Buffalo Wild Wings

Buffalo Wild Wings — Proxy Contest (April 2017)

50 slides from Buffalo Wild Wings's proxy contest presentation, Apr 20, 2017

  1. Slide 1: Buffalo Wild Wings April 2017

    BUFFALO WILD WINGS APRIL 2017

  2. Slide 2: Disclaimer

    DisclAIMER The views expressed in this presentation (the “Presentation”) represent the opinions of Marcato Capital Management LP and/or certain affiliates (“Marcato”) and the investment funds it manages that hold shares in Buffalo Wild Wings, Inc. (the “Company”). This Presentation is for informatio

  3. Slide 3: Certain information concerning the participants

    Certain information concerning the participants Marcato International Master Fund Ltd. (“Marcato International”), together with the other participants in Marcato International’s proxy solicitation, have filed with the SEC, and are mailing to shareholders on or about April 20, 2017, a definitive prox

  4. Slide 4: Table of contents

    table of contents Introduction I.Share Price Underperformance II.Margin Deficiencies III.Deteriorating Guest Experience IV.Poor Capital Deployment V.Dismissal of More Highly-Franchised Business Model These materials are intended to set the record straight on management’s failures in the following cr

  5. Slide 5: Introduction

    Introduction MARCATO

  6. Slide 6: Status quo at Buffalo Wild Wings is not sufficient

    Status quo at buffalo wild wings is not sufficient Management has repeatedly defended the status quo as BWLD shares have underperformed every relevant benchmark on a 1-year, 3-year, and 5-year basis BWLD’s Board of Directors has not held management accountable for critical areas of underperformance:

  7. Slide 7: Reiterating Marcato's multi-level plan to create value for BWLD shareholders

    Reiterating marcato’s multi-level plan to create value for BWLD shareholders Reinvigorate core business Engage operational consultants to revitalize same-store sales growth and refocus on the company’s historically successful core brand and value proposition Franchising strategy Sell stores to new a

  8. Slide 8: Insiders agree with Marcato's assessment of management

    Insiders agree with marcato’s assessment of management “Several of the BWW expats have had communication over the last couple of days. Just wanted to let you know that the assessment of you and your team, as it relates to the challenges with Buffalo Wild Wings, are spot-on and things that literally

  9. Slide 9: Insiders agree with Marcato's assessment of management (Cont'd)

    Insiders agree with marcato’s assessment of management (Cont’d) Source:Wall Street research. Note:Wedbush report summarized topics discussed during an “advisor call”. “[T]here remains a sense that the company retains a ‘small-company’ mentality that is lacking the structured corporate processes ofte

  10. Slide 10: Insiders agree with Marcato's assessment of management (Cont'd)

    Insiders agree with marcato’s assessment of management (Cont’d) Source:Email received from former BWLD Corporate employee. Note:Quote shown as submitted and is generally not edited for spelling, syntax, or grammatical error. “Just had a chance to quickly scan [Marcato’s] BDubs deck…the HQ staff is s

  11. Slide 11: Insiders agree with Marcato's assessment of management (Cont'd)

    Insiders agree with marcato’s assessment of management (Cont’d) “Buffalo Wild Wings senior management is taking the company down a path of no return. They recently “compressed” 50 home office and field employees in an effort to reduce costs…The firing of four dozen key employees may have slightly im

  12. Slide 12: I. Share price underperformance

    I.Share price underperformance

  13. Slide 13: Company statement on stock performance and Board effectiveness

    “We believe the stock performance is compelling evidence of the effectiveness of the Board and management” -Buffalo Wild Wings Media Statement, 3/8/17

  14. Slide 14: BWLD's shares have underperformed against relevant benchmarks

    BWLD’s shares have underperformed against relevant benchmarks Summary of shareholder returns “We believe the stock performance is compelling evidence of the effectiveness of the Board and management” -Buffalo Wild Wings Media Statement, 3/8/17 Source:Company filings, CapitalIQ. Market data as of 4/7

  15. Slide 15: BWLD's shares have underperformed against relevant benchmarks

    Source:Company filings, CapitalIQ. Market data as of 4/7/17. Note:Proxy peers include BJRI, BLMN, BOBE, EAT, CAKE, CMG, CBRL, PLAY, DIN, DPZ, DNKN, FIVE, PNRA, RRGB, RT, TXRH, and ULTA. Total shareholder return for proxy peer group uses the median return for applicable peers over each timeframe. fiv

  16. Slide 16: Analysts believe new leadership is the answer

    Analysts believe new leadership is the answer Source:Wall Street research. “Continued weak results show an inability to manage costs and successfully implement sales-building initiatives. Unlike many casual dining chains that lack differentiation and appeal, Buffalo Wild Wings is a unique concept wi

  17. Slide 17: II. Margin deficiencies

    Il. Margin deficiencies MARCATO

  18. Slide 18: Management statements on shareholder value creation

    “[O]ur financials…show our dedication to shareholder value creation. While I am proud of the value we have created in the past, our goal is to create similar value in the future” –Sally Smith, President & CEO, 8/16/16 “[Our] combined approach to develop both Company-owned and franchise restaurants h

