Rovi Corp

Rovi — Proxy Contest (April 2015)

85 slides from Rovi's proxy contest presentation, Apr 16, 2015

  1. Slide 1: Engaged Capital’s Perspectives on ROVI

    Connecting Markets East & West Engaged Capital’s Perspectives on ROVI STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL April 16, 2015 © Nomura

  2. Slide 2: Table of Contents

    Table of Contents 1. Executive Summary 2 2. ROVI’s History of Underperformance 11 a. Failed Strategic Plans and Poor Execution 12 b. Excessive Cost Structure 28 c. Undisciplined Capital Allocation 36 d. Misaligned Compensation 40 e. Poor Corporate Governance 45 3. Engaged Capital’s Proposal 52 4. RO

  3. Slide 3: Disclaimer

    Disclaimer This presentation is for discussion and general informational purposes only. It does not have regard to the specific investment objective, financial situation, suitability, or the particular need of any specific person who may receive this presentation, and should not be taken as advice o

  4. Slide 4: Executive Summary

    Cs Executive Summary

  5. Slide 5: About Engaged Capital

    About Engaged Capital  Private equity style investing in public equities  Focused on the small-mid cap space ($500mm - $8bn market cap)  Highly concentrated, conviction indexed portfolio of 10 to 15 positions Strategy  Typically own 1.0% to 9.9% of portfolio companies, no control positions  Bri

  6. Slide 6: ROVI Company Overview

    ROVI Company Overview Company Overview ROVI Offering  Provider of digital entertainment technology solutions  Product solutions include: created through the merger of Macrovision and Gemstar in − Personalized content discovery: interactive program May 2008 guides (IPG), recommendations, content an

  7. Slide 7: Why We Invested In ROVI

    Why We Invested In ROVI  Extensive and defensible patent portfolio  Significant and consistent cash flow generation  Recurring revenue model with limited capital requirements  Strong balance sheet with capital allocation flexibility  Potentially well-positioned in growing areas of media We beli

  8. Slide 8: Timeline of Engaged Capital’s Engagement with ROVI

    Timeline of Engaged Capital’s Engagement with ROVI Engaged Capital has been an investor in ROVI since early 2013 and has tried to engage in meaningful and constructive dialogue with the Board and management team May 2013 Nov 2013 Mar 2014 Jun 2014 Oct 2014 Jan 2015 (share price in $) Sent letter out

  9. Slide 9: Investing in ROVI Has Been a Losing Proposition for Shareholders

    Investing in ROVI Has Been a Losing Proposition for Shareholders Over the past 5 years, shareholders have suffered a 51% decline in share price (and a 73% decline from peak) and have suffered through the destruction of immense shareholder value (share price in $) Dec 2011 Feb 2012 Sep 2013 Mar 2014

  10. Slide 10: ROVI Has Significantly Underperformed Peers Over Almost Any Time Period

    ROVI Has Significantly Underperformed Peers Over Almost Any Time Period 1 Year – Indexed1 3 Year – Indexed1 40 100 29% 60% 20 50 51% 14% 0 0 (11%) (36%) (20) (50) (40) (100) Apr-14 Jun-14 Aug-14 Oct-14 Dec-14 Feb-15 Apr-15 Apr-12 Apr-13 Apr-14 Apr-15 5 Year – Indexed1 Since the Acquisition of Gemsta

  11. Slide 11: ROVI Has Dramatically Missed on its Long-Term Revenue Targets

    ROVI Has Dramatically Missed on its Long-Term Revenue Targets… Leadership has a track record of failing to deliver on its strategic and financial plans that we believe creates a credibility gap with the market Long-Term Guidance for ROVI Standalone Business set in 20111 $mm Achieved only 56% of long

