Elia Group Sa/nv · EURONEXT:ELI

Elia Group Sa/nv — Technical Presentation (November 2025)

80 slides from Elia Group Sa/nv's technical presentation, Nov 13, 2025

  1. Slide 1: WG Balancing Design & Solutions of 13/11/2025

    WG Balancing Design & Solutions of 13/11/2025 Hybrid meeting 13/11/2025

  2. Slide 2: For a smooth teleconference with 30+ people

    For a smooth teleconference with 30+ people … Some rules apply - Please put yourself on mute at any time that you are not speaking to avoid background noise. - If you receive a call, please ensure that you do not put this meeting on hold. - You can quit and reconnect later on. - You will be muted or

  3. Slide 3: Agenda

    Agenda – 09:30 – 09:35: Welcome and approval MoM – 09:35 – 09:55: Update Roadmap 2025-2028 – 09:55 – 10:15: Overview Balancing incentives 2026 – 10:15 – 10:25: Monitoring of Proof-of-Concept for economic use of FRR – 10:25 – 11:10: Incentive on LV prequalification – 11:10 – 11:30: T&C BRP – feedback

  4. Slide 4: Minutes of Meeting for approval

    Minutes of Meeting for approval Minutes of Meeting of WG Energy Solutions of 02/10/2024 • Comments: / • Suggestion to approve. 4

  5. Slide 5: Update on Roadmap 2025-2028

    Update on Roadmap 2025-2028 Martine Verelst

  6. Slide 6: Congestion management

    One balancing philosophy, Two core activities and two focus areas, while integrating the interface between Balancing and Congestion Congestion management 6

  7. Slide 7: Explicit flexibility (1/2)

    Explicit flexibility (1/2) MARI 2025 connection 2026 2027 2028 Post MARI Design connection implementation Combo aFRR+mFRR Evaluation bid price limit for non- contracted aFRR Possible amendments to Energy Bids and bid price limit and elastic elastic demand price demand curve threshold FCR Design evol

  8. Slide 8: Explicit flexibility (2/2)

    Explicit flexibility (2/2) 2025 2026 2027 2028 FRR procurement Study evolutions aFRR capacity auction design. 5 Study economic 6 optimization FRR procurement Possible development of new auction design/strategy Study on FRR downward Possible implementation of findings of procurement the study on FRR

  9. Slide 9: Implicit Flexibility

    Implicit Flexibility 2025 2026 2027 2028 Implicit Flex Study BRP balance Possible relaxation BRP obligation balance obligation 2 IP formula evolution Start publishing imbalance price forecast 2 Continuous improvement IP forecast BRP Knowledge Management Multiple BRPs * (possible design note, BRP con

  10. Slide 10: Vertical System

    Vertical System 2025 2026 2027 2028 Lower the barriers of implicit 7 flex and explicit flex - while Study Explicit LV Barriers Possible Implementation barriers reduction respecting the nature of FRR products Ease Pre-Qualification process 7 Implementation mFRR LV Regional supply split MVP Regional s

  11. Slide 11: Vertical System

    Vertical System 2025 2026 2027 2028 End consumer flex on LV & MV Flex Ready Assets Study on bidding Possible study on bidding obligation extension obligation extension Last resort flexible assets steering (Study/Analysis) EVfleet flexibility unlocking based on Next iteration of mobility & flexibilit

  12. Slide 12: Processes and Services

    Processes and Services 2025 2026 2027 2028 Customer services Execute 2-portal (EPIC & traXes) strategy, improving customer experience by reducing the number of digital channels. Improved digital account management services for BSP & BRP via one-stop EPIC & traXes Reduce barriers for onboarding , pro

  13. Slide 13: Overview balancing incentives 2026

    Overview balancing incentives 2026 Martine Verelst

  14. Slide 14: Overview Balancing Incentives 2026

    Overview Balancing Incentives 2026 Incentives Public Will be followed consultation in Analyse van de mogelijkheden voor een optimalisatie van de aankoop van aFRR en At the latest by 30 WG BD&S mFRR balanceringscapaciteit October 2026 Analyse de la pertinence et de la faisabilité de relaxer l'obligat

  15. Slide 15: Economic optimization of the use of FRR – Monitoring of the Proof-of-Concept

    Economic optimization of the use of FRR – Monitoring of the Proof-of-Concept Tanguy Port

  16. Slide 16: Economic use of FRR: proof-of-concept (PoC) monitoring

    Economic use of FRR: proof-of-concept (PoC) monitoring 23/07/2025 – 28/10/2025 % of quarter hours where a FRCE evolution mFRR SA demand is submitted • mFRR SA activations decreased significantly thanks to the PoC • FRCE did not evolve significantly, which confirms that the PoC does not have a negati

