Hess Corporation

Hess — Proxy Contest (April 2013)

161 slides from Hess's proxy contest presentation, Apr 17, 2013

  1. Slide 1: There Are Fundamental, Deep-Rooted Problems at Hess

    Elliott Management’s Perspectives: There Are Fundamental, Deep-Rooted Problems at Hess Shareholder Nominees Acknowledge The Problems and Can Fix Them April 2013 www.ReassessHess.com

  2. Slide 2: Additional Information

    Additional Information Elliott Associates, L.P. and Elliott International, L.P. (“Elliott”) filed a definitive proxy statement and an accompanying proxy card with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 3, 2013 to be used to solicit proxies in connection with the 2013 Annual Meeting of Stock

  3. Slide 3: Table of Contents

    Table of Contents (1) Change is Necessary 3  There Are Fundamental Problems at Hess 7  Culture of Avoiding Accountability 53  Hess Reacts Defensively and Fails to Address Its Problems 84 (2) Shareholder Nominees Acknowledge The Problems and Can Fix Them 109  Harvey Golub: Setting a Focused Strat

  4. Slide 4: Timeline of Events: Hess Relative Performance Since January 2011

    Timeline of Events: Hess Relative Performance Since January 2011(1) 110 Hess Announces on March 4, 2013: 4Q12 Earnings:  Plan to divest Energy Marketing, Retail,  Company announces that major moves to Hetco, and certain E&P assets and to reshape p pportfolio have been announced MLP Bakken infrastr

  5. Slide 5: Elliott owns 4.52% of Hess stock

    Elliott owns 4.52% of Hess stock, valued at over $1 billion. Hess is our largest initial equity investment in our 36 36-year year history. Our belief in the potential of Hess is demonstrated by the substantial investment we have made in the Company. [4]

  6. Slide 6: Great Assets Worth $39 to $50 Billion in Value

    Great Assets Worth $39 to $50 billion in Value / $96 to 128 per Share(1) Bakken Value Continues to Increase Elliott Estimates $92 Unconventionals Large, un-replicable and highly desirable position $90 in core of Bakken, a premier U.S. oil resource play $88  W.D. W D Von Gonten study concluded Hess

  7. Slide 7: Fundamental problems at Hess

    The simple truth is one widely recognized in the oil & gas industry: there are fundamental problems at Hess. Despite terrific assets, the Company continues  to lack a focused strategy,  to experience persistent operational issues,  to engage in woefully flawed capital allocation allocation, and 

  8. Slide 8: There Are Fundamental Problems at Hess

    There Are Fundamental Problems at Hess

  9. Slide 9: Fundamental Problems at Hess: Underperformance

    Fundamental Problems at Hess Unrelenting U ee t gU Underperformance de pe o a ce Lack of Focus Undisciplined Capital Allocation Operational Mismanagement Endless Ineffective Restructurings Abysmal Governance Culture [8]

  10. Slide 10: Hess Has Failed to Deliver Returns to Shareholders

    Hess Has Failed to Deliver Returns to Shareholders Shareholders. Hess Has Underperformed:  By Any Objective Measure,  Over Any Relevant Time Period, and  Against Any Pertinent Benchmark [9]

  11. Slide 11: Unrelenting Underperformance, Including Most Recent Transformation

    Unrelenting Underperformance, Including Most Recent “Transformation” Meanwhile, CEO Shifts Time Period He Wants Shareholders to Evaluate “You can't judge us on a one-year basis. You have to do it “Since July 24, 2012, the last day of trading before we over the long term.” announced our updated strat

  12. Slide 12: Hess Should Have Easily Outperformed Given Low Gas Exposure

    Hess Should Have Easily Outperformed Given Its Low Exposure to North American Natural Gas and Highest Oil Weighting of Any Peer Peer… Hess’s low exposure to N.A. natural gas means minimal impact from collapsing natural gas prices $9.00 U.S. Natural Gas Prices Since 2008(1) % Production from N. Ameri

  13. Slide 13: And Material Position in the Bakken

    …And And Material Position in the Bakken Bakken, a Premier U U.S. S Oil Resource Play  Despite stock price of Bakken operators increasing ~1,100% since 2008…  Despite Continental Resources (a Bakken pure play with equivalent acreage to Hess) creating $10 billion of market capitalization over the l

  14. Slide 14: Hess Constantly Switches Proxy Peers But Continues to Underperform

    Hess Constantly Switches Proxy Peers But Continues to Underperform Over the last five years, Hess has dropped 6 peers and added 5 new peers out of an original peer set of 16 companies (a churn of 69%).(1) Still, underperformance is clear. Hess Over (Under) Performance vs Proxy Peers(2) 5-Year 3-Year

  15. Slide 15: Underperforms Even Against More Integrated Peers

    Underperforms Even Against More Integrated Peers—Peers Who Have Downstream Operations That Have Not Benefited From Oil Price Increase In recent materials to Shareholders, Hess measures itself on a 10 year basis against only 6 of its 9 integrated proxy peers. Average market cap of these 6 is over 11x

  16. Slide 16: Most Relevant Peers Are Anadarko, Noble, Conoco, and Marathon

    Most Relevant Peers are Anadarko, Noble, Conoco, and Marathon Hess Has Dramatically Underperformed Them All Anadarko ConocoPhillips (COP / PSX) 17 Years 5-Year 5 Year 4-Year 4 Year 3-Year 3 Year 2-Year 2 Year 1-Year 1 Year 17 Years 5-Year 5 Year 4-Year 4 Year 3-Year 3 Year 2-Year 2 Year 1-Year 1 Yea

  17. Slide 17: Hess's Most Relevant Comparable in the Bakken is Continental

    Hess’s Most Relevant Comparable in the Bakken is Continental Continental Generated $10 Billion in Market Cap While Hess Went Nowhere 2009-2012(1) Hess Continental Increase in Bakken Production ~55 000 boe/d ~55,000 ~56 700 boe/d ~56,700 Despite similar production growth Equity Issued $0.7bn $1.0bn …

  18. Slide 18: Fundamental Problems at Hess: Lack of Focus

    Fundamental Problems at Hess Unrelenting U ee t gU Underperformance de pe o a ce Lack of Focus Undisciplined Capital Allocation Operational Mismanagement Endless Ineffective Restructurings Abysmal Governance Culture [ 17 ]

  19. Slide 19: Multitude of Businesses and Geographies Demonstrates Lack of Focus

    Multitude of Businesses and Geographies Demonstrates Lack of Focus That Results in Hess Being Subscale in Nearly Every Area in Which It Competes Laundry List of Non-Upstream Distractions Laundry List of Upstream Locations  Dotted line indicates divestiture announced after Jan 25, 2013  Upstream op

  20. Slide 20: Hess Upstream Operations Remain Spread Across 4x As Many Countries

    Compared to Peers of Similar Market Cap Size and Even Pro Forma for Hess Divestitures Announced or Completed, Hess Upstream Operations Remain Spread Across 4x As Many Countries Company Market Cap(1) Countries Listed in 10K Countries with Significant Operations(2) Size Multiple of Number % of Hess Nu

