Tessera Technologies — Proxy Contest (April 2013)
80 slides from Tessera Technologies's proxy contest presentation, Apr 30, 2013
Slide 1: Investor Presentation Tessera Technologies Inc.
Investor Presentation Tessera Technologies Inc. April 30, 2013
Slide 2: Overview of Starboard Value LP
Overview of Starboard Value LP Starboard Value LP is a deep value oriented investment firm that specializes in investing in underperforming companies and analyzing alternative strategies to unlock value for the benefit of all shareholders. – Our approach to investment research begins with a deep f
Slide 3: Starboard Has Significant Intellectual Property Expertise
Starboard Has Significant Intellectual Property Expertise Over the past few years, we have built significant expertise in intellectual property related companies and have helped play a role in several key transactions that have reshaped the industry and created value for the benefit of shareholder
Slide 4: Why We Are Involved with Tessera
Why We Are Involved with Tessera We first invested in Tessera Technologies Inc. (“Tessera” or the “Company”) in November 2011 because our research indicated that an opportunity existed to create significant value for Tessera shareholders based on actions within the control of management and the Bo
Slide 5: Our Slate of Highly-Qualified Candidates Is Far Superior to the Company's Slate
Our Slate of Highly-Qualified Candidates Is Far Superior to the Company’s Slate ■ Through a two-month search process utilizing a tier one executive search firm, we identified and nominated a slate of six new director candidates with exceptional and relevant credentials, including: − Tudor Brown: Fou
Slide 6: Our Nominees Have a Superior Strategic Plan to Restore and Enhance Value at Tessera
Our Nominees Have a Superior Strategic Plan to Restore and Enhance Value at Tessera Together with our nominees and IP Navigation Group, a leading intellectual property advisory firm, we have researched and begun development of a strategic plan that we believe will stabilize, improve, and drive sig
Slide 7: Real Change Is Necessary Now
Real Change Is Necessary Now 7
Slide 8: Dramatic Stock Price Underperformance
Dramatic Stock Price Underperformance Tessera’s stock price had dramatically underperformed the broader equity markets, the PHLX Semi Index, and all three of the Company’s Proxy Peer Groups over almost any measurement period. Summary Returns Five-Year Stock Price Chart As of November 26, 2012 Starbo
Slide 9: Weak Historical Consolidated Financial Performance
Weak Historical Consolidated Financial Performance The primary reason for Tessera’s long-term stock price underperformance has been the continued deterioration of the Company’s consolidated financial performance. From 2009 to 2012, Tessera’s revenue declined 21.8% while total operating expenses actu
Slide 10: Weak Historical Segment Financial Performance
Weak Historical Segment Financial Performance An analysis of the Company’s two business segments, Intellectual Property (“IP”) and Digital Optics Corporation (“DOC”), reveals that DOC has been the primary driver of the Company’s poor operating performance, but IP’s financial performance has also det
Slide 11: Weak Financial Performance Driven Primarily by DOC
Weak Financial Performance Driven Primarily by DOC Since 2005, Tessera has invested over $500 million in its DOC business representing $9.90 per share. In 2012 alone, DOC generated segment operating losses of $86.2 million (1). DOC Acquisitions and Investments since 2005 (2) ($ in millions) (1) FYE
Slide 12: Long History of Failed Commitments and Strategy Changes for DOC
Long History of Failed Commitments and Strategy Changes for DOC Tessera has failed to achieve every commitment it has made in its DOC business over the past few years. Tessera Commitment Failed Reality “Consumer optics represent a long-term growth opportunity for Tessera and we believe we are DOC ge
Slide 13: Tessera's IP Segment Has Also Underperformed
Tessera’s IP Segment Has Also Underperformed The financial performance of the IP segment has deteriorated substantially over the past few years. Although Tessera’s IP segment is currently profitable, its financial performance has deteriorated substantially over the past few years and its profit ma
Slide 14: Tessera's IP Segment Has Also Underperformed
Tessera’s IP Segment Has Also Underperformed There are several reasons for the IP segment’s poor financial performance: Failure to renew several key licenses and to collect owed royalties. Failure to monetize patent assets and generate an acceptable return on investment on research & development
Slide 15: Recently Announced Changes Are Insufficient
Recently Announced Changes Are Insufficient In response to Starboard’s involvement, Tessera has begun to make reactive changes, but the changes that have been announced thus far are insufficient. On March 21, 2013, the Company announced its second DOC restructuring only four months after its first
Slide 16: Continued Turnover Among Top-level Managers
Continued Turnover Among Top-level Managers Tessera has experienced continued turnover of its top-level managers in recent years, including a number who joined the Company only recently, yet received a handsome severance package or lucrative consulting arrangement. Tessera recently appointed Chair
Slide 17: Unusual Resignation of Two Tessera Directors Indicates the Board Is Extremely Dysfunctional
Unusual Resignation of Two Tessera Directors Indicates the Board Is Extremely Dysfunctional On February 22, 2013, two members of the Board, John Goodrich and Kevin Rivette, delivered a letter to the Board. The contents of the letter were disturbing and pointed to a fractious and dysfunctional board.