  19. Slide 19: Same-store sales growth, traffic, and margins have all deteriorated

    Same-store sales growth, traffic, and margins have all deteriorated SSS growth is at lowest levels in over a decade, due to deep & accelerating declines in traffic and mix Marcato believes “4-wall” margins have suffered due to expense mismanagement Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q4 2016 ‘13 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2015 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q

  20. Slide 20: Are management and shareholders focused on the same issues?

    Are management and shareholders focused on the same issues? “We are surprised the Company’s investor presentations continue to center on tactical efforts, like FastBreak Lunch and Wing Tuesday, and secondary strategic priorities, like international development and new concepts, rather than full expl

  21. Slide 21: Insiders cite lack of operating experience in senior management

    Insiders cite lack of operating experience in senior management “I am a former employee. Left on good terms with the company. But the frustrations I had with the lack of communication and infrastructure had me shaking my head often. With more than 20 years in the restaurant industry, I was quite tak

  22. Slide 22: Franchisees cite lack of operating experience in senior management

    franchisees cite lack of operating experience in senior management “To improve the performance of BWW, I would clean house and get operators involved in the management. Now you have bean counters and attorneys running the show with lip service about customer care” ─ Former Buffalo Wild Wings Franchi

  23. Slide 23: Industry experts see multiple ways to improve margins

    Industry experts see multiple ways to improve margins Source:Marcato’s presentation to BWLD management from June 2016, external consultants. A major consulting firm that evaluated BWLD at Marcato’s request identified several areas for potential margin improvement equivalent to 275 – 600bps Address F

  24. Slide 24: Research analysts recognize margin deficiencies

    Research analysts recognize margin deficiencies “[W]e believe BWLD company-owned stores could improve margins substantially, by up to 500 [basis points] based on our analysis, by adopting labor practices currently deployed by [franchisees]” –Jim Sanderson, Arthur Wood, 3/28/17 Source:Wall Street res

  25. Slide 25: Wall Street analyst: franchisee store margins up to 1000bp stronger

    Wall Street Analyst: “[Franchisees] currently generate store margins that are up to 1000BP stronger than BWLD company stores” “[Franchisees] generate much stronger store margins even after paying royalties and advertising fees to BWLD corporate” “More efficient labor utilization is the key driver, e

  26. Slide 26: Largest franchisee's 4-wall margins outperform company-owned average

    BWLD’s largest franchisee’s“4-wall” margins outperform company-owned system average by several hundred basis points Source:Company filings, US Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division. Note:“SAUC” refers to BWLD’s largest franchisee. ”COGS” refers to “cost of sales” line item for BWLD and “food, b

  27. Slide 27: Guest Captain role feedback

    Source:Inbound emails, submissions to www.WinningAtWildWings.com, Company filings. Note:Quotes shown as submitted and are generally not edited for spelling, syntax, or grammatical error. “Many of us (home office employees) completely agree with your assessment…The GEC (Guest Experience Captain) role

  28. Slide 28: III. Deteriorating guest experience

    III.Deteriorating guest experience

  29. Slide 29: Management statements on brand and fan experience

    “[O]ur financials…show our dedication to shareholder value creation. While I am proud of the value we have created in the past, our goal is to create similar value in the future” –Sally Smith, President & CEO, 8/16/16 “[Our] combined approach to develop both Company-owned and franchise restaurants h

  30. Slide 30: The quality of the B-dubs experience has generally declined over 5 years

    The quality of the “B-dubs” experience has generally declined over the last 5 yrs. Source:NRN Survey. Percentages reflect number of respondents who cited the restaurant as “Outstanding” or “Above Average” for relevant attributes. 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 Consumer survey results across many cate

  31. Slide 31: Buffalo Wild Wings ranks in the bottom quartile across every surveyed metric

    Buffalo wild wings ranks in the bottom quartile across every surveyed metric Source:NRN Consumer Survey 2016, Company filings. Quartiles based on 40 surveyed casual dining chains. Rankings for all metrics surveyed shown above. Note:Rank refers to relative score within the casual dining category of t

  32. Slide 32: Overall guest experience is rated the worst in casual dining

    Buffalo Wild Wings’ Overall guest experience is rated the worst in all of casual dining Source:NRN Consumer Survey 2016, Company filings. Note:Overall score is a weighted average of attribute scores. Attributes include food quality, value, cleanliness, service, menu variety, reputation, atmosphere,

  33. Slide 33: Back-of-the-pack on food quality and service ratings

    Back-of-the-pack on Food quality and service ratings Food Quality | NRN Consumer Survey 2016 – Casual dining restaurants Service | NRN Consumer Survey 2016 – Casual dining restaurants Source:NRN Consumer Survey 2016. Note:Attribute scores reflect the percent of respondents who said a chain was “outs

  34. Slide 34: Management paints a rosy picture of their commitment to guest experience

    Management paints a rosy picture of their commitment to guest experience… “I believe the future of this brand and Company are brighter now than ever before” “[T]oday made me more excited about the brand, because there’s so much happening. And the amazing thing is…it just keeps getting better” –James

