Banque nationale de Belgique SA · EURONEXT:BNB

Banque nationale de Belgique SA — Technical Presentation (December 2019)

29 slides from Banque nationale de Belgique SA's technical presentation, December 2019

  1. Slide 1: Payments, Credit & Asset Prices

    Payments, Credit & Asset Prices Monika Piazzesi Martin Schneider Stanford, NBER, CEPR Stanford, NBER, CEPR National Bank of Belgium, December 2019

  2. Slide 2: U.S. dollar payments; quarterly data at annual rates

    U.S. dollar payments; quarterly data at annual rates Inside money Reserves NSS FedSec FedFunds other settlement 1500 1500 residual $ Trillions $ Trillions nonfinancial 1000 NSCC/DTCC 1000 FICC + FedSec 500 500 0 0 05 07 09 11 05 07 09 11

  3. Slide 3: Simple model of payments & asset pricing

    Simple model of payments & asset pricing End users = households & institutional investors I pay for goods & assets with payment instruments = inside money I payment instruments = deposits, MMF shares, credit lines Banks handle payment instructions by end users I make interbank payments with reserves

  4. Slide 4: Implications

    Implications Baseline: Lucas 1980 I quantity equation connects outside money, output I asset prices reflect representative agent marginal utility This paper I quantity equation connects inside money, output + asset volume I intermediary asset pricing - banks value assets as collateral to inside back

  5. Slide 5: Related Literature

    Related Literature asset pricing with constrained investors Lucas 90, Kiyotaki-Moore 97, Geanakoplos 00, He-Krishnamurthy 12, Buera-Nicolini 14, Lagos-Zhang 14, Bocola 14, Moreira-Savov 14 monetary policy & financial frictions Bernanke-Gertler-Gilchrist 99, Curdia-Woodford 10, Gertler-Karadi 11, Ger

  6. Slide 6: Model: only goods transactions require inside money

    Model: only goods transactions require inside money

  7. Slide 7: Model

    Model Constant aggregate output Y I bank trees yield fruit x b ≤ Y , can be held by banks Households I infinite horizon, linear utility, discount rate δ I can invest in trees, deposits, short bonds, bank equity I cannot borrow or hold reserves (= numeraire) Payments I consumption s.t. deposit-in-adv

  8. Slide 8: Banking sector overview

    Banking sector overview Bank technology with constant returns to scale Payment system characterized by 1. collateral ratio κ = risk-weighted assets / inside money → price of safe assets held by banks: short (real) interest rate more collateral, assets less scarce, prices lower, interest rates higher

  9. Slide 9: Bank balance sheet and cash flow

    Bank balance sheet and cash flow Assets Liabilities M Reserves Deposits D F+ Fed funds lending Fed funds borrowing F− B Govmt bonds Equity Qbθ Bank trees Bank cash flow M (1 + iR ) − M 0 − D (1 + iD ) + D 0 +F + (1 + i ) − F +0 − F − (1 + i ) + F −0 +B (1 + i ) − B 0 +(Q b + Px b )θ − Q b θ 0 − c (κ

  10. Slide 10: Leverage cost

    Leverage cost Assets Liabilities M Reserves Deposits D F+ Fed funds lending Fed funds borrowing F− B Govmt bonds Equity Qbθ Bank trees Bank cash flow M (1 + iR ) − M 0 − D (1 + iD ) + D 0 +(F + + B − F − )(1 + i ) − (F +0 + B 0 − F −0 ) +(Q b + Px b )θ − Q b θ 0 − c (κ ) D + F − Leverage cost c decr

  11. Slide 11: Liquidity constraint

    Liquidity constraint Assets Liabilities M Reserves Deposits D F+ Fed funds lending Fed funds borrowing F− B Govmt bonds Equity Qbθ Bank trees Liquidity shocks I bank enters period with reserves M, deposits D I λ̃D = net funds sent to other banks (or received if λ̃ < 0) I λ̃ iid across banks with E λ

  12. Slide 12: Equilibrium

    Equilibrium Government I path of nominal liabilities Mg , Bg and reserve rate iR I lump sum transfers adjust to satisfy budget constraint I leverage costs depend on (Mg + Bg )/ tax base Market clearing: goods, reserves, overnight credit, deposits, trees Steady state I constant output Y, growth rate

  13. Slide 13: Characterizing steady state equilibrium

    Characterizing steady state equilibrium Bank optimization I choose positions to equate MC equity = MB assets = MC debt I only liquidity & collateral ratios determinate, same for all banks → summarize role of payment system by (λ, κ ) Nominal price level: quantity equation with money multiplier 1/λ M

