CoreLogic Inc

CoreLogic — Proxy Contest (October 2020)

76 slides from CoreLogic's proxy contest presentation, Oct 21, 2020

  1. Slide 1: Why New Directors Are Needed at CoreLogic

    Why New Directors Are Needed at CoreLogic OC T OB E R 2 0 2 0 https://unlockingcorelogic.com

  2. Slide 2: Disclaimer

    Disclaimer The views expressed in this presentation (the “Presentation”) represent the opinions of Senator Investment Group LP (“Senator”), Cannae Holdings, Inc. (“Cannae”) and/or certain of their respective affiliates with respect to CoreLogic, Inc. (the “Company”). This Presentation is for informa

  3. Slide 3: Certain Information Concerning the Participants

    Certain Information Concerning the Participants Senator Investment Group LP, Cannae Holdings, Inc. and the other Participants (as defined below) have filed a definitive proxy statement and an accompanying GOLD proxy card with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on September 23, 2020 t

  4. Slide 4: We Have Made a Compelling Proposal

    We Have Made a Compelling Proposal We have made a compelling offer with deal certainty from a uniquely qualified buyer Offering a 39% premium and a normalized EBITDA multiple 40%+ above CoreLogic’s 10.5x average Repeatedly stated we are open minded to increasing our offer if given diligence Unqualif

  5. Slide 5: Shareholders Expect a Sale of the Company

    Shareholders Expect a Sale of the Company… Stock Price Largest Shareholder Realized Volatility Has Jumped 40+% for Seven Years, Holding Has Collapsed 67% Since Our Involvement 17.8%, Has Sold Position CoreLogic no longer trades on Stock price has increased over 40%; Largest shareholder for over 40fu

  6. Slide 6: Yet, CoreLogic's Board Refuses to Engage

    Yet, CoreLogic’s Board Refuses to Engage CoreLogic’s Board has a long history of poor stewardship: Underperformed peers by 145% over 5 years Since Spin-off Performance VS. 1 Year 3 Years 5 Years ~10 Years Peers Selected By CoreLogic’s Own Board -4% -77% -145% -532% Broader Peer Group Set -8% -90% -1

  7. Slide 7: Shareholder Nominees Are Independent and Highly Qualified

    Shareholder Nominees Are Independent and Highly Qualified Nominees bring extensive experience overseeing and advising public companies as well as evaluating and executing value-maximizing transactions: Over half of the slate has served as CEO or Chair of a large organization Each has extensive M&A e

  8. Slide 8: Majority Needed to Protect Shareholder Rights and Ensure a Legitimate Sales Process

    Majority Needed to Protect Shareholder Rights and Ensure a Legitimate Sales Process Replacing nine of twelve, but not all, directors will maintain continuity: not seeking to replace the current CEO, Frank Martell (10 year tenure), Munce (3 year tenure), or Studenmund (9 year tenure) Majority needed

  9. Slide 9: Table of Contents

    Table of Contents Board’s Poor Stewardship We Have Made a Continues with Refusal Compelling Offer 1 4 to Engage with Us We Have Offered Deal Certainty from Independent Directors Are Needed 2 a Uniquely Qualified Buyer 5 to Protect Shareholder Value CoreLogic’s Board Has a Long Appendix: Correcting C

  10. Slide 10: Section One: We Have Made a Compelling Offer

    Section One We Have Made a Compelling Offer We Have Offered Deal Certainty for a Uniquely Qualified Buyer Core Logic’s Board Has a Long tistory of Poor Stewardship A Unlocking CoreLogic Board’s Poor Stewardship Bk Continues with Refusal Engage with Us Independent Directors Are Needed 5 to Protect Sh

  11. Slide 11: We Have Offered a Compelling Premium

    We Have Offered a Compelling Premium… 39% Premium to Unaffected Price 28% Premium to 52-Week High % Premium % Premium 60 % 60 % 50 % 50 % 40 % 30 % 28% 40 % 39% 20 % Median 12% 10 % 30 % 0% Median 22% -10 % 20 % -20 % 10 % -30 % -40 % 0% -50 % T Y K S I I B S P T Y S S P B I K I G C T L G T G G T Y

