Bob Evans Farms — Proxy Contest (July 2014)
109 slides from Bob Evans Farms's proxy contest presentation, Jul 28, 2014
Slide 1: Refresh Bob Evans: The Case and Nominees For Change
Refresh Bob Evans The Case and Nominees For Change July 2014 www.refreshbobevans.com 1 Strictly Confidential. Do Not Duplicate or Distribute.
Slide 2: Disclaimer
Disclaimer THIS PRESENTATION WITH RESPECT TO BOB EVANS FARMS, INC. (“BOB EVANS” OR THE “COMPANY’”) IS FOR GENERAL INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. IT DOES NOT HAVE REGARD TO THE SPECIFIC INVESTMENT OBJECTIVE, FINANCIAL SITUATION, SUITABILITY OR PARTICULAR NEED OF ANY SPECIFIC PERSON WHO MAY RECEIVE THIS
Slide 3: Additional Information Regarding the Solicitation
Additional Information Regarding the Solicitation SANDELL ASSET MANAGEMENT CORP., CASTLERIGG MASTER INVESTMENTS LTD., CASTLERIGG INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, CASTLERIGG INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED, CASTLERIGG OFFSHORE HOLDINGS, LTD., CASTLERIGG MERGER ARBITRAGE AND EQUITY EVENT FUND, LTD., CASTLERIGG M
Slide 4: Executive Summary
Refresh Bob Evans Executive Summary 4 Strictly Confidential. Do Not Duplicate or Distribute.
Slide 5: About Sandell Asset Management
About Sandell Asset Management Sandell Asset Management Corp. (“Sandell”) is a leading private, alternative asset management firm specializing in global corporate event-driven investing Over 16 years of managing event-driven strategies across both equity- and credit-oriented opportunities Combines b
Slide 6: Overview of Bob Evans Farms, Inc.
Overview of Bob Evans Farms, Inc. Bob Evans Farms, Inc. (“Bob Evans” or the “Company”) was founded in 1953 by the Company’s namesake and became publicly traded in 1963 The Company operates in two distinct business segments: Bob Evans ($ m illions,exceptpershare) Restaurants, and Bob Evans Farms Food
Slide 7: Executive Summary: Situation Overview
Executive Summary: Situation Overview Sandell has beneficial ownership of 7.6%1 of Bob Evans, making us one of the Company’s largest shareholders We initially acquired our position in Bob Evans because we believed that Bob Evans was materially undervalued and that the Company’s stock price did not f
Slide 8: Executive Summary: Bob Evans Abysmal Total Shareholder Return
Executive Summary: Bob Evans Abysmal Total Shareholder Return Bob Evans’ shareholders have suffered dramatic and sustained long-term stock price under-performance versus: The Company’s selected proxy peer group The Company’s most comparable family dining peer, Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, I
Slide 9: Executive Summary: Poor Operating Performance
Executive Summary: Poor Operating Performance There are a litany of operating problems that have plagued Bob Evans, including: Repeated reduction in earnings guidance Missing consensus earnings in 14 of the last 24 quarters Consistently poor and declining same store sales Bloated corporate o
Slide 10: Executive Summary: Unrecognized Asset Value
Executive Summary: Unrecognized Asset Value Despite its worst-in-class performance, Bob Evans has not taken the necessary steps to unlock the value of its unique real estate assets and its packaged foods business, BEF Foods We do not believe that the current Board is sufficiently impartial to undert
Slide 11: Executive Summary: Wasteful and Spendthrift Culture
Executive Summary: Wasteful and Spendthrift Culture Symbolic of the poor Board oversight at Bob Evans, the Company has spent millions of shareholder dollars on corporate luxuries which seem preposterous for a ‘farm’ oriented family dining restaurant brand $48 million New HQ $21 million New Corporate
Slide 12: Executive Summary: Failed Board Stewardship
Executive Summary: Failed Board Stewardship We believe these problems at Bob Evans are the direct result of the failed policies and a wasteful culture sanctioned by a stale and entrenched Board of Directors who have failed to exert effective management oversight and have lost all credibility with sh
Slide 13: Executive Summary: Nominees Suggestions for Fixing Bob Evans
Executive Summary: Nominees Suggestions for Fixing Bob Evans Our slate of genuinely independent nominees to the Board of Bob Evans have the relevant experience and expertise to fix the problems at the Company Our nominees have organized their suggestions for fixing Bob Evans into four categories:
Slide 14: Executive Summary: Nominees
Executive Summary: Nominees To address these problems and best position Bob Evans to deliver enhanced shareholder value, we have submitted an outstanding slate of eight Nominees for election to the Board of Bob Evans Our diverse set of independent nominees boast extensive experience in: restaurant o
Slide 15: Abysmal Total Shareholder Return
Refresh Bob Evans Abysmal Total Shareholder Return 15 Strictly Confidential. Do Not Duplicate or Distribute.
