AOL — Proxy Contest (May 2012)
42 slides from AOL's proxy contest presentation, May 7, 2012
Slide 1: AOL, Inc. Starboard Value Presentation
STARBOARBAALU E. AOL, Inc. Starboard Value Presentation May 7, 2012
Slide 2: Overview of Starboard Value LP
Overview of Starboard Value LP = Starboard Value LP is a deep value oriented investment firm that specializes in investing in underperforming companies and analyzing alternative strategies to unlock value for the benefit of all shareholders. — Our approach to investment research begins with a deep f
Slide 3: Why We Are Involved with AOL
Why We Are Involved with AOL ma We strongly believe that a significant opportunity exists to unlock value at AOL based on actions within the control of management and the Board of Directors (the “Board’). = Unfortunately, to date, management and the Board have been unwilling to consider adjustments
Slide 4: AOL Reported Business Segment Overview
AOL Reported Business Segment Overview AOL provides online products, services, and content to consumers, publishers, and advertisers. The Company reports revenue in five different business segments. Acca? Subscription-based dial-up internet access and related services ek) provided to more than three
Slide 5: We Believe AOL's Display Segment is Generating Massive Losses
We Believe AOL’s Display Segment is Generating Massive Losses Based on conversations with the Company, competitors, industry consultants, and Wall Street analysts, among others, we have estimated the profitability of each of AOL’s reported business segments with a high degree of conviction. 2011 Ope
Slide 6: Is AOL Operating its Display Business Efficiently?
Is AOL Operating its Display Business Efficiently? STARBOARDAYALU En 6
Slide 7: AOL has built one of the largest online content destinations
AOL has built one of the largest online content destinations Through acquisitions and investments, AOL has built one of the largest online content destinations, generating over 100 million unique visitors and 127 billion page views. Number of Unique Visitors, December 2011 Number of Page Views, 2011
Slide 8: However, AOL is not operating these assets efficiently
However, AOL Despite the well-recognized brands and attractive scale of AOL’s Display assets, we estimate that these businesses are collectively losing more than $500 million per year.) Further, excluding Patch and the acquisition of The Huffington Post, we estimate that organic Display revenue decl
Slide 9: WebMD Health is highly profitable on similar revenue base
Other s As just one example, WebMD Health is highly profitable on a simils milarly-sized premium content sites are highly profitable sized revenue base. = The majority of WebMD’s revenue is derived from public portal advertising and sp onsorship.(!) = By focusing on a single attractive vertical, Web
Slide 10: Smaller sized premium content sites are also highly profitable
Smaller sized premium content sites are also highly profitable CNET Networks serves as evidence that a display business can be highly profitable on a smaller revenue base than AOL has today. = CNET, prior to its acquisition by CBS Corporation in 2008, provided online information, product reviews, an
Slide 11: AOL's Display business is not profitable because it is pursuing a high cost strategy
AOL’s Display business is not profitable because it is pursuing a high cost strategy The poor performance of AOL’s Display business is the direct result of its lack of focus and the Company’s expensive operating cost structure. = AOL owns approximately 50 different content brands.) We question how m
Slide 12: Changes at The Huffington Post are a prime example
Changes at The Huffington Post are a prime example By implementing its high operating cost strategy at The Huffington Post, we believe AOL has eroded the business model that made The Huffington Post successful pre-acquisition: low-cost content generation. Pre-Acquisition = One of the few profitable
Slide 13: AOL's strategy has led to expenses outpacing revenue growth
AOL/’s strategy has led to expenses outpacing revenue growth From 2010 to 2011, AOL spent approximately $2.59 for every $1.00 of incremental Display revenue.@2 Change in AOL Display Revenue and Costs—2 (Six millions) = In2011, AOL added $61 million of 975 $61 incremental Display revenue, approximate
Slide 14: AOL needs to substantially improve the profitability of Display
AOL needs to substantially improve the profitability of Display The Board needs to take the following actions: = Fully allocate the costs for each content property and vertical to determine true profitability. — Based on conversations with managernent, AOL currently measures profitability by propert
Slide 15: Is Patch a Viable Business Model?
Is Patch a Viable Business Model? STARBOARDAYALU En 15
Slide 16: What is Patch?