  14. Slide 14: Valuation of collateral benefits

    Valuation of collateral benefits Bank FOC for short bonds δ = i −π + mb (κ ) return on equity collateral benefit I marginal benefit of more collateral is positive mb (κ ) = −c 0 (κ ) > 0 I diminishing as more collateral gets added mb 0 (κ ) < 0 I lower real interest rate on bonds: banks choose lower

  15. Slide 15: Valuation of liquidity benefits

    Valuation of liquidity benefits Bank FOCs for short bonds, reserves δ = i − π + mb (κ ) δ = iR − π + mb (κ ) + Prob(λ̃ > λ)mcl (κ ) I i − iR = liquidity benefit = exp. marginal cost of overnight borrowing I more collateral lowers marginal cost: mcl 0 (κ ) < 0 Since upper bound on liquidity shock, tw

  16. Slide 16: Scarce vs abundant reserves

    Scarce vs abundant reserves Plot liquidity and collateral ratio scarce abundant scarce reserves λ < λ̄ collateral ratio = banks borrow if large deposit outflow abundant reserves = banks never borrow liquidity ratio

  17. Slide 17: Valuation of liquidity benefits

    Valuation of liquidity benefits Bank FOCs for short bonds, reserves δ = i − π + mb (κ ) δ = iR − π + mb (κ ) + Prob λ̃ > λ mcl (κ ) liquidity benefit Liquidity management curve in (λ, κ ) plane I “how many reserves are optimal given collateral κ” I slopes down: low collateral ratio κ ⇒ high overnigh

  18. Slide 18: Liquidity management curve

    Liquidity management curve How many reserves are optimal given collateral ratio κ? “money demand”: high collateral ratio collateral ratio = high interest rate i = high opp cost i − i R = low liquidity ratio “liquidity trap” for high λ shifts up if higher interest on reserves liquidity ratio

  19. Slide 19: Capital structure curve

    Capital structure curve Balance sheet relates liquidity ratio λ and collateral ratio κ I given other collateral available to banks, what λ needed to achieve κ? I curve slopes up: to get more collateral, add reserves collateral ratio narrow bank: κ = λ shifts right if lower value of bank trees liquid

  20. Slide 20: Equilibrium

    Equilibrium Intersection of curves delivers steady state (λ, κ) I reserves can be scarce or abundant curves shift with policy, asset market shocks collateral ratio new steady state reached after one period read short-run price level response from PY = M/λ liquidity ratio

  21. Slide 21: Tighter money: central bank asset sale

    Tighter money: central bank asset sale Sell bonds to banks in exchange for reserves CS shifts left: lower λ needed to maintain any collateral ratio κ bank ratios I higher κ, real rate inflation lower reserves I collateral ratio higher money multiplier I → overall deflationary financial structure I s

  22. Slide 22: Tighter money: higher interest on reserves

    Tighter money: higher interest on reserves LM shifts up: banks hold more collateral at any λ here: same short rate as after bond sale, but higher λ bank ratios I higher κ, real rate inflation collateral ratio Ilower money multiplier Ireserves unchanged → deflationary financial structure I more nomin

  23. Slide 23: Asset trades also require inside money

    Asset trades also require inside money

  24. Slide 24: Active traders

    Active traders Households averse to Knightian uncertainty (ambiguity) I behave as if tree dividends drop by s percent next period I 1st order effects of uncertainty in steady state (Ilut et al. 2016) Active traders = competitive firms owned by household I issue equity, invest in deposits & subset of

  25. Slide 25: Equilibrium with active traders

    Equilibrium with active traders Value of tree traded by active traders P x̂ Q̂ = u (ŝ ) δ−(iD −π ) ; u (ŝ ) < 1 δ + 1+ γ̂ I uncertainty premium u (ŝ ) < 1 times present value of dividends I discount at higher rate if F higher opportunity cost of deposits δ − (iD − π ) F lower netting efficiency γ

  26. Slide 26: Asset prices & inflation with active traders

    Asset prices & inflation with active traders Price level depends on institutional investors’ money demand I lower if larger share of money absorbed by active traders M PY = (1 − α (κ, λ)) λ I1 − α = velocity of inside money; moves with uncertainty ŝ → Lower inflation in asset price booms! Flatter c

  27. Slide 27: Extension: “carry traders” borrow from banks, hold trees

    Extension: “carry traders” borrow from banks, hold trees

  28. Slide 28: Bad shock to broker dealers

    Bad shock to broker dealers Increase in leverage cost or uncertainty of trees CS shifts right: higher λ needed to maintain any collateral ratio κ dealer borrowing ↓ less bank collateral collateral ratio need more λ money multiplier ↓ → deflationary! liquidity ratio

  29. Slide 29: Summary of implications

    Summary of implications Baseline: Lucas 1980 I quantity equation connects outside money, output I asset prices reflect representative agent marginal utility This paper I quantity equation connects inside money, output + asset volume I intermediary asset pricing - banks value assets as collateral to

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