Slide 16: Peer Group Selection
Peer Group Selection Peer Group Rationale Company Market Value Majority Franchise? The peers listed on the right were BJ's Restaurants $ 879 No selected because they operate in the Family and Casual Dining space and a majority of their Bloomin’ Brands 2,520 No restaurants are non-franchised We refer
Slide 17: Peer Group Selection (cont.)
Peer Group Selection (cont.) Denny’s and DineEquity were not selected as peers because a majority of their restaurants are franchised (91% and 99% respectively) Ruby Tuesday was not selected as a peer due its small market value ($446 million), substantial financial leverage, and significant operatin
Slide 18: One Year Total Shareholder Return vs. Peers
One Year Total Shareholder Return vs. Peers 50% Bob Evans Proxy Peers 45% Proxy Peers +28.4% Cracker Barrel 40% Family & Casual Dining Peers 35% 30% +21.3% 25% Family & Casual 20% Dining +20.4% 15% 10% 5% +11.3% 0% Apr-13 Jul-13 Oct-13 Jan-14 Source:Bloom berg (as ofApril21,2014,which was priorto Sa
Slide 19: Three Year Total Shareholder Return vs. Peers
Three Year Total Shareholder Return vs. Peers 160% Bob Evans 140% Proxy Peers +102.5% Cracker Barrel 120% Family & Casual Dining Peers 100% Proxy Peers +87.5% 80% 60% Family & Casual 40% Dining +68.0% 20% 0% -20% +54.1% -40% Apr-11 Apr-12 Apr-13 Apr-14 Source:Bloom berg (as ofApril21,2014,which was
Slide 20: Five Year Total Shareholder Return vs. Peers
Five Year Total Shareholder Return vs. Peers 350% Bob Evans Proxy Peers Proxy Peers +237.5% 300% Cracker Barrel Family & Casual Dining 250% Peers 200% +228.7% 150% Family & Casual 100% Dining +155.4% 50% 0% +107.5% -50% Apr-09 Apr-10 Apr-11 Apr-12 Apr-13 Apr-14 Source:Bloom berg (as ofApril21,2014,w
Slide 21: Ten Year Total Shareholder Return vs. Peers
Ten Year Total Shareholder Return vs. Peers 300% Bob Evans Proxy Peers Proxy Peers +239.4% 250% Cracker Barrel 200% 150% +207.4% 100% Family & Casual 50% Dining +133.0% 0% -50% +79.2% -100% Apr-04 Apr-05 Apr-06 Apr-07 Apr-08 Apr-09 Apr-10 Apr-11 Apr-12 Apr-13 Apr-14 Source:Bloom berg (as ofApril21,2
Slide 22: CEO quote on outperforming indices
“We are very pleased with many of the transformations that have taken place within Bob Evans….One of the things that we’ve been able to accomplish over the last five years is we’ve outperformed the Nasdaq, the Russell 1000, and also the S&P 500. That’s to me the measure if we’re truly having success
Slide 23: Chronic and Severe Stock Price Underperformance
Chronic and Severe Stock Price Underperformance Bob Evans’ Total Shareholder Return Relative to: Family & Casual Proxy Peers Dining Peers 1 Year -10.0% -17.0% -9.1% 3 Year -48.4% -33.4% -13.9% 5 Year -121.2% -130.1% -47.9% 10 Year -128.2% -160.2% -53.8% Shareholders of Bob Evans have suffered years
Slide 24: Consistently Poor Operating Performance
Refresh Bob Evans Consistently Poor Operating Performance 24 Strictly Confidential. Do Not Duplicate or Distribute.