  21. Slide 21: Management Has Failed to Articulate a Rational Strategy for Portfolio

    Management Has Failed to Articulate a Rational Strategy for Portfolio Management wants to run a global conglomerate “In terms of exploration and production, we are different “We want to maintain our global presence and our global than the other independents. We are the most global.” reach because we

  22. Slide 22: Hess Is Not a Major and Should Not be Run Like One

    Hess Is Not a Major and Should Not be Run Like One “We We have the portfolio of a major major, we have the technical challenges of a major major…” John Hess, June 2010(1) Hess is NOT a major  It is 1/23rd the size of Exxon and 1/12th the size of Chevron  Yet, CEO is adamant in running Hess as thou

  23. Slide 23: Fundamental Problems at Hess: Capital Allocation

    Fundamental Problems at Hess Unrelenting U ee t gU Underperformance de pe o a ce Lack of Focus Undisciplined Capital Allocation Operational Mismanagement Endless Ineffective Restructurings Abysmal Governance Culture [ 22 ]

  24. Slide 24: Why Capital Allocation Is Critical at Hess

    Why Capital Allocation Is Critical at Hess …More than 25% of Shareholders’ investment is reinvested each year: y 5 Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average Capital Spending as % 17% 18% 30% 32% 47% 28% of Average Market Cap 2013 Capital Spending as % of = 26% Current Market Capitalization(1) Future cap

  25. Slide 25: No Discipline of Returning Cash to Shareholders

    No Discipline of Returning Cash to Shareholders… Shareholders Despite Brent prices more than quadrupling…  Bottom quartile among peers in returning cash to shareholders  Hess has not repurchased shares in over a decade 2002-2012 Dividend CAGR 2002-2012 Cash Return as % of Current Market Cap(1) 100

  26. Slide 26: Lost Over $4 Billion in Exploration in Last Five Years

    Lost Over $4 Billion in Exploration in Last Five Years Hess has squandered billions on adventures around the globe  Wood Mackenzie calculates that Hess has lost $4 billion of value from its exploration investment over the last 5 years(1)  Hess has squandered billions and provided zero recognition

  27. Slide 27: Lost $6.7 Billion in a Hedging Program Nine Times Worse Than Peers

    Lost $6.7 $6 7 Billion in a Hedging Program Nine Times Worse Than Its Peers Cumulative Realized Gains Realized Gains (Losses) Hedging (Losses) as % of E&P RRevenues Realized Hedging Performance 2002-2012(1) Anadarko $1.4bn 1% 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 Apache ($0.4)bn 0% $0 BP None/NM NA ($200) C

  28. Slide 28: Symptomatic of Poor Capital Discipline, Hess Engages in Prop Trading

    Symptomatic of Poor Capital Discipline Discipline, Hess Engages in Prop Trading Separate from hedging production, Hess also owns a hedge fund (HETCO) and engages in prop trading. WHY? Hedging Production Lost 9% of E&P revenue while peers gained ~1% of E&P revenue HETCO (Hedge Fund) Trades public equ

  29. Slide 29: Fundamental Problems at Hess: Operational Mismanagement

    Fundamental Problems at Hess Unrelenting U ee t gU Underperformance de pe o a ce Lack of Focus Undisciplined Capital Allocation Operational Mismanagement Endless Ineffective Restructurings Abysmal Governance Culture [ 28 ]

  30. Slide 30: Why Is Hess Headquartered in Manhattan?

    Why Is Hess Headquartered in Manhattan? Resulting in Top Leadership Being Out of Touch with Energy Industry ~25% of CVX 2012 U.S. Production in CA New York City S R San Ramon Denver Los Angeles Tulsa Oklahoma kl h City ~20% of OXY 2012 El Dorado Plano Production in CA Irving Midland Fort Worth The W

  31. Slide 31: Unable to Control Well Costs in Resource Plays

    Unable to Control Well Costs in Resource Plays, Hess Has Switched to a Completion Design Peers Refuse to Use in Similar Acreage In 1H 2012, Hess well costs were 39% above Continental when drilling same type of well Plug and Perf Completion Design(1) $13.0 $12.5 $12.0 Frac Method Plug & Perf Plug & P

  32. Slide 32: Ability to Control Well Cost Is Critical to Realizing Asset Value

    Ability to Control Well Cost Is Critical to Realizing Asset Value for Shareholders Resource plays require high number of wells to be drilled efficiently. Hess has struggled. asted millions on Bakken well  Hess wasted ell costs  In 2012, Hess underestimated its Bakken costs by $1 billion; having to

  33. Slide 33: Unable to Manage Rig Program Commensurate with Size of Acreage Position

    Unable to Manage Rig Program Commensurate with Size of Acreage Position Result is Destruction of NPV Potential and Decelerating Production Growth Hess’s inability to operate a rig program comparable to …as evidenced by slower production peers of its size results in $2.5 billion of forgone value… gro

  34. Slide 34: Hess Is Not Matching Peers in Maximizing Bakken's Future Potential

    Burdened by Yesterday’s Issues, Hess Is Not Matching its Peers in Working to Maximize Bakken Bakken’s s Future Potential Continental Accelerating A l ti L Lower Th Three • 20 wells to define the productivity of 2nd, 3rd and 4th Forks Exploration Program benches of the Three Forks across 75x60 miles(

  35. Slide 35: Inability to Make Most of Opportunities Shown in Eagle Ford

    Inability to Make Most of Corporate Opportunities Demonstrated in Eagle Ford Hess Not Only Failed to Capture Opportunity, Opportunity Hess Lost $771 Million Hess entered the Eagle Ford in 2010 and lost money. The Eagle Ford is one of the premier U.S. liquids resource plays and has seen a dramatic ri

  36. Slide 36: Fundamental Problems at Hess: Ineffective Restructurings

    Fundamental Problems at Hess Unrelenting U ee t gU Underperformance de pe o a ce Lack of Focus Undisciplined Capital Allocation Operational Mismanagement Endless Ineffective Restructurings Abysmal Governance Culture [ 35 ]

  37. Slide 37: Endless Ineffective Restructurings That Result in Further Underperformance

    Endless Ineffective Restructurings That Result in Further Underperformance “Will perpetual restructuring mode ever end?” - Goldman Sachs, October 2003(1) (nearly 10 years ago!) 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Span of Announced Restructur

  38. Slide 38: Today Shareholders Are Told of Hess's 7th Attempted Restructuring

    Today Shareholders Are Told of Hess’s 7th Attempted Restructuring Like Prior Restructurings, Restructurings There Is No Clear Beginning or End When did this “5” year restructuring begin and when will it end? When will it end? What? Ignore comments “…the major moves to reshape our It began in 2010? f

  39. Slide 39: Contradictory Statements Prove Recent Plan Is Not Thoroughly Reviewed

    Contradictory Statements Proves That Recent Plan Is Not Product of Thorough and Thoughtful Review “…the strategic infrastructure we have in North Dakota, having control of that adds a lot of value…that’s not something we would be interested in MLPing…Energy Marketing and Retail Marketing remain a lo