  12. Slide 12: and a Compelling Multiple

    and a Compelling Multiple Compelling Multiple Relative to Growth Compelling Multiple Relative to 3Y High 14 0% 13 0% 126% High 3Y 12 0% of % 11 0% as 10 0% at $66 Multiple 95% Mtge PF* EBITDA 90 % Median 88% ELLI (30%, ~20x) and Optimal Blue (35%, Takeout NTM ~25x) are below the 80 % / line and “off

  13. Slide 13: CoreLogic Wants an 'Information Services Peer' Multiple

    CoreLogic Wants an ‘Information Services Peer’ Multiple …But Has Not Come Close to Their Multiple, Growth, or TSR Has Never Received a Similar Multiple… …Because Has Never Performed Like Them Company % CLGX In fo Ser vi ces P eers Selected Peers difference 20 x CoreLogic has never Revenue CAGR grown

  14. Slide 14: Mortgage Volumes Have Consistently Been Volatile and Cyclical

    Mortgage Volumes Have Consistently Been Volatile and Cyclical MBA Expects Originations to Peak in 2020 and Revert Thereafter 3,500 CLGX forecasts ~30% above MBA for 2021 & 2022 “…normal mortgage market of $1.5 trillion to $1.75 trillion going forward.” 3,000 – Frank Martell, 2/23/2017 $ B 2,500 Orig

  15. Slide 15: CoreLogic Has Given Clear Guidance on Sensitivity to Mortgage Volumes

    CoreLogic Has Given Clear Guidance on Sensitivity to Mortgage Volumes “…sensitivity that we’ve used for several years for the Company, “So, for every $100 billion of mortgage origination volume, which is for every $100 billion of market activity in origination, it’s worth roughly $20 million to $25

  16. Slide 16: Mortgage Sensitivity Shows 100% of 2020 Increases Are Due to Mortgage Volumes

    Mortgage Sensitivity Shows 100% of 2020 EBITDA and Revenue Increases Are Simply Due to Increased Mortgage Volumes Revenue EBITDA Company Stated Sensitivity to each $100B increase in originations $22.5M $13.5M Historical sensitivity to originations (midpoint) X Increase in MBA 2020 Origination Foreca

  17. Slide 17: CoreLogic Acknowledges Mortgage Sensitivity When Compensating Themselves

    CoreLogic Acknowledges Mortgage Sensitivity When Compensating Themselves …But Not When Delivering Value to Shareholders When Mortgage Cycle is Down But When Mortgage Cycle is Up CoreLogic Lowers the Bar CoreLogic Claims they for Compensation are a ‘Powerhouse’ After underperforming its compensation

  18. Slide 18: The Market Does Not Pay for Volatile and Cyclical Mortgage Volumes

    The Market Does Not Pay for Volatile and Cyclical Mortgage Volumes ...Evidenced by Unchanged Stock Prices Among Mortgage Peers Mortgage 2QA Rev vs 3QE Rev vs Stock Price Company Mortgage Estimate on Estimate on Change Since Exposure June 15th June 15th June 15th CoreLogic claims it is “inflecting” b

  19. Slide 19: Revenue Growth Determines Valuation Multiple

    For Information Services Companies, Revenue Growth Determines Valuation Multiple… EBITDA Multiple is 90% Correlated to Revenue Growth 55x 50x 45x 40x 35x EBITDA 30x Our Offer Values CoreLogic NTM 25x “Above the Line” / EV i.e. Expensive for 20x at $66 Its Growth Profile Mtge PF* 15x 10x at $66 5x 0.

  20. Slide 20: CoreLogic Has Failed to Grow

    and CoreLogic Has Failed to Grow CoreLogic says it had a 6% CAGR over this period, but never acknowledged that 150% of its “growth” came from acquisitions [CoreLogic has been declining 2013 Revenue 2014-20 M&A | -$49 l-$192| Negative Organic Growth 2020 Expected Revenue Note: Source is CLGX filings.