Slide 25: Management Repeatedly Reduced Its Guidance for FY 2014
Management Repeatedly Reduced Its Guidance for FY 2014… $3.00 $2.75 $2.60 to $2.67 $2.60 to $2.65 $2.50 $2.20 to $2.30 Earnings Per Share $2.25 $2.00 $1.60 to $1.75 $1.75 $1.50 $1.25 $1.00 Oct. 22, 2013 Dec. 4, 2013 Jan. 27, 2014 Mar. 4, 2014 Source:SEC filings;CapitalIQ 25 Strictly Confidential. Do
Slide 26: Has Already Started to Guide-Down for FY 2015
…and Has Already Started to Guide-Down for FY 2015 $3.00 $2.80 to $3.00 $2.80 $2.60 $2.40 Earnings Per Share $2.20 $1.90 to $2.20 $2.00 $1.80 $1.60 $1.40 $1.20 $1.00 Mar. 4, 2014 Jul. 8, 2014 ”One major concern that continues to linger I think is the fact that your earnings outlooks over the recent
Slide 27: Bob Evans Repeatedly Misses Consensus Estimates
Bob Evans Repeatedly Misses Consensus Estimates $1.00 $0.50 Quarterly Earnings Per Share $0.00 -$0.50 -$1.00 -$1.50 -$2.00 -$2.50 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2009 2009 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010 2010 2011 2011 2011 2011 2012 2012 2012 2012 2013 2013 2013 201
Slide 28: Same Store Sales vs. Knapp-Track Casual Dining Index
Bob Evans Underperforms Both the Knapp-Track Casual Dining Index , and… 4.0% “We are surprised the stock 2.0% did not pull back more given the weak sales trend, 0.3% 0.0% 0.4% significant earnings revision for Same Store Sales 0.0% FY15, and uncertainty about -0.6% -0.8% -0.6% the Company's future -
Slide 29: Same Store Sales vs. Cracker Barrel
…Its Most Comparable Family Dining Peer, Cracker Barrel 8.0% 6.0% 5.4% 5.4% 4.3% 3.9% 4.0% 2.4% 2.7% 2.5% 2.0% 2.2% 2.0% 1.5% Same Store Sales 0.3% 0.4% 0.0% -0.9% -0.6% -2.0% -1.0% -2.0% -1.7% -1.8% -2.0% -2.9% -2.7% -4.0% -3.6% -4.7% -6.0% -6.7% -8.0% -10.0% May-13 Jun-13 Jul-13 Aug-13 Sep-13 Oct-
Slide 30: Same Store Sales Growth vs. Cracker Barrel
Same Store Sales Growth (2009 – Present) vs. Cracker Barrel 4% 3.1% 3% 2.2% 2% Same Store Sales Growth 1.0% 1% 0.8% 0.5%1 0.2% 0% -0.3% -1% -0.6% -1.0% -2% -1.7% -2.1% -3% -3.5% -4% FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 Source:SEC filings 1 Firstnine m onths ofFY 2014 30 Strictly Confident
Slide 31: 3-Year Average Same Store Sales Growth
3-Year Average Same Store Sales Growth 4.3% 3.3% 2.9% 2.5% 1.8% 1.6% 0.8% 0.5% -1.0% (Core Brands) Source:SEC filings Represents Average AnnualGrowth 31 Strictly Confidential. Do Not Duplicate or Distribute.
Slide 32: "Hockey Stick" FY 2015 Same Store Sales Guidance
“Hockey Stick” FY 2015 Same Store Sales Guidance 10.0% “high single- 8.0% digit increases during the second half of Same Store Sales Growth 6.0% the year” W e note thatsam e 4.0% store sales are “a flat to low 2.0% single-digit projected lowerEVEN increase” AFTER com pletion of 0.0% the Bob Evans “F
Slide 33: SG&A Expense Far in Excess of Peers
SG&A Expense Far in Excess of Peers The Company suffers from a cost structure that has resulted in SG&A expense far in excess of virtually all its peers ● Because Bob Evans does not pursue a franchising strategy, to most accurately asses the Company’s relative cost structure, we compare Bob Evans to
Slide 34: Perennially High SG&A Expense
Perennially High SG&A Expense As the following exhibit graphically illustrates, the last fiscal year was not an aberration, as Bob Evans has suffered from high SG&A expenses for a number of years versus the average of its family and casual dining peers that are not majority-franchised SG&A as a % of
Slide 35: Bloated Corporate Infrastructure
Bloated Corporate Infrastructure While there are several reasons why the Company’s SG&A expenses are far too high, one of the key reasons is the Company’s bloated corporate infrastructure; Bob Evans has 512 employees at its corporate headquarters1, which has resulted in far lower overhead efficiency
Slide 36: ROIC: Disastrous "Farm Fresh Refresh" Remodeling Results
ROIC: Disastrous “Farm Fresh Refresh” Remodeling Results The Company’s much-promoted “Farm Fresh Refresh” remodeling initiative, which has required capital expenditures of $120 million across the entire Bob Evans chain, has been a consummate failure based on the Company’s disappointing same store sa
Slide 37: Abysmal Return on Invested Capital
Abysmal Return on Invested Capital The Company’s 3-year Farm Fresh Refresh initiative, completed as of April 2014, has cost over $120 million and has generated almost no return on this invested capital Farm Fresh Refresh Rate of Return Same Store Sales (SSS) Year 1 Year 2 FY 2013 Q4 +2.20% +1.80% FY
Slide 38: EBITDAR Margin vs. Peers
EBITDAR Margin vs. Peers 21% 19.1% 19% 17.6% 17% Last Fiscal Year EBITDAR Margin 15.6% 15% 14.3% 14.2% 14.2% 13.7% 12.8% 13% 11% 10.2% 9% 7% 5% Cheesecake Brinker Red Robin Darden Texas BJ's Bloomin' Cracker Bob Evans Factory Roadhouse Restaurants Brands Barrel “BOBE’s business is unraveling quickly
Slide 39: Unrecognized Asset Values
Refresh Bob Evans Unrecognized Asset Values 39 Strictly Confidential. Do Not Duplicate or Distribute.