  40. Slide 40: Not Capable of Refocusing Exploration

    Not Capable of Refocusing Exploration Exploration Strategy 2003 Exploration Strategy 2012 “We are transitioning away from a program that existed for us in the “We were known as a very high-impact explorer. I think we can say that past, and towards a program which concentrates on high-impact that str

  41. Slide 41: Unable to Live Within Cash Flow

    Unable to Live Within Cash Flow “…The key to [profitable growth] will be [that] we will be able to live within our means and deliver, I think, very attractive financial returns on a going forward basis as I said.” - John Hess Hess, July 2012(1) Shareholders have heard this too many times before Hist

  42. Slide 42: Persistent Inability to Deliver Returns to Shareholders

    Persistant Inability to Deliver Returns to Shareholders “It should be obvious that we have made a lot of moves with a multi-year strategy to put our company in a position to generate long-term shareholder value, that we look at things for all shareholders benefit.” - John Hess, January 2013(1) What

  43. Slide 43: Fundamental Problems at Hess: Governance Culture

    Fundamental Problems at Hess Unrelenting U ee t gU Underperformance de pe o a ce Lack of Focus Undisciplined Capital Allocation Operational Mismanagement Endless Ineffective Restructurings Abysmal Governance Culture [ 42 ]

  44. Slide 44: History of Abysmal Governance Culture at Hess

    History of Abysmal Governance Culture at Hess Corporate governance failures under John Hess’s tenure  Staggered St d Board B d  Multiple attempts by Shareholders to destagger Board likely blocked by John Hess p  Compensation  Management and directors awarded $540 million while underperforming pe

  45. Slide 45: Current Board Exemplifies Lack of Adequate Director Oversight

    Current Board Exemplifies Lack of Adequate Director Oversight Continues Trend That Has Been in Place During Entire Tenure of Current Chairman & CEO Least independent, least energy experience, most management directors and one of the longest tenures 35% 14 yrs Hess Peer Average(3) 30% 25% 12 yrs 20%

  46. Slide 46: Hess Has Made No Attempt to Refresh Its Board

    Hess Has Made No Attempt to Refresh Its Board Until Shareholder Nominees Stepped Forward  Not a single non-management director has retired from the Hess Board since 2003  The average tenure of a director when stepping off the Hess Board is 17 years  Hess has never had even one independent directo

  47. Slide 47: Board and Management Received $540 Million in Compensation

    Board and Management Received $540 Million in Compensation While Delivering Unrelenting Underperformance Hess Over (Under) Performance(2,3) $540mm Paid to Board and Management John Hess Tenure  Compensation to John Hess: $195mm(1) 17 Years 5-Year 4-Year 3-Year 2-Year 1-Year vs Proxy Peers (333)% (3

  48. Slide 48: Unresponsive to Wide Criticism on Pay for Performance

    Unresponsive to Wide Criticism That Company Lacks Pay for Performance… Performance Shareholders object to Hess compensation Proxy advisors critical of Hess pay policies 2012 Say on Pay Support(1) “Shareholder returns continue to underperform peers similar in size and industry (as well as the broad i

  49. Slide 49: Misaligned Compensation Has Persisted for Years

    … And Misaligned Compensation Has Persisted for Years “ISS' quantitative analysis indicates that CEO pay significantly outranked peer companies within similar sector and size ranges, while 1- and 3-year TSRs were at or near the bottom ranking of the same peer group. Specifically, relative TSR perfor

  50. Slide 50: Culture of Coziness Undermines Credibility of Board

    Culture of Coziness Undermines Credibility of Board to Select Nominees; External Nominees Required Kean Walker Mullin III Franklin Leon Hess Mutual Estate Hill Brady White Mountain Dillon Read Insurance Olson Holiday John Hess Government NUI Matthews Bodman Overlap Lavizzo- Nunn Mourey Johnson Weath

  51. Slide 51: Independent Directors Paid Millions to Serve as Joint Executors

    Hess’s Boardroom Deems This Appropriate: 3 “Independent” Directors Are Paid Millions to Serve As Joint Executors of John Hess’s Hess s Family Estate Nicholas Brady y Thomas Kean John Mullin III Lead Independent p Director Independent p Director Lead Independent p Director AND AND AND Joint-Executor,

  52. Slide 52: Shareholders Have Tried to Hold Hess Accountable

    Shareholders Have Tried to Hold Hess Accountable Withholding votes on directors Trying to de-stagger Board Objecting via Say on Pay Most Recent Votes Withheld From Directors(1) % of Total Shares Voted for Declassification(3) Say on Pay Support(4) Brady 2012 S&P 500 Kean 2010 Olson Energy 2008 Compan

  53. Slide 53: John Hess Shares Prevented Directors from Becoming Accountable

    37mm Shares Prevented All Directors from Becoming Accountable …And And John Hess Had 37mm Shares How did John Hess vote in 2008? How will John Hess vote this year?  De-staggering the Hess Board requires  In 2012, Shareholders again backed de- 80% of outstanding (not just voting) staggering the Boa

  54. Slide 54: Culture of Avoiding Accountability

    Culture of Avoiding Accountability

  55. Slide 55: With Disclosure Comes Accountability

    With Disclosure Comes Accountability: Denial Is Easy When There Is No Disclosure No Analyst Day for nearly 7 years N b off Analyst Number A l t Days D or U Update d t CCalls ll 2007-2013 2007 2013(1) 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 0 for Hess 1 ?!?! 0 Hess Proxy Peers Revised Proxy Peers Number u be of o Pages ages i

  56. Slide 56: Culture of Avoiding Accountability

    Culture of Avoiding Accountability Deny Stock Performance Deny y Lack of Focus Deny Undisciplined Capital Allocation Deny Operational Mismanagement Deny Abysmal Governance Culture Recognition of reality, and the accountability that comes with it at a public company, seem to be precisely what Hess’s

  57. Slide 57: Hess Tells Shareholders to Only Remember Last Six Months

    Despite 17 Year Tenure of CEO and 13 Year Average Tenure of the Board, Hess Tells Shareholders to Only Remember Last Six Months “Since July 24, 2012, the last day of trading before we announced our updated strategy, Hess shares have increased...” - John Hess Hess, January 28 28, 2013(1) 120 1/25/13

  58. Slide 58: Hess Chooses July Start Date and Ignores Impact of Dividends

    Hess Chooses July Start Date Because It Is Near 5 Year Low… …And And in Materials to Shareholders Shareholders, Hess Ignores Impact of Dividends Date chosen by Hess to start calculation of its performance $90 $85 $ $80 $75 $70 $65 $60 $55 $50 $45 $40 $35 Since Hess has paid limited dividends, exclus

  59. Slide 59: Hess Uses Misleading Chart That Ignores Relevant Peers

    In Materials to Shareholders, Hess Uses Misleading Chart That Ignores Relevant Peers and Hides Impact of Oil Prices Absolute performance and comparison to S&P 500 inappropriately ignores dramatic increase in oil prices and material underperformance versus peers 800% John Hess Brent Price S&P 500 T T

