Shutterfly Inc

Shutterfly — Proxy Contest (May 2015)

53 slides from Shutterfly's proxy contest presentation, May 21, 2015

  1. Slide 1: “Delighting Our Customers” and Our CEO… But Not Our Shareholders

    Shutterfly, Inc. “Delighting Our Customers” and Our CEO… But Not Our Shareholders May 21, 2015 1

  2. Slide 2: Important Disclosures

    Important Disclosures THIS PRESENTATION IS FOR DISCUSSION AND GENERAL INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. IT DOES NOT HAVE REGARD TO THE SPECIFIC INVESTMENT OBJECTIVE, FINANCIAL SITUATION, SUITABILITY, OR THE PARTICULAR NEED OF ANY SPECIFIC PERSON WHO MAY RECEIVE THIS PRESENTATION, AND SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN

  3. Slide 3: Table of Contents

    Table of Contents I. Introduction to Marathon Partners Equity Management, LLC II. Executive Summary III. Current Shutterfly Issues  Management Compensation & Incentives  Board Misalignment  Distorted Capital Allocation and M&A  Operating Performance Deterioration  Stock Price Performance IV. Ou

  4. Slide 4: I. Introduction to Marathon Partners Equity Management, LLC

    I. Introduction to Marathon Partners Equity Management, LLC 4

  5. Slide 5: Introduction to Marathon Partners Equity Management, LLC

    Introduction to Marathon Partners Equity Management, LLC • Investment Firm Founded by Mario Cibelli; $265 million AUM Marathon • Patient capital including multi-year commitments Partners Equity • Long-biased, concentrated equity strategy Management, LLC • Since its inception (4/1/97), our flagship f

  6. Slide 6: We’ve Been Actively Communicating With the Board Since 2013

    We’ve Been Actively Communicating With the Board Since 2013 Many of the concerns we share throughout this presentation are not new, as our correspondence with the Board regarding these issues dates back to May 2013 Brief excerpts from our May 2013 letter to the Board of Directors regarding managemen

  7. Slide 7: II. Executive Summary

    II. Executive Summary 7

  8. Slide 8: Executive Summary

    Executive Summary Management compensation and Board dynamics have led to distorted capital allocation decisions, leading to a decline in operating metrics, which has resulted in a languishing share price • We believe Shutterfly’s issues encompass:  Management Compensation & Incentives  Board Conti

  9. Slide 9: Our Vision

    Our Vision • With the right changes, we believe Shutterfly is well-positioned for value creation going forward • We believe Shutterfly should:  Design a compensation plan tied to metrics that will motivate management to perform and that we believe will directly drive shareholder value  Focus on im

  10. Slide 10: We Believe Shareholders are Losing Confidence

    We Believe Shareholders are Losing Confidence • Shutterfly’s Shareholders have been given an opportunity to weigh in on executive compensation annually  The Company’s rate of approval deteriorated from approximately 98% of the votes cast in favor of the “say on pay” proposal at its 2011 Annual Meet

  11. Slide 11: Our Highly Qualified and Experienced Nominees

    Our Highly Qualified and Experienced Nominees Marathon Partners has nominated three Directors who, we believe, will represent the best interests of Shareholders • Mario Cibelli  Managing Member of Marathon Partners Equity Management  One of Shutterfly’s largest shareholders • Thomas D. Hughes  Ph

  12. Slide 12: II. Current Shutterfly Issues

    II. Current Shutterfly Issues 12

  13. Slide 13: Management Compensation & Incentives

    Management Compensation & Incentives 13

  14. Slide 14: “It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends”

    “It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it.” - Upton Sinclar, I, Candidate for Governor: And How I Got Licked 14

  15. Slide 15: The Board Continues to Increase Compensation

    The Board Continues to Increase Compensation • Mr. Housenbold’s compensation has the potential to be up almost as much as 10x from 2007 • Shareholders have paid over ⅓ of profits for Mr. Housenbold’s services • Mr. Housenbold’s compensation has been multiples of his peer group $25 Potential 2015 Tot