  12. Slide 12: …as Well As its Long-Term Margin Targets

    …as Well As its Long-Term Margin Targets Operating margins not only missed targets, but actually decreased Adjusted Pro Forma Operating Margin for ROVI Standalone Business set in 20111 27% below long-term 60% target 55% 55% 52% 50% 50% 47% 47% 45% 40% 40% 35% 30% 2010 2011 2012 2 2013 2 2014 Managem

  13. Slide 13: The Board Has Profited Despite Shareholder Losses

    The Board Has Profited Despite Shareholder Losses Shareholders have suffered greatly while a stagnant Board has netted over $11mm in cumulative compensation1 (share price in $) ($mm) $70.00 $15.0 $60.00 $11.5 $10.0 $50.00 $10.0 $8.5 $40.00 $7.0 $30.00 $5.0 $3.6 $20.00 $18.58 (51.4%) $10.00 $0.0 Apr-

  14. Slide 14: ROVI’s History of Underperformance

    ROVI’s History of Underperformance

  15. Slide 15: Key Drivers of ROVI’s Underperformance

    Key Drivers of ROVI’s Underperformance ROVI’s leadership team has failed on a number of fronts 1 Failed Strategic Plans and  Multiple failed growth strategies Poor Execution  Current strategic plan risks being another iteration of past failed plans 2 Excessive Cost Structure  Increasing expense s

  16. Slide 16: ROVI’s History of Underperformance

    ROVI’s History of Underperformance Failed Strategic Undisciplined Excessive Misaligned Poor Corporate Plans & Poor Capital Cost Structure Compensation Governance Execution Allocation

  17. Slide 17: ROVI Has Two Different Business Models

    ROVI Has Two Different Business Models IP Licensing Product Business % 2014  Patents licensed under long term agreements to leading Vertical Solutions Revenue Service Provider, Consumer Electronics, and OTT customers  Interactive Program Guides (“IPGs”)  Patents are related to content discovery,

  18. Slide 18: High Margin IP Licensing Business Funds Heavy Investment in Low Return Product Business

    High Margin IP Licensing Business Funds Heavy Investment in Low Return Product Business 2015E Financials by Segment1 $mm $350 EBITDA OPEX Revenue: $299 $300 Revenue: $251 $250 $95 $200 $150 $235 $100 $204 $50 $ -- $16 Licensing Product EBITDA 68% 7% Margin Rich cash flows from IP licensing business

  19. Slide 19: Growth Through Significant Investments in R&D…

    ROVI Has Attempted to Drive Product Revenue Growth Through Significant Investments in R&D… ROVI has spent $380mm on R&D initiatives since 2011, nearly all of which was focused on its product strategy Cumulative R&D Spend Since 2011 $mm $400 $380 $97 $300 $93 $200 $96 $100 $94 $0 1 1 2011 2012 2013 2

  20. Slide 20: …and Has Supplemented Growth Investments with an Aggressive Acquisition Strategy

    …and Has Supplemented Growth Investments with an Aggressive Acquisition Strategy The Board has presided over $1.3bn of investment since 2011, primarily focused on its product strategy Overall R&D and M&A Investment Since 20111 $mm $1,500 Represents 78% $28 $1,320 of ROVI’s current market $1,250 capi

  21. Slide 21: Despite This Significant Investment, ROVI Has Failed to Generate ANY Revenue Growth…

    Despite This Significant Investment, ROVI Has Failed to Generate ANY Revenue Growth… Total Revenue $mm $600 $584 $1mm of incremental revenue $541 $542 $526 $537 $500 $302 $253 $400 $285 $275 $293 $300 $200 $288 $283 $282 $251 $244 $257 $100 $0 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Product IP Licensing Source: Co

  22. Slide 22: …and Product Revenue has Actually Declined

    …and Product Revenue has Actually Declined Product Revenue $mm $300 $288 $283 $275 $257 $251 $250 $244 $225 $200 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Source: Company filings, SEC correspondence dated 10/20/2014, and earnings conference calls. Note: Excludes all divested and discontinued operations including Son