Slide 40: Extensive Real Estate Holdings
Extensive Real Estate Holdings The Company has amassed an extensive portfolio of 480 wholly-owned restaurants (both land and building), or 86% of its entire restaurant base, all of which had been remodeled at significant cost by the end of FY 2014 100% 90% 80% 70% % Restaurants Owned 60% 50% 40% 30%
Slide 41: Unrecognized Real Estate Value
Unrecognized Real Estate Value Our analysis shows that the Company’s stock price does not reflect the significant value associated with its owned real estate, including its wholly-owned restaurants as well as its industrial and office real estate, which in total may be worth upwards of $900+ million
Slide 42: Unrecognized Real Estate Value (cont.)
Unrecognized Real Estate Value (cont.) The excuses repeatedly utilized by the management and Board of Bob Evans for not unlocking the value associated with the Company’s real estate are in our opinion both specious and disingenuous: Flexibility: The Com pany’s claim thata sale-leaseback would “reduc
Slide 43: BEF Foods: No Meaningful Synergies
BEF Foods: No Meaningful Synergies BEF Foods, the Company’s packaged foods division, contributes little in the way of synergies Volatile sow prices, a significant cost to BEF Foods, have had a dramatic, negative impact on the Company’s earnings BEF Foods operates independently, has a separate manage
Slide 44: BEF Foods: No Meaningful Synergies (cont.)
BEF Foods: No Meaningful Synergies (cont.) We believe that operating a packaged foods company such as BEF Foods within a restaurant chain impairs long-term shareholder value Compromises Efficiency of Both Businesses: When manufacturers are captured by their customers, they are pressured to operate
Slide 45: BEF Foods: Value Disconnect
BEF Foods: Value Disconnect Market Enterprise EV/2014E EV/2015E In addition to contributing little in the way of ($ in m illions) Value Value (EV) EBITDA EBITDA synergies, the value of BEF Foods is not being Restaurants - Family and Casual Dining (Non-Majority Franchised, > $500mm) adequately reflec
Slide 46: Starbucks comparison quote
“Starbucks started out with coffee shops and now when you go into the grocery channel, you’ll find bags of coffee, you’ll find Starbucks kiosks. I think they’ve done the best job of what we’re trying to do. I think that serves as a great model for us.” – Steven Davis, Chairman & CEO of Bob Evans Col
Slide 47: Wasteful and Spendthrift Culture
Refresh Bob Evans Wasteful and Spendthrift Culture 47 Strictly Confidential. Do Not Duplicate or Distribute.
Slide 48: Unnecessary Expenditures
Unnecessary Expenditures Bob Evans has incurred expenses far in excess of its peers for what are, in our view, several unnecessary and extravagant pursuits which is particularly objectionable in light of the Company’s poor stock price performance New Corporate Headquarters – The Company recently ope
Slide 49: Extravagant New Corporate Headquarters
Extravagant New Corporate Headquarters We believe that the wasteful spending behavior of management is best illustrated by the recent construction of the Company’s new $48.2 million corporate headquarters campus in New Albany, Ohio (see www.youtube.com/watch?v=lHQ_drorVk0) We believe that the constr
Slide 50: Extravagant New Corporate Headquarters (cont.)
Extravagant New Corporate Headquarters (cont.) “The new corporate headquarters campus will include a 175,197 SF facility comprised of three separate structures. The Main Building is 137,542 SF of private and open offices, conference rooms, various test kitchens, cafeteria, fitness area, locker rooms
Slide 51: Corporate Jets
Corporate Jets For many years, Bob Evans was shouldering the expenses associated with the aircraft pictured below, an ASTRA SPX (Gulfstream G-100) 14-seat aircraft: ● We note that a 49% interest in this plane was purchased in 2009 by a subsidiary of Greif, Inc. and we highlight the fact that Michael
Slide 52: Farm and Homestead Museum
Farm and Homestead Museum The Company is required to incur the expenses associated with maintaining the 937-acre Bob Evans Farm in southeastern Ohio and not long ago invested more than $4 million in renovations to the Farm and its Homestead Museum1 “Many people might not know that we actually do not
Slide 53: Failed Board Stewardship
Refresh Bob Evans Failed Board Stewardship 53 Strictly Confidential. Do Not Duplicate or Distribute.
