Owens Realty Mortgage — Proxy Contest (June 2018)
30 slides from Owens Realty Mortgage's proxy contest presentation, Jun 26, 2018
Slide 1: Fix Owens Realty Mortgage! Change Is Needed in the Boardroom
Fix OWENS REALTY MORTGAGE! — tone Howtovote stostneiermatrsts Press Releses Nominees Contact CHANGE IS NEEDED IN THE BOARDROOM Wilcome othe webs descated to the Shareholder Groups pony campayn in support ofthe election of Steven . Hovde and James P Hua fo the Board of Decors of Owens Realy Mongape,
Slide 2: Fix Owens Realty Mortgage: Change Is Needed in the Boardroom
FIX OWENS REALTY MORTGAGE CHANGE IS NEEDED IN THE BOARDROOM JUNE 2018 WWW.FIXORM.COM FOLLOW LINK TO RECEIVE STATUS UPDATES Hovde Building•122 W. Washington Ave, Suite 350•Madison, Wisconsin 53703 Item 2: The Shareholder Group also intends to post the following presentation to www.fixorm.com.
Slide 3: Disclaimer
DISCLAIMER The views expressed on this presentation represent the opinions of Hovde Capital Advisors LLC and certain of its affiliates (collectively, the “Shareholder Group”), which beneficially own shares of Owens Realty Mortgage, Inc. (the “Company” or “ORM”) and are based on publicly available in
Slide 4: Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS 3 www.fixORM.com SECTION CONTENTS PAGE I Who We are and Reason for Proxy Solicitation 4 II Company and Stock Performance 10 III Why Change is Needed in the Boardroom 16 IV Our Nominees and What They Will Accomplish 22 V Voting Instructions and Contact Information 27
Slide 5: Who We Are and Reasons for Proxy Solicitation
WHO WE ARE AND REASONS FOR PROXY SOLICITATION SECTION I 4 www.fixORM.com
Slide 6: Did You Know?
DID YOU KNOW? Are you aware that over the last 10 years ORM’s external Manager, Owens Financial Group, Inc. (OFG), has collected over $45.7 million in fees from the Company, plus another $4.4 million in expense reimbursements, while we as shareholders (and formerly Owens Mortgage Investment Fund inv
Slide 7: Who We Are and Why We Are Pursuing Director Nominations
WHO WE ARE AND WHY WE ARE PURSUING DIRECTOR NOMINATIONS • • • • We are long-term shareholders of ORM. We are value investors. We believe ORM is being mismanaged by Owens Financial Group (OFG), the external manager. We believe the Manager (OFG), including Bryan Draper and Bill Owens, is destroying sh
Slide 8: Reasons for Proxy Solicitation
REASONS FOR PROXY SOLICITATION • One-sided management agreement that allows the Manager (OFG) to reap all the economic rewards while ORM and its shareholders take all of the credit risk. • Two of five ORM board members (40%) are insiders and owners of the external manager (OFG) compared to ISS’s rep
Slide 9: What We Hope to Achieve with Board Seats
WHAT WE HOPE TO ACHIEVE WITH BOARD SEATS 1. Restructure the management contract between ORM and the Manager (OFG), to hold Management accountable for creating shareholder value and removing the Manager’s excessive lending fee incentives that leave shareholders with all of the risk while the Manager
Slide 10: Why Your Support Benefits All Shareholders
WHY YOUR SUPPORT BENEFITS ALL SHAREHOLDERS • Restructuring the management contract will better align OFG's interests with ORM to properly balance the one-sided economic incentives that only benefits the Manager (OFG) and not ORM shareholders. •This will include a pay-for-performance compensation str
Slide 11: Company and Stock Performance
COMPANY AND STOCK PERFORMANCE SECTION II 10 www.fixORM.com
Slide 12: Why the Manager's Interests Are Not Aligned with Shareholders
WHY THE MANAGER’S INTERESTS ARE NOT ALIGNED WITH SHAREHOLDERS • ORM is externally managed and advised by OFG: •Bryan Draper, ORM’s CEO, is a significant shareholder of OFG •Bill Owens, a current ORM Director and Chairman Emeritus, is also the majority shareholder of the Manager (OFG) The Manager (OF
Slide 13: Fees to the External Manager
FEES TO THE EXTERNAL MANAGER Over the last 10 years, ORM (and formerly OMIF) has only generated total Net Income of $6.1 million, producing an average 0.43% Return on Equity. During this same 10-year period, the Manager has collected $45.7 million in fees and an additional $4.4 million in expense re
Slide 14: ORM Stock Performance – Price Change
ORM STOCK PERFORMANCE – PRICE CHANGE Source: SNL Financial • It is important to note that since ORM became a publicly traded company on July 1, 2013, especially the first several years, the Company’s Net Income benefitted from the sales of REO (Real Estate Owned) assets that were the result of massi
Slide 15: ORM Stock Performance – Dividend Yield