  60. Slide 60: Hess Has Underperformed the S&P 500 Over 5 Years

    And Even If Hess Does Want to Be Compared Against the S&P 500 It Has Underperformed Dramatically Over the Last 5 Years Over the last five years, Hess has underperformed the S&P 500 by 33% to 58%, despite Brent oil prices increasing over 20% during this period(1) – 3x the performance of the S&P 500(2

  61. Slide 61: Hess Hides Behind Analyst Price Targets

    Hess Hides Behind Analyst Price Targets That Price in Management Mediocrity Hess’s March 4th presentation points to Wall Street price targets as justification that nothing is wrong… Yet these targets merely reflect Hess’s poor execution  Two years ago, Hess’s price target was $100 / share  Poor ex

  62. Slide 62: Culture of Avoiding Accountability

    Culture of Avoiding Accountability Deny Stock Performance Deny y Lack of Focus Deny Undisciplined Capital Allocation Deny Operational Mismanagement Deny Abysmal Governance Culture Recognition of reality, and the accountability that comes with it at a public company, seem to be precisely what Hess’s

  63. Slide 63: Claiming Absurd Synergies

    Claiming Absurd Synergies Synergies, Hess Views Disparate Asset Base as a Strength Hess claims it is “realizing synergies from the transfer of technical skills and operating capabilities globally.”(1) If that is the case, then… Why is Hess a less efficient operator in unconventional plays than indep

  64. Slide 64: Culture of Avoiding Accountability

    Culture of Avoiding Accountability Deny Stock Performance Deny y Lack of Focus Deny Undisciplined Capital Allocation Deny Operational Mismanagement Deny Abysmal Governance Culture Recognition of reality, and the accountability that comes with it at a public company, seem to be precisely what Hess’s

  65. Slide 65: Hess Falsely Claims Conventional Assets Funded Bakken Opportunity

    Hess Falsely Claims Conventional Assets Funded Bakken Opportunity “…our conventional portfolio generate[s] the cash needed to fund the unconventional growth that we have in the Bakken and the Utica.” John Hess, January 2013(1) [ 64 ] 1. 4Q 2012 Earnings call January 30, 2013

  66. Slide 66: Reality: Bakken Was Funded By Hess Balance Sheet

    Reality: Bakken Was Funded By Hess Balance Sheet Hess(1) Continental(2) 2009-2012 Reality Increase in Bakken Production ~55 55,000 000 boe/d ~56 56,700 700 boe/d Despite D it similar i il production d ti growth, th and d Increase in Bakken Net Acreage ~155,000 ~560,000 acquiring 72% fewer acres Capi

  67. Slide 67: Where Did Cash From Conventional Assets Go?

    Where Did Cash From Conventional Assets Go? Cash did not go to shareholders… 2009-2012 Cash Return as % of Current Market Cap(1) 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% COP 46% XOM 28% TOT 25% DVN 21% STL 19% RDSA 18% BP 17% CVX 14% MUR 13% MRO 12% Instead cash used on Instead, on… OXY 10% TLM 10%

  68. Slide 68: Culture of Avoiding Accountability

    Culture of Avoiding Accountability Deny Stock Performance Deny y Lack of Focus Deny Undisciplined Capital Allocation Deny Operational Mismanagement Deny Abysmal Governance Culture Recognition of reality, and the accountability that comes with it at a public company, seem to be precisely what Hess’s

  69. Slide 69: Hess Falsely Claims It Is Lowest Cost Bakken Operator

    Hess Falsely Claims It Is Lowest Cost Bakken Operator “…our well costs now rank us among the lowest cost and best in our peer group ” group. John Hess, March 2013(1) [ 68 ] 1. Hess business update call, March 4, 2013

  70. Slide 70: Reality: Hess Is Not Low Cost Operator

    Reality: Hess Is Not Low Cost Operator; Like for Like Like, Hess Remains Higher Cost Plug and Perf Completion Design(1) Sliding Sleeve Completion Design(2) Hess well costs 39% above Continental Hess well costs 17% to 38% above Whiting 1H’12 drilling the same type of well 4Q’12 drilling the same type

  71. Slide 71: Culture of Avoiding Accountability

    Culture of Avoiding Accountability Deny Stock Performance Deny y Lack of Focus Deny Undisciplined Capital Allocation Deny Operational Mismanagement Deny Abysmal Governance Culture Recognition of reality, and the accountability that comes with it at a public company, seem to be precisely what Hess’s

  72. Slide 72: New Lead Independent Director Just as Independent as the Last One

    Hess Claims It is “Mindful” of Governance, Yet… New Lead “Independent” Independent Director Just as “Independent” Independent as the Last One On March 4th Hess announced the appointment of a new lead “independent” director… Former Lead Independent Director New Lead Independent Director Nicholas Brad

  73. Slide 73: Management Nominees Appear Picked for Concurrence on a Plan

    Management Nominees Appear to Be Picked for Their Concurrence on a Plan That Supposedly Predates Them by 3 to 17 Years Management Nominees: Shareholder Nominees: Handpicked for Concurrence? Independent “These independent directors agreed to join our board, because they believe in our outstanding pla

  74. Slide 74: Quigley Placed on Board Without a Vote

    Quigley Was Placed on Board in March 2013 Without a Vote, Despite Shareholders Continually Calling for Destaggering of the Board Management Nominee James H. Quigley  Former CEO, Deloitte Upstream Oil & Gas Restructuring Experience Operating Experience None None For over 5 y years,, shareholders hav

  75. Slide 75: Culture of Avoiding Accountability

    Culture of Avoiding Accountability Deny Stock Performance Deny y Lack of Focus Deny Undisciplined Capital Allocation Deny Operational Mismanagement Deny Abysmal Governance Culture Recognition of reality, and the accountability that comes with it at a public company, seem to be precisely what Hess’s

  76. Slide 76: Everyone Else Acknowledges Their Existence

    While Hess May Deny These Problems, Everyone Else Acknowledges Their Existence. [ 75 ]

  77. Slide 77: Market Has Acknowledged That Fundamental Problems Exist at Hess

    Market Has Acknowledged That Fundamental Problems Exist at Hess Hess… “HES has been what we call a ‘value trap’ for some time.” Societe Generale (January 30, 2013) “In multiple client conversations throughout the day we found literally no one that defended the shape, nor global strategy of Hess.” De

  78. Slide 78: And Has Done So For a Long Time

    …And And Has Done So For a Long Time “The large variability in capex versus original guidance (just set six months ago) demonstrates some lack of capital discipline within the company.” Citigroup (July 25, 2012) “On the upstream side, we question whether the company has the bandwidth to operate in o

  79. Slide 79: A Really Long Time

    …A A Really Long Time “To summarize, the key growth assets underperform, expectations are lowered, and a key investor fear – Hess’s propensity to outspend cash flow – is stoked by an early upward revision to the 2012 budget.” Deutsche Bank (April 25, 2012) “Flowing “Fl i through th h ffrom th the hi

  80. Slide 80: A Really, Really Long Time

    …A A Really Really, Really Long Time “We think the frequency of HES’s analyst meetings could be increased. How about biannual?” Merrill Lynch (May 22, 2006) “The keyy q question,, in our view,, going g g forward is whether Hess is starting g to spread p itself too thin via a g growing gpproject j p