Slide 18: Tessera's Newly Composed Board Is Also Problematic
Tessera’s Newly Composed Board Is Also Problematic We believe that the Company, in an attempt to appease shareholders during this election contest, hastily assembled a new Board made up of a combination of incumbent directors and new directors, many of whom lack relevant experiences and have questio
Slide 19: Real Change Is Needed Now
Real Change Is Needed Now Poor share price performance. Poor consolidated financial performance. Weak segment performance. − Digital Optics Segment. − Intellectual Property Segment. Reactionary changes are insufficient. Turnover and severance has been excessive. Tessera has been complete
Slide 20: Starboard's Nominees Have a Better Plan
Starboard’s Nominees Have a Better Plan 20
Slide 21: May 23rd and Beyond: Context
May 23rd and Beyond: Context We recognize that any election contest creates some uncertainty for employees and shareholders and we want to communicate a set of principles and process that we expect to go through within the 90 days following the 2013 annual meeting. Principles − We are fact-based
Slide 22: Summary of Value Creation Plan
Summary of Value Creation Plan Our nominees have a better plan to enhance shareholder value involving: Refocusing Tessera on becoming a successful technology licensing company, with a disciplined approach to spending and capital allocation. Realizing the full licensing value of Tessera’s current
Slide 23: Evolution of the Intellectual Property Industry
Evolution of the Intellectual Property Industry The IP market has grown substantially over the past two decades with Global IP Licensing Revenue global IP licensing revenues in excess of $200 billion annually. $ billions 200 $180.0 ― Patents owners are realizing that their assets have little value
Slide 24: History of the Tessera Business Model
History of the Tessera Business Model In 1990, Tessera was founded after inventing its core TCC chip-scale packaging (CSP) technology. CSP achieved initial market adoption in the mid-1990s and was licensed by several major technology companies (e.g. Intel, Toshiba, Samsung and others) over the f
Slide 25: Starboard's Nominees Have a Better Plan: Portfolio Overview
Starboard’s Nominees Have a Better Plan Portfolio Overview 25
Slide 26: Patent Portfolio Overview
Patent Portfolio Overview Over 3,300 issued patents and pending applications, including approximately 2,000 U.S. issued patents and pending applications. Average life of 9 years for the U.S. issued patents with expirations ranging from 2013-2031. Generated approximately $1.7 billion in royalty
Slide 27: Tessera Inc. – Portfolio Breakdown
Tessera Inc. – Portfolio Breakdown Over 550 issued U.S. patents and pending applications. The patents are applicable to several forms of chip packaging. − Ball grid array solution. − Solder bump / Flip chip. − Chip stacking – Package-on-package. As shown below, Tessera Inc. patents broadly cov
Slide 28: Tessera Inc. – Early Patents / High Value Assets
Tessera Inc. – Early Patents / High Value Assets QScore algorithm consists of over 100 weighted variables IPNav considers relevant from past licensing and litigation experiences. − QScore above 70 typically indicates patents that are high value and litigation worthy. Over 60% of the US patents h
Slide 29: Tessera Inc. – Applicable Markets / Illustrative Licensing Opportunity
Tessera Inc. – Applicable Markets / Illustrative Licensing Opportunity Packaging technologies are applicable to several large markets(1), including: 2012 Market S ize by Device Type MEMS Accelerometer $2,450 NOR $3,488 Microcontrollers $14,355 Baseband Processors $14,656 App Processor $15,246 DRAM
Slide 30: Invensas – Portfolio Breakdown
Invensas – Portfolio Breakdown Invensas is a wholly owned subsidiary of Tessera. Over 725 issued U.S. patents and pending applications. − Cover areas such as circuitry design, memory modules, and advanced packaging / interconnect. Formed Invensas in 2011 to focus on acquisition, development an
