¤ects of consolidations involving both spending and taxes So far, we have assumed that South pursue either pure spending- or tax-based consolidation strategies Now, we assess the merits of two alternative “mixed strategies”, involving both spending-cuts and tax hikes

  78. Slide 78: Mixed Strategies

    Mixed Strategies Assessing the e¤ects of consolidations involving both spending and taxes So far, we have assumed that South pursue either pure spending- or tax-based consolidation strategies Now, we assess the merits of two alternative “mixed strategies”, involving both spending-cuts and tax hikes

  79. Slide 79: Mixed Strategies

    Mixed Strategies Assessing the e¤ects of consolidations involving both spending and taxes So far, we have assumed that South pursue either pure spending- or tax-based consolidation strategies Now, we assess the merits of two alternative “mixed strategies”, involving both spending-cuts and tax hikes

  80. Slide 80: Mixed Strategies

    Mixed Strategies E¤ects of “Mixed Strategies” Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 24 / 27

  81. Slide 81: Concluding remarks

    Concluding remarks Our analysis points towards an important short- and long-term trade-o¤ between spending- and tax-based consolidations in CU, especially when a large subset of members undertakes large consolidations in a long-lived liquidity trap Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Cons

  82. Slide 82: Concluding remarks

    Concluding remarks Our analysis points towards an important short- and long-term trade-o¤ between spending- and tax-based consolidations in CU, especially when a large subset of members undertakes large consolidations in a long-lived liquidity trap Spending based approach preferable in the long-run,

  83. Slide 83: Concluding remarks

    Concluding remarks Our analysis points towards an important short- and long-term trade-o¤ between spending- and tax-based consolidations in CU, especially when a large subset of members undertakes large consolidations in a long-lived liquidity trap Spending based approach preferable in the long-run,

  84. Slide 84: Concluding remarks

    Concluding remarks Our analysis points towards an important short- and long-term trade-o¤ between spending- and tax-based consolidations in CU, especially when a large subset of members undertakes large consolidations in a long-lived liquidity trap Spending based approach preferable in the long-run,

  85. Slide 85: Sensitivity analysis

    Sensitivity analysis Assessing the e¤ects of endogenous sovereign spreads So far, we have assumed that government and banks borrow at the same rate (it ) in both South and North Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 26 / 27

  86. Slide 86: Sensitivity analysis

    Sensitivity analysis Assessing the e¤ects of endogenous sovereign spreads So far, we have assumed that government and banks borrow at the same rate (it ) in both South and North We now explore the consequences of assuming that government and banks in South is subject to the following premium itS it

  87. Slide 87: Sensitivity analysis

    Sensitivity analysis Assessing the e¤ects of endogenous sovereign spreads So far, we have assumed that government and banks borrow at the same rate (it ) in both South and North We now explore the consequences of assuming that government and banks in South is subject to the following premium itS it

  88. Slide 88: Sensitivity analysis

    Sensitivity analysis Assessing the e¤ects of endogenous sovereign spreads So far, we have assumed that government and banks borrow at the same rate (it ) in both South and North We now explore the consequences of assuming that government and banks in South is subject to the following premium itS it

  89. Slide 89: Sensitivity analysis

    Sensitivity analysis Assessing the e¤ects of endogenous sovereign spreads So far, we have assumed that government and banks borrow at the same rate (it ) in both South and North We now explore the consequences of assuming that government and banks in South is subject to the following premium itS it

  90. Slide 90: Sensitivity analysis

    Sensitivity analysis Assessing the e¤ects of endogenous sovereign spreads So far, we have assumed that government and banks borrow at the same rate (it ) in both South and North We now explore the consequences of assuming that government and banks in South is subject to the following premium itS it

  91. Slide 91: Sensitivity analysis

    Sensitivity analysis E¤ects of endogenous sovereign spreads when Small South consolidates Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations October, 2012 27 / 27

Banque Nationale De Belgique — presentatie erceg on 6ix