  81. Slide 81: A Really, Really, Really Long Time

    …A A Really Really, Really, Really Really Long Time “Hess’s near-term strategic outlook is fairly clear-cut: the company must improve. [Hess] will need to regain project management credibility after disappointing results…” Bank of America (January 6, 2004) “Having lagged the recent rebound in the se

  82. Slide 82: Back into the Early Part of the Last Decade

    …Back Back into the Early Part of the Last Decade “The continued string of negative news has left management with some work to do to rebuild investor confidence.” Bank of America Credit Research (January 31, 2003) “We belie believe e Hess sho should ld trade at a 5% 5%-10% 10% discount disco nt to t

  83. Slide 83: Even Back into the Twentieth Century

    …Even Even Back into the Twentieth Century “In 2003, Hess’s ROACE of 7.6% is the lowest in its peer group and is well below Hess’s cost of capital of 10%-12%.” UBS Warburg (September 22, 2000) “Hess’s consistently poor returns…” UBS Warburg (September 22, 2000) “Hess announced a broad-based restruct

  84. Slide 84: Hess's problems are deeply rooted, pervasive, and fundamental

    Hess’s Hess s problems are deeply rooted, pervasive, and fundamental. [ 83 ]

  85. Slide 85: Hess Reacted Defensively and Has Failed to Address Its Problems

    Elliott Put Forward a Proposal in January: Hess Reacted Defensively and Has Failed to Address Its Problems

  86. Slide 86: Elliott Put Forward a Proposal and Hess Reacted Defensively

    Elliott Put Forward a Proposal and Hess Reacted Defensively with No Engagement or Genuine Analysis Elliott Presentation Hess Response January 29th March 4th Shareholder  Elect the five world-class nominees  Rejected  Pushed out all five directors originally up Nominees for election  Found five n

  87. Slide 87: Fellow Shareholder Also Finds Hess Reaction Misleading and Defensive

    Fellow Shareholder Also Finds Hess Reaction “Misleading, Self-Serving, and Defensive Defensive” “…We find many of your responses to the shareholders’ concerns to be misleading, self serving, and defensive…Given the inconsistencies in many of your recent communications, we expect that the shareholder

  88. Slide 88: Hess Pulled Slate Originally Up for Election

    Hess Pulled Slate Originally Up for Election Found New Nominees Willing to Agree to Hess Plan Original slate severely lacked operating experience, independence, and had long tenure Hess Slate Oil & Gas Ten re Tenure Independence Shareholder Vote Operating ??? Withheld in Last Experience Election (20

  89. Slide 89: What Shareholders Want Is For All Directors to Be Accountable

    What Shareholders Really Want Is For All Directors to Be Accountable Proper Comparison Is Hess’s Hess s New Nominees Against Incumbent Board Hess’s New Nominees Incumbents Name Age Return Tenure Background William Schrader (1) (2) Over Tenure(2) John Krenicki Jr. John Hess 58 (460%) 35 / 17 Hess Cha

  90. Slide 90: Hess Claims Process to Update Directors Began Last August

    Hess Claims Process to Update Directors Began Last August But Hess Pushed Out Sam Nunn Who Was Actually Added in August Before Shareholder Nominee Involvement After Shareholder Nominee Involvement “Hess Corporation p ((NYSE: HES)) announced “We are also adding…directors g to the board. Last today th

  91. Slide 91: Hess Claimed Its Reaction Was a Plan in Place for Years

    Hess Claimed Its Reaction Was a Plan That Had Been in Place for Years “We We have had this strategic transformation transformation…underway underway really going back back, not only since I became Chairman and we started to shift to E&P, but predominantly when we started to build our Bakken position

  92. Slide 92: First Dividend Increase or Share Buyback in a Decade

    Yet This Is the First Dividend Increase or Share Buyback in a Decade Yet, Hess Dividends(1) Authorized Share Buybacks as % of Market Cap(1)(2) $ $1.00 18% 16% $0.90 14% $0.80 12% $0.70 10% $0.60 8% 6% $0.50 4% $0.40 2% $0.30 0% 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014E 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013-2

  93. Slide 93: Hess Had Called Restructuring Plan Complete

    Before Shareholder Nominee Involvement: Hess Had Called Restructuring Plan Complete Before Shareholder Nominee Involvement After Shareholder Nominee Involvement “We have had this strategic transformation… Question on January 2013 earnings call: underway really going back…since I became Chairman… In

  94. Slide 94: Bakken Midstream MLP Was Inappropriate

    Before Shareholder Nominee Involvement: Bakken Midstream MLP Was Inappropriate Before Shareholder Nominee Involvement After Shareholder Nominee Involvement “…the strategic infrastructure we have in “Today we are announcing the culmination of North Dakota…the Tioga Gas Plant…that's not that process…S

  95. Slide 95: Energy Marketing and Retail Was Strategic

    Before Shareholder Nominee Involvement: Energy Marketing and Retail Was Strategic Before Shareholder Nominee Involvement After Shareholder Nominee Involvement “Our Energy Marketing and Retail Marketing “Today we are announcing the culmination of businesses remain a long-term strategic part that proc

  96. Slide 96: Hess Resorted to Scare Tactics of Calling It Liquidation

    Hess Refused to Consider a More Fulsome Review and Resorted to Scare Tactics of Calling It an “Attempt Attempt to Liquidate the Company” Company In a letter to Hess shareholder, Relational Investors: “W h “We hope that h you will ill urge Elli Elliott to cease its i attempt to liquidate li id the h

  97. Slide 97: Creation of Manageable Enterprises Accountable to Shareholders

    Specifically, We Suggested The Creation of Manageable Enterprises Accountable to Shareholders Instead of an opaque, unmanageable conglomerate Unlock great companies that will be accountable to shareholders Create Hess Resource Co. Unconventional Bakken and Utica with dropdown of midstream assets  7

  98. Slide 98: Different Assets Require Different Management Capabilities

    We Think It Makes Sense Because… Different Assets Require Different Management Capabilities Resource Plays Offshore Assets  High sensitivity to capital costs  Low sensitivity to capital cost  Many low cost wells  Few high cost wells  Lean manufacturing process  Tax regimes and/or PSCs allow fo

  99. Slide 99: Current Portfolio Mix Undervalued and Penalized by Analysts

    We Think It Makes Sense Because… Current Portfolio Mix Undervalued and Penalized by Analysts More Important  Bakken Operators: NAV-based valuation Less Important Bakken Large Cap  Focus on acreage value sees through initial capital intensity Hess Operators (1) Int’l (2)  Only 2 Hess analysts cove

  100. Slide 100: Shareholder Nominees Are Truly Independent

    However, While Elliott Put Forward This Proposal For Consideration, Shareholder Nominees Are Truly Independent “While While this letter presents Elliott Elliott’s s perspectives perspectives, Shareholder Nominees will form their own, independent views on the Company, its assets, and its strategy. Th

