Ems Technologies Inc

Ems Technologies — Proxy Contest (April 2011)

63 slides from Ems Technologies's proxy contest presentation, Apr 8, 2011

  1. Slide 1: EMS Technologies: Change is Overdue

    MMI INVESTMENTS, L.P. EMS Technologies: Change is Overdue INVESTOR PRESENTATION 2011 Annual Meeting of Shareholders of EMS Technologies, Inc. April2011

  2. Slide 2: Table of Contents

    Table of Contents L Executive Summary IL Stock Performance I. Operating Performance 12 IV. Management Plan — “Strategic Realignment” 17 V. Valuation & Strategic Alternatives Opportunity 28 VI. The MMI Nominees 37 VIL Opposed Nominees & Corporate Governance 45 VII. Conclusion 52 IX. Endnotes BA x. Ap

  3. Slide 3: Executive Summary

    Executive Summary

  4. Slide 4: MMI Investments, L.P.

    MMI Investments, L.P. MMI = Founded in 1996, MMI Investments, L.P. (“MMI")is a long-only fund and the third largest shareholder of EMS with 7.8% ownership = MMthas a track record of creating value for all shareholders in its investments with a 26% average annual return since inception, net of all fe

  5. Slide 5: Change is Needed at EMS

    Change is Needed at EMS Weak Stock Price Performance — EMS's shareholder returns have been weak over the short, intermediate and long-term. ~— EMS's stock has underperformed the Russell 2000 by an average of -48% over the 18-month, two, three, four, five, and ten year periods. Operating performance

  6. Slide 6: Change is Needed at EMS (cont'd)

    Change is Needed at EMS (cont'd) EMS Would Like to Focus this Debate Solely on a Self-Serving Version of Short-Term Results = InNovember of 2009, EMS reported disastrous earnings, slashed guidance and disclosed the loss of its largest contract — causing the stock to fall -40%. Every mention of stock

  7. Slide 7: Stock Performance

    Stock Performance

  8. Slide 8: Three Year Stock Performance

    Three Year Stock Performance Over the past three years shareholder value has deteriorated . While the market has recovered substantially during this period, EMS has continued to . languish: Indexed Return Sep- Dec- Mar- dun- Sep- Dec. Mar- dun- Sep- Dec- Mar- 08 08 08 08 09 o9 o9 09 10 10 10 10 11 —

  9. Slide 9: Measurement Period is Relevant

    Measurement Period is Relevant tain a all'garvinganid acbitiary weaearecinnk yartol Nocianiag alter the 3000 earnings blow-up. This might be justifiable if Chatman Mowell and then COO Neil Mackay didn't preside over the value destruction of late 2009. 160 10 Tom Taal omonpea = cirareyint. 10 pefedee

  10. Slide 10: Years of Poor Shareholder Returns

    10 Years of Poor Shareholder Returns EMS's stock has dramatically underperformed both an index of aerospace & defense companies and the ma ‘ket for each of the 18-month, two, three, four, five, and ten y of these periods of lost opportunity for EMS shareholders were during Jack Mowell’s tenure as Ch

  11. Slide 11: Operating Performance

    Operating Performance

  12. Slide 12: Deteriorating Operating Performance

    Deteriorating Operating Performance = Claim: EMS “recently announced record 2010 revenues and profits” = Reality: — 2010 reported revenue actually declined -1% from 2009, — EMS's reported 2010 Adjusted EPS is down -26% since 2008 and is the lowest since 2006. — Any claims of growth from EMS in recen

  13. Slide 13: Core Operations are Struggling

    Core Operations are Struggling Claim: EMS is experiencing “positive momentum resulting from the strategic realignment of our business units” Reality - EMS's non-LXE, core operations (equaling 60% of revenue an % of Adjusted EBITDA) xperienced declines in 2010 of -15% and -26% in revenue and Adjusted