Slide 54: A Highly Conflicted Board
A Highly Conflicted Board “Bob Evans’ Board is parochial in the extreme for a public company…This is in part due to the fact that a majority of the Board’s members have long-standing relationships with each other and with the Company’s Chairman and CEO, Defendant Steven A. Davis, whether through loc
Slide 55: A Highly Conflicted Board – Before Our Involvement
A Highly Conflicted Board – Before Our Involvement The vast majority of Board members have numerous personal connections both to Steven Davis, who is Chairman and CEO, as well as amongst themselves This closely-knit Board has allowed the irresponsible spending and failed initiatives of management go
Slide 56: Dizzying Array of Connections – Before Our Involvement
Dizzying Array of Connections – Before Our Involvement Mary Haben Gordon Bill Ingram Gee Cheryl Michael Krueger Gasser Steven Key Davis The Ohio State Univ. Former The James Foundation CEO The Columbus Academy Robert Lucas Vorys, Sater Greif, Inc. Larry State Auto Corbin Eileen Paul Columbus College
Slide 57: Director quote on board service as a hobby
“Sitting on a corporate board has been like playing golf to me. It is my hobby.” – Gordon Gee, Director at Bob Evans (2009 – 2014) Vanderbilt Hustler, September 27, 2006 (emphasis added) M r.Gee expressed this attitude before Bob Evans saw fitto add him to the Board. Itwasn’tuntilafterourinvolvem en
Slide 58: A Stale Board – Before Our Involvement
A Stale Board – Before Our Involvement Bob Evans suffers from a stale Board of Directors, with an average Director tenure of over 14 years TSR Relative to Family & Casual Dining Peers that TSR Relative to Director Year Appointed Tenure (Years) are not majority- Cracker Barrel1 franchised1 Larry C. C
Slide 59: Are the three new Board members capable of effecting change?
Are the three new Board members capable of effecting change? Purely as a knee-jerk reactionary measure in our view, and coming one day after the announcement of our nomination of a slate of directors, the Company appointed three new members to the Board Meaningful Restaurant New Board Member Current
Slide 60: Past as Prologue? - The History of Mimi's Café
Past as Prologue? - The History of Mimi’s Café The disastrous history of Mimi’s Café, from its acquisition by Bob Evans in July of 2004 for $183 million to its sale in February of 2013 for $50 million, is a painful illustration of the value destruction resulting from this Board’s failure to react to
Slide 61: Mimi's Café: Even Less than Meets the Eye
Mimi’s Café: Even Less than Meets the Eye The actual value received for Mimi’s may be even less than reported ● Of the reported $50 million received by Bob Evans for the Mimi’s chain, $30 million was in the form of a seven- year promissory note with an annual interest rate of 1.5%, which is currentl
Slide 62: Repeated Weaknesses in Internal Controls
The Current Bob Evans Board has Overseen Repeated “Weaknesses in Internal Controls” The Company has had to restate earnings three times in the last two years1 Most recently, the Company delayed its Fiscal 2014 full-year and Q4 earnings release due to “weaknesses in internal controls”2 We highlight t
Slide 63: Board's Entrenchment Action Forced Sandell Litigation
Board’s Entrenchment Action Forced Sandell Litigation In November of 2011, the Board sought to impose an improper Bylaw restriction on shareholders that would have further entrenched the Board by severely limiting the ability of shareholders to effect change by amending the Company’s Bylaws ● Specif
Slide 64: Oklahoma Firefighters vs. Bob Evans
Oklahoma Firefighters vs. Bob Evans Because of the Board’s improper action, another long-time shareholder, the Oklahoma Firefighters Pension & Retirement System (“Oklahoma Firefighters”), filed suit in Delaware against the Company and its Directors in January of 2014 The complaint filed by the Oklah
Slide 65: Nominees Suggestions for Fixing Bob Evans
Refresh Bob Evans Nominees Suggestions for Fixing Bob Evans 65 Strictly Confidential. Do Not Duplicate or Distribute.
Slide 66: Fixing Bob Evans: Top-Line Improvement
Fixing Bob Evans Top-Line Improvement • Revise Brand Position and Improve Customer Experience • Simplify & Enhance Menu • Optimize Marketing Effectiveness Bottom-Line Improvement Realizing Value for Assets Changing the Corporate Culture 66 Strictly Confidential. Do Not Duplicate or Distribute.