  21. Slide 21: Even After Adjusting for Mortgage Sensitivity, CoreLogic Has Not Grown Organically

    Even After Adjusting for Mortgage Sensitivity, CoreLogic Has Not Grown Organically…Despite Repeatedly Claiming It Has No Growth, Even After Adjusting for Wind Downs of Failed Businesses (a questionable adjustment) 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 1H ‘20 2% 0% -2% -4% -6% -8% ex M&A, FX, MD&A M tge Adj,

  22. Slide 22: No Matter How One Calculates It: CoreLogic Has Not Grown

    No Matter How One Calculates It: CoreLogic Has Not Grown 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 1H ‘20 Cumulative 1Prior Year Reported Rev 1,404 1,405 1,528 1,953 1,851 1,788 877 2Plus: Deferred Rev - - - - - (24) - 3Equals: Adj. Base for Prior Year Rev 1,404 1,405 1,528 1,953 1,851 1,765 877 4Plus: Wind Dow

  23. Slide 23: 2021 and 2022 Forecasts Assume Unprecedented Inflection in Organic Growth

    Yet, CoreLogic’s 2021 and 2022 Forecasts Assume an Unprecedented Inflection in Organic Growth 6% 5% 4% Our targeted diligence requests are focused 3% on validating this Y/Y% unprecedented increase in organic growth 2% Growth We are willing 1% to pay for real Organic organic growth 0% but we need -1%

  24. Slide 24: Any Valuation Should Normalize for Mortgage Volumes

    Any Valuation of CoreLogic Should Normalize for Mortgage Volumes and Sensitize Impact From Organic Growth Guidance Given volatility of the mortgage market, Given history of negative growth, normalize for average mortgage volumes: look at EBITDA with & without assumed growth: Normalized Mortgage Mark

  25. Slide 25: Our Offer Is Compelling: Pays for Growth Potential

    Our Offer Is Compelling: Pays for Growth Potential Despite Years of No Growth Including Excluding Unprecedented Unprecedented Organic Growth Organic Growth Assumption Assumption CoreLogic 2021 EBITDA Guidance 648 648 Normalized for Mortgage Market (149) (149) Normalize for mortgage market Show with

  26. Slide 26: We Are Open-Minded to Increasing Our Offer if Supported by Diligence

    As We Have Repeatedly Stated to the Board: We Are Open-Minded to Increasing Our Offer if Supported by Diligence “Our request for diligence is sincere. The current surge At our July 14th meeting, the first and only in mortgage origination volumes reflected in second meeting allowed with the Board, we

  27. Slide 27: The Research Community Has Agreed

    Every Step of the Way, the Research Community Has Agreed “Offer price seems fair given peak multiples on peak of mortgage cycle.” “… we think the market could see the targeted revenue growth rates of 4-5% – Deutsche Bank, 6/26/20 in 2021/22 as challenging.” – KBW, 7/7/20 “To us, this looks like a ve

  28. Slide 28: Section Two: Deal Certainty from a Uniquely Qualified Buyer

    Section Two We Have Made a We Have Offered Deal Certainty from 2 a Uniquely Qualified Buyer CoreLogic’s Board Has a Long listory of Poor Stewardship Unlocking CoreLogic Board’s Poor Stewardship Bk Continues with Refusal Engage with Us Independent Directors Are Needed 5 to Protect Shareholder Value k

  29. Slide 29: Our Proposal Provides Regulatory and Financing Certainty

    Our Proposal Provides Regulatory and Financing Certainty Regulatory Certainty: No Overlapping Businesses and Financing Certainty Hell or High Water Commitment â–º Neither Cannae nor Senator have a single â–º Bank of America has provided a ‘highly overlapping business with CoreLogic confident’ letter

  30. Slide 30: We Are a Uniquely Qualified Buyer

    We Are a Uniquely Qualified Buyer and Precisely the Type of Credible Buyer With Whom CoreLogic Should Want to Engage Logical Buyer Pay High Multiples When Warranted Cannae is led by William P. Foley II (“Bill Foley”) a Paid ~25x for Optimal Blue due to 35% sustainable preeminent operator and deal ma

  31. Slide 31: Section Three: Board's Long History of Poor Stewardship

    Section Two We Have Made a We Have Offered Deal Certainty from 2 a Uniquely Qualified Buyer CoreLogic’s Board Has a Long listory of Poor Stewardship Unlocking CoreLogic Board’s Poor Stewardship Bk Continues with Refusal Engage with Us Independent Directors Are Needed 5 to Protect Shareholder Value k

