Elia Group SA/NV · EURONEXT:ELI
Elia Group SA/NV — Technical Presentation (June 2023)
20 slides from Elia Group SA/NV's technical presentation, Jun 22, 2023
Slide 1: Incentive on Prequalification, Control, and Penalties – aFRR/mFRR
Incentive on Prequalification, Control, and Penalties – aFRR/mFRR 2nd Workshop 22/06/2023| Loup Vanderlinden
Slide 2: Agenda
Agenda • Onboarding & Prequalification • Penalty for MW Made Available • Activation Control aFRR Incentive on Prequalification, Control, and Penalties aFRR/mFRR 2 – 2nd workshop
Slide 3: Incentive Roadmap
Incentive Roadmap Final Launch PC Report 2023 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Bilateral exchanges PC 23/12 MPs Feedback TODAY 1/5 WS1 15/5 22/5 29/5 5/6 12/6 19/6 WS2 26/6 8/5 22/6 Incentive on Prequalification, Control, and Penalties aFRR/mFRR 3 – 2nd workshop
Slide 4: Onboarding & Prequalification
ONBOARDING & PREQUALIFICATION
Slide 5: New PQ Design Proposal - Reminder
New PQ Design Proposal - Reminder Two main takeaways: 1. The ownership of the prequalified volume will shift from the BSP to the Grid User 2. Amend the prequalification process to lower barriers to the participation of new and existing technologies to capacity auctions These translate in 3 main chan
Slide 6: MPs Feedback Following 1st Workshop (08/05)
MPs Feedback Following 1st Workshop (08/05) The feedbacks ELIA received on the new PQ design proposal were generally positive, especially on the PQ test time window reduction and the possibility to perform asymmetric tests. However, 3 main concerns were raised: The relevance of the PQ test is questi
Slide 7: Penalty for MW Made Available aFRR & mFRR
PENALTY FOR MW MADE AVAILABLE aFRR & mFRR
Slide 8: AS IS Situation – Reminder
AS IS Situation – Reminder • Context: After clearing of Capacity Auction, all awarded capacity bids lead to the obligation to submit contracted energy bids, which must be submitted at the latest in D-1 at 15:00. The validity period of an energy bid is 15 min. If, for one QH, the MW Made Available (p
Slide 9: Design Proposal Discussed @ 1st Workshop (08/05)
Design Proposal Discussed @ 1st Workshop (08/05) Principle: ➢ Keep a progressive penalty scheme in order to make a distinction between exceptional and frequent unavailabilities ➢ Avoid penalty levels that provide wrong incentives while still ensuring responsible behavior of the BSPs in the capacity
Slide 10: Let’s Dive In the New Design Proposal
Let’s Dive In the New Design Proposal Principle: ➢ For each direction, the penalty level a BSP is in depends on the average compliance over a 30-day rolling window ➢ Proposal to calculate average compliance on day D on a rolling window between D-15 and D+15, to prevent risks of arbitrage in case a B
Slide 11: Activation Control aFRR
-€ elia ACTIVATION CONTROL aFRR 96 +t BR —__
Slide 12: AS IS Situation – Reminder
AS IS Situation – Reminder • Context: ELIA continuously controls the quality of aFRR delivery via the activation control (contracted & non-contracted energy bids) • Goal: Check the quality of the aFRR Supplied • Current Penalty Formula: Where remuneration(M) is the sum of capacity remuneration & | e
Slide 13: Design Proposal Discussed @ 1st Workshop (08/05)
Design Proposal Discussed @ 1st Workshop (08/05) It was initially considered to: ➢ Change energy discrepancy from monthly to QH ➢ Remove capacity remuneration from the formula ➢ Assess capacity availability via availability tests ⇒ This solves the issues 2 and 3 However, × Some MPs are concerned by
Slide 14: New Design Proposal
New Design Proposal Principle: ➢ Like for the AS IS situation, use the actual activations to define the penalty for the capacity ➢ QH granularity for energy with same principle as AS IS to limit risks of arbitrage and better capture value of the service at the time of the discrepancy ➢ Right balance
Slide 15: Illustration on the Granularity of the Continuous Capacity Control
Illustration on the Granularity of the Continuous Capacity Control Power [MW] aFRR Capacity Underdelivery Obligation Up aFRR Requested aFRR Supplied time QH QH QH QH QH QH QH QH QH QH QH QH QH QH QH QH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1 CCTU ➢ During this CCTU, for a given BSP, aFRR Requested
Slide 16: Activation Control aFRR – AS IS
Activation Control aFRR – AS IS Power [MW] aFRR energy discrepancy aFRR Energy Discrepancy penalty M Obligation Up = 1.3 aFRR Energy Discrepancy M X aFRR energy requested M X remuneration(M) time Where remuneration(M) is the sum of capacity remuneration & | energy remuneration | of the month Obligat
Slide 17: Activation Control aFRR – TO BE
Activation Control aFRR – TO BE ENERGY PENALTY + CAPACITY PENALTY aFRR energy discrepancy Power [MW] aFRR Capacity Underdelivery Power [MW] Obligation Up time time Obligation Down aFRR Requested (± 15% tolerance band) aFRR Supplied aFRR Energy Discrepancy penalty QH = factorenergy = factorcapacity *
Slide 18: Zoom In on aFRR Capacity Requested
Zoom In on aFRR Capacity Requested * aFRR Capacity Discrepancy penalty week = factorcapacity ∗ aFRR Capacity Underdelivery week aFRR Capacity Requested week ∗ remuneration aFRR awarded week aFRR Capacity Requested Power [MW] Obligation Up ➢ In the upwards direction, aFRR Capacity Requested is capped
Slide 19: Zoom In on Situations when aFRR Supplied & aFRR Requested Have Opposite Signs
Zoom In on Situations when aFRR Supplied & aFRR Requested Have Opposite Signs Power [MW] • aFRR Requested > 0 Obligation Up 1• aFRR Supplied > aFRR Requested } (overdelivery) ⇒ do not penalize capacity • aFRR Requested = 0 ⇒ do not penalize capacity since there is 1 aFRR Supplied 2 no obligation lin
Slide 20: Thank you.
Thank you.