Slide 67: Top-Line Improvement Ideas
Top-Line Improvement Ideas Reversing the decline in same store sales in order to drive top-line improvement is a key priority Our nominees have numerous actionable ideas that can help Bob Evans reverse the decline in restaurant traffic Revise Brand Position and Improve Customer Experience Simpli
Slide 68: Revise Brand Position and Improve Customer Experience
Top-Line Improvement: Revise Brand Position and Improve Customer Experience In order to drive traffic back to the restaurants, the Bob Evans brand positioning needs to be revised Our nominees have a number of suggestions to achieve this Reposition the Bob Evans brand to focus on what made it great
Slide 69: Simplify & Enhance Menu
Top-Line Improvement: Simplify & Enhance Menu The Bob Evans menu is a needlessly complicated collage of years of stale ideas: www.bobevans.com/Menu Our nominees believe that many items on the current Bob Evans menu are too large or too expensive We believe that Bob Evans’ menu has diluted the Compan
Slide 70: Doug Benham on Menu Simplification
Top-Line Improvement: Simplify & Enhance Menu (cont.) Doug Benham on Menu Simplification As former CEO of Arby’s, one of the largest U.S. restaurant chains with over 3,500 restaurants, including over 1,000 company-operated locations, Doug Benham presided over significantly enhanced sales performance
Slide 71: Optimize Marketing Effectiveness
Top-Line Improvement: Optimize Marketing Effectiveness We believe Bob Evans has dramatically lagged the industry in its ability to effectively attract customers through its marketing program Our nominees would seek to optimize the marketing efforts of Bob Evans by: Implementing more effective soci
Slide 72: Mike Weinstein on Marketing
Top-Line Improvement: Optimize Marketing Effectiveness (cont.) Mike Weinstein on Marketing As CEO of the Triarc Beverage Group, Mike Weinstein dramatically increased sales of Snapple, a company whose purchase he oversaw for $300 million and sold 3 years later for $1.5 billion “When Triarc acquired S
Slide 73: Fixing Bob Evans: Bottom-Line Improvement
Fixing Bob Evans Top-Line Improvement Bottom-Line Improvement • Improve Restaurant Margins • Reduce Corporate Overhead • Reassess Capital Spending • Future Franchise Opportunities Realizing Value for Assets Changing the Corporate Culture 73 Strictly Confidential. Do Not Duplicate or Distribute.
Slide 74: Improve Restaurant Margins
Bottom-Line Improvement: Improve Restaurant Margins The Company’s “Prime Costs” are currently between 63-64% of revenue – well above the majority of its peers To improve restaurant margins, we believe Bob Evans should: Explore augmenting menu with lower-cost carbohydrates in lieu of protein Re-e
Slide 75: David Head on Improving Margins
Bottom-Line Improvement: Improve Restaurant Margins (cont.) David Head on Improving Margins As former CEO of O’Charley’s, a company with three distinct restaurant brands spread across 27 states, Mr. Head oversaw the company’s successful turnaround, as he and his management team were able to increase
Slide 76: Reduce Corporate Overhead
Bottom-Line Improvement: Reduce Corporate Overhead Public documents do not break out how many of the 512 corporate employees1 are dedicated to BEF Foods, however we believe that the ratio of corporate staff to restaurants to should be closer to one staff member per two to three restaurants We believ
Slide 77: Reassess Capital Spending
Bottom-Line Improvement: Reassess Capital Spending The Farm Fresh Refresh remodeling initiative has been a costly, no return endeavor for Bob Evans (see page 37) Effective restaurant operators test remodeled restaurants and roll them out slowly – with fiscal prudence – and only proceed if the result
Slide 78: Future Franchise Opportunities
Bottom-Line Improvement: Future Franchise Opportunities As a longer-term strategy, Bob Evans has the ability to pursue various franchise opportunities The Company must first implement top line and bottom line improvements to achieve better restaurant-level economics in order to appeal to potential
Slide 79: Steve Lynn on Future Franchise Opportunities
Bottom Line Improvement: Future Franchise Opportunities (cont.) Steve Lynn on Future Franchise Opportunities As Chairman and CEO of Sonic Corporation, Steve Lynn built the management team that transformed the company into a chain with $3 billion in system-wide sales and has been involved in the succ
Slide 80: Fixing Bob Evans: Realizing Value for Assets
Fixing Bob Evans Top-Line Improvement Bottom-Line Improvement Realizing Value for Assets • Real Estate • BEF Foods Changing the Corporate Culture 80 Strictly Confidential. Do Not Duplicate or Distribute.