  32. Slide 32: CoreLogic Has Significantly Underperformed Its Peers

    CoreLogic Has Significantly Underperformed Its Peers Against any relevant peer group over any relevant period of time, the Company has underperformed: Spin-off 1 Year 3 Years 5 Years ~10 Years Peers Selected By -4% -77% -145% -532% CoreLogic’s Own Board Broader Peer Group Set -8% -90% -161% -634% Pe

  33. Slide 33: Underperformed Every Single One of Its Peers

    Every Single One of Its Peers Spin-off 1 YEAR 3 YEARS 5 YEARS ~10 YEARS -7% -152% -198% -1260% -24% -199% -357% -1608% -1% -89% -100% -302% 7% -47% -76% -13% -2% -64% -75% -264% -6% -37% -138% NM -13% -93% -274% NM Performance -16% -12% -58% -358% vs. 15% -3% -31% -183% 8% -71% -142% -271% -28% -118

  34. Slide 34: Consistently Missed Market Expectations

    Consistently Missed Market Expectations: Ranks in the Bottom 4% of the Entire Russell 3000 Bottom 4% of Russell 3000 – and – Bottom 4% of Russell 3000 for Frequency of Negative Reactions for Severity of Reactions Frequency Of Negative Returns Average Return 0% 20% 10% 15% 20% 10% 30% 5% 40% 50% 0% 6

  35. Slide 35: Failed to Achieve Long-Term Goals: (1) Diversify Away From US Mortgages

    Failed to Achieve Any of Its Three Long-Term Goals: (1) Has Not Diversified Away From US Mortgages 60% 50% GO A L > 5 0 % Total 40% % Revenue 30% Mortgage 20% 10% US Non - 0% 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 1H20 “Our goal is to “strategic business “…long-established “The company is “As a matter o

  36. Slide 36: Failed to Achieve Long-Term Goals: (2) 30% EBITDA Margins

    Failed to Achieve Any of Its Three Long-Term Goals: (2) 30% EBITDA Margins—Six Years Late and Not Actually Achieved “...CoreLogic’s target of 30% adjusted EBITDA margins during 2013 .$1 trillion to $1.2 trillion to deliver the 30% margin.” 11/3/11 “We think the long-term margin profile of the Compan

  37. Slide 37: Failed to Achieve Long-Term Goals: (3) Organic Growth

    Failed to Achieve Any of Its Three Long-Term Goals: (3) Has Not Grown Organically, Yet Constantly Claims It Has CoreLogic Has Never Grown, Despite Claiming It Has Even After Adjusting for Wind Downs of Failed Businesses (a questionable adjustment) 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 1H ‘20 2% 0% ex M&A, F

  38. Slide 38: Avoids Accountability by Continually Re-segmenting Financials

    Avoids Accountability by Continually Re-segmenting Financials â–º Used to publish 14 KPIs tracking quarterly “Frank is very astute at re-segmenting often so he isn’t held mortgage volume exposure but now reports none accountable for some stuff that he told the Street. I had IR-related responsibiliti

  39. Slide 39: Wasted Capital on Misguided Strategic Initiatives and M&A

    Wasted Capital on Misguided Strategic Initiatives and M&A: CoreLogic Acquisitions Were Misguided From the Start CoreLogic spent nearly $1 billion and CoreLogic Valuations Revenue ($mm) MBA Ori gi nations ($bn) almost 5 years acquiring and integrating $450 3,500 valuation & appraisal businesses Board

  40. Slide 40: Margin Expansion Only Arrived With Wind Down of Failing Businesses

    Failed to Improve Execution: Margin Expansion Only Arrived With Wind Down of Failing Businesses Margins Historically Only Expanded With Wind Downs “…we’re not going to shrink our way into it.” – Frank Martell, 7/26/18 $2,000 29% A n d i t c o n t i n u e s … 28% $1,900 “The divestiture of these busi

  41. Slide 41: Continually Ranked Last in Employee Morale

    Continually Ranked Last in Employee Morale TH0MS0N REUTERS | TransUnioRu | ©Verrsk | IHS Markft’ | «RLLN I Texpprian. | FICO I Wotters KKu wAr | EQUIFAX | CoSlarC CoreLogic 1 I Note: Source is Glassdoor.com. SECTION THREE - CORELOGIC’S BOARD HAS A LONG HISTORY OF POOR STEWARDSHIP PAGE NO. 41

