Supervalu Inc

Supervalu — Proxy Contest (July 2018)

175 slides from Supervalu's proxy contest presentation, Jul 24, 2018

  1. Slide 1: Supervalu Board Member Accountability

    SUPERVALU BOARD MEMBER ACCOUNTABILITY JULY 2018 CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 1

  2. Slide 2: CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION

    CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 2

  3. Slide 3: Disclaimer

    Disclaimer The views expressed in this presentation (the “Presentation”) represent the opinions of Blackwells Capital LLC and/or certain affiliates (“Blackwells”) and the investment funds it manages that hold shares in Supervalu Inc. (the “Company”). This Presentation is for informational purposes o

  4. Slide 4: Table of Contents

    TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Executive Summary II. The Case for Change at Supervalu A. A Record of Poor Performance B. The Board Has Failed at Each of its Core Responsibilities C. Board is Poorly Composed and Has Misaligned Interests III. Staggering Disloyalty: The Albertsons/Cerberus Affair IV. The Nominee

  5. Slide 5: Table of Contents

    I. Executive Summary II. The Case for Change at Supervalu A. A Record of Poor Performance B. The Board Has Failed at Each of its Core Responsibilities C. Board is Poorly Composed and Has Misaligned Interests III. Staggering Disloyalty: The Albertsons/Cerberus Affair IV. The Nominees’ Plan for Superv

  6. Slide 6: About Blackwells Capital

    About Blackwells Capital BLACKWELLS CAPITAL (“BLACKWELLS”) IS AN ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MANAGER FOCUSED ON GLOBAL FUNDAMENTAL AND SPECIAL SITUATION INVESTING ACROSS CAPITAL STRUCTURES OUR RESEARCH- VALUE- INVESTMENT INTENSIVE ORIENTED CONCENTRATED APPROACH Blackwells’ principals have We have held se

  7. Slide 7: Supervalu (NYSE: SVU) Snapshot

    Supervalu (NYSE: SVU) Snapshot SUPERVALU IS ONE OF THE LARGEST U.S. BASED FOOD WHOLESALERS, WITH ~$14BN OF ANNUAL REVENUES. SVU WAS ESTABLISHED IN THE 1870s The Company is organized into three primary segments: Summary Financials ($mm) 78% of revenue, 68% of Adj. EBITDA, 30 distribution facilities M

  8. Slide 8: Shareholder Value Destruction

    Shareholder Value Destruction SUPERVALU SHAREHOLDERS HAVE EXPERIENCED A 92% DECLINE IN VALUE OVER THE PAST 10 YEARS Supervalu 10 – Year Stock Price Chart $200 $150 $100 $50 $0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Source: Bloomberg, as of February 5, 2018 unaffected date. CONFIDENTI

  9. Slide 9: Executive Summary: Only Substantial Change Can Save Supervalu

    Executive Summary: Only Substantial Change Can Save Supervalu Blackwells urges shareholders to vote on the GREEN proxy card AFTER YEARS OF UNDERPERFORMANCE AND A BOARD THAT WE BELIEVE HAS FAILED TO FULFILL ITS RESPONSIBILITIES, SHAREHOLDERS SHOULD VOTE FOR CHANGE AND IMPROVE THE COMPOSITION OF THE B

  10. Slide 10: A Long History of Unmitigated Under-Performance

    A Long History of Unmitigated Under-Performance BY ALMOST ANY METRIC, ACROSS ALMOST ANY TIME PERIOD, SUPERVALU HAS UNDERPERFORMED ITS PEERS • Total shareholder returns have been abysmal Performance Metric Pages – Investors have lost more than $5 billion in the last ten years Total – The stock is dow

  11. Slide 11: Supervalu's Tumultuous Recent Corporate History

    Supervalu’s Tumultuous Recent Corporate History WE ORGANIZE SUPERVALU’S RECENT CORPORATE HISTORY INTO THREE STAGES Phase I – Retail Destruction: Value destructive M&A strategy with terrible execution Phase II – Cerberus Duplicity: Confusing financial disclosures and a conflicted board of directors l

  12. Slide 12: Supervalu's Board Has Failed At Its Core Responsibilities

    Supervalu’s Board Has Failed At Its Core Responsibilities WE BELIEVE THE PERFORMANCE ISSUES ARE THE RESULT OF, AND HAVE NOT BEEN CORRECTED BY, THE BOARD Board Responsibility Pages • We believe the Supervalu Board has failed to carry out its responsibilities to shareholders and the Company Strategy 4

  13. Slide 13: The Culpable Six Have Overseen Massive Value Destruction

    The Culpable Six Have Overseen Massive Value Destruction WE BELIEVE SIX DIRECTORS HAVE OVERSEEN THE HORRIFIC MISMANAGEMENT OF SUPERVALU: Irwin Cohen, Philip Francis, Donald Chappel, Eric Johnson, Frank Savage and Mathew Pendo Albertsons Initiates Albertsons Albertsons ends Acquisition of Acquisition

  14. Slide 14: Board Failures Due to Lack of Skills and Alignment

    Board Failures Due to Lack of Skills and Alignment WE BELIEVE THE BOARD HAS FAILED TO PERFORM BECAUSE THE DIRECTORS ARE NOT UP TO THE TASK • The incumbent Supervalu directors – all of whom have been re- Expectation Pages nominated by the Company – are not well suited for the task of overseeing a lar

  15. Slide 15: Shocking Disloyalty of Directors: The Albertsons / Cerberus Affair

    Shocking Disloyalty of 6 Directors: The Albertsons / Cerberus Affair WITH THE SALE OF SUPERVALU’S RETAIL STORES TO CERBERUS, WE BELIEVE SIX DIRECTORS HAVE SHOWN THEIR LACK OF LOYALTY TO SUPERVALU SHAREHOLDERS • In 2013, Supervalu sold most of its retail grocery stores to Disqualifying Acts Pages Cer

  16. Slide 16: The Nominees Have a Plan and Will Fulfill Their Duties

    The Nominees Have a Plan and Will Fulfill Their Duties as Directors BLACKWELLS HAS NOMINATED TALENTED PROFESSIONALS, WHO ARE PREPARED TO HELP SUPERVALU IMMEDIATELY Board Responsibility Pages • The Nominees have developed a plan for fulfilling their obligations as directors, once elected Strategy 118

  17. Slide 17: Blackwells Nominees Bring Substantial Board and Executive Experience

    Blackwells Nominees Bring Substantial Board and Executive Experience BLACKWELLS NOMINEES BRING EXTENSIVE CREDENTIALS IN GROCERY RETAIL, FOOD DISTRIBUTION, TRANSPORTATION & LOGISTICS, OPERATIONAL TURNAROUNDS AND SUSTAINABILITY Rick Anicetti Steven Baer Chris Kreidler Frank Lazaran Jim Martell Sandra

  18. Slide 18: Blackwells' Nominees Are Prepared to Add Value

    Blackwells’ Nominees Are Prepared to Add Value Supervalu Shortcoming Blackwells’ Nominee Blackwells’ Nominee Value Add ƒ History of value destructive M&A ƒ Upgrade Supervalu’s M&A strategy and execution Rick Anicetti ƒ Retail stores in dilapidated conditions ƒ Guide capex refresh strategy implementa

  19. Slide 19: Blackwells' Unsuccessful Attempts to Engage Constructively

    Blackwells’ Unsuccessful Attempts to Engage Constructively BLACKWELLS HAS ATTEMPTED TO ENGAGE CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE BOARD August 24, 2017 Dec 7, 2017 Jan 17, 2018 Feb 6, 2018 March 20, 2018 May 3, 2018 June 27, 2018 Blackwells met with Blackwells Blackwells presented Blackwells Blackwells Blackwel

  20. Slide 20: Shareholders See the Value in Our Ideas

    Shareholders See the Value in Our Ideas Total Shareholder Returns (%) PRIOR to Blackwells (a) One Year TSR (%) Three Year TSR (%) S&P 500 18% S&P 500 37% Russell 2000 10% Russell 2000 29% 2018 Proxy Peers (b) 6% 2018 Proxy Peers 18% R2000 Cons. Spls. (1%) R2000 Cons. Spls. 9% Grocery Peers (c) (24%)

  21. Slide 21: Table of Contents

    I. Executive Summary II. The Case for Change at Supervalu A. A Record of Poor Performance B. The Board Has Failed at Each of its Core Responsibilities C. Board is Poorly Composed and Has Misaligned Interests III. Staggering Disloyalty: The Albertsons/Cerberus Affair IV. The Nominees’ Plan for Superv

  22. Slide 22: A Record of Poor Performance

    A. A Record of Poor Performance By nearly every objective measure of business and stock performance, Supervalu has underperformed and disappointed its investors CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 22

  23. Slide 23: Report Card: Record of Poor Performance

    Report Card: Record of Poor Performance Performance Metric Criteria Assessment Supervalu Grade Total Lags peers and indices Keeping pace or exceeding peer group Shareholder across all relevant time total shareholder return Return horizons Financial performance (growth and Financial Declining absolut