  23. Slide 23: ROVI Appears to be Perpetually in “Transition” Mode

    ROVI Appears to be Perpetually in “Transition” Mode Investors are left wondering “when will we reach the promised land?” “2012 was a very active transition year for Rovi” Q4 2012 Earnings 2/13/2013 “2013 was a year of transition” Q4 2013 Earnings 2/12/2014 “I truly feel that a significant transition

  24. Slide 24: Growth is Always “Just Around the Corner”

    Growth is Always “Just Around the Corner” ROVI continues to promises double-digit growth, but always starting 1 to 2 years in the future “We’re well positioned to drive growth; you’ll see that. Look, by ourselves, 2011 Analyst Day we think we have a 15% to 20% growth... There are long-term growth 1/

  25. Slide 25: Several of ROVI’s Largest Product Growth Initiatives Have Been Complete Failures

    Several of ROVI’s Largest Product Growth Initiatives Have Been Complete Failures Divested Rovi Entertainment Store (Paid acquiror to take business) DivX Divested TotalGuide Discontinued Advertising <$20m of revenue in 2013 Other Discontinued at least 10 other products 20

  26. Slide 26: Failed Growth Initiative: Rovi Entertainment Store

    Failed Growth Initiative: Rovi Entertainment Store The Rovi Entertainment Store was one of the primary reasons ROVI pursued the acquisition of Sonic and was deemed a major growth initiative Excitement at Time of Sonic Acquisition “The primary value that we saw in the Sonic business was the RoxioNow1

  27. Slide 27: Failed Growth Initiative: Rovi Entertainment Store (Cont’d.)

    Failed Growth Initiative: Rovi Entertainment Store (Cont’d.) ROVI strongly believed in RES’ viability as a growth driver “We continue to have high expectations and believe the end markets are significant, for both Q3 2011 the Rovi Entertainment Store and data licensing.” Earnings Call 11/8/2011 “We

  28. Slide 28: Failed Growth Initiative: DivX

    Failed Growth Initiative: DivX DivX Revenue1 $mm $150 $125 $113 $117 $100 $73 $75 $50 $25 $0 2011A 2012A 2013A Failures  Consistently late to market with new releases “We have not given enough priority to updating our DivX content creation software. This is critical to maintaining demand.” -Q2 2012

  29. Slide 29: Failed Growth Initiative: DivX (Cont’d.)

    Failed Growth Initiative: DivX (Cont’d.) ROVI repeatedly built-up DivX as a growth engine despite continued commercial disappointments Q4 2010 “We see a lot of good strength in the DivX related business…it's had a great year in 2010, and is up to a really nice start in 2011. So lots of buttons we ca

  30. Slide 30: Failed Growth Initiative: TotalGuide

    Failed Growth Initiative: TotalGuide TotalGuide was one of ROVI’s most important internal development projects and projected growth drivers for the Product business Initial Plan Rollouts  Targeted initial customer sign-ups in the first half of 2011  Service Providers  Solution encompassed: − Tota

  31. Slide 31: Failed Growth Initiative: TotalGuide (Cont’d.)

    Failed Growth Initiative: TotalGuide (Cont’d.) ROVI continued to hold up TotalGuide as a key growth driver despite mounting evidence of failure Q4 2009 “Many, many of the CE manufacturers, and in fact, some fairly significant service providers [are] Earnings Call interested in TotalGuide.... And to

  32. Slide 32: Despite A Long History of Failures, ROVI is Actually Increasing Investment in Growth Products

    Despite A Long History of Failures, ROVI is Actually Increasing Investment in Growth Products Investment in Growth Products $mm $200 $160 $155 $137 $120 $112 $80 Investment in $40 “pre revenue” $75 products1 $0 2013A 2014A 2015E Given this Board’s disappointing track record, shareholders should be c

  33. Slide 33: ROVI’s History of Underperformance

    ROVI’s History of Underperformance Failed Strategic Undisciplined Excessive Misaligned Poor Corporate Plans & Poor Capital Cost Structure Compensation Governance Execution Allocation