Slide 81: Realizing Value for Assets: Real Estate
Realizing Value for Assets: Real Estate Bob Evans currently owns 86% of their restaurants, substantially more than its comparable peers The Company must perform a “top down” analysis of the real estate in order to determine the best means to realize value Bob Evans is unnecessarily tying up capita
Slide 82: Lee Wielansky on Bob Evans Real Estate
Realizing Value for Assets: Real Estate (cont.) Lee Wielansky on Bob Evans Real Estate Lee Wielansky has over 30 years of real estate development experience, having served as CEO of JDN Development Company, a subsidiary of JDN Corporation, a publicly- traded REIT, as well as Managing Director of Reg
Slide 83: Real Estate: Indication of Interest and Tiered Approach
Realizing Value for Assets: Real Estate (cont.) As opposed to a theoretical exercise, the following represents a very recent indication of interest from a highly credible, multi-billion dollar investment firm interested in pursuing a real estate transaction with Bob Evans: We would recommend that
Slide 84: Annelise Osborne on Real Estate and Financial Strength
Realizing Value for Assets: Real Estate (cont.) Annelise Osborne on Real Estate and Financial Strength As a Senior Credit Officer at Moody’s Investor Service, Annelise Osborne is responsible for evaluating a credit portfolio of over $450 billion in securities tied to commercial real estate and has o
Slide 85: Realizing Value for Assets: BEF Foods
Realizing Value for Assets: BEF Foods $65 The bidding war for Hillshire indicates the M&A appetite for a packaged foods company like BEF Foods $60 June 3, 2014: Pilgrim’s Pride Our nominees believe that now is an excellent time to offers to acquire Hillshire for $7.7 June 9, 2014: $55 perform a fu
Slide 86: Aron Schwartz on Realizing Full Value for Assets
Realizing Full Value for Assets: BEF Foods (cont.) Aron Schwartz on Realizing Full Value for Assets As a private equity investor for over 15 years focused on consumer-oriented businesses underperforming their potential at ACON Investments, Avenue Capital and Fenway Partners, Mr. Schwartz has investe
Slide 87: Realizing Full Value for Assets: BEF Foods (cont.)
Realizing Full Value for Assets: BEF Foods (cont.) “When I look at Bob Evans‘ structure I see a company with two divisions that are both performing substantially below their potential. A company with two disparate operating divisions not only confuses research analysts and investors alike, but also
Slide 88: Fixing Bob Evans: Changing the Corporate Culture
Fixing Bob Evans Top-Line Improvement Bottom-Line Improvement Realizing Full Value for Assets Changing the Corporate Culture • Improve Corporate Governance Structure • Ensure that Corporate Culture matches Corporate Brand • Continuity and Transition Planning 88 Strictly Confidential. Do Not Duplicat
Slide 89: Improve Corporate Governance Structure
Changing the Corporate Culture: Improve Corporate Governance Structure Despite the Company’s claims of “embracing good governance,” we believe that Bob Evans requires numerous structural governance changes We agree that certain well-performing companies should be afforded governance-latitude (e.g. c
Slide 90: Charles Elson on Bob Evans' Corporate Governance
Changing the Corporate Culture: Improve Corporate Governance Structure (cont.) Charles Elson on Bob Evans’ Corporate Governance Charles Elson is one of the foremost authorities on corporate governance issues in the United States and has served on the boards of directors of many publicly-traded compa
Slide 91: Ensure that Corporate Culture Matches Corporate Brand
Changing the Corporate Culture: Ensure that Corporate Culture Matches Corporate Brand Bob Evans has fallen far from its modest “Farm Fresh” roots and has morphed into an HQ-centric, top-heavy organization The Company’s corporate culture is a world away from the realities of its customer-facing-staff
Slide 92: Continuity and Transition Planning
Changing the Corporate Culture: Continuity and Transition Planning Given the un-challenged, vise-like grip with which Chairman and CEO Steven Davis has run Bob Evans, along with the close personal relationships among current Directors, it is our strongly-held belief that only by dramatically changin
Slide 93: Continuity and Transition Planning (cont.)
Changing the Corporate Culture: Continuity and Transition Planning (cont.) If needed, there is a team from Reconstruction Partners that would be able to offer its services to the Board if the Board deems it necessary in order to ensure a smooth transition should existing management prove unable or u
Slide 94: Nominees
Refresh Bob Evans Nominees 94 Strictly Confidential. Do Not Duplicate or Distribute.
Slide 95: KeyBanc quote on proxy contest
“We think the Bull argument [for BOBE] centers around Sandell Asset Management winning the proxy contest by replacing a majority of the board of directors.” KeyBanc, July 10, 2014 (emphasis added) 95 Strictly Confidential. Do Not Duplicate or Distribute.