  24. Slide 24: Returns Consistently Lag Peers and Indices

    Returns Consistently Lag Peers and Indices One Year TSR (%) Three Year TSR (%) S&P 500 18% S&P 500 37% R2000 10% R2000 29% 2018 Proxy Peers (a) 6% 2018 Proxy Peers (a) 18% R2000 Cons. Spls (1%) R2000 Cons. Spls 9% Grocery Peers (b) (24%) Grocery Peers (b) (17%) Wholesale Peers (c) (24%) Wholesale Pe

  25. Slide 25: Supervalu Has Underperformed Even After Announcing its Latest Long-Term Vision

    Supervalu Has Underperformed Even After Announcing its Latest “Long-Term” Vision SINCE CEO MARK GROSS OUTLINED HIS LONG-TERM VISION ON APRIL 26, 2016, THE COMPANY HAS SUBSTANTIALLY UNDERPERFORMED BENCHMARK INDICES AND ITS GROCERY AND WHOLESALE PEERS 60% 40% Russell 2000 = 34% 20% 0% Wholesale Peers

  26. Slide 26: Every Member of the Board Has Overseen Value Destruction

    Every Member of the Board Has Overseen Value Destruction Board Member Start Date Board Tenure Supervalu % TSR During Tenure (a) Irwin Cohen May 2003 15 years (86%) Philip Francis February 2006 12 years (92%) Donald Chappel June 2010 8 years (82%) Eric Johnson July 2013 5 years (74%) Mathew Pendo Apr

  27. Slide 27: Perpetual Declines in EBITDA

    Perpetual Declines in EBITDA THE BOARD HAS BEEN UNABLE TO ARREST DECLINES IN EBITDA • Prior to the sale of Albertsons, Supervalu EBITDA declined 41% over 5 years • After the sale of Albertons, Supervalu EBITDA has continued to decline: Down 12% over 4 years SVU EBITDA pre-Albertsons Sale SVU EBITDA

  28. Slide 28: EBITDA Performance Woeful Compared to Peers

    EBITDA Performance Woeful Compared to Peers SUPERVALU’S RECORD OF EBITDA DECLINES IS UNIQUE IN THE INDUSTRY 2007 to 2012 EBITDA Growth (%) 2013 to 2017 EBITDA Growth (%) 73% 78% 61% 38% 37% 42% (41%) 18% 17% % Decline 20% (12%) Decline 10% 10% 2% (41%) (9%) (12%) UNFI VLGEA SPTN WMK KR IMKTA SVU SFM

  29. Slide 29: Retail Identical Store Sales Worst in Industry

    Retail Identical Store Sales Worst in Industry SUPERVALU RETAIL “IDENTICAL” STORE SALES HAVE REGULARLY BEEN THE ABSOLUTE WORST PERFORMER COMPARED TO SUPERVALU’S PEERS SVU Annual ID Sales ’06 – ‘18 SVU Quarterly ID Sales Q1 ’13 – Q4 ‘18 12.0% 6.0% 10.0% 4.0% 8.0% 6.0% 2.0% 4.0% 0.0% 2.0% 0.0% (2.0)%

  30. Slide 30: Retail EBITDA Margins Worst in Industry

    Retail EBITDA Margins Worst in Industry SINCE Q4 2015, RESULTING IN SUPERVALU BECOMING THE ABSOLUTE WORST PERFORMER RELATIVE TO ITS PEER SET Supervalu Retail LTM EBITDA and Margins LTM Retail EBITDA Margins (%) 400 7.0% 8.0% 7.0% 350 6.0% 7.0% LTM Retail Adj. EBITDA Margin (%) LTM Retail Adj. EBITDA

  31. Slide 31: Wholesale Continues to Underperform

    Wholesale Continues to Underperform WE SEE NO SIGN OF THE “TURNAROUND” Wholesale Performance (ex M&A) • Although revenue has grown due to expensive $ in millions FY ’16 FY ’17 FY ’18 acquisitions, organic EBITDA is essentially flat over a Wholesale Revenue $7,935 $7,705 $8,430 3-year period % growth

  32. Slide 32: Capital Markets Value Supervalu Earnings Below All Peers

    Capital Markets Value Supervalu Earnings Below All Peers VALUATION REFLECTS LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN TURNAROUND AND FUTURE EARNINGS STREAMS 14.0x 12.0x 11.5x 10.9x 11.2x EV / Estimated EBITDA (x) 10.0x 9.2x 8.0x 7.6x SVU 7.1x 5.1x 6.2x 6.3x 6.0x 4.0x 2.0x 0.0x SVU SPTN IMKTA KR UNFI USFD SFM PFGC SYY S

  33. Slide 33: Short-Interest in Supervalu is Extremely High

    Short-Interest in Supervalu is Extremely High DESPITE LOW VALUATION MULTIPLES, SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF INVESTORS ARE ACTIVELY BETTING AGAINST THE “TRANSFORMATION” AT SUPERVALU SVU 30% 25.7% 25% Short Interest (%) 20% 15% 12.2% 10.6% 9.9% 9.5% 10% 8.1% 6.2% 5% 3.6% 3.3% 2.3% 1.0% 0% SVU SFM WMK IMKTA

  34. Slide 34: Sell-Side Analysts Dismiss Supervalu's Transformation

    Sell-Side Analysts Dismiss Supervalu’s “Transformation” SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF SELL-SIDE ANALYSTS BELIEVE THE STOCK WILL PERFORM IN-LINE OR WORSE THAN THE MARKET 100% SVU 82% Hold or Sell Recommendations (% of Total) 90% 88% 80% 70% 65% 63% 59% 60% 50% 46% 43% 40% 38% 30% SVU SPTN UNFI KR SYY PFGC S

  35. Slide 35: Repeatedly Missing Earnings Guidance

    Repeatedly Missing Earnings Guidance SINCE Q2 2016 (SEPTEMBER 2015), SUPERVALU HAS LOWERED ITS FULL YEAR GUIDANCE EVERY QUARTER EXCEPT FOR Q2 2018 2 Day Stock Period Guidance Reaction Change Q4 ’15 New Fiscal Year FY ‘16 Sales & Adj. EBITDA to modestly increase versus last year Q2 ’16 Revised Down (

  36. Slide 36: Sell-Side Earnings Estimates Continuously Come Down

    Sell-Side Earnings Estimates Continuously Come Down WALL STREET ANALYST ESTIMATED EBITDA AND ADJUSTED EARNINGS PER SHARE (ADJ. EPS) HAVE CONTINUED TO DECLINE OVER MULTIPLE YEARS Consensus FY 2018 EBITDA Estimate ($mm) Consensus FY 2018 Adj. EPS Estimate ($) $7 $940 Consensus FY 2018 EBITDA Estimate

  37. Slide 37: Missing Long Term Projections

    Missing Long Term Projections SUPERVALU MANAGEMENT SUBSTANTIALLY UNDERACHIEVED THE LONG-TERM FINANCIAL PROJECTIONS IT PROVIDED TO INVESTORS IN 2013 “I've been working on those projects since July, and I was very much a part of building the model for this new company, along with all the other great p

  38. Slide 38: The Board Failed in Each of its Core Responsibilities

    B. The Board Failed in Each of its Core Responsibilities The Supervalu directors must be held responsible for the Company’s underperformance CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 38

  39. Slide 39: Report Card: Underperformance Tied to Board Failures

    Report Card: Underperformance Tied to Board Failures Board Responsibility Criteria Assessment Supervalu Grade Vet and adopt a differentiated, winning Focus on growth at any cost over Strategy strategy returns Oversee business execution and hold Execution Persistent poor execution management accounta

  40. Slide 40: Rudderless Shifts of Strategy

    Rudderless Shifts of Strategy “Become America’s Neighborhood Grocer” (2011) “Having Three Distinct Segments [Wholesale, Retail and Hard Discount Retail] within the same organization provides a unique, compelling and exciting business proposition” (2013) “The Leading Distributor of Consumable Product

  41. Slide 41: Strategy Emphasizes Growth Through Acquisition… Again

    Supervalu’s Strategy Emphasizes Growth Through Acquisition… Again SUPERVALU’S BOARD HAS OVERSEEN THIS FAILED STRATEGY OF M&A FUELED GROWTH AND MISMANAGEMENT OF ASSETS BEFORE Expensive Lever up Mismanage Stock Price Exit Assets and Acquisition Balance Sheet Assets Declines Refocus Failed Retail Expan

  42. Slide 42: What's Wrong With This (Strategy) Picture?

    What’s Wrong With This (Strategy) Picture? THE MARKET DOES NOT APPEAR TO BELIEVE IN THE “TRANSFORMATION” ANNOUNCED ON THE Q4 2016 EARNINGS CALL Analyst Mean Short Interest Stock Price Target Price (As % of Float) $37.45 $47.25 17.4% $21.56 $14.24 4.7% April 26, 2016 Feb. 5, 2018 April 26, 2016 Feb.