  17. Slide 17: Economic use of FRR: proof-of-concept (PoC) monitoring

    Economic use of FRR: proof-of-concept (PoC) monitoring 23/07/2025 – 28/10/2025 ATC leftovers after intraday DE + FR + NL 23/07/2025 – 28/10/2025 Percentile Export (MW) Import (MW) Average absolute spread (IP-DA)* 5% 313 2 • Residual ATCs for 10% 500MW 701 122 balancing are more 15% 980 259 1GW frequ

  18. Slide 18: Economic use of FRR: proof-of-concept (PoC) monitoring

    Economic use of FRR: proof-of-concept (PoC) monitoring 23/07/2025 – 28/10/2025 Methodology to compute high-level benefits 1 2 Assumption on activation prices: Assumption on activation occurrences: New activation prices are calculated with When forecasted |SI| is low & ATCs are large, the QH aFRR pri

  19. Slide 19: Incentive Study on barrier to LV explicit balancing

    Incentive Study on barrier to LV explicit balancing Arnaud Debray

  20. Slide 20: Agenda

    Agenda 1. Introduction 2. Status of low-voltage in Belgium 3. Barriers hindering participation of low-voltage assets in the explicit balancing 4. Measurement and metering requirements for low-voltage Balancing – Description of the current requirements – Barrier 1: Need for an enabled SMR3 head meter

  21. Slide 21: Overview of the barriers mentioned by market parties

    Overview of the barriers mentionned by market parties

  22. Slide 22: Updated overview of the barriers mentioned by market parties

    Updated overview of the barriers mentionned by market parties Metering Communication On-boarding (Prequalification) Need for MID compliant meters (ToE) Local Gateway obligation Lengthy on-boarding Need for SMR3 headmeter (aFRR) Tase2/ICCP requirement Obligations on individual assets Need for real-ti

  23. Slide 23: Barriers related to metering

    Barriers related to metering

  24. Slide 24: Need for SMR3 headmeter

    SMR3 barrier MID barrier Need for SMR3 headmeter N/A for FCR

  25. Slide 25: Need for an SMR3 head meter (1)

    Need for an SMR3 head meter (1) – At Elia level (T&C): The presence of an SMR3 meter is not imposed – At regional level (FSP-DSO contract): The headmeter shall of the type with quarter-hourly measurement and these quarter- hours shall be used in the allocation The actual requirements is not the need

  26. Slide 26: Need for an SMR3 head meter (2)

    Need for an SMR3 head meter (2) – At Elia level (T&C): The presence of an SMR3 meter is not imposed – At regional level (FSP-DSO contract): The headmeter shall of the type with quarter-hourly measurement and these quarter- hours shall be used in the allocation The actual requirements is not the need

  27. Slide 27: Need for MID compliant meters

    SMR3 barrier MID barrier Need for MID compliant meters As soon as there is ToE

  28. Slide 28: Current Status

    Current Status – The current reading of MID leads to the following applicability: With ToE Without ToE FCR (ToE N/A) MID is not applicable aFRR MID is applicable MID is not applicable mFRR MID is applicable MID is applicable – MID imposes a measurement accuracy of 3.5% or better which is hard to rea

  29. Slide 29: How MID will impact the development of flexibility

    How MID will impact the development of flexibility Technologies present in our grid Presence of MID Future outlook meter today Batteries Low Highly competitive market => expected to remain low EV’s (private charging poles) Low/Medium Mandatory since this year when repayment by the employer EV’s (pub

  30. Slide 30: Is MID a fair barrier? Is it fit-for-purpose?

    Is MID a fair barrier? Is it fit-for-purpose? Giving an incentive to OEMs in Ensuring a qualitative delivery of Guaranteeing a fair remuneration of including qualitative measurements flexiblity services grid users systems in their assets Presentation title 30

  31. Slide 31: Is MID a fair barrier? Is it fit-for-purpose?

    Is MID a fair barrier? Is it fit-for-purpose? Giving an incentive to OEMs in Ensuring a qualitative delivery of Guaranteeing a fair remuneration of including qualitative measurements flexiblity services grid users systems in their assets – The law of large numbers shows that when pooling a large num

  32. Slide 32: Is MID a fair barrier? Is it fit-for-purpose?

    Is MID a fair barrier? Is it fit-for-purpose? Giving an incentive to OEMs in Ensuring a qualitative delivery of Guaranteeing a fair remuneration of including qualitative measurements flexiblity services grid users systems in their assets – Elia has no view on the agreements between the FSPs and the