  16. Slide 16: We Believe Shareholders Were Misled by the 2014 Proxy Statement

    We Believe Shareholders Were Misled by the 2014 Proxy Statement • The Company engaged with Shareholders to solicit feedback on executive compensation • There was Shareholder concern regarding size of overall CEO target compensation • Compensation committee response was: “Significantly reduced the ov

  17. Slide 17: We Believe The Board Did Not Keep Its Promise

    We Believe The Board Did Not Keep Its Promise • On November 20, 2014 (the “RSUs Grant”) Mr. Housenbold was granted approximately $7M of time-based RSUs • We find the sudden need to retain the services of Mr. Housenbold just prior to the critical holiday season disconcerting, particularly in light of

  18. Slide 18: No Matter How the Board Slices It, the CEO's Compensation Was Not Reduced

    No Matter How the Board Slices It, the CEO's Compensation Was Not Reduced • The 2015 Proxy Statement takes great care in asking Shareholders to consider Mr. Housenbold’s November 2014 grant as part of his 2015 compensation. Under this scenario, Mr. Housenbold’s 2015 long-term incentive package would

  19. Slide 19: We Believe the CEO’s Interests are Misaligned

    We Believe the CEO’s Interests are Misaligned • We believe Mr. Housenbold’s strong desire to turn his stock-based grants into cash creates a misalignment with the interests of Shutterfly Shareholders • As displayed in the chart below, Mr. Housenbold has engaged in numerous sales of Shutterfly stock

  20. Slide 20: Insider Sales Occurred While Company Repurchased Shares

    Insider Sales Occurred While Company Repurchased Shares • Even after bullish commentary, in our opinion, Mr. Housenbold sold shares of stock at prices lower than the Company paid to repurchase such shares in specific quarters  “So it's not – we're going to wait and see; we're going to step in marke

  21. Slide 21: We Believe The Comp. Committee Sets Easily Attainable Performance Goals

    We Believe The Comp. Committee Sets Easily Attainable Performance Goals • In 2013, 2014 and 2015 the Compensation Committee set revenue and Adjusted EBITDA goals at or below the low end of initial full year guidance Stated Initial Revenue Stated Initial EBITDA Goal FY Guidance Goal FY Guidance Reven

  22. Slide 22: Low Adjusted EBITDA Trigger with Funding Based on Revenue

    Low Adjusted EBITDA Trigger with Funding Based on Revenue • The 2015 trigger Adjusted EBITDA is $181 million for Mr. Housenbold’s 198,000 PBRSUs • Shutterfly’s original 2015 guidance was:  Net Revenues from $1,040 million to $1,060 million; and  Adjusted EBITDA from $182 million to $192 million; A

  23. Slide 23: The 2015 Compensation Plan Revealed

    The 2015 Compensation Plan Revealed • While Shutterfly attempts to shift the discussion to its so called ‘improvements’ to the 2016 compensation plan, the Company revealed just how lucrative the 2015 compensation plan is  Mr. Housenbold may make nearly $28 million on his 2015 compensation plan if h

  24. Slide 24: 2016 Compensation Plan – More of the Same

    2016 Compensation Plan – More of the Same • 60% of the long-term incentive program will be in PBRSUs and 40% will be time-based RSUs  45% of the total long term incentive program will be tied to Shutterfly’s FCF per share metric • Shutterfly defines Free Cash Flow as (EBITDA + stock based compensat

  25. Slide 25: We Believe the Tradition of Low Hurdles Continues in 2016

    We Believe the Tradition of Low Hurdles Continues in 2016 • “The free cash flow per share targets are expected to be set at least 15% higher than our free cash flow for the year ended December 31, 2015 because they will be based on 2017 and 2018 free cash flow.” - Shutterfly 2015 Proxy • Context on

  26. Slide 26: Higher Free Cash Flow Growth Scenario

    Higher Free Cash Flow Growth Scenario • Assuming higher revenue growth rates and margin expansion, free cash flow grows over 73%  “…but we can make this a mid-20s EBITDA model, if we wanted to cut back on investments.” - Jeffrey Housenbold, 4/30/2014 Guidance 2015E 2016E 2017E Revenue $1,050 $1,192