  43. Slide 43: Is Current Strategy The Result of a Plan or Mismanagement?

    Is Current Strategy The Result of a Plan or Mismanagement? WE BELIEVE SUPERVALU BACKED-INTO ITS CURRENT STRATEGY OF BEING A WHOLESALE COMPANY AS RETAIL EARNINGS HAVE PRECIPITOUSLY DECLINED DUE TO MISMANAGEMENT • Three years ago, Supervalu’s Retail and Wholesale segments generated the same EBITDA Uni

  44. Slide 44: Lazy and Unfocused Marketing Efforts

    Lazy and Unfocused Marketing Efforts FOOD RETAIL 101 DICTATES THAT MARKETING NEEDS TO BE TAILORED TO THE INTERESTS AND NEEDS OF THE LOCAL CUSTOMER • Supervalu’s retail advertising and marketing utilizes the same advertising flyers across its banners despite each banner representing a different demog

  45. Slide 45: Underinvestment in Retail Capex

    Underinvestment in Retail Capex THE RETAIL SEGMENT HAS UNDERINVESTED IN CAPEX, SPENDING APPROXIMATELY 1.0% TO 2.0% OF SALES, WHILE COMPETITORS HAVE AVERAGED CAPEX SPEND ABOVE 2.5% Grocery Retail Capex Spend as a Percentage of Revenue 5.0% 4.5% 4.0% 3.5% 3.0% 2.5% 2.0% 1.5% 1.0% FY '14 FY '15 FY '16

  46. Slide 46: Rudimentary Execution in Retail Stores is Lacking

    Rudimentary Execution in Retail Stores is Lacking HOW OFTEN HAS THE BOARD VISITED SUPERVALU’S RETAIL STORES? “I think investors are going to appreciate the fact that this management team is doing the right thing to keep the stores in the right shape and even if it means a modest, short-term impact t

  47. Slide 47: Retail Stores - Unappealing Entrance and Façade

    Retail Stores - Unappealing Entrance and Façade SUPERVALU WELCOMES ITS CUSTOMERS TO ITS BRANDS WITH BROKEN SIGNAGE CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 47

  48. Slide 48: Retail Stores – Worn Down Facilities

    Retail Stores – Worn Down Facilities SUPERVALU RETAIL FACILITIES ARE IN DIRE NEED OF INVESTMENT AS WE OBSERVED HOLES AND CRACKS IN THE FLOOR, SIGNIFICANT SCUFF MARKS, BROKEN WALL TILES AND HOLES IN THE CEILING CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 48

  49. Slide 49: Retail Stores – Dated and Broken Fixtures

    Retail Stores – Dated and Broken Fixtures WE OBSERVED MULTIPLE INSTANCES OF OUTDATED AND BROKEN FIXTURES CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 49

  50. Slide 50: Retail Stores – Frequent Out-of-Stock Inventory

    Retail Stores – Frequent Out-of-Stock Inventory OUT OF STOCK INVENTORY AND MESSY SHELF DISPLAYS WERE PREVALENT THROUGHOUT THE SUPERVALU RETAIL STORES CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 50

  51. Slide 51: Retail Stores – Ineffectual Marketing Displays

    Retail Stores – Ineffectual Marketing Displays INEFFECTUAL MARKETING WAS PREVALENT THROUGHOUT THE SUPERVALU RETAIL STORES CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 51

  52. Slide 52: Retail Stores – Unappetizing Product Display

    Retail Stores – Unappetizing Product Display UNAPPETIZING PRODUCT DISPLAYS AT SUPERVALU RETAIL STORES INCLUDED DRIED SPILLS, GREASY LABELS, MESSY FOOD DISPLAYS, BROWNED ORANGES AND UNAPPETIZING SEAFOOD CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 52

  53. Slide 53: Retail Stores – Disorganized and Cluttered

    Retail Stores – Disorganized and Cluttered POOR IN-STORE EXECUTION SPEAKS TO THE CULTURE AND BASIC STANDARDS OF THE RETAIL BUSINESS CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 53

  54. Slide 54: Retail Stores – Filthy or Out of Order Bathrooms

    Retail Stores – Filthy or Out of Order Bathrooms BATHROOMS AND WATER FOUNTAINS WERE REGULARLY OUT-OF-ORDER, WHILE THOSE THAT WERE FUNCTIONING WERE LEFT IN FILTHY CONDITIONS CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 54

  55. Slide 55: Executive Leadership and Compensation

    Executive Leadership and Compensation SUPERVALU HAS HAD 5 DIFFERENT CEOS OVER THE COURSE OF THE LAST 9 YEARS Despite a total shareholder return of negative 86% over this 9 year time period, the Supervalu board has authorized total CEO payments of $99.2mm 2006 2017 Jeff Noddle Craig Herkert Wayne Sal

  56. Slide 56: Revolving Door of Personnel in Executive Suite

    Revolving Door of Personnel in Executive Suite THE EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP SUITE HAS BEEN A REVOLVING DOOR OVER THE PAST 6 YEARS Supervalu Executive Leadership Changes 2012 through 2018 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Craig Wayne Sam Mark CEO Herkert Sales Duncan Gross Sherry Bruce Susan Bruce Rob C

  57. Slide 57: Why Can't This Board Grow or Retain a Management Team?

    Why Can’t This Board Grow or Retain a Management Team? THE AVERAGE TENURE OF SUPERVALU EXECUTIVES IS ONLY 2 YEARS Average Tenure of Executives (a) CEO Changes Since Jan 1, 2012 UNFI 0 SVU 2 Years IM 1 KR 1 SFM 4 Years SPTN 1 VLGEA 1 SVU WMK 1 UNFI 5 Years SFM 2 3 SPTN 6 Years SVU 3 KR 13 Years CFO C

  58. Slide 58: Failure to Align Executive Compensation with Performance

    Failure to Align Executive Compensation with Performance THE SUPERVALU BOARD HAS FAILED TO ALIGN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION WITH PERFORMANCE • Supervalu has seen two consecutive years of significant stock price and Adj. EBITDA declines • Yet in FY 2018, the board of directors awarded every named executi

  59. Slide 59: CEO Compensation Out of Line

    CEO Compensation Out of Line OVER THE LAST 10 YEARS, THE SUPERVALU BOARD HAS AWARDED ITS CEOS SUBSTANTIAL COMPENSATION COMPARED TO ITS PEERS, DESPITE GLARINGLY WORSE TOTAL SHAREHOLDER RETURNS Retailer and Wholesaler CEO Compensation ($ mm) (a) Retail and Wholesaler Shareholder Return (b) SVU 138% $7

  60. Slide 60: De-emphasis of Retail as a Bonus Metric

    De-emphasis of Retail as a Bonus Metric THE SUPERVALU BOARD’S DE-EMPHASIS OF RETAIL ID STORE SALES AS A BONUS METRIC IS CORRELATED TO THE DECLINES IN RETAIL’S OPERATING PERFORMANCE AS MANAGEMENT FOCUSED ELSEWHERE • In 2015, the last year Supervalu generated positive Retail comp store sales growth, 2

  61. Slide 61: Easing Executive Compensation Metrics to Reward Failure

    Easing Executive Compensation Metrics to Reward Failure IN LIGHT OF DECLINING FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS HAS MOVED AWAY FROM USING OBJECTIVE FINANCIAL METRICS TO MEASURE EXECUTIVE PERFORMANCE FY ’15 FY ’16 FY ‘17 FY ‘18 • In FY 2016, the board introduced a Financial Metrics non-GA

  62. Slide 62: Poorly Constructed Compensation Metrics

    Poorly Constructed Compensation Metrics WE BELIEVE SUPERVALU’S BOARD STRUCTURED MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION PLANS THAT ENCOURAGE VALUE DESTRUCTIVE BEHAVIOR • Supervalu’s history of shareholder destructive acquisitions is due to the formulation of incentives that are based on aggregate sales and EBITDA g

  63. Slide 63: Compensation Plan Incentivized Growth Without Returns

    Compensation Plan Incentivized Growth Without Returns FOR THE PAST FIVE YEARS, SUPERVALU’S BOARD OF DIRECTORS HAS INCENTIVIZED MANAGEMENT TO GROW EBITDA AND SALES, WITH NO REGARD FOR USE OF CAPITAL OR SHAREHOLDER VALUE • This misguided pursuit for growth has led to “A key element of bringing my visi

  64. Slide 64: Executives Fly Private, At Shareholders' Expense

    Supervalu’s Executives Fly Private, At Shareholders’ Expense SUPERVALU HAS BEEN INCURRING EXPENSES ASSOCIATED WITH A PRIVATE JET • Minneapolis – Saint Paul International Airport is located 14 miles from Supervalu’s headquarters and offers direct non-stop flights to every major Retail banner they own

  65. Slide 65: Albertsons Acquisition Destroyed Shareholder Value

    Albertsons Acquisition Destroyed Shareholder Value SUPERVALU’S ACQUISITION OF ALBERTSONS LED TO THE DESTRUCTION OF OVER $10BN IN VALUE • Over the life of the transaction Supervalu’s stock price declined by 87% and its enterprise value declined by $10.2bn January 2006 Acquisition January 2013 Sale %