ORM STOCK PERFORMANCE – DIVIDEND YIELD Source: SNL Financial, S&P 500 and Russell 3000 not reported • Clearly ORM falls far below its ISS selected peer group in terms of the cash dividend it generates for shareholders. ORM could not cover its current $0.20 per share cash dividend with the operating
Slide 16: ORM Stock Performance – Total Return
ORM STOCK PERFORMANCE – TOTAL RETURN Source: SNL Financial • Again, it is important to point out that the results of the 5 year timeframe are inflated by non-core income (REO sales) and does not reflect the losses taken that resulted in the foreclosures that created the REO portfolio. Because of thi
Slide 17: Why Change Is Needed in the Boardroom
WHY CHANGE IS NEEDED IN THE BOARDROOM SECTION III 16 www.fixORM.com
Slide 18: Change Is Needed in the Boardroom
CHANGE IS NEEDED IN THE BOARDROOM • ORM’s stock has underperformed on numerous levels compared to peers and broader markets despite benefiting from the sales of Real Estate Owned in the years following its IPO. However, this does not take into account the massive losses incurred on the loan portfoli
Slide 19: Viability of ORM's Business Model
VIABILITY OF ORM’S BUSINESS MODEL • At best, we believe that ORM can only generate earnings yields in the 5% range after deducting management fees of 1.5%, reserves for future credit losses of roughly 1.0% and other expenses when their all in loan yield is 7.5%. 1 ORM currently borrows on a floating
Slide 20: Bryan Draper Should Not Be Reelected to the Board
BRYAN DRAPER SHOULD NOT BE REELECTED TO THE BOARD • • • Current CEO and Executive Director of ORM. Executive of the external manager, OFG, since 1987 and holds a significant ownership in OFG. Mr. Draper is the CEO of ORM, yet he is not compensated by ORM nor is his compensation based on ORM’s perfor
Slide 21: James Kessler Should Not Be Reelected to the Board
JAMES KESSLER SHOULD NOT BE REELECTED TO THE BOARD • • • Independent director of ORM since January 2013. Does not have the lending or investment experience required for the Board of ORM. Over the last five years, he has failed to represent shareholders and address the egregious fees paid to the Mana
Slide 22: Our Nominees and What They Will Accomplish
OUR NOMINEES AND WHAT THEY WILL ACCOMPLISH SECTION IV 22 www.fixORM.com
Slide 23: The Nominees — Steven D. Hovde
THE NOMINEES — STEVEN D. HOVDE CEO of Hovde Group, LLC, an investment banking firm focused on mergers and acquisitions, capital raising, financial advisory, restructurings, investments and merchant banking, since 1988 and has been its Chairman since 2009. Mr. Hovde is responsible for managing its in
Slide 24: The Nominees — James P. Hua
THE NOMINEES — JAMES P. HUA CEO, Portfolio Manager and founder of Opal Advisors, LLC, a value-oriented asset management firm, since 2012. Mr. Hua is responsible for identifying and managing investment opportunities including the overall investment strategy for Opal and its clients. Through a combina
Slide 25: Support Our Nominees
SUPPORT OUR NOMINEES We believe Mr.Hovde’s and Mr. Hua’s vast real estate, investing,lending andcorporate governance experience over several decades in the real estate, capital management and banking industries, along with their significant ownership stake in ORM, makes both Nominees extremely valua
Slide 26: Creating Shareholder Value
CREATING SHAREHOLDER VALUE Our Nominees will unlock and create shareholder value by: 1. Restructuring the management contract between ORM and the Manager (OFG), to hold Management accountable for creating shareholder value and removing the Manager’s excessive lending fee incentives that leave shareh
Slide 27: Voting Instructions and Contact Information
VOTING INSTRUCTIONS AND CONTACT INFORMATION SECTION V 27 www.fixORM.com
Slide 28: How to Vote
HOW TO VOTE Your Vote is Important – Tell the Board of ORM What You Think By Voting the Proxy Card. VOTE BY INTERNET OR PHONE If any of your shares of Common Stock are held in the name of a brokerage firm, bank, bank nominee or other institution, only it can vote such shares of Common Stock and only
Slide 29: More Information
MORE INFORMATION WEBSITE www.fixORM.com DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT Definitive Proxy Statement Receive Status Updates Follow Link to Receive Status Updates PRESS RELEASES INVESTOR CONTACT Open Letter to ORM shareholders (5/8/18) Ian Joyce Hovde Capital Advisors (202) 822-8117 Response to ORM Press Re
Slide 30: More Information
MORE INFORMATION DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT Definitive Proxy Statement PRESS RELEASES Open Letter to ORM shareholders (5/8/18) Response to ORM Press Release (5/10/18) WEBSITE www.fixORM.com Receive Status Updates Follow Link to Receive Status Updates INVESTOR CONTACT lan Joyce Hovde Capital Advisors