Slide 31: Invensas – High Quality / High Value Assets
Invensas – High Quality / High Value Assets QScore algorithm consists of over 100 weighted variables IPNav considers relevant from past licensing and litigation experiences. ― QScore above 70 typically indicates patents that are high value and litigation worthy. Over 65% of the US patents have Q
Slide 32: Invensas – Applicable Markets / Illustrative Licensing Opportunity
Invensas – Applicable Markets / Illustrative Licensing Opportunity The patents are applicable to several large technology markets(1), including: 2012 Market S ize by Device Type MEMS Acceleromet er $2,450 Microcont roller $14,355 App P rocessor $15,246 DRAM $26,200 Microprocessor $44,011 $0 $5,000
Slide 33: DOC – Portfolio Breakdown
DOC – Portfolio Breakdown Over 775 issued US patents and pending applications in five broad cluster areas: − General digital imaging. − Computational optics / EDoF. − Lithography and Optoelectronic Packaging. − Integrated Optics and Photonic Devices. − mems|cam™ specific assets. Patent assets we
Slide 34: DOC – Early Digital Imaging Patents
DOC – Early Digital Imaging Patents QScore algorithm consists of over 100 weighted variables IPNav considers relevant from past licensing and litigation experiences. ― QScore above 70 typically indicates patents that are high value and litigation worthy. Portfolio contains clusters of high value
Slide 35: DOC – Applicable Markets / Illustrative Licensing Opportunity
DOC – Applicable Markets / Illustrative Licensing Opportunity Some DOC patents have been licensed to the digital camera market, but have applicability to several large markets(1) that remain untapped: 2012 Market S ize by Device Type Digital Cameras $25 T ablets $41 Notebook PCs $136 Smartphones $
Slide 36: Starboard's Nominees Have a Better Plan: Historical Issues
Starboard’s Nominees Have a Better Plan Historical Issues 36
Slide 37: Issues with Tessera's Current Strategy
Issues with Tessera’s Current Strategy Tessera has a long track record of not managing its patent assets effectively. Since 2007 Tessera has generated $1.2 billion in license and royalty revenues, which we estimate represents less than half of the total addressable licensing opportunity for its
Slide 38: Licensing Missteps: Packagers Not Manufacturers
Licensing Missteps: Packagers Not Manufacturers Tessera has repeatedly licensed outsourced semiconductor assembly and test companies (OSATs) instead of higher value OEM and manufacturer licensees despite OSATs having far lower revenue and margins. This has led to frequent complications for Tesse
Slide 39: Licensing Missteps: Inefficient Patent Litigation Expenses
Licensing Missteps: Inefficient Patent Litigation Expenses Tessera’s litigation expenses have averaged $36 million annually over the past six years and cumulatively total $217 million over the period: $ m illions 100 $84.3 75 50 $34.3 $26.1 $29.3 $36m / Year Average $22.3 $20.3 25 0 2007 2008 2009
Slide 40: Licensing Missteps: Ineffective Patent Monetization Strategy
Licensing Missteps: Ineffective Patent Monetization Strategy Apart from DRAM, Tessera has been generally unable to successfully monetize its portfolios. After licensing much of the DRAM market, Tessera targeted several Non-DRAM markets by filing litigation in District Court (April 2007) and a co
Slide 41: Product Focus in Digital Optics
Product Focus in Digital Optics Tessera began to focus on Digital Optics in the mid-2000s as a new, large addressable market to grow its licensing business once the DRAM market started to mature. After spending over $150 million on technology acquisitions and having limited licensing success, th
Slide 42: Declining IP Revenues