  66. Slide 66: Buying at High Multiples, Selling at Low Multiples

    Buying at High Multiples, Selling at Low Multiples SUPERVALU’S SALE OF THE ALBERTSONS BANNERS IN 2013 WAS AT A SUBSTANTIAL DISCOUNT TO PEERS • The Supervalu board authorized the sale of its Albertsons retail banners to Cerberus at an EV / EBITDA valuation multiple of 4.0x. The average trading multip

  67. Slide 67: Save-A-Lot Sale Was a Huge Disappointment for Shareholders

    Save-A-Lot Sale Was a Huge Disappointment for Shareholders SUPERVALU’S PROPOSED TAX-FREE SPIN-OFF TO SHAREHOLDERS HARMED INVESTORS, ENDING IN A LOWER-THAN-EXPECTED SALE VALUATION TO A FINANCIAL BUYER STOCK PRICE TUMBLED 24%+ IN THE WEEKS FOLLOWING THE SALE and EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENT • Management regu

  68. Slide 68: Buying High and Selling Low is Poor Capital Stewardship

    Buying High and Selling Low is Poor Capital Stewardship SUPERVALU HAS CONSISTENTLY SOLD ASSETS AT INDUSTRY LOW MULTIPLES AND ACQUIRED ASSETS AT INDUSTRY HIGH MULTIPLES Supervalu Buying (x) Supervalu Selling (x) 12.0x 11.1x 10.8x 10.0x 9.7x 9.0x EV / LTM EBITDA Multiple (x) 8.0x 7.6x 6.9x 7.1x 7.1x 6

  69. Slide 69: Board Has Ignored Legitimate M&A Inquiries

    Supervalu’s Board Has Ignored Legitimate M&A Inquires WE BELIEVE THE SUPERVALU BOARD HAS IGNORED INTEREST FROM POTENTIAL ASSET BUYERS • A bona fide inquiry from a strategic buyer has been ignored by Supervalu • We are also aware of other financial buyers that have inquired about various assets; Supe

  70. Slide 70: No Capital Return Policy for Shareholders

    No Capital Return Policy for Shareholders SUPERVALU IS THE ONLY ONE OF ITS PEERS WITH NO CURRENT CAPITAL RETURN POLICY • Supervalu has not paid a dividend or repurchased a single share in six years (since July 2012) Company Dividend Buyback Source: Company filings and Bloomberg. CONFIDENTIAL – NOT F

  71. Slide 71: Supervalu Has Restated Its Financials, Confusing Analysts

    Supervalu Has Restated Its Financials, Confusing Analysts IN ITS 2018 ANNUAL REPORT, SUPERVALU HAS RESTATED ITS HISTORICAL FINANCIALS • The Revised Disclosure makes it appear as if Adjusted EBITDA increased +1.6% from 2014 to 2017, compared to declining - 2017 Annual Report 2.2% under previous discl

  72. Slide 72: What Was FY 2017 EBITDA?

    What Was FY 2017 EBITDA? SUPERVALU HAS MADE ITS FY 2017 RESULTS BY SEGMENT INCOMPARABLE ON A HISTORICAL BASIS April 2017 Release • The April 2018 financial results release have different Adjusted EBITDA results for FY 2017 from the April 2017 release, making it impossible for investors to understand

  73. Slide 73: What Was FY 2018 EBITDA?

    What Was FY 2018 EBITDA? FOR ITS FY 2018 RESULTS, SUPERVALU FURTHER CONFUSED INVESTORS BY PUBLISHING A TOTAL OF SIX DIFFERENT EBITDA CALCULATIONS AS KEY OPERATING METRICS FOR THE BUSINESS • Each of the different EBITDA metrics showed a different Year over Year growth percentage, obfuscating and conf

  74. Slide 74: Confusing Financial Disclosures Mask Underperformance

    Confusing Financial Disclosures Mask Underperformance SUPERVALU’S BOARD IS PERMITTING THE USE OF MUDDLED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES, WHICH CONFUSE INVESTORS ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF ITS TURNAROUND EFFORTS • We have seen these tactics previously used by Supervalu during Cerberus’ ownership Tactics Actions Ta

  75. Slide 75: Supervalu Continues to Confuse Shareholders

    Supervalu Continues to Confuse Shareholders AS RECENTLY AS JULY 17, 2018, SUPERVALU USED CHERRY-PICKED DATA TO CLAIM ITS TURNAROUND OF RETAIL WAS PROCEEDING WELL. THE CHART IT USES ONLY INCLUDES 54% OF ITS STORE BASE. • “Improving Identical Store Sales” claim is inappropriate because it fails to not

  76. Slide 76: Sellside Research Confirms Confusing Financial Disclosure

    Sellside Research Confirms Confusing Financial Disclosure ANALYSTS DO NOT APPRECIATE THE UNCERTAINTY ANYMORE THAN INVESTORS DO CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 76

  77. Slide 77: Glaringly Inconsistent TSA Disclosures

    Glaringly Inconsistent TSA Disclosures SUPERVALU HAS NEVER PROVIDED CLEAR DISCLOSURE REGARDING THE ALBERTSONS TSA • At the inception of the TSA in 2013, Supervalu played down the profitability of the TSA. • Then, In 2017, as the TSA was winding down, Supervalu highlighted the significant declines in

  78. Slide 78: Reaction to TSA Communication Failures

    Reaction to TSA Communication Failures LED TO AN 21% INTRADAY DECLINE IN THE STOCK PRICE • On October 18, 2017, Supervalu reported Q2 2018 results that were in-line with street estimates and for the first time in years, there was no downgrade to full year guidance • The stock reacted positively to t

  79. Slide 79: Experts Thrown Into Confusion Regarding the TSA

    Experts Thrown Into Confusion Regarding the TSA THE TSA COMMUNICATION ON OCTOBER 18, 2017 ALSO CONFUSED THE RESEARCH ANALYSTS IN THEIR PUBLISHED NOTES, WHICH PROVIDED VARYING NUMBERS AND YEARS FOR THE FINANCIAL IMPACT – Morgan Stanley: "We note that management now expects the TSA contribution (~$125

  80. Slide 80: Lack of Investor Engagement

    Lack of Investor Engagement SUPERVALU PROVIDED VIRTUALLY NO FORM OF SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT PRIOR TO THIS CONTEST • Furthermore, Supervalu is one of the few food retailers that does not publish a report or provide materials around the Company’s sustainability efforts • With customers’ increase focus

  81. Slide 81: Most Recent Investor Engagement Failure

    Most Recent Investor Engagement Failure WE BELIEVE SUPERVALU’S COMMUNICATIONS PLAN REGARDING ITS PROPOSED REORGANIZATION IS INDICATIVE OF THE COMPANY’S FAILED INVESTOR RELATIONS EFFORTS • On June 12, 2018, Supervalu proposed a reorganization restructure that would cause all of the Company’s debt to

  82. Slide 82: Supervalu's Sustainability Efforts Are Tenuous

    Supervalu’s Sustainability Efforts Are Tenuous • Supervalu is a major participant in food supply; significant user of energy (refrigeration and transportation); employer (including union workers); obligor to pensions; and an important institution in many communities • Yet, it seems absent and unawar

  83. Slide 83: Lack of Focus on Sustainability and Corporate Responsibility

    Lack of Focus on Sustainability and Corporate Responsibility UNLIKE MOST OF ITS COMPETITORS, SUPERVALU DOES NOT ISSUE A ROBUST SUSTAINABILITY AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 83

  84. Slide 84: Board Has Put Low-Income and Rural Food Supply at Risk

    Board Has Put Low-Income and Rural Food Supply at Risk SUPERVALU’S STRUGGLES PUT THE FOOD SUPPLY OF LOW-INCOME AND RURAL AREAS AT RISK • Supervalu is one of the largest suppliers to independent grocers, an industry that generates $70 billion in sales and employed over 330,000 full-time employees • I

  85. Slide 85: Board Failures Are Result of Misaligned Interests and Lack of Skills

    C. Board Failures Are Result of Misaligned Interests and Lack of Skills We believe the inability of this Board to meet its core obligations, causing a decade of abject underperformance, is the result of directors who are ill-suited and have misaligned incentives CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 8

  86. Slide 86: Report Card: Misaligned Interests and Lack of Skills

    Report Card: Board Failures are Result of Misaligned Interests and Lack of Skills Expectation Criteria Assessment Supervalu Grade Relevant Only two directors with Possess executive experience in relevant Industry recent retail or food industry industries or disciplines Experience experience Multiple

  87. Slide 87: Board Members Lack Relevant Industry Experience

    Supervalu Board Members Lack Relevant Industry Experience ONLY TWO INCUMBENT BOARD MEMBERS HAVE ANY RECENT INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE C Name Francesca Irwin Philip Donald Mathew Frank Eric Mary Ruiz De Cohen Francis Chappel Pendo Savage Johnson Winston Luzuriaga Managing Vice Business Role Partner CEO CFO

  88. Slide 88: The Strategic Landscape is Complicated And Shifting

    Yet, The Strategic Landscape is Complicated And Shifting SUPERVALU NEEDS DEEP INDUSTRY EXPERTISE TO HELP NAVIGATE A VOLATILE COMPETITIVE MARKET • Supervalu and its wholesale independent customers historically competed against supermarket chains, Wal-Mart and club stores such as Costco and Sam’s Club