  34. Slide 34: ROVI Has Invested Significant Capital Into its Growth Strategy…

    ROVI Has Invested Significant Capital Into its Growth Strategy… Overall R&D and M&A Investment Since 20111 $mm $1,500 Represents 78% $28 $1,320 of ROVI’s current market $1,250 capitalization3 $150 $1,000 $750 $763 $500 $250 $380 $380 $0 R&D Sonic Other M&A 2 Purchases of Patent Total Investment Port

  35. Slide 35: …However, Increasing Investments Have Not Translated into Material Revenue Growth

    …However, Increasing Investments Have Not Translated into Material Revenue Growth $mm R&D Expense Revenue $mm $584 $600 $600 $542 $550 $526 $537 $500 $500 $109 $400 $400 Product Investment Annual Revenue $97 $300 $300 $93 $200 $200 $96 $100 $100 $94 $0 $0 2 2011A 2012A 2013A 2014A 2015E Despite heav

  36. Slide 36: …and All Purported Cost Reductions Have Been Reinvested Back into the Business

    …and All Purported Cost Reductions Have Been Reinvested Back into the Business Overall Adjusted Operating Expense Bridge 2011 to 2015E Guidance 1,2 $400 $330 $22 $300 $38 $102 $75 $200 $297 $100 $0 2011A Operating Cost Saving Initiatives Discovery, Data, Licensing Infrastructure 2015E Operating Expe

  37. Slide 37: As a Result, Margins Have Declined Significantly

    As a Result, Margins Have Declined Significantly Overall Revenue Growth and Adjusted EBITDA Margin $350 $550 $600 $541 ~1.5% increase in revenue $500 $300 $272 $400 Revenue EBITDA $250 $300 $220 $200 $200 ~19% decline in $100 EBITDA $150 $ -- 2010A 2015E EBITDA Revenue EBITDA 50% 40% Margin Source:

  38. Slide 38: Lack of “Cost Culture” Highlighted by Maintenance of At Least Three Corporate Offices

    Lack of “Cost Culture” Highlighted by Maintenance of At Least Three Corporate Offices CEO Office: Wayne, PA Corporate HQ: Santa Clara, CA CFO Office: Burbank, CA ROVI spends over $50mm on “corporate” costs, or nearly 10% of sales Source: Company filings and presentations. 32

  39. Slide 39: Company’s Long-Term Plan Implies OPEX Spending Will Continue to Grow

    Company’s Long-Term Plan Implies OPEX Spending Will Continue to Grow Implied OPEX Spending per Guidance and Long-Term Plan1 $mm $400 $381 $364 $347 $330 $309 $298 $300 $200 $100 $0 2013A 2014A 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E Source: Company filings, 2015 Analyst Day presentation (1/7/2015). 1. Assumes midpo

  40. Slide 40: Despite Past Failures, ROVI is Investing Significant Capital into Speculative Growth Projects

    Despite Past Failures, ROVI is Investing Significant Capital into Speculative Growth Projects Nearly all of existing Product EBITDA is from legacy guides and ACP, which require only limited investment 2015E Planned Investment and Revenue Forecasts $mm 1 2 Investment Revenue $180 $160 $140 $120 $100

  41. Slide 41: At the Current Rate, ROVI Will Invest Over $600mm in Growth Products

    At the Current Rate, ROVI Will Invest Over $600mm in Growth Products Before Material Revenue Growth is Expected Cumulative Growth Investment1 $mm $700 $602 $600 $500 $447 $400 $292 $300 $200 $137 $100 $0 2014 2015 2016 2017 Given ROVI does not expect material product revenue growth until 2017, Inclu

  42. Slide 42: ROVI’s History of Underperformance

    ROVI’s History of Underperformance Failed Strategic Undisciplined Excessive Misaligned Poor Corporate Plans & Poor Capital Cost Structure Compensation Governance Execution Allocation