  14. Slide 14: LXE Rebound is from Cyclical Recovery

    LXE Rebound is from Cyclical Recovery = LXWis a capital goods business and therefore highly subject to the business cycle = While LXE experienced a year-over-year improvement in 2010, it was only over the disastrous 2009 baseline results, which included a collapse in EBITDA to a $3mm loss = 2010 rev

  15. Slide 15: History of Failed Initiatives

    History of Failed Initiatives MM = Over the last ten years, EMS has funded money-losing business lines and initiatives that have been a drag on operating performance and a waste of shareholder capital in an unsuccessful effort to accelerate growth = During this period, EMS reported over $75mm of wri

  16. Slide 16: Management Plan: Strategic Realignment

    Management Plan “Strategic Realignment”

  17. Slide 17: History of "Strategic Realignment"

    History of “Strategic Realignment” MMI = Inlate 2008 and early 2009, EMS made two acquisitions (Satamatics and SkyConnect) that now make up the vast majority of EMS’s Global Tracking business = At that time, management believed that these businesses were similar to the SatCom business (now named Avi

  18. Slide 18: The New "Strategic Realignment"

    The New “Strategic Realignment” = MMI's September 2 disjointed, noting that LXE had no logical connection or anotion that EMS had previously acknowledged publicly Inits December 13, 2010 Investor Presentation, EMS introduced a “Strategic Realignment” potential synergies among its long-held s — Aviat

  19. Slide 19: A Closer Look at GRM

    A Closer Look at GRM fs = LXE and Global Tracking are both good businesses, but they have little practical overlap ~ LXE: handheld computers / barcode readers for inventory management in high volume environments, primarily warehouses and ports in the developed world. = Global Tracking: satellite-bas

  20. Slide 20: A Closer Look at GRM (cont'd)

    A Closer Look at GRM (cont'd) — Before LXE products can even offer tracking of any kind, they have to succes: fully sell “out of the warehouse”, a market in which EMS has not yet scratched the surface — One application management is citing is areas where satellite is needed to fill in gaps in terres

  21. Slide 21: A Closer Look at Aero Connectivity

    A Closer Look at Aero Connectivity Aviation provides products that enable aixeraft connectivity solutions. It serves the business jet, air-transport, general aviation and military markets. = Defense and Space provides components and subsystems that enable advanced mobile communications for a broad r

  22. Slide 22: 5-Year Growth Targets

    5-Year Growth Targets = Following criticism from MMI, in its December 13, 2010 Investor Presentation, EMS introduced, for the first-time, aggressive 5-year financial goals for Revenue and Adjusted EBITDA compound annual growth, Longer Term Financial Goals Revenue | Adjusted E8ITOA = These goals are

  23. Slide 23: Actual Historical Organic Growth

    MMI Actual Historical Organic Growth = Atno time in the last three years has EMS performed at the level of these financial goals on an organic b: 2 = EMS’s organic compound annual growth rates from 2008 through 2011 (giving EMS the benefit of mid-point 2011 guidance) are 0.1% for revenue and -1.3"%

  24. Slide 24: EMS Guidance Credibility

    EMS Guidance Credibility = EMS has missed its initial annual earnings guidance SIX times in the last ten years, missing the mid-point of euidance by an average of over -26% in those periods = Earnings fell short of the mid-point by more than -20° five times and by more than -35% twice. Initial Annua

  25. Slide 25: Aggressive growth targets and analyst skepticism in 2009

    The last time shareholders were asked to believe aggressive evowth targets, similar to the current five year plan, was in 2009 when EMS put forward highly aggressive annual guidance. Even at the time, it was clear to others that EMS's expectations were out of touch with the market as illustrated by

  26. Slide 26: Risks to Current Plan

    Risks to Current Plan MMI = AsEMS has experienced numerous times over its years of poor operating results and missed guidance, management's operating plan is subject to internal and external risks Execution Risks, — GRM initiative leading to lost focus in LXE core markets. ~ Overspending on R&D and