  89. Slide 89: Split Loyalties: Eric Johnson

    Split Loyalties: Eric Johnson ERIC JOHNSON IS THE CEO OF BALDWIN RICHARDSON FOODS CO., WHICH SUPPLIES NATIONAL GROCERY CHAINS WITH PRIVATE-LABEL PRODUCTS, INCLUDING FOOD TOPPINGS, MUSTARDS, CONDIMENTS, SAUCES AND MARINADES • Mr. Johnson’s customers are direct competitors of Supervalu, creating split

  90. Slide 90: Split Loyalties: Frank Savage

    Split Loyalties: Frank Savage FRANK SAVAGE HAS AND CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH CERBERUS, THE OWNERS OF ALBERTSONS AND SAFEWAY, AND IS A FRIEND OF CERBERUS’ CEO • From the Rite Aid proxy “Mr. Savage also informed the Rite Aid board of directors that in connection with his role as

  91. Slide 91: Split Loyalties: Mathew Pendo

    Split Loyalties: Mathew Pendo MATHEW PENDO HAS EXTENSIVE TIES TO CERBERUS, OWNER OF COMPETITOR ALBERTSONS AND SAFEWAY • Mr. Pendo served on the board of Ally Financial from 2013 – 2015 with Cerberus CEO Stephen Feinberg • Mr. Pendo’s employer, Oaktree Capital Management, maintains significant relati

  92. Slide 92: Loyalty to the Person, Not The Shareholders: Irwin Cohen

    Loyalty to the Person, Not The Shareholders: Irwin Cohen IRWIN COHEN HAS OVERSEEN AN (86%) DECLINE IN SUPERVALU’S STOCK PRICE DURING HIS 15 YEAR TENURE. HE IS OVER RETIREMENT AGE AND HAS EXCEEDED SUPERVALU’S TERM LIMITS POLICY • The existing Supervalu board policy calls for mandatory retirement at t

  93. Slide 93: De Minimus Stock Ownership

    De Minimus Stock Ownership THE SUPERVALU BOARD COLLECTIVELY OWNS AN INSIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF SUPERVALU STOCK: 204,030 SHARES (0.53% OF THE SHARES OUTSTANDING) Stock Ownership % of Shares Name Shares Outstanding $ Value (000s) Irwin Cohen 36,639 0.09% $597 Philip Francis 30,435 0.08% $496 Donald Chapp

  94. Slide 94: Board Does Not Believe in Its Own Leadership

    Supervalu Board Does Not Believe in Its Own Leadership THE BOARD HAS RESPONDED TO THE SIGNIFICANT DECLINE IN SHARE PRICE UNDER THEIR WATCH BY COLLECTIVELY PURCHASING A MERE $32,050 IN STOCK OVER THE PAST 6.5 YEARS • The cumulative total of open Supervalu Share Cumulative Open Market market purchases

  95. Slide 95: Substantial Director Compensation Despite Poor Performance

    Substantial Director Compensation Despite Poor Performance OUT OF THE 44 COMPANIES IN THE RUSSELL 2000 CONSUMER STAPLES INDEX WITH THREE YEARS OF HISTORICAL RESULTS, SUPERVALU’S BOARD HAS THE SECOND HIGHEST AVERAGE ANNUAL BOARD COMPENSATION OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS OF $2.3MM • In return for this el

  96. Slide 96: Table of Contents

    I. Executive Summary II. The Case for Change at Supervalu A. A Record of Poor Performance B. The Board Has Failed at Each of its Core Responsibilities C. Board is Poorly Composed and Has Misaligned Interests III. Staggering Disloyalty: The Albertsons/Cerberus Affair IV. The Nominees’ Plan for Superv

  97. Slide 97: Staggering Disloyalty: The Albertsons/Cerberus Affair

    Staggering Disloyalty: The Albertsons/Cerberus Affair OUR RESEARCH INTO THE SALE OF MOST OF THE COMPANY’S RETAIL STORES TO CERBERUS — AND THE SUBSEQUENT CERBERUS INVESTMENT INTO SUPERVALU — HAS REVEALED SHOCKING DIRECTOR DISLOYALTY • The 2013 sale of the retail assets of the Company for $3.3 The Cul

  98. Slide 98: The Albertsons / Cerberus Affair – Timeline of Events

    The Albertsons / Cerberus Affair – Timeline of Events WE BELIEVE SIX DIRECTORS HAVE SHOWN THEIR LACK OF LOYALTY TO SUPERVALU SHAREHOLDERS Jan. 10, 2013 Sept. 2013 Jan. 13, 2014 1H 2014 Jan 30, 2015 April 23, 2015 Oct. 1, 2015 Supervalu Board Albertsons / Robert Miller Albertsons / Cerberus Albertson

  99. Slide 99: Shareholders Should Expunge the Culpable Six

    Shareholders Should Expunge the Culpable Six IT IS TIME TO PURGE THE SUPERVALU BOARD OF ALL MEMBERS THAT HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE DISASTROUS CERBERUS PHASE, EITHER OVERSEEING IT IN SILENCE OR BEING DIRECTLY / INDIRECTLY APPOINTED TO THE BOARD BY CERBERUS Irwin Philip Don Eric Mathew Frank Disqu

  100. Slide 100: Overview of Structure of Sale of Albertsons to Cerberus

    Overview of Structure of Sale of Albertsons to Cerberus AS A RESULT OF THE SALE OF THE ALBERTSONS STORES TO CERBERUS IN 2013: 1. Cerberus became a substantial shareholder in Supervalu 2. Albertsons and Supervalu agreed upon a Transition Services Agreement (TSA) 3. Cerberus directly appointed 3 membe

  101. Slide 101: Misrepresentation of Board Composition

    Misrepresentation of Board Composition AFTER THE ALBERTSONS SALE TO CERBERUS IN 2013, RATHER THAN A BOARD CONTROLLED BY INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS, SUPERVALU SHAREHOLDERS WERE BOARD MEMBERS TO BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE: GIVEN A BOARD THAT WAS CONTROLLED BY CERBERUS / ALBERTSONS PROFESSIONALS • Supervalu failed

  102. Slide 102: Appointed Directors with Loyalty to Chairman (and Albertsons)

    Appointed Directors with Loyalty to Chairman (and Albertsons) Rather than SVU Shareholders CURRENT SUPERVALU BOARD MEMBERS APPROVED THE APPOINTMENT OF JOHN STANDLEY AND SAM DUNCAN TO THE SUPERVALU BOARD DESPITE THEIR BOARD MEMBERS TO BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE: SUBSTANTIAL WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH CHAIRMA

  103. Slide 103: Public Pronouncements of Relationship and Loyalty to Chairman

    Public Pronouncements of Relationship and Loyalty to Chairman JOHN STANLEY AND SAM DUNCAN HAVE MADE PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING THEIR STRONG RELATIONSHIP WITH FORMER SUPERVALU CHAIRMAN BOB MILLER AND THEIR GRATITUDE FOR HIS MENTORSHIP John Sam Standley Duncan From Healthcare Distributor Magazine art

  104. Slide 104: Approved Directors that Negotiated M&A Transactions Between Competitors

    Approved Directors that Negotiated M&A Transactions Between Supervalu Competitors While Serving on the Supervalu Board • Current Supervalu board members approved the appointment of directors BOARD MEMBERS TO BE that, while serving on the Supervalu board, engaged in negotiations with competitors in t

  105. Slide 105: Independent Directors Took No Action When Board Conflicts Became Apparent

    “Independent Directors” Took No Action When Board Conflicts Became Apparent SUPERVALU BOARD MEMBERS TOOK NO ACTION WHEN IT BECAME PUBLICLY APPARENT THAT THE CERBERUS / ALBERTSONS DESIGNATED DIRECTORS HAD SUBSTANTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST WHILE SERVING ON THE BOARD BOARD MEMBERS TO BE HELD ACCOUNTABL

  106. Slide 106: Approved Directors that Executed Transactions in Direct Conflict

    Approved Directors that Executed Transactions in Direct Conflict With Supervalu’s Ongoing Operations • Current Supervalu board members approved the appointment of directors that, while BOARD MEMBERS TO BE serving on the Supervalu board, engaged in merger negotiations between Albertsons HELD ACCOUNTA

  107. Slide 107: Albertsons TSA Was a Substantial Driver of Growth

    Albertsons TSA Was a Substantial Driver of “Growth” • Supervalu’s LTM EBITDA increased significantly between April 2013 and January 2015, driven completely by substantial TSA payments from Albertsons • The stock price saw a substantial increase over the same period • The reality is that, excluding t

  108. Slide 108: TSA Growth Masked Continued Weak Earnings at Supervalu

    TSA Growth Masked Continued Weak Earnings at Supervalu • Supervalu’s LTM EBITDA (excluding TSA payments) by segment was flat to declining between Q4 2013 and the peak share price achieved in Q3 2015 • Corporate EBITDA driven by the Albertsons TSA payments skyrocketed Segment LTM EBITDA ($mm) $375 Se