  101. Slide 101: Shareholder Nominees Have Led Different Types of Transformations

    And Shareholder Nominees Have Helped Lead Very Different Types of Transformations Karl Kurz David McManus (Former COO, Anadarko) (Former EVP, Pioneer) Karl Kurz helped lead a David McManus helped Pioneer transformation of Anadarko Natural Resources execute a Petroleum earlier in the decade restructu

  102. Slide 102: Hess's Knee-Jerk Reaction Indicative of a Board Dug In

    Hess’s Knee-Jerk Reaction Is Indicative of a Board That Has Dug in Its Heels on Exactly the Dry-eyed, Dry eyed Disciplined Business Analysis That Is Sorely Needed Instead of a thoughtful response, based on an dispassionate analysis y of the facts,, Hess has responded p with demonstrably y false fund

  103. Slide 103: Misleading Statements on Funding

    Misleading Statements on Funding “And just having the Bakken or Utica standalone, they would not be self- funding. They could not get access to the credit markets and that's a real issue ” issue. John Hess January 2013(1) “Even without any initial debt, Singer’s ResourceCo would likely be a sub- inv

  104. Slide 104: Standalone Hess Resource Co. Could Easily Fund Itself

    Reality: Standalone Hess Resource Co Co. Could Easily Fund Itself in the Capital Markets Management either has not done its homework or does not understand the credit markets  Numerous examples of U.S. resource focused companies with negative free cash flow  All able to fund themselves in the publ

  105. Slide 105: Resource Co. Would Be One of the Best Funded Pure Plays

    Reality: Resource Co. Would Be One of the Best Funded U.S. Unconventional Pure Plays Given ability to raise capital via debt markets or raise proceeds from infrastructure, Hess Resource Co. has ample cash to standalone Bakken Standalone Unit 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Cash flow gap due to high-return

  106. Slide 106: Misleading Statements on Tax

    Misleading Statements on Tax “Bakken capital spending generates substantial excess tax deductions that are used to offset taxable income generated by other U.S. assets. Singer’s ResourceCo would be generating unused tax deductions and InternationalCo would be paying taxes on otherwise shielded incom

  107. Slide 107: Value of Tax Savings from Deductions is Immaterial

    Reality: Value of Tax Savings from Deductions is Immaterial Impact of Tax Shield from Bakken = $0.13 per share(1) Tax Calculations Unit 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Hess Bakken should (2) Bakken Production MBOE/D 68 87 105 120 131 become a taxpayer in (3) Bakken EBITDA $mm $1,432 $1,853 $2,218 $2,537 $2

  108. Slide 108: Misleading Statements on InternationalCo Financial Flexibility

    Misleading Statements on InternationalCo Financial Flexibility “…InternationalCo would be forced to assume all of Hess’ existing debt and therefore restrict InternationalCo’s financial flexibility, future growth rate, and ability to return cash to shareholders.” Hess Presentation to Shareholders Mar

  109. Slide 109: Hess International Would Generate Billions in Cash Flow

    Reality: Hess International Would Generate Billions in Cash Flow And Retain Investment Grade Rating Strong Cash Flow; Investment Grade Rating  Long lived oil assets producing substantial cash flow ““We note that strategic initiatives suggested by Elliott are not necessarily leveraging or detrimenta

  110. Slide 110: Shareholder Nominees Acknowledge The Problems and Can Fix Them

    Shareholder Nominees Acknowledge The Problems and Can Fix Them

  111. Slide 111: Shareholder Nominee Involvement Begins to Lift Management Discount

    Shareholder Nominee Involvement Begins to Lift Management Discount Hess Relative Performance vs. Revised Peers 110 100 Hess Management announces Elliott 90 intention to nominate directors; sale of terminal network 80 70 60 Elliott releases Elliott begins to “Perspectives on Hess” 50 acquire Hess sto

  112. Slide 112: Favorable Reaction to Shareholder Nominee Involvement

    Favorable Reaction to Shareholder Nominee Involvement “Elliott’s nominees assure greater accountability and are more likely to continue to explore all avenues to enhance shareholder value while providing more pertinent E&P experience.” David H. Batchelder, Hess shareholder, Relational Investors LLC

  113. Slide 113: Shareholder Nominees Have Exact Skills Necessary to Reassess and Refocus Hess

    Shareholder Nominees Have Exact Skills Necessary to Reassess and Refocus Hess [ 112 ]

  114. Slide 114: The Right Nominees For Shareholder Value at Hess

    The Right Nominees For Shareholder Value at Hess Hess needs directors that (1) will acknowledge issues, and (2) are capable of fixing them Shareholder Nominees Rodney Harvey Karl David Mark Smith Experience Hess Needs Chase Golub Kurz McManus Recognition of Problems at Hess True Independence Strong

  115. Slide 115: Harvey Golub: Setting a Focused Strategy

    Shareholder Nominees Acknowledge The Problems and Can Fix Them Harvey Golub: Setting a Focused Strategy Karl Kurz: Instilling g Capital p Discipline p Mark Smith: Overseeing Operational Excellence David McManus: Executing Effective Restructuring Rodney Chase: Instilling Oversight & Accountability Su

  116. Slide 116: Harvey Golub

    Harvey Golub Former Chairman & CEO, American Express Former Non-Exec Chairman AIG, Campbell Soup Co, Readers Digest, Ripplewood Chairman of Miller Buckfire, Advisory Board of Kleinwort Benson Investors Former Director Dow Jones, RHJI International Legendary Ability to Focus Organizations Histo

  117. Slide 117: What Shareholders and CEOs Say About Harvey Golub as a Leader

    What Shareholders and CEOs Say About Harvey Golub as a Leader “Harvey Golub is everything that you would want in a director. And one of the things that I appreciate most about him is that he has always respected the space between the Non-Executive Chairman and the CEO roles. He challenged me me. He

  118. Slide 118: Setting a Focused Strategy: Harvey Golub

    Setting a Focused Strategy: Harvey Golub “Successful companies generally have two things - a good strategy and solid execution. A good strategy establishes corporate focus and determines which businesses a company should stay in and exit over time. And solid execution gets the job done.” [ 117 ]

  119. Slide 119: Harvey Golub: Why I am Excited to Join the Board of Hess

    Harvey Golub: Why I am Excited to Join the Board of Hess “Hess has an interesting set of assets that have not yielded competitive shareholder returns over time. And they ought to. Working with the Board to refocus Hess in order to deliver returns to shareholders represents an exciting opportunity.”