  33. Slide 33: Is MID a fair barrier? Is it fit-for-purpose?

    Is MID a fair barrier? Is it fit-for-purpose? Giving an incentive to OEMs in Ensuring a qualitative delivery of Guaranteeing a fair remuneration of including qualitative measurements flexiblity services grid users systems in their assets – Most grid users are unaware of MID certification when purcha

  34. Slide 34: Conclusion

    Conclusion – Elia believes MID is not fit for purpose and will investigate ways to get rid of this barrier Recommendation of Elia: To avoid hindering flexibility development, Elia recommends pursuing several actions concurrently: ➢ In the short term, it is crucial to clarify, in cooperation with the

  35. Slide 35: Barriers related to communication requirements

    Barriers related to communication requirements

  36. Slide 36: Local Gateway

    Local Gateway

  37. Slide 37: Why considering a switch to central gateway?

    Why considering a switch to central gateway? – The Local Gateway has been mentioned as one of the key barriers to the development of LV flexibility as the associated cost for the gateway installation and operation entirely kills the business case – For this reason, Elia and the DSOs temporarily allo

  38. Slide 38: High volume of real-time data

    High volume of real-time data

  39. Slide 39: High volume of real-time data as an additional barrier?

    High volume of real-time data as an additional barrier? – Some market actors reported that Elia’s requirements were rather stringent imposing high volumes of data to be sent in real- time at individual asset level. Further analysis reveals that this element is highly dependent on the different commu

  40. Slide 40: Conclusion

    Conclusion Recommendation of Elia: Elia recommends maintaining the real-time capability requirement at individual level but implementing event-driven communication for all delivery points in order to reduce the volume of data to be transmitted. Elia invites stakeholders to respond specifically to th

  41. Slide 41: Barriers related to on-boarding

    Barriers related to on-boarding

  42. Slide 42: BSP on-boarding process

    BSP on-boarding* process *on-boarding: entire process for a delivery point to join the market and start offering bids Presentation title 42

  43. Slide 43: Why type-prequalification shouldn't be applied blindly

    Why type-prequalification shouldn’t be applied blindly Creg expects “Propositions to simplify the prequalification process for low-voltage units, including the possibility of prequalifying by unit type via manufacturers” Communication chain Technical ability of an asset to follow a setpoint Accuracy

  44. Slide 44: Why type-prequalification shouldn't be applied blindly

    Why type-prequalification shouldn’t be applied blindly Creg expects “Propositions to simplify the prequalification process for low-voltage units, including the possibility of prequalifying by unit type via manufacturers” Communication chain Technical ability of an asset to follow a setpoint Accuracy

  45. Slide 45: At asset level: Meter homologation

    At asset level: Meter homologation – In FCR: – an « internal » procedure is in place and used for >1year (POC stage) – The procedure is not clear nor documented – The success of LV FCR demonstrates a clear interest/Impact – In aFRR, good progress has been realized already by the SOs: – There is a cl

  46. Slide 46: Elia Position on current PQ test

    Elia Position on current PQ test – PQ test is not indicated as a major barrier for LV by market participants – There are some other concerns raised related to PQ tests more generally (not only LV): – It can be costly, especially for mFRR (no remuneration) – It generates a loss of opportunity (lead t

  47. Slide 47: T&C BRP – feedback on the public consultation

    T&C BRP – feedback on the public consultation Simon Serrarens

  48. Slide 48: Proposed timeline

    PEPPOL EiF Deadline analysis FG Proposed timeline & Ext. Inc. 2024 2025 2026 Nov May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Start obs. 19 weeks to Eval. End obs. Analysis submission period plan Period (12M) period (4M) CREG T2 CREG discussion + writing PC Adapt C

  49. Slide 49: Content of the public consultation

    Content of the public consultation • Public consultation on the T&C BRP, from 03/09/2025 till 03/10/2025 included • T&C BRP – revision 2 2025 includes amendments concerning: 1. Incentive Faster Settlement 2. GUFlex (perimeter correction) 3. Peppol 4. Contact details 5. Remaining changes • Elia recei

  50. Slide 50: Feedback GUFlex

    Feedback GUFlex Market Feedback received Response Elia party Febeliec Febeliec does not oppose the introduction of the concept of Modulated The implementation of CREG’s decision (B)2899 requires amendment of several regulated Volume in order to cope in the future with flexible connection agreements.