  109. Slide 109: Cerberus Exit of SVU Investment Coincided with TSA Cancellation

    Cerberus Exit of SVU Investment Coincided with TSA Cancellation • On April 16, 2015, Albertsons announced the initiation of the wind-down of the TSA agreement, marking the peak of Supervalu’s EBITDA, Cerberus subsequently distributed its Supervalu shares to its limited partners 7 days later, bringin

  110. Slide 110: Cerberus' Asymmetric Information and Cross Shareholdings

    Cerberus’ Asymmetric Information and Cross Shareholdings Allowed it to Generate a Significant Investment Return • Based on an investment structured across two fierce competitors in the grocery industry, Cerberus was able to generate at least $374mm in profits (assuming zero return on their investmen

  111. Slide 111: Long-Term Shareholder Returns Decline After TSA Cancellation

    Long-Term Supervalu Shareholder Returns Decline After TSA Cancellation • The wind-down of the TSA agreement marked the peak of Supervalu’s EBITDA and initiated a multi-year decline as the substantial TSA payments decreased over time • Long-term Supervalu investors have realized an (81%) decline in t

  112. Slide 112: Directors Concurrently Served on Boards of Competitors

    Approved Directors That Concurrently Served on the Board of Directors of Supervalu Competitors CURRENT SUPERVALU BOARD MEMBERS APPROVED THE APPOINTMENT OF DIRECTORS THAT CONCURRENTLY SERVED ON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF RITE-AID AND ALBERTSONS • Directors that serve on two competitors unnecessarily e

  113. Slide 113: Excessive Board Compensation

    Excessive Board Compensation WITH A SUPERVALU BOARD CONTROLLED BY CERBERUS AND COMPRISED OF DIRECTORS WITH DIRECT RELATIONSHIPS TO CHAIRMAN BOB MILLER, WE BELIEVE WHAT OCCURRED IS INCORRIGIBLE: • Supervalu Chairman Bob Miller was granted a substantial compensation BOARD MEMBERS TO BE package inconsi

  114. Slide 114: Despite Cerberus' Sale of Equity Interest, The Legacy Continues

    Despite Cerberus’ Sale of Equity Interest, The Legacy Continues… DESPITE CERBERUS’ MULTIPLE CONFLICTS, CURRENT ZERO ECONOMIC INTEREST IN SUPERVALU AND OWNERSHIP OF A SUBSTANTIAL COMPETITOR TO SUPERVALU, TWO CERBERUS APPOINTED BOARD MEMBERS CURRENTLY REMAIN ON SUPERVALU’S BOARD • Supervalu announced

  115. Slide 115: Supervalu Wholesale Customers Compromised

    Supervalu Wholesale Customers Compromised CURRENT SUPERVALU BOARD MEMBERS APPROVED THE APPOINTMENT OF DIRECTORS THAT MAY COMPROMISE THE PROPRIETARY COMPETITIVE INFORMATION AND PRODUCT SELECTION OF SUPERVALU WHOLESALE CUSTOMERS • Risks abound with the conflicted directors’ participation in Supervalu’

  116. Slide 116: Table of Contents

    I. Executive Summary II. The Case for Change at Supervalu A. A Record of Poor Performance B. The Board Has Failed at Each of its Core Responsibilities C. Board is Poorly Composed and Has Misaligned Interests III. Staggering Disloyalty: The Albertsons/Cerberus Affair IV. The Nominees’ Plan for Superv

  117. Slide 117: The Nominees Are Committed to Fulfilling Their Board Responsibilities

    The Nominees Are Committed to Fulfilling Their Board Responsibilities Incumbent Board Board Responsibility Blackwells Nominee Commitment Focus on growth at any cost over returns Strategy Core strategy of stabilize, grow and monetize Rigorous oversight of operational execution, with Persistent poor e

  118. Slide 118: Stabilize, Grow and Monetize

    Stabilize, Grow and Monetize NOMINEES’ OPERATIONAL TURNAROUND PLAN IS PREMISED ON A THREE STEP PROCESS Step 1: Stabilize Step 2: Grow Step 3: Monetize Exit Subscale Improve Fix Retail Grow Logistics Review Capital Strategic Review Retail Wholesale • Liquidate or sell off • Organizational • Perform c

  119. Slide 119: To Stabilize the Business, Exit Subscale Retail

    To Stabilize the Business, Exit Subscale Retail ON MARCH 14, 2018, SUPERVALU ANNOUNCED THE SALE OF 21 OF ITS 38 FARM FRESH STORES, LEAVING 17 SUBSCALE AND ORPHANED STORES THAT SUPERVALU IS TRYING TO SELL TO WHOLESALE CUSTOMERS AND FARM FRESH EMPLOYEES • Blackwells believes the residual Farm Fresh st

  120. Slide 120: Stabilizing Requires Retail Operational Turnaround

    Stabilizing Requires Retail Operational Turnaround SUPERVALU MUST URGENTLY EMBARK ON A TURNAROUND OF ITS RETAIL OPERATIONS TO ARREST ITS DECLINE Merchandising & Operational Strategic Financial Growth Marketing Review store-level Evaluate banner Review product pricing, Refine product pricing Aggressi

  121. Slide 121: To Stabilize Retail, Transform Retail Pricing Strategy

    To Stabilize Retail, Transform Retail Pricing Strategy SUPERVALU’S LONG HISTORY OF INDUSTRY WORST RETAIL STORE SALES AND EBITDA MARGINS, DESPITE POSSESSING A STORE BASE THAT IS NOT STRUCTURALLY INFERIOR TO PEERS IMPLIES THAT ITS INTERNAL PRICING STRATEGY IS FUNDAMENTALLY BROKEN • Supervalu must emba

  122. Slide 122: To Stabilize Retail, Stores Need To Be Refreshed

    To Stabilize Retail, Stores Need To Be Refreshed SUPERVALU MUST MAXIMIZE THE VALUE OF ITS CAPEX SPEND TO UPDATE ITS RETAIL STORE BASE TO REJUVENATE THE BRAND AND RETAIL SEGMENT EARNINGS • Concentrating Capex in specific markets to elevate the brand consistently for consumers will drive traffic back

  123. Slide 123: Retail and Wholesale Sustainability Market Opportunity

    Retail and Wholesale Sustainability Market Opportunity WHILE GROCERS HISTORICALLY COMPETED BASED ON PRICE AND LOCATION, NIELSEN’S GLOBAL STORE CHOICE DRIVER REPORT MULTIPLE SUSTAINABILITY FACTORS AS KEY OPPORTUNITIES FOR RETAILERS • Furthermore, Nielsen found that consumers are increasingly willing

  124. Slide 124: Continuous Customer Profitability Analysis In Wholesale Business

    Continuous Customer Profitability Analysis In Wholesale Business SUPERVALU TYPICALLY PERFORMS A PROFITABILITY ANALYSIS FOR NEW CUSTOMERS THAT ASSESSES COST OF SERVICE FOR PROJECTED VOLUMES; THIS MUST BE A CONTINUOUS EXERCISE • A continuous profitability analysis for its Wholesale customers would rev

  125. Slide 125: Elimination of CPG Direct Store Delivery is Opportunity

    Elimination of CPG Direct Store Delivery (DSD) is Opportunity AS CONSUMER PACKAGED GOODS (CPG) COMPANIES TRANSFORM THEIR DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS TO SAVE COSTS AND IMPROVE EFFICIENCIES, ELIMINATION OF DSD PROGRAMS PROVIDE A SUBSTANTIAL OPPORTUNITY FOR SUPERVALU • Supervalu needs to partner and work col

  126. Slide 126: Become Leader in CSR to Drive Wholesale Segment Growth

    Become Leader in CSR to Drive Wholesale Segment Growth PROPERLY EXECUTED CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR) INITIATIVES CAN BECOME A REVENUE DRIVER • CSR initiatives map directly to Supervalu’s Wholesale selling strategy of “Add, Grow and Keep” Supervalu Wholesale Strategy Potential Supervalu CSR

  127. Slide 127: Overseeing the Implementation of the Capex Refresh Strategy

    Overseeing the Implementation of the Capex Refresh Strategy BLACKWELLS’ NOMINEE RICK ANICETTI HAS SUBSTANTIAL EXPERIENCE IN IMPLEMENTING “MARKET RENEWAL” CAPEX REFRESH PROGRAMS AND CAN HELP OVERSEE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS IMPORTANT STRATEGIC INITIATIVE Securing Contractor Resources Phasing in Emp

  128. Slide 128: Overseeing the Wholesale Business

    Overseeing the Wholesale Business THE WHOLESALE BUSINESS IS A COMPLICATED LOGISTICS COMPANY AND THE BOARD SHOULD DEMAND EXCEPTIONAL PERFORMANCE • The Nominees’ goal will be to ensure execution that drives: i) operational efficiencies, ii) technology improvements and iii) growth opportunities at Supe