  43. Slide 43: ROVI Has Spent ~$1bn on Acquisitions Since 2009

    ROVI Has Spent ~$1bn on Acquisitions Since 2009 ROVI leadership has demonstrated a track record of failed M&A, spending over $1bn on 11 acquisitions which, to date, have generated little to no revenue growth Acquisition History Since Macrovision – Gemstar / TV Guide International, Inc. Acquisition T

  44. Slide 44: There Are Bad Acquisitions…And Then There’s Sonic

    There Are Bad Acquisitions…And Then There’s Sonic The Sonic acquisition resulted in the entire business being divested in pieces for a capital loss of $677mm, the equivalent of 41% of today's market cap Result of Sonic Acquisition $763.1 ($6.5) Value Destruction $677.1 $17.5 $75.0 Sonic Acquisition

  45. Slide 45: Expectations Behind the Sonic Acquisition Were Unrealistic From the Start

    Expectations Behind the Sonic Acquisition Were Unrealistic From the Start ROVI Expectations for Sonic1,2,3 $mm 2010A – 2014A CAGR $600 Total Sonic $497 $500 29.1% $400 $373 Growth Businesses $300 $278 $415 43.5% $200 $293 $200 $179 $198 $98 $125 $100 Roxio Consumer $81 $75 $77 $80 $82 0.3% $0 2010A

  46. Slide 46: ROVI’s Current Board is Responsible for the Value Destruction Caused by the Sonic Acquisition

    ROVI’s Current Board is Responsible for the Value Destruction Caused by the Sonic Acquisition With the exception of the CEO change and the very recent addition of a new Board member, the Board features the same individuals that presided over the Sonic acquisition Directors During the Sonic Acquisiti

  47. Slide 47: ROVI’s History of Underperformance

    ROVI’s History of Underperformance Failed Strategic Undisciplined Excessive Misaligned Poor Corporate Plans & Poor Capital Cost Structure Compensation Governance Execution Allocation

  48. Slide 48: ROVI’s Board & Management Remain Well Paid While Shareholders Have Lost Money

    ROVI’s Board & Management Remain Well Paid While Shareholders Have Lost Money Shareholders have suffered ~$5.6bn of losses since the Sonic deal while the Board and Management1 team have netted ~$48m in cumulative compensation (share price in $) ($mm) $70.00 $47.7 $50.0 $60.00 $40.0 $50.00 $31.4 $30.

  49. Slide 49: ROVI’s Director Compensation is Significantly Higher Than Larger Peers

    ROVI’s Director Compensation is Significantly Higher Than Larger Peers Average 2014 Director Compensation $k $350 $310 $300 $250 $250 $200 $190 $150 $100 $50 $ -- Mid Cap 1 Large Cap 2 ROVI Market $2.4B $16.7B $1.7B Cap At $310K per year, ROVI directors earn ~25% more than large-cap companies and ~6

  50. Slide 50: Shareholders Have Repeatedly Disapproved of ROVI’s Compensation Practices

    Shareholders Have Repeatedly Disapproved of ROVI’s Compensation Practices  We believe ROVI’s “say-on-pay” results is evidence of an insular Board that has ignored shareholder concerns for numerous years Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation 100% U.S. Company Average: 91% 88% 80% 71% 60% 53

  51. Slide 51: Engaged Capital Addressed ROVI’s Significant Executive Compensation Deficiencies in a Letter

    Engaged Capital Addressed ROVI’s Significant Executive Compensation Deficiencies in a Letter The June 2014 letter provided a detailed critique of ROVI’s compensation plan and included numerous recommendations aimed at properly aligning compensation with shareholders 43

  52. Slide 52: ROVI’s Executive Compensation Programs Required Material Changes In Numerous Areas

    ROVI’s Executive Compensation Programs Required Material Changes In Numerous Areas Problem Description  Discretionary component of CEO cash bonus was up to 200% Discretionary  CEO was awarded 90% of annual bonus target in 2012 despite poor performance Compensation relative to goals ($264k based on