Declining IP Revenues Intellectual Property revenues decreased by over 21% in FY12 and decreased 62% year-over-year in Q4’12 due to non-payers and license expirations. − Micron, Powertech and Amkor no longer pay royalties. Digital Optics royalty and license revenues decreased by over 39% in FY12
Slide 43: Investing Heavily in R&D and SG&A in IP Business
Investing Heavily in R&D and SG&A in IP Business Tessera has increased its investment in R&D and SG&A in the IP segment dramatically over recent years. − IP R&D expenses have increased 53% from 2008-2012, while SG&A has more than doubled. The increasing investment in R&D has apparently not resul
Slide 44: Maintaining a Bloated Cost Structure and Excessive Headcount
Maintaining a Bloated Cost Structure and Excessive Headcount From 2009 to 2012, Tessera’s revenue declined 21.8% Tessera Historical Revenue $350 while total operating expenses actually increased 40.7% 21.8% decline resulting in a massive decline in operating income. $300 $299.4 $301.4 This drama
Slide 45: Starboard's Nominees Have a Better Plan: Proposed Solutions
Starboard’s Nominees Have a Better Plan Proposed Solutions 45
Slide 46: Starboard's Nominees Have a Better Plan
Starboard’s Nominees Have a Better Plan Our nominees have a better plan to enhance shareholder value: 1) Reduce IP cost structure. 2) Actively monetize patent assets. 3) Re-assess litigation. 4) Form strategic partnership for DOC (mems|cam). 5) Expand patent portfolio through partnerships and small
Slide 47: Action #1: Reduce IP Cost Structure (R&D)
Action #1: Reduce IP Cost Structure (R&D) Tessera’s R&D spend is so much lower than competing semiconductor companies it will be challenging, if not impossible, to out-innovate them in the future. − The tables below shows Tessera’s annual R&D spend is dwarfed by other semiconductor companies and i
Slide 48: Action #1: Reduce IP Cost Structure (SG&A)
Action #1: Reduce IP Cost Structure (SG&A) Tessera has spent $217 million on litigation over the past six Select Comparable Companies years. Revenues ($ in Revenue Per Total Employees − We believe total litigation expense relative to case load millions) Employee shows that Tessera is primarily usi
Slide 49: Action #2: Reinvigorate Licensing Activities
Action #2: Reinvigorate Licensing Activities Over the next three years Tessera Inc., Invensas, and Digital Optics have a combined 207 patents expiring, of which 85% have QScores above 70. Tessera Inc. has been plagued with unpaid royalties and non-renewals of licenses. Despite the fact that ne
Slide 50: Action #3: Reassess Ongoing Litigation, Prioritize and Implement New Actions as Needed
Action #3: Reassess Ongoing Litigation, Prioritize and Implement New Actions as Needed Amkor arbitration. − Initiated by Amkor, Tessera has had two favorable rulings thus far, including a $20 million award in 2012 and at least $130 million spread over the next few years, while spending $36 million
Slide 51: Action #4: Strategic Partnership for DOC (mems|cam)
Action #4: Strategic Partnership for DOC (mems|cam) Form a strategic partnership with a key industry player with expertise in design, manufacturing and sales. − Tessera contributes IP rights and know-how in exchange for equity ownership or a per-unit royalty on future mems|cam units sold. DOC me
Slide 52: Action #5: Expand Patent Portfolio through Partnerships and Small Tuck-in Acquisitions
Action #5: Expand Patent Portfolio through Partnerships and Small Tuck-in Acquisitions We believe Tessera should leverage industry relationships to form partnerships with operating companies and universities to expand the portfolio with valuable patents. ― Many of the best patent portfolios are no
Slide 53: Action #6: Return Cash to Shareholders
Action #6: Return Cash to Shareholders Balance sheet is over capitalized if losses in DOC can be reduced. A 10% increase in share price requires a 17% increase in enterprise value. Opportunity to return significant value to shareholders through a combination of dividends and share repurchases.