  27. Slide 27: Valuation & Strategic Alternatives Opportunity

    Valuation & Strategic Alternatives Opportunity

  28. Slide 28: EMS is Undervalued

    EMS is Undervalued MM = MM[believes that EMS is significantly undervalued due to its poor operating performance strategic planning and corporate development, and the sub-scale nature of its operations. = EMSis trading at 6.8s and 6.1 2010 and 2011 Adjusted EBITDA, respectively Valuation multiples of

  29. Slide 29: EMS is Sub-scale and Disjointed

    EMS is Sub: cale and Disjointed = Despite claims of rationalization, EMS's operations remain sub-scale and disjointed leading to amargin structure that is consistently below its peers. = Because each of EMS's businesses are sub-scale and serve different markets and customers, EBITDA margins are appr

  30. Slide 30: Scale: Investments Have Failed to Create Value

    Scale: Investments Have Failed to Create Value |/MM Ea Over the last four years, EMS has Because of EMS's small scale, growth through acquisitions is logical if executed correctly Unfortunately for shareholders, EMS has a track record of failing to grow through acquisitio Since 2008, EMS has spent o

  31. Slide 31: Scale: Eat or be Eaten

    sale: Kat or be Eaten = Since EMS has been unsuccessful in its acquisition st potential solution to solve its seale problem is to pursue a sale of the Company to ak: er organization. = We believe EMS would be an attractive acquisition candidate due to its: — Strong technology — Attractive, though di

  32. Slide 32: EMS Has Failed to Engage Potential Acquirers

    EMS Has Failed to Engage Potential Acquirers MMI = We believe BMS has received numerous inquiries from qualified acquirers — Multiple strategic and multiple financial buy — Overtures repeated over several years. — At substantial premiums to EMS’s current value. Vs. = Webelieve the Board has failed t

  33. Slide 33: Present Value of Management's Plan

    Present Value of Management’s Plan MMI = The responsibility of any Board when evaluating a strategic plan is to app risk adjustment that takes into account the feasibility of the plan as well a prior execution track record mn appropriate management's = We believe EMS's current five year operating pl

  34. Slide 34: M&A Value — Entire Company Sale

    M&A Value — Entire Company Sale = Webelieve there are some buyers interested in acquiring all of EMS and many more that would be interested in buying either LXE or core operations. = IfEMS were sold in its entirety, based on comparable historical deals, we believe that EMS shareholders could realize

  35. Slide 35: M&A Value — Sale of the Parts

    M&A Value — Sale of the Part = IfEMS were sold in two transactions, based on comparable historical deals, we believe that EMS shareholders could still realize a tantially greater value than the risk adjusted present value of management's plan, even with our estimate of tax leakage” LXE 2011 EBITDA $

  36. Slide 36: The MMI Nominees

    The MMI Nominees

  37. Slide 37: MMI Nominees Address EMS Deficiencies

    MMI Nominees Address EMS Deficiencies MM = Board has placed an over-emphasis on academia, government and research science. ~ Half of the current Board has spent their careers principally in these fields ~ While these are valuable skills, better-run companies use advisory boards to gain this expertis

  38. Slide 38: MMI Nominees Bring Valuable Expertise

    MMI Nominees Bring Valuable Expertise = Collective strengths of MMI’s highly qualified nominees — True independence — Decades of public compa company serving the aer y operating experience, including CEO experience at a public ace and distribution markets ~ Decades of public company corporate s aero

  39. Slide 39: MMI Nominees Will Bring Boardroom Focus

    MMI Nominees Will Bring Boardroom Focus If elected, the MMI nominees will wor with the EMS Board to: Evaluate and risk-adjust management's “Strategic Realignment” and five-year targets Examine expense structure to drive margins more in-line with peers: * Overhead — review all corporate spending for