  53. Slide 53: ROVI’s History of Underperformance

    ROVI’s History of Underperformance Failed Strategic Undisciplined Excessive Misaligned Poor Corporate Plans & Poor Capital Cost Structure Compensation Governance Execution Allocation

  54. Slide 54: ROVI’s Current Board is Stale and in Need of Fresh Perspectives

    ROVI’s Current Board is Stale and in Need of Fresh Perspectives  Half of incumbent directors have been on Board for at least a decade  Independent directors earn ~$300k per year CEO Tom Carson 4 Average Tenure: 10 Years Alan Earhart 7 Chairman Andrew Ludwick 9 Ruthann Quindlen 11 James O'Shaughnes

  55. Slide 55: Directors Have Profited Handsomely Despite Significant Underperformance

    Directors Have Profited Handsomely Despite Significant Underperformance Independent Directors - 5 Year Total Return and Compensation Received Chairman Andrew Ludwick (51%) $2.4 mil Alan Earhart (51%) $2.2 mil James O'Shaughnessy (51%) $2.2 mil James Meyer (51%) $2.2 mil Ruthann Quindlen (51%) $2.1 m

  56. Slide 56: While Independent Directors Have Never Bought Shares, They Have Not Been Shy About Selling

    While Independent Directors Have Never Bought Shares, They Have Not Been Shy About Selling  No independent director has ever acquired shares in the open market  Independent directors have sold over 600K shares Open Market Transactions by Independent Directors Sales Purchases $70 $65 $60 $55 $50 $4

  57. Slide 57: Low Insider Ownership Signifies Lack of Alignment With Shareholders

    Low Insider Ownership Signifies Lack of Alignment With Shareholders and Lack of Confidence in ROVI’s Plan ROVI’s insiders own a significantly lower stake in the business than other index peers Average Insider Ownership 10.0% 9.0% 8.6% 8.0% 7.0% ROVI is significantly lower than the average of relevan

  58. Slide 58: Historical Shareholder Votes Indicate Shareholders are Ready for Change

    Historical Shareholder Votes Indicate Shareholders are Ready for Change All three directors we seek to replace have consistently received extremely low shareholder support running unopposed ROVI Proxy Voting Results – 2013 & 2014 S&P 400 Average: 79% 96% Chairman Andrew Ludwick 74% 79% James O'Shaug

  59. Slide 59: Poor Corporate Governance Extends Beyond Executive Compensation

    Poor Corporate Governance Extends Beyond Executive Compensation ROVI’s Certificate of Incorporation and Bylaws contain a number of shareholder unfriendly provisions  Shareholder actions by written consent prohibited Written Consent  Prevent amendment of bylaws, removal of directors without cause,

  60. Slide 60: The Incumbent Directors We Seek to Replace are Long Tenured With Limited Industry Experience

    The Incumbent Directors We Seek to Replace are Long Tenured With Limited Industry Experience Chairman Andrew Ludwick James Meyer James O’Shaughnessy  Chairman of Rovi since 2008  CEO of Sirius XM Radio  IP consultant Current /  Retired since 1997  Previously at Thomson Reuters  Previously, Chi

  61. Slide 61: Engaged Capital’s Proposal

    Cs Engaged Capital’s Proposal

  62. Slide 62: Engaged Capital’s Proposal for ROVI

    Engaged Capital’s Proposal for ROVI Engaged Capital has nominated three highly qualified directors that can catalyze needed change by addressing the following: Key Drivers of Underperformance Engaged Capital's Response Bring in new experienced Board Board members Review Company strategy, Strategic P

  63. Slide 63: Engaged Capital’s Plan: Reconstitute the Board

    Engaged Capital’s Plan: Reconstitute the Board David Lockwood Raghavendra Rau Glenn W. Welling  CEO and President of EnergySolutions  Former CEO and director of  Founder and CIO of Engaged Capital (current) SeaChange (current)  Chairman and CEO of Liberate  Director of iProf Learning Solutions