Slide 54: May 23rd and Beyond: First 90 Days
May 23rd and Beyond: First 90 Days Continue CEO search process. Engage with search firm to review position specifications and status – make adjustments where needed and proceed with search. Conduct in-depth review of the IP licensing business. The current plan, focusing on major open licensing
Slide 55: May 23rd and Beyond: 90 Days and Forward
May 23rd and Beyond: 90 Days and Forward Finalize CEO selection. Continue patent portfolio review process. Depending on review of DOC business, execute strategic transaction for the Digital Optics business. Execute on licensing plan. − Limit days of negotiation. − Commence/continue litigatio
Slide 56: Starboard's Nominees Are More Qualified
Starboard’s Nominees Are More Qualified 56
Slide 57: Everyone Agrees that Change Is Necessary
Everyone Agrees that Change Is Necessary After the recent and reactionary changes to the management team and Board, it seems we are all now in agreement that we need a new board of directors. Now the question is: how do we select the best possible board to oversee Tessera? Tessera now recognizes t
Slide 58: Starboard's Nominees Are More Qualified
Starboard’s Nominees Are More Qualified Name Experience Tudor Brown Founding member and former President & COO of ARM Holdings plc, one of the most successful semiconductor IP licensing companies in the world. During his tenure, ARM’s valuation increased from approximately $150 million to $17 bi
Slide 59: Tudor Brown
Tudor Brown Founding member and former President & Chief Operating Officer of ARM Holdings plc, one of the most successful semiconductor IP licensing companies in the world. – From the time of the IPO until 2012, ARM’s valuation increased from approximately $150 million to $17 billion. – Co-develo
Slide 60: George Cwynar
George Cwynar Former President of COM DEV Canada, a division of COM DEV International. Former President, CEO and Director of MOSAID Technologies. During his tenure, MOSAID was a leading licensor of memory technology, and supplier of memory test systems to major semiconductor companies worldwide.
Slide 61: Peter Feld
Peter Feld Managing Member and Head of Research of Starboard Value LP. Mr. Feld has served on the board of directors of Unwired Planet, Inc., an intellectual property licensing company, since July 2011, and currently serves as its Chairman of the Board. – Completed transition from legacy, failin
Slide 62: Thomas Lacey
Thomas Lacey Former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Components Direct, a provider of product life cycle solutions. Former President, Chief Executive Officer and a director of Phoenix Technologies Ltd. − Sold non-core money losing businesses, significantly reduced SG&A and R&D costs, incr
Slide 63: George A. Riedel
George A. Riedel Currently Chairman of the Board of Accedian Networks. Joined Nortel Networks in 2006, as part of the restructuring team. Former CSO and President of business units. – Led unprecedented effort to monetize 6,500 patents in industry defining transaction. Patents were sold for $4.5
Slide 64: Donald E. Stout
Donald E. Stout NTP, Inc. Senior partner at the law firm of Antonelli, Terry, Stout & Kraus, LLP. – Mr. Stout's legal practice involves all facets of intellectual property, including litigation, the provision of expert witness opinions, and the licensing and representation of clients before the US
Slide 65: We Have Serious Concerns About the Credentials of the Existing Board
We Have Serious Concerns About the Credentials of the Existing Board Tessera’s slate has an alarming lack of relevant experience. There is not a single nominee who has run an IP licensing business, has direct background in imaging technology components, or has experience in patent law. David C. Na
Slide 66: We Have Serious Concerns About the Credentials of the Existing Board
We Have Serious Concerns About the Credentials of the Existing Board We believe that the Company, in an attempt to appease shareholders during this election contest, hastily assembled a new Board made up of a combination of incumbent directors and new directors, many of whom lack relevant experience
Slide 67: We Have Serious Concerns About the Credentials of the Existing Board
We Have Serious Concerns About the Credentials of the Existing Board In Tessera’s own investor presentation, these are the key criteria for directors that they list: − Public Company CEO / CFO − Public Company Board Experience − “Technology Innovation” − Location − Appointed Within Last 8 Months