  40. Slide 40: MMI Nominees: Theodore E. Martin

    MMI Nominees Theodore E. Martin = Former President and CEO of Barnes Group Inc. componentiy for aerospace and industrial markets, $1 billion manufacturer and distributor of = Former senior executive at Allied-Signal including division President of a manufacturing and distribution business. = Former

  41. Slide 41: MMI Nominees: Samme L. Thompson

    MMI Nominees ‘ho = President of Telit Associates, a strategy consulting and financial advisory firm that focuses on telecommunications and information technology. ume son Former Senior Vice President of Global Strategy and Corporate Business Development at Motorola Corporation. = Formerinvestment ba

  42. Slide 42: MMI Nominees: Carroll R. Wetzel

    MMI Nominees MM oll R. ‘etzel. = Former Co-Head of Chase Manhattan M&A group. = Former Managing Director of Smith Barney in the M&A group = Professional director with focus on strategic configuration, corporate governance best practices, and value creation for all shareholders Director of Exide Tech

  43. Slide 43: MMI Nominees: Jerome J. Lande

    MMI Nominees MM Jerome J. Lande = Partner of MCM Capital Management, LLC, the general partner of MMI, owner of 7.8% of EMS, where Mr. Lande is responsible for all areas of portfolio management. 50mm global diversified = Former Corporate Development Officer of Key Components, Inc., a industrial manuf

  44. Slide 44: Opposed Nominees & Corporate Governance

    Opposed Nominees & Corpor: te Governance

  45. Slide 45: Jack Mowell and EMS: 1984-2011

    Jack Mowell and EMS: 1984-2011 Jack Mowell, 76, has been a Board member for 27 years and Chairman for the past 10 years — Overhis tenures as Board member and Chairman, the Company has experienced annualized returns of 3% and 2%, respectively We consider Chairman Mowell an “affiliated outside directo

  46. Slide 46: Jack Mowell — The Truth About Reflectone

    Jack Mowell — The Truth About Reflectone MM = While Mowell’s biography notes that he sold Reflectone to British Aerospace, public information demonstrates that under Mowell’s leadership Reflectone suffered major operating problems, lost key contracts, and saw FY’89 revenue decline -25% with reported

  47. Slide 47: Other Directors Opposed by MMI

    Other Directors Opposed by MMI = All of the directors opposed by MMI have been recommended AGAINST by ISS since 2007 due to the Company's “dead-hand” poison pill that the Board has only recently amended to remove the “dead-hand” provisions. = Norman E. Thagard, 67 (EMS Board for 1: — Former astronau

  48. Slide 48: Reactionary Moves

    Reactionary Moves = Recent actions taken hy EMS since December 2010 to remedy its weak Corporate Governance profile and lack of strategic direction have in our view been reactionary and superficial in nature. ~ MMTI°s September 27, 2010 letter questioned the overly complex and disjointed nature of E

  49. Slide 49: MMI's Attempts to Communicate with the Board

    MMs Attempts to Communicate with the Board = MMIwas unable to engage Chairman Mowell or the EMS Board in a meaningful dialogue regarding our concerns over strategic configuration and ways to unlock shareholder value. — Between August 5, 2010 and September 26, 2010, MMI unsuccessfully attempted to sc

  50. Slide 50: Weak Corporate Governance

    Weak Corporate Governance We believe that the Compar yy has a poor corporate governance profile that facilitates entrenchment. No Lead Independent Director despite Mowell becoming Executive Director in 2009 Affiliated outside director serves as Chairman of the Board, as well as Chairman of the Gover

  51. Slide 51: Conclusion

    Conelusion

  52. Slide 52: Conclusion

    CONCLUSION = STOCK PRICE PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN WEAK IN THE SHORT, MEDIUM, AND LONG TERM. = OPERATING PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN WEAK IN THE SHORT, MEDIUM, AND LONG TERM. = EMS'S CLAIMS OF SHORT TERM PERFORMANCE ARE MYOPIC AND ARBITRARY. = THE BOARD HAS BEEN A POOR STEWARD OF CAPITAL, = THE BOARD HAS NOT SA