  64. Slide 64: David Lockwood Full Biography

    David Lockwood Full Biography Mr. Lockwood’s extensive experience leading public companies, his expertise with IP licensing, and relationships with service providers will be valuable assets to the Board  Currently, Mr. Lockwood is the Chief Executive Officer and President of EnergySolutions, an env

  65. Slide 65: Raghavendra Rau Full Biography

    Raghavendra Rau Full Biography Mr. Rau is an accomplished global executive who has led transformative change in software companies, and has experience in the online video, OTT, and IP industries as well as close relationships with large service providers  Currently, Mr. Rau serves as a founding dir

  66. Slide 66: Glenn Welling Full Biography

    Glenn Welling Full Biography Mr. Welling’s leadership and expertise in corporate strategy, capital allocation, executive compensation, and corporate governance is well respected and needed on ROVI’s board  Mr. Welling is the Founder and Chief Investment Officer of Engaged Capital, a California-base

  67. Slide 67: Engaged Capital’s Plan: Install New Strategy & Finance Committee

    Engaged Capital’s Plan: Install New Strategy & Finance Committee  Given past failures, ROVI’s current Strategy Committee does not provide sufficient leadership and risk oversight  New and independent directors with fresh perspectives are required to properly assess the Company’s strategy  Followi

  68. Slide 68: Engaged Capital’s Plan: Comprehensive Review of Product Strategy

    Engaged Capital’s Plan: Comprehensive Review of Product Strategy Comprehensive  All pillars of the product strategy will be analyzed individually Review  Includes metadata, analytics, search and recommendations, and connected guide Assess  Detailed analysis of competitors’ offerings across each p

  69. Slide 69: Engaged Capital’s Plan: Comprehensive Review of Product Strategy (Cont’d.)

    Engaged Capital’s Plan: Comprehensive Review of Product Strategy (Cont’d.)  Bottoms-up, risk-adjusted revenue build for each platform over several years  Carefully consider likelihood of adoption by each potential Tier 1 customer Revenue Model  Assess probability of replacing third party competit

  70. Slide 70: Engaged Capital’s Plan: Comprehensive Review of Product Strategy (Cont’d.)

    Engaged Capital’s Plan: Comprehensive Review of Product Strategy (Cont’d.)  The new Strategy and Finance Committee will present to the entire Board a specific recommendation on each individual product category  All options should be “on the table,” including: – Shifting investment dollars from hig

  71. Slide 71: Engaged Capital’s Plan: Optimize Corporate Cost Structure

    Engaged Capital’s Plan: Optimize Corporate Cost Structure  In conjunction with a review of the product strategy, the newly formed Strategy and Finance Committee will complete a thorough analysis of ROVI’s cost structure  Specific actions of this cost review will include: – Benchmarking study condu

  72. Slide 72: Engaged Capital’s Plan: Implement Capital Allocation Best Practices

    Engaged Capital’s Plan: Implement Capital Allocation Best Practices  Implement a disciplined capital allocation framework − All potential uses of capital will be benchmarked against share repurchases − Capital will be allocated to the alternative representing the highest risk-adjusted return − Inte

  73. Slide 73: Engaged Capital’s Plan: Improve Corporate Governance and Compensation

    Engaged Capital’s Plan: Improve Corporate Governance and Compensation  Determine the key drivers of shareholder value and tie executive compensation to those metrics  Targets will be based on achieving the Board’s approved long-term strategic plan  Enhance visibility and transparency behind both