  42. Slide 42: Board Has Rewarded Such Failures: 200% Bonus for Target Not Achieved

    Yet, the Board Has Rewarded Such Failures, Rather Than Fix Them: Awarding a 200% Bonus for Target Six Years Late and Not Achieved Six Years Late Not Actually Achieved Margin target set in 2011 to be achieved in 2013: “CoreLogic’s target of 30% adjusted EBITDA margins during 2013” - Frank Martell, 11

  43. Slide 43: Current 2021 & 2022 Plan Has More of the Same

    Current 2021 & 2022 Plan Has More of the Same… Margin Expansion Through Wind Mortgage Market Primary Driver of Results Downs / Divestitures CoreLogic assumptions for 2021-22 well above 35% margin target requires divestitures and strong industry forecasters mortgage market “Marking down” CoreLogic’s

  44. Slide 44: Section Four: Board's Poor Stewardship Continues with Refusal to Engage

    Section Four Board’s Poor Stewardship Continues with Refusal 1 4 to Engage with Us 2 5 3 6 .

  45. Slide 45: Shareholders Expect a Sale of the Company

    Shareholders Expect a Sale of the Company… Stock Price Largest Shareholder Realized Volatility Has Jumped 40+% For Seven Years, Holding Has Collapsed 67% Since Our Involvement 17.8%, Has Sold Position CoreLogic no longer trades on Stock price has increased over 40%; Largest shareholder for over seve

  46. Slide 46: Board Refuses to Engage or Commence a Sales Process

    Yet, CoreLogic’s Board Refuses to Engage or Commence a Sales Process Refuses The Board has withheld information necessary for us to assess raising our offer Diligence After each of our efforts at private dialogue, CoreLogic has immediately responded Undermines Constructive with hyperbolic press rele

  47. Slide 47: Every Step of the Way, the Board Has Refused to Engage Constructively

    Every Step of the Way, CoreLogic’s Board Has Refused to Engage Constructively S ECT I O N FO U R – BO A R D ’ S PO O R STE W A R D SH I P CO N T I N U ES WI T H RE F U S A L TO EN G A G E WI T H US PA G E NO . 47

  48. Slide 48: June 2020: Refuse to Speak With Us

    June 2020: Refuse to Speak With Us Despite Stock Jumping 40% and Realized Volatility Collapsing in Reaction to Our Proposal MAY–JUNE 25 Cannae & Senator JUNE 1 acquire 15% of CLGX’s ten-year CLGX stock, JUNE 16 & 17 purchase right to JUNE 16-26 driving up trading Gordon Haskett FAF that offered JUNE

  49. Slide 49: July 1–15, 2020: Insist on Bringing Defense Advisors

    July 1–15, 2020: Insist on Bringing Defense Advisors to Only Meeting; Issue Press Release as Soon as Meeting Concludes JULY 14 JULY 7 Cannae & Senator principals meet with CoreLogic principals Cannae & Senator issue press JULY 8 and defense advisors. JULY 15 release noting HOHW commitment and multip

  50. Slide 50: July 16–30, 2020: Press Releases After Each Private Communication

    July 16–30, 2020: Press Releases After Each of Our Efforts at Private Communication Games Around Special Meeting: Diluting Us Below 10% JULY 17 Cannae & Senator JULY 20 deliver private letter CLGX issues 7:00am JULY 23 to Board again stating open to increasing press release rejecting CLGX issues 2Q2

  51. Slide 51: August 1–13, 2020: Publicly Call Special Meeting, Privately Threaten to Undermine It

    August 1–13, 2020: Publicly Call Special Meeting, Privately Threaten to Undermine It Refuse to Speak with Shareholders Who Asked for Sale Process AUGUST 9 On a Sunday, CLGX announces it is AUGUST 10 calling Special Meeting for November 17. The absolute last day they can be Cannae & Senator counsel s

  52. Slide 52: August 14–30, 2020: More Games With Special Meeting

    August 14–30, 2020: More Games With Special Meeting: Setting Multiple Record Dates, Refusing to Agree to Not Cancel It AUGUST 14 CLGX issues press release refusing AUGUST 21 to sign ‘agreement’ to hold Special Meeting. In order to ensure meeting CLGX sets September 18th cannot be moved, we are force