  120. Slide 120: Karl Kurz: Instilling Capital Discipline

    Shareholder Nominees Acknowledge The Problems and Can Fix Them Harvey Golub: Setting a Focused Strategy Karl Kurz: Instilling g Capital p Discipline p Mark Smith: Overseeing Operational Excellence David McManus: Executing Effective Restructuring Rodney Chase: Instilling Oversight & Accountability Su

  121. Slide 121: Karl Kurz

    Karl Kurz Former COO, Anadarko Petroleum Corporation Former SVP North America Operations Midstream and Marketing, SVP United States O h Onshore anddM Marketing, k ti VP Mid Midstream t anddM Marketing k ti Managing Director and Co-Head of Energy Group at CCMP Capital from 2009 to 2012 Current Di

  122. Slide 122: Capital Allocation: Karl Kurz

    Capital Allocation: Karl Kurz “Capital “C it l discipline di i li is i the th critical iti l process off allocating ll ti a company’s’ most precious resource after its people, cash flow, to ensure desired investment returns for the benefit of all stakeholders. At Anadarko we created a culture of cap

  123. Slide 123: Karl Kurz: Why I am Excited to Join the Board of Hess

    Karl Kurz: Why I am Excited to Join the Board of Hess “I am excited to apply my previous experiences turning around underperforming companies to Hess. The prospect of working with management to transform Hess into a highly motivated organization that consistently delivers top quartile results is an

  124. Slide 124: Mark Smith: Overseeing Operational Excellence

    Shareholder Nominees Acknowledge The Problems and Can Fix Them Harvey Golub: Setting a Focused Strategy Karl Kurz: Instilling g Capital p Discipline p Mark Smith: Overseeing Operational Excellence David McManus: Executing Effective Restructuring Rodney Chase: Instilling Oversight & Accountability Su

  125. Slide 125: Mark Smith

    Mark Smith SVP and CFO, Ultra Petroleum Corporation CFO of Gulf Liquids, Inc (Midstream) VP of Business Development at J. M. Huber Energy VP of Upstream Business Development at Constellation Energy Technical background in Petroleum Engineering Senior Mgmt Unconventional Experience Financial E

  126. Slide 126: Operational Excellence: Mark Smith

    Operational Excellence: Mark Smith “At Ultra Petroleum, we have concentrated on creating a culture of operational discipline and efficiency. We focus relentlessly on costs, best practices practices, and constant benchmarking to continuously improve the efficiency and effectiveness of our operations.

  127. Slide 127: Mark Smith: Why I am Excited to Join the Board of Hess

    Mark Smith: Why I am Excited to Join the Board of Hess “Hess is a company with great assets that I believe are not being valued appropriately in the market. I am excited not only to apply the lessons I have learned at Ultra to Hess’s Hess s operations in the Bakken Bakken, but also to help Hess achi

  128. Slide 128: David McManus: Executing Effective Restructuring

    Shareholder Nominees Acknowledge The Problems and Can Fix Them Harvey Golub: Setting a Focused Strategy Karl Kurz: Instilling g Capital p Discipline p Mark Smith: Overseeing Operational Excellence David McManus: Executing Effective Restructuring Rodney Chase: Instilling Oversight & Accountability Su

  129. Slide 129: David McManus

    David McManus Former EVP and Head of International Operations, Pioneer Natural Resources Co Former EVP at BG President of ARCO Europe Current Director at Rockhopper Exploration, Flex LNG and Caza Oil & Gas Extensive Experience Evaluating & Immense International Energy Experience Relevancy to E

  130. Slide 130: Portfolio Repositioning: David McManus

    Portfolio Repositioning: David McManus “Portfolio construction should always begin with an evaluation of the company’s core strengths. If an asset doesn’t play to a strength, it shouldn’tt be there. If an asset is not material with respect to NAV or shouldn doesn’t have the potential to be, it shoul

  131. Slide 131: David McManus: Why I am Excited to Join the Board of Hess

    David McManus: Why I am Excited to Join the Board of Hess “Hess is unmistakably materially undervalued, with oversight and discipline lacking. But at the end of the day, everyone wants to see Hess succeed I believe my background and experiences have particular succeed. relevance to the difficulties

  132. Slide 132: Rodney Chase: Instilling Oversight & Accountability

    Shareholder Nominees Acknowledge The Problems and Can Fix Them Harvey Golub: Setting a Focused Strategy Karl Kurz: Instilling g Capital p Discipline p Mark Smith: Overseeing Operational Excellence David McManus: Executing Effective Restructuring Rodney Chase: Instilling Oversight & Accountability Su

  133. Slide 133: Rodney Chase

    Rodney Chase Former Deputy Chief Executive, BP plc Former CEO of Exploration & Production, CEO of Marketing & Refining, Chairman/CEO BP off BP America A i Current or Former Independent Chairman at Genel, Nalco, Petrofrac Led Successful Restructurings At Both Succession Planning Experience Relev

  134. Slide 134: What Colleagues Say About Rodney Chase as a Leader

    What Colleagues Say About Rodney Chase as a Leader “Over the course of his 38-year career, Rodney has made an outstanding contribution to BP. He has played a critical part in all the major developments of recent years that have transformed the company into one of the world's leading energy businesse

  135. Slide 135: Oversight & Accountability: Rodney Chase

    Oversight & Accountability: Rodney Chase “The key role of a board member is to appoint management, to set, together with management, a clear strategy with defined goals and metrics, and to hold management accountable for effecting that strategy. The oversight role of the board is critical.” [ 134 ]

  136. Slide 136: Rodney Chase: Why I am Excited to Join the Board of Hess

    Rodney Chase: Why I am Excited to Join the Board of Hess “I believe a sustained and rigorous focus on strategy and its execution, combined with a robust corporate governance structure, can help Hess maximize long term value for shareholders. I am excited to help Hess accomplish these goals.” [ 135 ]

  137. Slide 137: Superior Nominees With Unparalleled Experience

    Shareholder Nominees Acknowledge The Problems and Can Fix Them Harvey Golub: Setting a Focused Strategy Karl Kurz: Instilling g Capital p Discipline p Mark Smith: Overseeing Operational Excellence David McManus: Executing Effective Restructuring Rodney Chase: Instilling Oversight & Accountability Su

  138. Slide 138: Shareholder Nominees Have Unparalleled Operating Experience

    Shareholder Nominees Have Unparalleled Operating Experience Shareholder Nominees John Hess’s Nominees  Former Deputy Group Chief Executive, BP Rodney Chase  Former Chairman/CEO of BP America,  Former COO, TNK-BP joint venture William Schrader CEO of Marketing & Refining Refining, CEO of E&P  For

  139. Slide 139: Nominees Have Relevant Operating and Restructuring Experience

    Shareholder Nominees Have The Relevant Oil & Gas Operating and Restructuring Experience Needed at Hess Shareholder Nominees John Hess’s Nominees No Which nominees are Senior Management 20% Yes Y 40% better suited for a Upstream Oil & Gas No Yes 60% pure-play E&P Operating Experience 80% company? No

  140. Slide 140: John Hess's Nominees Lack Unconventional Experience

    John Hess’s Hess s Nominees Lack Unconventional Experience Amidst a flurry of defensive hyperbole and insults, Hess claims its Nominees have “deep deep and directly relevant shale experience experience.” “Even the most casual observer would recognize that Hess nominees have deep and directly relevan

  141. Slide 141: John Hess's Nominees Lack Restructuring Experience

    John Hess’s Hess s Nominees Lack Unconventional Experience Amidst another defensive bout of assertions, Hess claims all of its Nominees have restructuring experience. experience “All of Hess’ six new directors have experience executing or advising on major corporate p restructurings.” g Hess Letter