What is Patch? Patch is a collection of 863 different news and information websites for small towns across the US. \ ¥ (1) Numb er ofPatches reponted y the Company as of yearend 2011. STARBOARDAYALU ES 16
Slide 17: Patch is the largest single contributor to losses in Display
Patch is the largest single contributor to losses in Display = AOL acquired Patch, a company thatAOL’s Chairman and CEO Tim Armstrong co-founded, for $7.0 million in cash from an investment company that Mr. Armstrong also founded. = Since then, the Company lost approximately $75 million in 2010 and
Slide 18: We believe the Patch business model is flawed and will not succeed
We believe the Patch business model is flawed and will not succeed = Patch is a high cost business model that is not scalable. = Local advertisers want direct response ads that have an attractive measurable ROI, which we believe Patch ads do not provide.() = National advertisers do not appear to val
Slide 19: Patch is not a scalable business model
Patch is not a scalable business model Each individual Patch requires sub stantial fixed costs to operate. Patch’s fixed operating costs include “: = Adedicated local editor in each town writing 100 or more articles per month. = Several freelance journalists in each town writing an additional 20 to
Slide 20: AOL has consistently underestimated the costs of operating Patch
AOL has consistently underestimated the costs of operating Patch Manageme’ imates of Annual Patch Q12010 Call: “And J think we are still probably disclosing $50 million (Bin millions) fofinvestment in Patch] and we'll continue on that path until we see a need to change that number.” 1Q10 _- — CEO Ti
Slide 21: And monetization and profitability have remained elusive
And monetization and profitability have remained elusive Patch Financials © Q22010 Call: “And J think over time basically the expectations on monetization should be, Patch is going to be an investment 40 4 property over the next two years and I think coming out of x0 4 $13 the next two years, we'd e
Slide 22: Patch has failed to sell a meaningful portion of its ad slots to local advertisers
Patch has failed to sell a meaningful portion of its ad slots to local advertisers Despite Patch’s target of selling 80% of its ad slots to local advertisers, less than 20% of ad placements on Patch are filled by local businesses. LocalAds asa Total PatchAd Placements Patch has failed to achieve thi
Slide 23: The majority of local advertisers do not renew
The majority of local advertisers do not renew Based on interviews with former Patch employees, approximately 70% of local advertisers who adyertise on Patch do not renew when their 6-12 month contracts expire. Patch Local Advertiser Renewal Rate ‘) = Based on Patch’s lack of an attractive measurabl
Slide 24: Local businesses can bypass Patch's high rate cards
Local businesses can bypass Patch’s high rate cards Even if local businesses wanted to advertise on Patch, they could bypass Patch’s high rate card pricing by using Google AdWords. Google AdWords allows advertisers to specify on which sites they want their advertisements to appear, including placing
Slide 25: AOL fills Patch ad slots with remnant AOL ad inventory
AOL fills Patch ad slots with remnant AOL ad inventory We believe the majority of Patch’s ad slots are being filled with remnant AOL ad inventory at very low CPMs. This inventory could be placed on any AOL property, yet we believe itis pushed to Patch in order to justify continued investment in Patc
Slide 26: It appears national advertisers do not value Patch
It appears national advertisers do not value Patch Given the substantial percentage of ad slots on Patch that we believe are sold at steep discounts to rate card pricing, we would also question whether national advertisers value Patch. As part of the assignment, L.E.K. Consulting contacted national
Slide 27: So, is Patch a viable business model?
So, is Patch a viable business model? Below are Patch’s rate card prices to advertise on its homepage and its internal pages. Homepage Options Internal Page Options Homepage A Homepage B Internal Page A Internal Page B YourTownPatch arr gat? ini STF Bet? Wy QU NUN) 11) WANN U0) IY STARBOARDAYALU E.