  27. Slide 27: Return Hurdles Appear to Favor Mr. Housenbold as Well

    Return Hurdles Appear to Favor Mr. Housenbold as Well • ~25% of the PBRSUs will be tied to total shareholder return over a three-year performance period relative to an appropriate broad index • We believe the Board doesn’t include dividends reinvested in respective indices, which we believe misleads

  28. Slide 28: Board Misalignment

    Board Misalignment 28

  29. Slide 29: Board Dynamics: The Board’s Stake in the Business has Withered

    Board Dynamics: The Board’s Stake in the Business has Withered • Current director and executive officer ownership has declined from 59.5% to 1.3% from July 2006 to April 2015 respectively • VC firms with Board representation have exited, but representation remains on the Board years later 59.5% 32.5

  30. Slide 30: Venture Capital Directors: We Believe It’s Way Past Check-Out Time

    Venture Capital Directors: We Believe It’s Way Past Check-Out Time James White has remained on the Board well beyond his firm’s exit in Shutterfly • Sutter Hill Ventures exited Shutterfly over 4 years ago  Sutter Hill after the IPO offering owned 6.8%  By 2011, the firm owned 0 shares  Whose inte

  31. Slide 31: Poor Corporate Governance

    Poor Corporate Governance • The Compensation Committee from 2009 to 2012 consisted ONLY of Stephen Killeen and Nancy Schoendorf  While the Audit and Governance Committee each consisted of at least three directors • Lack of a Vested Interest in Shutterfly  No large shareholder representation on the

  32. Slide 32: Distorted Capital Allocation and M&A

    Distorted Capital Allocation and M&A 32

  33. Slide 33: We Believe Capital Invested Back Into the Business has Produced Poor Returns

    We Believe Capital Invested Back Into the Business has Produced Poor Returns • 2010 ROE: 8.3% • 2014 ROE: 3.5% • Average Stockholders Equity increased by $498 million from 2010 to 2014, yet we believe investors were not rewarded for this increase  Average 2010 Stockholders Equity: $236 million  Av

  34. Slide 34: We Believe Management has Been Distracted with M&A

    We Believe Management has Been Distracted with M&A • “So, as of January 1, 2013 through today, we've looked at 149 different books in our space, broadly speaking, right, e- commerce, personalized products, and services.” - Jeffrey Housenbold, 4/30/2014 • “Since January of 2013, has looked at approxi

  35. Slide 35: M&A – Dial it Back until Competence is Demonstrated, In Our Opinion

    M&A – Dial it Back until Competence is Demonstrated, In Our Opinion • The Company has spent more than $500M on acquisitions since 2010, or ~30% of the current enterprise value • Notable M&A deals:  Tiny Prints, acquired for $406 million (4/25/2011)  Four years after its acquisition, we believe Tin

  36. Slide 36: Share Repurchases

    Share Repurchases • Shutterfly recently approved a $300 million buyback, and in the 1st quarter of 2015, repurchased a record amount of shares • We believe Shutterfly’s largest share repurchase authorization and record quarterly buyback is not a coincidence  We believe Marathon Partners’ presence w

  37. Slide 37: Operating Performance Deterioration

    Operating Performance Deterioration 37

  38. Slide 38: We Believe Shutterfly is Using the Wrong Metrics

    We Believe Shutterfly is Using the Wrong Metrics • Absolute growth does not necessarily create Shareholder value • Growth in free cash flow per share does create Shareholder value 3 Year 2 Year 1 Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 CAGR CAGR Growth Revenue $473 $641 $784 $922 25% 20% 18% Less Meaningful Shutte

  39. Slide 39: We Believe Shutterfly’s Quality of Earnings has Deteriorated Dramatically

    We Believe Shutterfly’s Quality of Earnings has Deteriorated Dramatically • As Shutterfly trumpets its record “EBITDA profitability,” we believe stock based compensation and depreciation and amortization have become an increasingly large portion of the mix, pointing to a lower quality of earnings •