  129. Slide 129: Recruiting and Retaining Exceptional Talent

    Recruiting and Retaining Exceptional Talent WITH DEEP INDUSTRY CONNECTIONS AND KNOWLEDGE, THE NOMINEES ARE IN A POSITION TO EVALUATE MANAGEMENT AND RECRUIT, MENTOR AND RETAIN LEADERSHIP TALENT • The Nominees are committed to ensuring the company has the finest executive team available Relevant Opera

  130. Slide 130: Assessing Retail Operational Turnaround Leadership

    Assessing Retail Operational Turnaround Leadership THE POOR PERFORMANCE OF SUPERVALU’S CURRENT RETAIL OPERATIONS REQUIRES A FULL ASSESSMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION’S PERSONNEL TO EVALUATE WHETHER THE APPROPRIATE TEAM IS IN PLACE TO EXECUTE UPON THE IDENTIFIED OPERATIONAL TURNAROUND PLAN Executive Leader

  131. Slide 131: Executive Compensation Should Be Tied to Returns

    Executive Compensation Should Be Tied to Returns SUPERVALU SHOULD INCENTIVIZE ITS EXECUTIVES TO GENERATE STRONG RETURNS ON SHAREHOLDERS’ CAPITAL, NOT MERELY GROW AT ANY COST OR THROUGH EXPENSIVE ACQUISITIONS • Unlike its peers, Supervalu’s current executive compensation programs reward management fo

  132. Slide 132: Decisions All Considered Through Lens of Returns, Not Growth

    Decisions All Considered Through Lens of Returns, Not Growth NOMINEES ARE COMMITTED TO REVIEWING ALL STRATEGIES AND OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE THROUGH A LENS OF RETURNS ON CAPITAL • Define capital return policy • Assess dividend policy Shareholder • Evaluate share buybacks Returns • Align executive com

  133. Slide 133: Assess Additional Sale Leasebacks

    Assess Additional Sale Leasebacks SUPERVALU MUST PERFORM A FULL ASSESSMENT OF METHODS TO UNLOCK THE COMPANY’S REAL ESTATE VALUE AND MAXIMIZE THE VALUE OF ITS CAPITAL LOSS CARRYFORWARD BEFORE ITS EXPIRATION • Even after the execution of a sale-leaseback of distribution warehouse real estate, Superval

  134. Slide 134: Assess Capital Policy

    Assess Capital Policy SUPERVALU MUST ASSESS ITS SHAREHOLDER CAPITAL RETURN POLICY AS ITS BALANCE SHEET LEVERAGE FALLS IN-LINE WITH ITS WHOLESALE DISTRIBUTION PEERS, ALL OF WHOM CURRENTLY HAVE EITHER A SHARE BUYBACK OR DIVIDEND • If Supervalu were to sell an additional 3.0mm square feet (23% of owned

  135. Slide 135: Strategic Review – Evaluate Strategic Alternatives

    Strategic Review – Evaluate Strategic Alternatives AFTER EXECUTING UPON ITS OPERATIONAL TURNAROUND EFFORTS, SUPERVALU MUST FULLY ASSESS STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES FOR ITS RETAIL AND WHOLESALE SEGMENTS • Blackwells’ full analysis of strategic alternatives was published in its February 6, 2018 presentatio

  136. Slide 136: Implement Annual Strategic Review Process

    Implement Annual Strategic Review Process IMPLEMENT AN ANNUAL STRATEGIC REVIEW PROCESS THAT EVALUATES MANAGEMENT’S EXISTING STRATEGY TO CREATE SHAREHOLDER VALUE VERSUS M&A ALTERNATIVES TO ASSESS THE BEST PATH FOR SHAREHOLDERS Operational Strategy Assessment Perform Valuation Review Management’s Asse

  137. Slide 137: Ensure Transparency and Accurate Financial Reporting

    Ensure Transparency and Accurate Financial Reporting NOMINEES INCLUDE EXPERIENCED AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND PUBLIC COMPANY CFOS • Nominees will ensure that shareholders receive sufficient information to make good investment Relevant Public Company Experience decisions – Historical financials shoul

  138. Slide 138: The Nominees Will Seek to Improve Financial Disclosure

    The Nominees Will Seek to Improve Financial Disclosure SUPERVALU’S FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE AROUND ITS “CORPORATE” SEGMENT AND ITS “TRANSITION SERVICES AGREEMENT” HAS CONFUSED INVESTORS • Supervalu should classify the Albertsons TSA as discontinued operations as: i) the contract is in wind-down, ii) the

  139. Slide 139: Adopt Best Practices for Shareholder Engagement

    Adopt Best Practices for Shareholder Engagement SUPERVALU SHOULD HOLD ANALYST DAYS, PRODUCE INVESTOR PRESENTATIONS AND ACTIVELY ENGAGE WITH SHAREHOLDERS Outreach Current Supervalu Opportunity Investor Day • Last investor day was held May 2011 • Investor days provide management the opportunity to edu

  140. Slide 140: Ensuring Optimal Board Composition and Governance

    Ensuring Optimal Board Composition and Governance BOARD SHOULD NOT TOLERATE ANY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR SHAREHOLDER UNFRIENDLY GOVERNANCE Relevant Public Company Experience • Nominees will ensure that the interests of the directors are fully aligned with shareholders – There is no room for split lo

  141. Slide 141: Driving Sustainability Throughout the Value Chain

    Driving Sustainability Throughout the Value Chain SUSTAINABILITY WILL DRIVE VALUE AND ENSURE LONG TERM VIBRANCY AND COMPETITIVENESS PRIMARY ACTIVITIES • Inbound Logistics: Improving packaging to reduce waste and optimizing network to reduce emissions • Operations: Improve energy conservation in refr

  142. Slide 142: Ensuring Culture of Thrift, Responsibility and Accountability

    Ensuring Culture of Thrift, Responsibility and Accountability The Nominees will insist that the Company sell its corporate jet, which negatively impacts Supervalu’s culture and is uneconomic to operate CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 142

  143. Slide 143: Table of Contents

    I. Executive Summary II. The Case for Change at Supervalu A. A Record of Poor Performance B. The Board Has Failed at Each of its Core Responsibilities C. Board is Poorly Composed and Has Misaligned Interests III. Staggering Disloyalty: The Albertsons/Cerberus Affair IV. The Nominees’ Plan for Superv

  144. Slide 144: Summary of 100-Day Implementation Plan

    Summary of 100-Day Implementation Plan INITIAL 100-DAY IMPLEMENTATION WITH WORK STREAM FOR EACH KEY STRATEGY ELEMENT ACCELERATES TRANSFORMATION AND SETS COMPANY ON PATH FOR SUCCESS • Combination of developing a long-term road map and immediate execution balances short and long term goals Day 1 Day 1

  145. Slide 145: 100 Day Plan – Exiting Discontinued Operations

    100 Day Plan – Exiting Discontinued Operations EXITING UNSALVAGEABLE RETAIL OPERATIONS MUST BE EXPEDITIOUSLY EXECUTED TO PREVENT FURTHER DESTRUCTION OF VALUE AND/OR DISTRACTION FOR MANAGEMENT Action Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Review store level profitability and cash burn Develop 13 week

  146. Slide 146: 100 Day Plan – Retail Operational Turnaround

    100 Day Plan – Retail Operational Turnaround SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS CAN BE ACHIEVED IN RETAIL SIMPLY THROUGH ENGAGED MANAGEMENT, IMPROVED OVERSIGHT AND REINFORCING BASIC EXECUTION PRINCIPLES Action Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Review store level profitability and force rank stores Deploy

  147. Slide 147: 100 Day Plan – Retail Store Capex Refresh

    100 Day Plan – Retail Store Capex Refresh AFTER MANY YEARS OF UNDERINVESTED CAPEX AND LIMITED CAPEX BUDGETS, SUPERVALU MUST RETHINK ITS APPROACH TO RETAIL CAPEX SPEND AND DEVELOP A NEW STORE REFRESH PROGRAM Action Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Establish “capex” SWAT team to execute quick fix

  148. Slide 148: 100 Day Plan – Corporate Social Responsibility & Sustainability Plan

    100 Day Plan – Corporate Social Responsibility & Sustainability Plan CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY MUST BECOME INGRAINED IN SUPERVALU’S CULTURE AS A KEY DRIVER OF THE FIRM’S STRATEGY AND OPPORUNITY SET Action Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Assess current CSR and sustainab

  149. Slide 149: 100 Day Plan – Wholesale Customer Profitability Assessment

    100 Day Plan – Wholesale Customer Profitability Assessment DEVELOPING A RENEWED FOCUS ON PROFITABILITY AND RETURN ON CAPITAL WILL ENSURE THE COMPANY CAN SUPPORT A NEW PARADIGM SHIFT IN STRATEGY Action Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Assess financial reporting capabilities for support Assess IT

  150. Slide 150: 100 Day Plan – Strategic Planning Program

    100 Day Plan – Strategic Planning Program BOARD MEMBERS WITH NO CONFLICTS AND FRESH IDEAS SHOULD FULLY ASSESS THE STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES AND VALUE OF SUPERVALU Action Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Tour and review Retail locations Tour and review warehouse locations Assess transportation ass