  74. Slide 74: ROVI’s April 13 Letter to Shareholders Contains Numerous Misleading Statements

    ROVI’s April 13 Letter to Shareholders Contains Numerous Misleading Statements

  75. Slide 75: ROVI vs. Reality: Stock Performance

    ROVI vs. Reality: Stock Performance  ROVI’s Claim $200.00  “Rovi has outperformed benchmarks since the $150.00 transformation began” $100.00 82% 69% $50.00 52% 52% 32% $0.00 07/18/12 02/01/13 08/20/13 03/07/14 09/22/14 04/09/15  Reality ROVI S&P 500 NASDAQ 2015 Proxy Com ps IP and DaaS Com ps  R

  76. Slide 76: ROVI vs. Reality: Product Strategy

    ROVI vs. Reality: Product Strategy  ROVI’s Claim  Reality  “We expect revenues from these initiatives to be a key  We believe ROVI’s product portfolio includes a number of driver in sustaining double-digit growth in and beyond 2017” valuable assets, including the Company’s metadata franchise and

  77. Slide 77: ROVI vs. Reality: Board Change Will Hurt Renewals

    ROVI vs. Reality: Board Change Will Hurt Renewals  ROVI’s Claim  Reality  “Dramatic, non-amicable Board change could derail  We understand the importance of ROVI’s IP business our strategic transformation and hinder our ability to and have a vested interest in successful renewals deliver long-te

  78. Slide 78: ROVI vs. Reality: Ownership

    ROVI vs. Reality: Ownership  ROVI’s Claim  Reality  “All of ROVI’s current Board members own meaningful  The ENTIRE ROVI Board, with an average tenure of ~10 amounts of ROVI’s stock” years, owns only ~0.2% of ROVI shares1  ROVI’s insider ownership is significantly below the S&P 400 average  “E

  79. Slide 79: ROVI vs. Reality: Settlement Proposal

    ROVI vs. Reality: Settlement Proposal  ROVI’s Claim  Reality  “ROVI recently made a good faith settlement offer to  ROVI’s settlement offer was NOT reasonable Engaged Capital, offering to further augment the Board with  Offered to ADD one of our nominees and ADD another two new directors – one

  80. Slide 80: ROVI vs. Reality

    ROVI vs. Reality  ROVI’s Claim  Reality  “Rovi has carefully pulled over  ALL cost reductions (and more) have been reinvested $100mm of costs and corporate  Despite supposed cost reductions, margins have declined Cost overhead out of the business significantly with EBITDA down ~$50mm on flat re

  81. Slide 81: The Time for Change is Now

    Cs The Time for Change is Now

  82. Slide 82: Countless Failings Under Current Board

    Countless Failings Under Current Board  Significant stock underperformance over any period of time  Approved the acquisition of Sonic which destroyed ~$680mm of shareholder value  Long history of failed growth initiatives, including Rovi Entertainment Store, DivX, and TotalGuide  Continued heavy

  83. Slide 83: We Believe that to Support Incumbent Directors is to Endorse Continued Underperformance

    We Believe that to Support Incumbent Directors is to Endorse Continued Underperformance Shareholder returns under incumbent directors speak volumes 1 Year – Indexed1 3 Year – Indexed1 40 100 29% 60% 20 50 51% 14% 0 0 (11%) (36%) (20) (50) (40) (100) Apr-14 Jun-14 Aug-14 Oct-14 Dec-14 Feb-15 Apr-15 A

  84. Slide 84: Engaged Capital Has A Credible Plan to Correct Underperformance at ROVI

    Engaged Capital Has A Credible Plan to Correct Underperformance at ROVI… Key Drivers of Underperformance Engaged Capital's Response Bring in new experienced Board Board members Review Company strategy, Strategic Plan and Execution structure, and spend Review Company strategy, Cost Structure structur

  85. Slide 85: Vote for Engaged Capital’s Nominees

    …and Has Three Experienced Nominees Prepared to Immediately Enact This Plan David Lockwood Raghavendra Rau Glenn W. Welling  CEO and President of EnergySolutions  Former CEO and director of  Founder and CIO of Engaged Capital (current) SeaChange (current)  Chairman and CEO of Liberate  Director

Rovi — Proxy Contest (April 2015) on 6ix