  51. Slide 51: Feedback Incentive Faster Settlement (1/3)

    Feedback Incentive Faster Settlement (1/3) Market party Feedback received Response Elia Febeliec Regarding the modifications made for the Elia wishes to assure Febeliec that the updated financial guarantee is the result of thorough analysis, as set out in the faster settlement, Febeliec would like t

  52. Slide 52: Feedback Incentive Faster Settlement (2/3)

    Feedback Incentive Faster Settlement (2/3) Market party Feedback received Response Elia FEBEG FEBEG regrets that Elia did not retain Elia acknowledges that FEBEG proposed the idea of having BRPs select between the current settlement approach and the new one. Elia FEBEG's request (see FEBEG's reactio

  53. Slide 53: Feedback Incentive Faster Settlement (3/3)

    Feedback Incentive Faster Settlement (3/3) Market party Feedback received Response Elia FEBEG FEBEG requests Elia to put in place a flexible system, allowing a combination of Elia agrees and has adapted the T&C BRP accordingly. several bank guarantees and a cash deposit to cover the full required am

  54. Slide 54: aFRR & mFRR capacity auction design evolutions

    aFRR & mFRR capacity auction design evolutions Kris Poncelet

  55. Slide 55: Assessment possible future revision of the aFRR capacity auction

    Recall WG of 6th Feb 2025 Assessment possible future revision of the aFRR capacity auction • Elia intends to assess the need for possible future revisions of the auction for aFRR capacity. • The main motivation for the evaluation is the increasing liquidity in the aFRR capacity auctions and more par

  56. Slide 56: Increase in awarded Single-CCTU volumes

    Recall WG of 4th April 2025 The increase of liquidity in the Single-CCTU product led to an increase in awarded Single-CCTU volumes…  Throughout 2024, the share of volumes awarded from the All-CCTU product remained rather stable  Significant ALL-CCTU share in the upward direction.  Highly limited

  57. Slide 57: Significantly lower capacity prices/costs start 2025

    Recall WG of 4th April 2025 … which result in significantly lower capacity prices/costs start 2025 While aFRR capacity prices (and costs) slightly increased in 2024 (relative to 2023), a significant decrease in aFRR capacity prices and costs is observed early 2025 due to more and more competitive Si

  58. Slide 58: In the meantime

    In the meantime • Elia engaged in bilateral discussions with many BSPs • The liquidity in the aFRR Capacity auctions (and in particular in the Single-CCTU product) has stabilized. • CREG requested in Decision (B)3047 to perform an amendment of the aFRR capacity auction design such that more than the

  59. Slide 59: Objective of today's presentation

    Objective of today’s presentation • Present the assessment performed by Elia • Present main feedback received from stakeholders in bilateral discussions • Present Elia’s resulting proposal for evolutions of the capacity auction design

  60. Slide 60: Scope of the assessment

    Scope of the assessment Considering the input provided by BSPs and CREG, Elia has performed an assessment on following aspects: • Increase procured aFRR capacity when economically justified: • Can more aFRR capacity be procured in moments the marginal price for aFRR capacity is below the marginal pr

  61. Slide 61: Procurement cost reduction

    Increase procured aFRR capacity when economically justified (1/1) 140.000 Procurement cost reduction • Context: For some CCTUs, the marginal price for upward aFRR capacity has 120.000 been observed to be below the marginal price for upward mFRR capacity. 100.000 80.000 [k€] 60.000 40.000 • In these

  62. Slide 62: Increase procured aFRR capacity when economically justified (2/2)

    Increase procured aFRR capacity when economically justified (2/2) • The potential benefits could be captured through a joint aFRR and mFRR capacity auction, which could look as follows: • Objective function: minimize aFRR + mFRR procurement costs* • Constraints: • Volume of aFRR procured ≥ aFRR Need

  63. Slide 63: Deviation from total cost minimization

    Deviation from total cost minimization • In the current aFRR auction, there is a mechanism to deviate from the minimal cost solution by “favoring” the selection of single-CCTU bids. This mechanism was successful in fostering the development of liquidity in the single-CCTU market segment. This mechan

  64. Slide 64: Relevance of maintaining the All-CCTU product (1/3)

    Relevance of maintaining the All-CCTU product (1/3) • The All-CCTU product differs from the Single-CCTU product in the following ways: • All-CCTU bids span an entire day • All-CCTU bids are mutually exclusive (i.e., only one All-CCTU bid per BSP can be selected) • All-CCTU bids are indivisible • The

  65. Slide 65: Relevance of maintaining the All-CCTU product (2/3)

    Relevance of maintaining the All-CCTU product (2/3) • Considering the current levels of liquidity in the Single-CCTU aFRR product, the removal of the All-CCTU aFRR capacity product at this moment would hence come with the following risks: • Risk of increasing aFRR procurement costs • Risk of periods