Slide 68: We Have Serious Concerns About the Board's Past Attempts to Disenfranchise Its Shareholders
We Have Serious Concerns About the Board’s Past Attempts to Disenfranchise Its Shareholders The Board has utilized Tessera’s corporate machinery to insulate itself and prevent change that would benefit all shareholders. In advance of the 2012 annual meeting, the Board accelerated the Company’s m
Slide 69: Tessera Has Used Deceptive Practices to Disenfranchise Shareholders
Tessera Has Used Deceptive Practices to Disenfranchise Shareholders Timeline of Events November 2011: Starboard begins acquiring position and attempts to schedule meeting with Company. December 21, 2011: Company announced that the 2012 Annual Meeting would be held on March 30, 2012 (vs. May 24th
Slide 70: We Have Tried to Reach a Reasonable Settlement with Tessera
We Have Tried to Reach a Reasonable Settlement with Tessera Starboard has invested significant time and effort in an attempt to reach a settlement agreement with Tessera During settlement discussions, it became clear to us that Chairman Richard Hill would not agree to anything that did not leave h
Slide 71: Appendix
Appendix IPNav Overview IPNav Review Process Director Nominees – Tudor Brown – George Cwynar – Peter A. Feld – Thomas Lacey – George A. Riedel – Donald E. Stout 71
Slide 72: IPNav Overview
IPNav Overview Starboard engaged IPNav to assist in conducting a comprehensive review of Tessera, its businesses, patent portfolios and opportunities to unlock value for shareholders. IPNav is a leading full service patent monetization firm that helps corporations, universities, organizations an
Slide 73: IPNav Review Process
IPNav Review Process Assets in the Tessera portfolio were analyzed by both human experts and IPNav’s proprietary Analyzer. The IPNav Analyzer is a custom developed, patent analytics and market analysis tool used to optimize strategy and maximize return. − The Analyzer provides a QScore for asset
Slide 74: Tudor Brown
Tudor Brown Tudor Brown, age 54, was one of the founding members and until May 2012, President of ARM Holdings plc (“ARM”), a publicly- traded, semiconductor IP and software design company based in Cambridge, UK. Mr. Brown began his career at ARM over twenty years ago as a principal engineer and l
Slide 75: George Cwynar
George Cwynar George Cwynar, age 63, is a consultant offering strategic and operational guidance, mentoring and executive coaching to small and mid- sized companies. Mr. Cwynar was the President of COM DEV Canada, a division of COM DEV International, a global designer and manufacturer of space har
Slide 76: Peter A. Feld
Peter A. Feld Peter A. Feld, age 34, is a Managing Member and Head of Research of Starboard Value LP. Previously, Mr. Feld served as a Managing Director of Ramius LLC and a portfolio manager of Ramius Value and Opportunity Master Fund Ltd, a position he held between November 2008 and April 2011. P
Slide 77: Thomas Lacey
Thomas Lacey Thomas Lacey, age 54, is the former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Components Direct, a provider of cloud- based product life cycle solutions, and has served in those capacities since May 2011. Mr. Lacey also currently serves on the board of directors and the audit committee
Slide 78: George A. Riedel
George A. Riedel George A. Riedel, age 54, is currently the Chairman of the Board of Montreal- based Accedian Networks, where he has served as a director since 2010. Mr. Riedel has also served on the board of directors of PeerApp since 2011. Mr. Riedel served on the board of directors of Blade Net
Slide 79: Donald E. Stout
Donald E. Stout Donald E. Stout (Don), age 66, is a senior partner at the law firm of Antonelli, Terry, Stout & Kraus, LLP of Arlington, Virginia. In 1992, Mr. Stout co- founded NTP Inc. (“NTP”), a patent holding company for which he prepared the original NTP patents and managed its patent litigat
Slide 80: This presentation is for discussion and general informational purposes only
THIS PRESENTATION IS FOR DISCUSSION AND GENERAL INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. IT DOES NOT HAVE REGARD TO THE SPECIFIC INVESTMENT OBJECTIVE, FINANCIAL SITUATION, SUITABILITY, OR THE PARTICULAR NEED OF ANY SPECIFIC PERSON WHO MAY RECEIVE THIS PRESENTATION, AND SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS ADVICE ON THE MERIT