  53. Slide 53: Endnotes

    Endnotes

  54. Slide 54: Endnotes

    MMI Endnote ‘See page 60 for reconciliation of organic revenue and adjusted EBITDA growth. ‘Trux revenue based on Raymond James research analyst Chris Quiltys research report dated February 29, 2008, EBITDA based on ‘management's comment that Trux margins were similar to LKB on the 4GOT earnings con

  55. Slide 55: Appendix

    Appendix

  56. Slide 56: Trading Comparables

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  57. Slide 57: Transaction Comparables

    MMI Transaction Comparable (os $onmitione) Ent Ent Vals _eviERIDA ‘Announced croreet Acquiror Value Law Rev. “DTW Forward ‘erorpece & Defme: Communications and Eictronies Gaaaiit Spectrum Contole APL Terologie 00 sax 19x aor Hermyinaweies Rrawe moo oor tay {2010 Apphed Sigel Rayon feo ian uae {aero

  58. Slide 58: Peer Margin Comparison

    Peer Margin Comparison MM ‘Aerospace & Defense Roce otine 106% 21% Horne 124K 2% ebnam pe 20% 214% Heioo 199% 21mm Tebatne Tecinogite raw 139% Aeron Hong 205% 2a vos 28% men Canteen Teeeanmureatins ew mm rare 110% a6 ‘average 165% = Mobite Computing Auto 1D Memon am ew dota am ow tenes Pes Dene ax o

  59. Slide 59: Present Value Analysis

    Present Value Analysis Base Year a ‘toa 200 an se552 $5050 «$495 CME «SAA mes Sage tg Caneel 403 Base Year Projected ‘toa 2 50% Risk Adjustment "2010 Sn os Ba _caGR Revenues se52 fom Suga) sugs | atae, Co ‘Groth i 63% o% oo EBITDA, 403 M5 481 521 sea (ama) rots Base Year Projected oss 3 20082011 Gro

  60. Slide 60: Organic Revenue and EBITDA Growth

    Organic Revenue and EBITDA Growth MM 2008 Reconciliation Revenue EBITDA 2008 Acquisition Results Prior to Closing Formation and Satamatics'* $48.6 86 Sky Connect? 88 15 Teux* 13 o1 ‘Total Acquired Revenue & EBITDA Bd 700, 2008 EMS Reported $395.0 $363 Incremental ftom Acquired Companies 58.6 10.0 ‘P

  61. Slide 61: February 23, 2011, MMI Letter to EMS

    February 23, 2011, MMI Letter to EMS MMI Misucar MMI | sensors, te February 23,2001 Jot 8. Mowe Chairman, EMS Tecnologie, ne 660 Engineering Ove Noro, Georgia 30082 ‘Dear Charman Mowe ‘The Mia nominees othe EMS board aren receipt of your let of February 28 requesting that hey ‘eet with your Governan

  62. Slide 62: EMS: How to Punish Long-Term Investors

    EMS: How to Punish Long-Term Investors MM = EMS has struggled to build stock price appreciation for any meaningful period. = Infact, a $20 stock price has been a harbinger of missteps. EMS's stock price has crossed $20 only to return below $15 on four different occasions in the past 10 years = EMSha

  63. Slide 63: Disclaimer

    DISCLAIMER ‘THIS PRESENTATION IS FOR DISCUSSION AND GENERAL INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. IT DOES NOT HAVE REGARD TO ‘THE SPECIFIC INVESTMENT OBJECTIVE, FINANCIAL SITUATION, SUITABILITY, OR THE PARTICULAR NEED OF ANY SPECIFIC PERSON WHO MAY RECEIVE THIS PRESENTATION, AND SHOULD NOTBE TAKEN AS ADVICE

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