  35. Slide 35: Our research shows widespread dissatisfaction among core customers

    …our research shows widespread dissatisfaction among core customers “I believe the future of this brand and Company are brighter now than ever before” “[T]oday made me more excited about the brand, because there’s so much happening. And the amazing thing is…it just keeps getting better” –James Schmi

  36. Slide 36: IV. Poor capital deployment

    IV. Poor capital deployment MARCATO

  37. Slide 37: Management on franchise acquisitions approach

    “Our approach to investing in franchise acquisitions is strategic and opportunistic…We have a rigorous, diligent review process. Only when the return metrics are attractive and we see long-term value creation opportunities do we consider a purchase” -Sally Smith, Chief Executive Officer, 8/16/16

  38. Slide 38: 2015 franchisee acquisitions have not earned a return above cost of capital

    2015 Franchisee acquisitions have not earned a return above BWLD’s cost of capital Source:Company filings, Marcato analysis. Note:Analysis assumes acquired stores operated at 2015 franchise system AUVs and “4-wall” margins of 18.6%, in-line with BWLD’s FY 2015 company-operated average. Incremental G

  39. Slide 39: The street also recognizes this was a poor use of capital

    The street also recognizes this was a poor use of capital “[T]he last minute exercise of the first right of refusal to buy a big block of franchise stores in 2015 …is a perfect example of how misguided your incentive compensation structure is and how poor strategic planning can lead to poor capital

  40. Slide 40: Franchisee acquisition helped catalyze trend of underperformance

    Franchisee acquisition helped catalyze trend of underperformance Source:Company filings, CapitalIQ, Bloomberg. Market data as of 4/7/17. BWLD’s 5-year Total shareholder returns have underperformed proxy peers’ by 20% BLWD’s 5-year TSR under-performance: -20% Under-performance from date of large fran

  41. Slide 41: V. Dismissal of more highly-franchised business model

    V.Dismissal of more highly-franchised business model

  42. Slide 42: CFO statement on refranchising to 90%

    “In order for [refranchising to 90%] to create value requires…selling nearly 500 stores at multiples higher than we believe are achievable…[and] trading multiple expansion to levels significantly higher than demonstrated on a sustained basis by casual diners” -Alex Ware, Chief Financial Officer, 2/7

  43. Slide 43: Highly franchised companies trade at higher multiples

    Highly franchised companies trade at higher multiples Even with fewer “high growth” concepts in the category, restaurants with 70+% franchise mixes trade categorically higher than less-franchised peers BWLD is one of the few peers “in the middle”, and could trade at a much higher multiple given its

  44. Slide 44: Industry-leading advisor says major refranchising is highly feasible

    Industry-leading advisor says major refranchising is highly feasible Source:Marcato’s presentation at Sohn SF in October 2016. “We are highly confident BWLD could refranchise their owned stores at a multiple of 6.0x or higher and estimate a refranchising process to 90% could take as few as 18-24 mon

  45. Slide 45: Research analysts overwhelmingly agree that refranchising adds value

    “Our math supports a more favorable range of outcomes for investors in a refranchising strategy[.]…We agree with the spirit of [Marcato’s] work” –John Zolidis, Buckingham, 9/6/16 Research analysts overwhelmingly agree that refranchising adds value “Our analysis of a theoretical model in which 80% of

  46. Slide 46: Franchising feasibility is a matter of corporate culture and willingness to change

    Franchising feasibility is a matter of corporate culture and willingness to change, not of whether the brand has table service “All the other publicly held restaurant companies that have shifted business models are QSR chains, but we argue the common ingredient to all of their successes was not thei

  47. Slide 47: Former franchisees believe they can provide a better experience

    Former franchisees believe they can provide a better experience “I am a former BWW franchisee who sold my stores to the BWW corporation. I created many of the promotions BWW uses to this day and was awarded all of the BWW franchise awards possible. Immediately after corporate took over the operation

  48. Slide 48: Best-in-class restaurant companies have identified refranchising as a way to improve the brand

    Best-in-class restaurant companies have identified refranchising as a way to improve the brand & stimulate growth Source:Company filings. “The material financial benefits [of refranchising] to highlight [are that it] will reduce volatility, will increase free cash flow, will accelerate its growth of

  49. Slide 49: Best-in-class companies see a franchise-focused model as better for the brand

    best-in-class restaurant companies see a franchise-focused model as better for the brand, because franchisees are best equipped to operate restaurants “[T]he beauty of a franchise business is they run their stores more efficiently in most cases than Corporate folks do. And that’s consistent not just

  50. Slide 50: Status quo at Buffalo Wild Wings is not sufficient

    Status quo at buffalo wild wings is not sufficient Management has repeatedly defended the status quo as BWLD shares have underperformed every relevant benchmark on a 1-year, 3-year, and 5-year basis BWLD’s Board of Directors has not held management accountable for critical areas of underperformance:

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