  40. Slide 40: Shutterfly’s Stock Based Compensation Is Out of Line With Peers

    Shutterfly’s Stock Based Compensation Is Out of Line With Peers • We believe Shutterfly’s total stock-based compensation relative to peers is excessive 2012 2013 2014 Peer Group Median SBC / Adjusted EBITDA 18% 20% 15% SFLY SBC / Adjusted EBITDA 29% 36% 37% SFLY Multiple of Median SBC / Adjusted EBI

  41. Slide 41: Stock Price Performance

    Stock Price Performance 41

  42. Slide 42: Stock Price Underperformance

    Stock Price Underperformance • Shares of Shutterfly have significantly underperformed the market and peers over an extended period of time • Unlike the Company’s performance chart, we believe including dividends presents the fairest picture (1) Share Price Performance 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year Rus

  43. Slide 43: IV. Our Plan

    IV. Our Plan 43

  44. Slide 44: Plan to Improve Performance at Shutterfly

    Plan to Improve Performance at Shutterfly • We believe Shutterfly should:  Design a compensation plan tied to metrics that will motivate management to perform and that we believe will directly drive shareholder value  Focus on improving operating results of the existing business; de-emphasize M&A

  45. Slide 45: The Right Compensation Plan to Drive Bottom Line Oriented Results

    The Right Compensation Plan to Drive Bottom Line Oriented Results • Implement a compensation plan that we believe encourages the right kind of behavior from management  We believe an intelligently designed compensation plan that encourages growth in metrics that are more direct drivers of sharehold

  46. Slide 46: Focus on Operational Improvements

    Focus on Operational Improvements Improve margins and lower capital intensity • Examine costs and spending on start-up projects • Rigorous analysis of operations with eye towards improving returns • More rigid analysis on insource vs outsource decisions • Rightsize operating costs per employee, whic

  47. Slide 47: Shrinking Shutterfly’s Shares Outstanding Going Forward

    Shrinking Shutterfly’s Shares Outstanding Going Forward • We believe right sizing stock based compensation to fall more in line with peers and continuing share repurchases will slow or even reverse growth in shares outstanding • Operational improvements coupled with fewer shares outstanding over the

  48. Slide 48: We Believe the Board Needs to Adopt an Owners Mentality

    We Believe the Board Needs to Adopt an Owners Mentality • Change Board philosophy to bring Shareholders to the forefront of thinking – will be challenging but we are up for the task  Return focused versus growth at any cost  Reconstitute board  IN: Board members that are engaged and active, with

  49. Slide 49: We Believe Shutterfly’s Board has done a Poor Job Representing Shareholders

    We Believe Shutterfly’s Board has done a Poor Job Representing Shareholders × On the Board for over 8 years × 1 of 3 members of the Compensation Committee responsible for egregious and misaligned compensation plans Stephen J. × Was 1 of only 2 members of the Compensation Committee for 4 years [2009-

  50. Slide 50: We Believe Our Slate Will Think of Shareholders First and Foremost

    We Believe Our Slate Will Think of Shareholders First and Foremost  Nearly 25 years of investment experience  Sector focus around internet and e-commerce companies Mario D.  Investor in Shutterfly for over 7 years Cibelli  High level understanding of Shutterfly’s business and management team  I

  51. Slide 51: Confronting the Elephant in the Room

    Confronting the Elephant in the Room • Can Shutterfly prosper without Mr. Housenbold?  We believe the answer is YES • Mr. Housenbold contributed substantially over Shutterfly’s formative years; however, recently there has been a growing disconnect between his vision and Shareholders’ • Through almo

  52. Slide 52: We are Open to a Sale of Shutterfly at a Fair Price

    We are Open to a Sale of Shutterfly at a Fair Price • We are open to a sale of the Company at a fair price, should an opportunity present itself • We believe there continues to be a strong interest in Shutterfly from potential buyers • We believe this dynamic has created a window of opportunity for

  53. Slide 53: VOTE BLUE Protect and Enhance Your Investment by Voting on the BLUE Proxy Card

    VOTE BLUE Protect and Enhance Your Investment by Voting on the BLUE Proxy Card TODAY • Vote For Change at Shutterfly By Electing Our Highly Qualified and Experienced Nominees • Your Vote is Critical to Help Transform Shutterfly Vote the BLUE Proxy Card TODAY 53

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