  53. Slide 53: September 1–30, 2020: Reject Olive Branch, Issue Ad Hominem Attacks

    September 1–30, 2020: Reject Olive Branch Gesture, Issue Ad Hominem Attacks Claim $101-$135/Share Valuation with Misleading Materials SEPTEMBER 4 Cannae & Senator SEPTEMBER 9 & 10 attempt backchannel CLGX schedules virtual SEPTEMBER 10 communication non-deal-roadshow through advisors to CoreLogic is

  54. Slide 54: October: More of the Same Misleading Games

    October: So Far, More of the Same Misleading Games Try to Claim Shareholder Support…Never Say He Is an Insider On October 5th, CoreLogic’s media Kennedy was actually pushed off the relations firm assisted in issuing a CoreLogic Board by investors in 2012 statement of support from Kennedy Enterprises

  55. Slide 55: Section Five: Independent Directors Are Needed to Protect Shareholder Value

    Section Five 1 4 Independent Directors Are Needed 2 5 to Protect Shareholder Value 3 6

  56. Slide 56: Each CoreLogic Director Has Presided Over Substantial Underperformance

    Each CoreLogic Director Has Presided Over a Period of Substantial Underperformance Performance VS. Peers Selected by Cumulative CoreLogic Director Start of Tenure Broader Peer Group Set CoreLogic’s Own Board Compensation J. David Chatham MAY-10 -532% -634% $2.5mm Thomas C. O’Brien MAY-10 -532% -634%

  57. Slide 57: Long Tenures Undermine Independence

    Long Tenures Undermine Independence: Majority of Board Will Have Served Over 9 Years by Upcoming AGM Longest Tenured Directors Chair Committees and Board Tenure by Upcoming Tenure Over 9 Years Director Name Chairs Annual Meeting by Upcoming AGM Frank D. Martell (CEO) 10 yrs Chairs Compensation J. Da

  58. Slide 58: CEOs Sitting on Each Others' Boards and Overboarding Undermine Oversight

    CEOs Sitting on Each Others’ Boards, Relationships Among Directors, and Overboarding Undermine Oversight Note: Sourced from public records. Note: Sourced from public records. __i ! SECTION FIVE - INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS ARE NEEDED TO PROTECT SHAREHOLDER VALUE

  59. Slide 59: Chairman Paul Folino Was Chairman of Emulex When Broadcom Offered to Acquire Them

    CoreLogic’s Chairman, Paul Folino, Was Chairman of Emulex When Broadcom Offered to Acquire Them Chairman Has Done This Before… Chairman: Paul Folino Hired Bill Anderson (then Goldman Sachs) Hired Bill Anderson (now Evercore) and Sard Verbinnen & Co. Hire Same Defense Advisors and Sard Verbinnen & Co

  60. Slide 60: With Disastrous Results for Shareholders

    With Disastrous Results for Shareholders Chairman: Paul Folino Broadcom abandoned its bid three months later Acquirer Walked Away after Emulex ‘successfully’ blocked a sale Emulex went on to miss revenue guidance by 16% and operating income guidance by 47%— Company Massively further demonstrating th

  61. Slide 61: Majority Change of Board Necessary to Protect Shareholder Rights

    Majority Change of Board Necessary to Protect Shareholder Rights While Publicly Calling We Reached Out Privately to Correct This a Special Meeting… Issue and Corelogic Refused Publicly Cannae & Senator disagree with CoreLogic’s aggressive interpretation of its bylaws We privately asked CoreLogic to

  62. Slide 62: Majority Change of Board Necessary to Ensure Legitimate Sale Process

    Majority Change of Board Necessary to Ensure Legitimate Sale Process Board has sought delay whenever possible and deployed endless Board Has Demonstrated defense tactics rather than engage with us or commence a process Stern Resistance to Refuse to even speak with shareholders who asked them to sell

  63. Slide 63: Independent Nominees Have Relevant and Proven Expertise

    Independent Nominees Have Relevant and Proven Expertise Nominees have no affiliation with Senator, Cannae, or any of our associates Nominees have no affiliation with each other W. Steve Albrecht Wendy Lane Sreekanth Ravi Valuable public director and leadership experience Extensive financial, risk ma