Slide 28: Patch is not a viable business model
iness model Patch is not a viable b Even at AOL’s target revenue model of selling 80°% of ad slots to local advertisers near rate card pricing, we estimate that Patch would still lose approximately $20 million to $60 million per year) = Patch is currently selling less than 20% of its ads to local ad
Slide 29: The Board needs to take action on Patch immediately
The Board needs to take action on Patch immediately = We believe Patch is currently losing approximately $150 million peryear.™ = We believe Patch cannot be profitable, even in the best case scenario, because its businessmodel is flawed. — Patch is ahigh cost business model thatis not scalable. — Pa
Slide 30: Losses in each of the Display businesses are unacceptable
Losses in each of the Display businesses are unacceptable and must be independently analyzed by the Board immediately = Aswe havehighlighted, we believe AOL is currently losing over $500 million in its Display business, including losses of approximately $150 million in Patch alone.(!) = However, rat
Slide 31: AOL's owned content properties do not drive search on AOL.com
AOL?s owned content properties do not drive search on AOL.com = AOL generates the vast majority of its search revenue from AOL.com. = However, based on our analysis of industry data on visits to AOL.com, less than 2% of visits are originatedfrom AOL’s other owned content properties.“ Instead, the ma
Slide 32: Patch certainly does not drive search on AOL.com
Patch certainly does not drive search on AOL.com Asa local community website, Patch is used as a destination to learn about specific community news and events. AOL.com, on the other hand, provides mostly national news as well as information within targeted verticals, such as Entertainment, Finance,
Slide 33: We question whether owning content actually improves Search
We question whether owning content actually improves Search Engagement drives search, yet owning and producing content in house does not neces engagement. hily drive iL ength of Stay on Website “) (finutes) z = Priorto the acquisition of The Huffington Post by AOL in March 2011, The Huffington Post
Slide 34: AOL has already outsourced its Sports, Health, and Real Estate content
AOL has already outsourced its Sports, Health, and Real Estate content Why would AOL users reading sports on AOL.com be less interested in searching on AOL.com’s toolbar because AOL does not own SPORTS NEWS + Legendary Pitcher injures Knee, Career May Be Over + LeBron Leads Heatto Verge of Advancing
Slide 35: What actually drives search on AOL.com?
What actually drives search on AOL.com? “Ifyou look at where search comes from on the AOL properties, majority of it comes from the homepage client and from AOL.com.” —CEO Tim Armstrong, 2Q10 conference cail, 8/4/10 “... AOL’s search business is intimately linked to the Access business. Content isn’
Slide 36: Any decision to invest in Display should be viewed independently
on to invest in Dis Any dec play should be viewed independently AOL/’s decision to continue to invest in each of its Display businesses should be viewed by the Board entirely independent from the rest of AOL’s businesses, particularly given its massive losses. 2011 Operating Perf (B in millions) Adj
Slide 37: AOL needs to substantially improve the profitability of Display
AOL needs to substantially improve the profitability of Display = While AOL has amassed a large content business with over 100 million unique visitors and $573 million in revenue with the scale to compete profitably, the Company is not operating this business efficiently. — In fact, we believe thatA
Slide 38: Patch's business model is structurally flawed and will not succeed
Patch’s business model is structurally flawed and will not succeed = Patchis the single largest contributor to losses in Display, losing approximately $150 million per year.) = Patch’s business model, which requires substantial personnel in each local market, is high cost and is not scalable. = AOLh
Slide 39: Each of AOL's Display properties needs to be analyzed by the Board independently
Each of AOL’s Display properties needs to be analyzed by the Board independently of AOL’s other businesses = AOLs argument that its losses in Display should not be viewed separately from Search are questionable and we believe are meant to conceal the massive losses in the Display business. = The maj
Slide 40: Our Board nominees will ask the difficult questions
Our Board nominees will ask the difficult questions to focus the Company on dramatically improving profitability and value for all shareholders If elected, our nominees would ask the right questions regarding the key issues facing AOL. Some of these questions would include Can Patch actually be prof
Slide 41: Our nominees have the appropriate skill sets and fortitude
Our nominees have the appropriate skill sets and fortitude to improve value for all shareholders We have nominated three highly-qualified, independent director candidates for election to the AOL Board of Directors at the 2012 Annual Meeting, which will be held on June 14 in Boston, MA. = Dennis A. M
Slide 42: Disclaimer
THISPRESENTATION IS FOR DISCUSSION AND GENERAL INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. IT DOES NOT HAVE REGARD TO THE SPECIFIC INVESTMENT OBJECTIVE, FINANCIAL SITUATION, SUITABILITY, OR THE PARTICULAR NEED OF ANY SPECIFIC PERSON WHO MAY RECEIVE THIS PRESENTATION, AND SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS ADVICE ON THE MERITS