  151. Slide 151: Contingency Plan: Change of Control Provisions

    Contingency Plan: Change of Control Provisions AS NOTED IN OUR PROXY STATEMENT, SOME OF SUPERVALU’S AGREEMENTS HAVE CHANGE OF CONTROL PROVISIONS THAT MAY BE TRIGGERED BY A MAJORITY CHANGE IN THE BOARD • Change of Control provisions in Director and Officer agreements – Our intention is to work with t

  152. Slide 152: Table of Contents

    I. Executive Summary II. The Case for Change at Supervalu A. A Record of Poor Performance B. The Board Has Failed at Each of its Core Responsibilities C. Board is Poorly Composed and Has Misaligned Interests III. Staggering Disloyalty: The Albertsons/Cerberus Affair IV. The Nominees’ Plan for Superv

  153. Slide 153: Nominee Comparison

    Nominee Comparison Qualifications Incumbent Nominee Qualifications • Overseen (82%) decline in stock price • Former Chairman of the board of XPO during his 8 year tenure on board Logistics, where he oversaw a +455% increase in share price during his tenure on board • Oversaw sale of Albertsons asset

  154. Slide 154: Nominee Comparison Cont'd

    Nominee Comparison Cont’d Qualifications Incumbent Nominee Qualifications • Overseen (71%) decline in stock price • Industry leader in corporate social during his 4 year tenure on board responsibility as the CEO and founder of Sustainable Business International • Appointed to the board by Cerberus,

  155. Slide 155: Rick Anicetti Profile

    Rick Anicetti Profile Executive Experience • Former CEO of the Fresh Market (formerly NASDAQ: TFM), a gourmet food retailer operating 180 stores across 24 states, overseeing the sale of the company to Apollo Management • Former CEO of Food Lion LLC, where he oversaw the retail operations of more tha

  156. Slide 156: Rick Anicetti – M&A and Capex Program Expertise

    Rick Anicetti – M&A and Capex Program Expertise MR. ANICETTI, HAVING SOLD THE FRESH MARKET TO PRIVATE EQUITY FIRM APOLLO MANAGEMENT IN 2016, HAS ONE OF THE MOST RELEVANT EXPERIENCES IN MAXIMIZING PROCEEDS FROM A SALE PROCESS FOR A GROCERY STORE • His experience will be immensely relevant to the Supe

  157. Slide 157: Steve Baer Profile

    Steve Baer Profile Executive Experience • Partner at the turnaround and restructuring firm, High Ridge Partners, bringing 45 years of experience advising, operating, financing, restructuring and selling commercial real estate properties and commercial businesses in a wide variety of industries • Fed

  158. Slide 158: Steve Baer – Distressed Asset Monetization Expertise

    Steve Baer – Distressed Asset Monetization Expertise MR. BAER HAS HELD THE ROLE OF CHIEF RESTRUCTURING OFFICER, FINANCIAL ADVISER OR STATE COURT RECEIVER FOR MULTIPLE OPERATING BUSINESSES AND COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE PROJECTS • Through these roles, he has developed significant expertise in monetizing

  159. Slide 159: Chris Kreidler Profile

    Chris Kreidler Profile Executive Experience • Former CFO and EVP of Sysco Corp (NYSE: SYY), a global foodservice leader from 2009 to 2015 where he saw Sysco’s market cap increase from $11 billion to over $23 billion • Former CFO and EVP of C&S Wholesale Grocers, Inc., the largest wholesale grocery s

  160. Slide 160: Chris Kreidler - Experience Driving Value During Transformation

    Chris Kreidler - Experience Driving Value During Transformation DURING MR. KREIDLER’S TENURE AS CFO OF SYSCO (NYSE: SYY), HE OVERSAW A +96% INCREASE IN THE COMPANY’S SHARE PRICE, INCREASING SHAREHOLDER VALUE BY $10 BILLION • Through this period of time, Mr. Kreidler helped Sysco navigate through a c

  161. Slide 161: Frank Lazaran Profile

    Frank Lazaran Profile Executive Experience • 40-year veteran of the retail food industry • Former Chairman, CEO and President of Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., a multi-format regional food retailer with ~100 stores where he led the company in a successful turnaround from 2006 to 2011 • Former CEO of publ

  162. Slide 162: Frank Lazaran – Expertise in Retail Store Operations

    Frank Lazaran – Expertise in Retail Store Operations • From 2006 to 2011, Frank Lazaran led Marsh Supermarkets through a successful turnaround that generated a substantial increase in EBITDA, increased shareholder value and attracted strategic interest Financial Operational Capital Strategic Growth

  163. Slide 163: Jim Martell Profile

    Jim Martell Profile Executive Experience • With over 30 years of experience in the transportation and logistics sectors, Mr. Martell is seen as one of the leading executives in the logistics industry • Served on the board of directors of XPO Logistics (NYSE: XPO), a public company engaged in the gro

  164. Slide 164: Jim Martell – Substantial Boardroom and Chairman Experience

    Jim Martell – Substantial Boardroom and Chairman Experience • From 2005 to 2016, Mr. Martell served on the board of XPO Logistics (NYSE: XPO), where he oversaw the growth of the Company that generated $1mm in EBITDA in 2005 into a national logistics leader that generated $1.2bn in EBITDA and command

  165. Slide 165: Sandra Taylor Profile

    Sandra Taylor Profile Executive Experience • Ms. Taylor is a pioneer in corporate social responsibility and is the President and CEO of Sustainable Business International LLC, an independent consultancy she founded which specializes in social responsibility for global businesses • Served as the Seni

  166. Slide 166: Sandra Taylor – Success in Implementing Sustainability Initiatives

    Sandra Taylor – Success in Implementing Sustainability Initiatives MS. TAYLOR IS A PIONEER IN THE FIELD OF SUSTAINABILITY AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY Driving global standards for Starbucks Advising corporations and the coffee industry on corporate responsibility • Ms. Taylor led the creation

  167. Slide 167: Table of Contents

    I. Executive Summary II. The Case for Change at Supervalu A. A Record of Poor Performance B. The Board Has Failed at Each of its Core Responsibilities C. Board is Poorly Composed and Has Misaligned Interests III. Staggering Disloyalty: The Albertsons/Cerberus Affair IV. The Nominees’ Plan for Superv

  168. Slide 168: Wall Street Analysts Recognize Supervalu's Challenges

    Wall Street Analysts Recognize Supervalu’s Challenges MAJOR WALL STREET RESEARCH FIRMS HAVE NEGATIVE RATINGS ON SUPERVALU’S STOCK HIGHLIGHTING THEIR EXPECTATIONS OF WEAK FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE Firm Rating Comment “We expect Supervalu will continue to cede share within the Retail Equalweight / Food ca

  169. Slide 169: Investor Support for Blackwells

    Investor Support for Blackwells ON MAY 30, 2018, THE D3 FAMILY FUNDS, WHICH OWN 500,000 SHARES OF SUPERVALU MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS: CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 169

  170. Slide 170: Sell-side Research and Media Support for Blackwells

    Sell-side Research and Media Support for Blackwells May 31 31, 2018 July 17, 2018 CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 170

  171. Slide 171: Table of Contents

    I. Executive Summary II. The Case for Change at Supervalu A. A Record of Poor Performance B. The Board Has Failed at Each of its Core Responsibilities C. Board is Poorly Composed and Has Misaligned Interests III. Staggering Disloyalty: The Albertsons/Cerberus Affair IV. The Nominees’ Plan for Superv

  172. Slide 172: Supervalu Claims to Have Already Implemented the Blackwells Plan

    Supervalu Claims to Have Already Implemented the Blackwells Plan SINCE BLACKWELLS’ ENGAGEMENT AND PUBLICATION OF THE PRESENTATION TO INCREASE SHAREHOLDER VALUE ON FEBRUARY 6, 2018, SUPERVALU HAS BEGUN TO ADDRESS SEVERAL OF THE PROPOSALS WE HAVE OUTLINED • Substantial work remains to be done Proposal

  173. Slide 173: Supervalu's Claims About Blackwells Are False and Disingenuous

    Supervalu’s Claims About Blackwells Are False and Disingenuous Supervalu’s Assertion The Truth • Blackwells has invested tens of millions in Supervalu stock, over 100 times more than any incumbent director Blackwells position is hedged and it does • Blackwells has hedged some of its investment becau

  174. Slide 174: Supervalu's Claims That 'All Is Well' Are Demonstrably False

    Supervalu’s Claims That ‘All Is Well’ Are Demonstrably False Supervalu’s Assertion The Truth • Supervalu may have announced a “transformation” but, to date, the announcement and results have only caused the stock to decline further Supervalu’s “transformation” was started long • Blackwells does not

  175. Slide 175: Investors and Press Contacts

    INVESTORS: Morrow Sodali Mike Verrechia (800) 662-5200 [email protected] PRESS / MEDIA: Gagnier Communications Dan Gagnier / Jeffrey Mathews (646) 569-5897 CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION 175

Supervalu — Proxy Contest (July 2018) on 6ix