  64. Slide 64: Nominees Possess Extensive Friendly and Contested M&A Experience

    Nominees Possess Extensive Friendly and Contested M&A Experience W. Steve Albrecht Wendy Lane Sreekanth Ravi Martina Lewis Bradford Ryan McKendrick Lisa Wardell Gail Landis Katherine “KT” Rabin Oversaw issuance of proxy vote recommendations on millions of ballot proposals across tens of thousands of

  65. Slide 65: Nominees Bring More Relevant Expertise Than Existing Directors

    Nominees Bring More Relevant Expertise Than Existing Directors Based on Categories Identified by CoreLogic’s Own Board CoreLogic’s Board identifies 4 categories of experience and expertise as relevant: Number of Categories Number of Categories Nominee Name Identified by CoreLogic Director For Remova

  66. Slide 66: Conclusion

    Conclusion

  67. Slide 67: We Have Offered a Compelling Proposal Yet Board Refuses to Engage

    We Have Offered a Compelling Proposal …Yet CoreLogic’s Board Refuses to Engage We have made a compelling offer with deal certainty from a credible, qualified buyer Shareholders expect a sale: realized volatility has declined 67%; the stock price has risen over 40%; the largest shareholder for over s

  68. Slide 68: New Independent and Highly Qualified Directors Are Needed

    New Independent and Highly Qualified Directors Are Needed to Protect Shareholder Rights and Ensure a Legitimate Sales Process New independent directors are highly qualified with extensive experience overseeing and advising public companies as well as evaluating and executing value-maximizing transac

  69. Slide 69: Appendix: Correcting CoreLogic's Misleading Communications

    Appendix 1 4 2 5 Appendix: Correcting CoreLogic’s 3 6 Misleading Communications

  70. Slide 70: Claim: Successful Transformation into a Powerhouse

    Claim: “Successful Transformation” into a “Powerhouse” “Delivering Value” Reality: Decade of Underperformance and Missed Targets Failed to Diversify Away from Mortgages Failed to Improve Normalized Margins ex M&A, FX, MD&A Mtge Adj, & Wind Downs ex M&A, FX, Sensitivity Mtge Adj, & Wind Downs Page No

  71. Slide 71: Claim: Operational Excellence and Delivering Results

    Claim: “Operational Excellence” and “Delivering Results” Reality: No Growth, No Margin Improvement, Shareholders Suffer While claiming growth and margin expansion, CoreLogic has delivered neither. The result has been terrible stock performance at each earnings announcement CoreLogic Has A Track Reco

  72. Slide 72: Claim: 2020 Results Validate Transformation

    Claim: 2020 “Results Validate Transformation” Reality: 2020 Is Entirely Due to Mortgage Market Surge Mortgage volumes have surged to $3.14T this year from an average Specific Sensitivity to Mortgage Volumes level of $1.75T due to low interest rates Repeatedly Stated by CoreLogic 20E/19A Change in Mo

  73. Slide 73: Claim: 2021 Is Even More Compelling

    Claim: 2021 Is “Even More Compelling” Reality: 2021 Is Based on Aggressive and Unsubstantiated Assumptions 2021 Forecasts call for: Assumes Unprecedented Inflection in Organic Growth of “at the 6% Organic growth least 5%” when company has not grown for 10 years 5% Our targeted diligence requests 4%

  74. Slide 74: Claim: Comparable Companies Imply $101–$135 per Share

    Claim: “Comparable Companies” Imply “$101—$135” per share Reality: CoreLogic Has Never Performed Even Close to Those Companies Claiming it deserves a $101-$135 per share valuation (implying a 115% to 190% premium) demonstrates CoreLogic has no intention to engage in a real discussion on value CoreLo

  75. Slide 75: Claim: Sell-Side Research Has Been Highly Supportive

    Claim: “Sell-Side Research Has Been Highly Supportive” Reality: Sell-Side Research Has NOT Been Supportive of CoreLogic “Offer price seems fair given peak multiples on peak of mortgage cycle.” “… we think the market could see the targeted revenue growth rates of 4-5% – Deutsche Bank, 6/26/20 in 2021

  76. Slide 76: Investor and Media Contacts

    We greatly appreciate the support we have heard from shareholders. If you are a fellow CoreLogic shareholder, please contact us with any thoughts or questions: IN V E ST O R C O N T A C T ME DI A C O N T A C T D.F. King & Co., Inc. Sloane & Company Edward McCarthy / Geoffrey Weinberg Dan Zacchei / J

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