  66. Slide 66: Relevance of maintaining the All-CCTU product (3/3)

    Relevance of maintaining the All-CCTU product (3/3) • Illustration of a joint aFRR/mFRR capacity auction with Single-CCTU aFRR Bids, All-CCTU aFRR Bids and Single-CCTU mFRR bids: • Objective function: minimize aFRR + mFRR procurement costs* • Constraints: #𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒−𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑈 𝑎𝐹𝑅𝑅 𝑈𝑝…

  67. Slide 67: CCTU granularity (1/2)

    CCTU granularity (1/2) • Currently, Elia procures aFRR and mFRR capacity in blocks (CCTUs) of 4 hours each • Procuring capacity in 4-hour blocks might not be suitable for all technologies due to: • Non-constant availabilities during the 4-hour period (cf. illustration PV) • Non-constant (opportunity

  68. Slide 68: CCTU granularity (2/2)

    CCTU granularity (2/2) • A benchmark with other countries reveals some other countries already have more granular CCTUs: • France and the Nordic countries have hourly aFRR and mFRR Capacity products • Spain has quarter-hourly capacity products • Germany and Austria have 4-hour capacity products but

  69. Slide 69: Bid complexity Single-CCTU product

    Bid complexity Single-CCTU product • Single-CCTU aFRR and mFRR Capacity Bids are currently fully divisible and no linking of bids is possible (e.g., block bids, exclusive groups of bids) • A benchmark reveals different practices in different countries: • No bid complexities in the German-Austrian ca

  70. Slide 70: Paid-as-bid remuneration for aFRR and mFRR Capacity

    Paid-as-bid remuneration for aFRR and mFRR Capacity • aFRR and mFRR Capacity is currently remunerated based on a paid-as-bid scheme. Benefits paid-as-cleared remuneration Drawbacks paid-as-cleared remuneration • Efficient allocation of capacity reservation • Prone to market power and abuse • Reduced

  71. Slide 71: Overview of proposed evolutions

    Overview of proposed evolutions Proposed evolutions • Evolve to a joint auction for aFRR and mFRR (minimizing costs to secure the required aFRR and FRR) ❑ Decrease capacity costs ❑ Increase depth and attractiveness of the aFRR capacity market ❑ Secure additional aFRR Energy Bids ❑ Simplify the aFRR

  72. Slide 72: Next steps

    Next steps • Elia welcomes additional feedback on the proposed aFRR and mFRR capacity auction evolutions •  Please contact your KAM Energy • Implementation possibilities and timeline will be further investigated by Elia • Key feedback (and implementation planning) will be presented in the WG BD&S o

  73. Slide 73: Status on DFD project

    Status on DFD project Aline Mathy

  74. Slide 74: The mitigation measure aimed at avoiding ENTSO-E's penalty

    The mitigation measure aimed at avoiding ENTSO-E’s penalty Context: Trigger for Elia’s initiative: - Discussions at ENTSO-E level to penalize TSOs contributing too much for DfD. In 2022 Elia exceeded the 30% threshold of DFD contribution for 3 quarters. - The potential penalty is an obligation to co

  75. Slide 75: Elia contribution to DFD is constantly decreasing

    Elia contribution to DFD is constantly decreasing Potential positive impact on DFD contribution Improvement 15’ MTU Core DACC Go-live Go-live 15’ of activation ID market and Core FB PICASSO MTU SDAC of aFRR BE-NL-DE DA market Core 15’ MTU during DfD coupling IDCC BE-FR IDA Go-live Most recent and up

  76. Slide 76: Next steps

    Next steps Elia’s contribution to DFDs is constantly decreasing and external factors should manly confirm the trend in the near future. Applying a mitigation measure would always come with a cost while a penalty is not yet of application on ENTSO-E side. No view is available on when the penalty woul

  77. Slide 77: Improvements done since last update

    On top of that, our engineer made sure that the whole analysis can be re-run by just “pushing on a button” in order to re-generate the same outputs anytime Improvements done since last update we want to re-perform the analysis. Models DFD forecast ACE forecast Clustering: separate analysis for upwar

  78. Slide 78: AOB

    -€ elia AOB Alexandre Torreele

  79. Slide 79: WG next dates

    -€ elia WG next dates

  80. Slide 80: 2025 WG Energy Solutions

    2025 WG Energy Solutions • Thursday 06/02/2025 09:00 – 17:00 • Friday 04/04/2025 09:00 – 17:00 • Thursday 19/06/2025 09:00 – 17:00 • Thursday 02/10/2025 09:00 – 17:00 • Thursday 13/11/2025 09:00 – 17:00 • Thursday 18/12/2025 09:00 – 17:00 80

Elia Group — Technical Presentation (November 2025) on 6ix