  142. Slide 142: Hess Nominees Fail to Recognize That Real Change Is Needed

    Most Critically, John Hess’s Nominees Fail to Recognize That Real Change Is Needed At Hess Shareholder Nominees bring recognition that real change is needed and an ability to effect change through g the Boardroom. Shareholder Nominees have led substantial turnarounds and driven operational achieveme

  143. Slide 143: Externally Imposed Board Restructuring Is Needed

    Given The Pervasive, Deep-rooted, Persistent Problems at Hess Externally Imposed Board Restructuring Is Needed  Large turnover needed to change Board dynamic and culture  Provides opportunity to reset culture and introduce accountability  Need directors with no links to current Board and manageme

  144. Slide 144: Shareholder Nominees Acknowledge The Problems and Can Fix Them

    Shareholder Nominees Acknowledge The Problems and Can Fix Them There are fundamental problems at Hess that have persisted for nearly two decades and have resulted in unrelenting underperformance. Hess’s attitude that nothing fundamental is wrong, that no substantive problems needd to t be b addresse

  145. Slide 145: Contacts & Additional Information

    Contacts & Additional Information Investors Bruce H. Goldfarb / Pat McHugh / Geoff Sorbello Okapi Partners LLC Tel: +1-212-297-0720 [email protected] f @ Press John Hartz Tel: +1-212-446-1872 Tel 2: +1-718-926-3503 [email protected] For Additional Information www.ReassessHess.com [ 144 ]

  146. Slide 146: I. Additional Information on Compensation

    I. Additional Information on Compensation

  147. Slide 147: Shareholder Nominee Compensation is Pay for Performance

    Shareholder Nominee Compensation is Pay for Performance What it is: $30,000 for each 1% that Hess’s stock outperforms Hess’s own proxy peers as measured at the end of the Shareholder Nominee’s three three-year ear term as a director (2016)  Similar to Hess’s Performance Share Unit (PSU) program but

  148. Slide 148: An Example

    An Example If:  Shareholder Nominee is elected to the Board, and  During the three years following the 2013 Annual Meeting  Hess Common Stock had a total return of 30%  Peer group has a total return of 20%  Therefore, outperformance of 10% Then:  Nominee would receive compensation of $300,000

  149. Slide 149: Nominee Compensation Endorsed By Shareholders and Governance Experts

    Nominee Compensation Endorsed By Shareholders and Governance Experts “We understand from reading their proxy statement that any continuing agreement between Elliott and their nominees will be purely executory and such nominees will not owe any duty or allegiance to Elliott. Moreover, we find that th

  150. Slide 150: And More Governance Experts

    And More Governance Experts “The Elliott plan makes perfect sense for Hess shareholders. In fact, it is state-of-the-art and ought to be more broadly adopted. Tying director compensation directly to outperformance against peers perfectly aligns the directors with the interests of shareholders. The p

  151. Slide 151: Nominee Compensation Serves as Catch-up to Current Directors

    Shareholder Nominee Compensation Serves as Catch Catch-up up to Current Directors After years of receiving unrestricted stock, Hess’s current Board members have similar upside to Shareholder Nominee compensation Current Non- Compensation Per 1% Management Board Increase Hess Stock(1) Members Nichola

  152. Slide 152: II. Additional Information on Peers

    II. Additional Information on Peers

  153. Slide 153: Who Are Hess's Peers?

    Who Are Hess’s Hess s Peers? Company Description Chevron (CVX) U.S. SuperMajor; Poor comparable due to size and business mix E Exxon (XOM) U S SuperMajor; U.S. S M j Poor P comparable bl ddue to t size i and dbbusiness i mix i BP (BP) European SuperMajor; Poor comparable due to size, business mix an

  154. Slide 154: Hess Relative Performance

    Hess Relative Performance (1) (2) As of 11/28/12 End Date As of 1/25/13 End Date 17-Year 5-Year 4-Year 3-Year 2-Year 1-Year 17-Year 5-Year 4-Year 3-Year 2-Year 1-Year U.S. SuperMajor U.S. SuperMajor CVX (359)% (71)% (59)% (61)% (66)% (25)% CVX (368)% (100)% (83)% (72)% (54)% (8)% XOM O (320)% (38)%

  155. Slide 155: Hess Cherry-Picks Proxy Peers Year by Year

    Hess Cherry-Picks Proxy Peers Year by Year Still Manages to Underperform Them All 10 – Year 7-Year 5-Year 3-Year 1-Year 2003 Proxy Peers 2006 Proxy Peers 2008 Proxy Peers 2010 Proxy Peers 2012 Proxy Peers Indicates Anadarko Anadarko Anadarko Anadarko Anadarko change in Hess proxy peers Apache Apache

  156. Slide 156: Most Comparable Peers Are Large Cap Independents and Continental

    Based on Market Capitalization and E&P Revenue Most Comparable Peers Are Large Cap Independents and Continental Market Cap Revenue E&P Revenue Production as Multiple as Multiple as Multiple as Multiple of Hess(1) of Hess of Hess of Hess  Market capitalization: U.S. SuperMajor  Super Majors are ~5

  157. Slide 157: Hess Should Have Outperformed Given Low Exposure to N.A. Natural Gas

    With Low Exposure to Collapsing N.A. Natural Gas Prices, Hess Should Have Outperformed All of the Independents Independents, Especially DVN, DVN EOG, EOG and TLM % of Production % of Production U.S. natural gas prices have collapsed over the past 5 years North American Oil Gas or NGLs N.A. Natural G

  158. Slide 158: Hess Is No More Integrated Than Large Cap Independents

    Hess Is No More Integrated Than Any of The Large Cap Independents But Is Substantially Less Integrated Than The SuperMajors Average % of Gross Average % of Net Income PP&E Outside of E&P(1) Outside of E&P 5- Yr 3-Yr 1-Yr 5- Yr 3-Yr 1-Yr Hess 7% 6% 6% 6% 3% 9% al ating % of Gross PP&E or % of Net Inc

  159. Slide 159: Idiosyncratic Events Make Apache and BP Not Comparable to Hess

    Idiosyncratic Events Make Apache (APA) and BP Not Comparable to Hess Over The Last 5 Years Apache suffered from the Arab Spring  For Apache: 20% of production, 30% of cash flow, and 58% of operating income come from Egypt “Since early-2011, Egypt has been a persistent “APA's stock performance has s

  160. Slide 160: Anadarko and Noble Are The Most Comparable Peers

    On The Basis of Size, N.A. Gas Exposure, and % of PP&E Outside of Upstream, Anadarko And Noble Are The Most Comparable Peers; Conoco And Marathon Are Instructive Given Similar Transitions to Pure-play E&P; Continental Is Closest Comparable For Bakken Position Mkt Cap E&P Average % of Gross Independe

  161. Slide 161: Contacts & Additional Information

    Contacts & Additional Information Investors Bruce H. Goldfarb / Pat McHugh / Geoff Sorbello Okapi Partners LLC Tel: +1-212-297-0720 [email protected] f @ Press John Hartz Tel: +1-212-446-1872 Tel 2: +1-718-926-3503 [email protected] For Additional Information www.ReassessHess.com [ 160 ]

Hess — Proxy Contest (April 2013) on 6ix