Slide 96: Doug Benham
Doug Benham Former President and CEO of Arby’s Restaurant Group, Doug Benham led the revitalization of the $3 billion Arby’s chain of 3,500 restaurants, increasing company-operated restaurant EBITDA by over 100% Mr. Benham was previously Chief Financial Officer and a director of RTM Restaurant G
Slide 97: Charles Elson
Charles Elson Charles Elson is one of the foremost authorities on corporate governance issues in the United States Professor Elson is “Of Counsel” to the law firm of Holland & Knight and holds the Edgar S. Woolard, Jr. Chair in Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware Professor Elson
Slide 98: David Head
David Head President and CEO of Primanti Brothers, Inc., David Head has a broad skill set and deep operational experience in the restaurant industry, bringing valuable perspective through his track record of refining and repositioning restaurant brands With over 35 years of experience in the ind
Slide 99: Steve Lynn
Steve Lynn Founder and Partner of Reconstruction Partners, LLC, a firm that offers strategy, restructuring, refranchising, and interim management services to chain restaurant companies, Steve Lynn has over 40 years of experience in the restaurant industry Mr. Lynn spent 12 years as Chairman and
Slide 100: Annelise Osborne
Annelise Osborne Senior Credit Officer at Moody’s Investor Services, Annelise Osborne has over 15 years of finance experience that encompasses a wide range of transactions Ms. Osborne has a deep knowledge of real estate and has led sizeable teams of analysts involved in assessing transactions in
Slide 101: Aron Schwartz
Aron Schwartz Managing Partner at AKON Investments, LLC and Founder of Constructivist Capital, LLC, Aron Schwartz has been a private equity professional for over 15 years and has been involved in the acquisition, supervision, and growth of many companies Mr. Schwartz was a Managing Director at t
Slide 102: Michael Weinstein
Michael Weinstein Former CEO of the Triarc Beverage Group, where he successfully orchestrated the purchase of Snapple for $300 million and its subsequent sale three years later for $1.5 billion, Mr. Weinstein is a highly-respected professional who has delivered tremendous value to shareholders at
Slide 103: Lee Wielansky
Lee Wielansky Chairman and CEO of Midland Development Group, which focuses on the development of retail properties in the mid-west and southeast and was the largest developer of Kroger supermarket-anchored shopping centers in the United States, Lee Wielansky has over 37 years of real estate experi
Slide 104: Appendix
Refresh Bob Evans Appendix 104 Strictly Confidential. Do Not Duplicate or Distribute.
Slide 105: Performance Case Study: Bob Evans vs. Cracker Barrel
Performance Case Study: Bob Evans vs. Cracker Barrel (Last Fiscal Year) $1,329 million Total Revenue $2,665 million 561 Store Count 625 Non-Franchised Business Model Non-Franchised $9.23 Average Check $9.68 No Serves Alcohol No 86% % Restaurants Owned 66% Cracker Barrel is the most comparable family
Slide 106: Bob Evans vs. Cracker Barrel in Key Areas
Performance Case Study: Bob Evans vs. Cracker Barrel (cont.) Yes Non-Core Segments No2 14 Average Board Tenure1 4 13.7% SG&A as a % of Revenue1 7.7% $2.6 million Revenue Per Corporate Employee1 $5.5 million 107.5% 5-Year TSR3 228.7% No Separate Chairman and CEO1 Yes …yet Bob Evans compares poorly to
Slide 107: Cracker Barrel Turnaround and Five Year TSR
Performance Case Study: Bob Evans vs. Cracker Barrel (cont.) Cracker Barrel operates more than 600 stores, located in 42 Five Year Total Shareholder Return2 states, serving breakfast, lunch, and dinner in the dining room, 300% 275% and offering a wide variety of decorative and functional items 250%
Slide 108: Revenue per Corporate Employee
Revenue per Corporate Employee Revenue Per Corporate Employee Average ex-BOBE Corporate/Support Office 512 195 860 644 400 492 NA 315 476 Headcount (Last Fiscal Year) Revenue (FY 2014E) $1,329 $854 $4,438 $2,914 $2,001 $2,720 $6,286 $1,114 $1,556 ($ in m illions) Revenue Per Employee $2,595 $4,381 $
Slide 109: Investor and Media Contacts
Investors: MacKenzie Partners, Inc. Dan Burch or Larry Dennedy (212) 929-5500 Press/Media: Sloane & Company Elliot Sloane or Dan Zacchei (212) 446-1860 or (212) 446-1882 109 Strictly Confidential. Do Not Duplicate or Distribute.