Topps — Proxy Contest (June 2007)
52 slides from Topps's proxy contest presentation, Jun 15, 2007
Slide 1: Presentation to Investors June 2007
Presentation to Investors June 2007 The Topps Company, Inc.
Slide 2: Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements
Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements This presentation may contain statements that are not historical facts and are considered “forward-looking” within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These forward-looking statements are identified by their use of
Slide 3: Important Information has been Filed with the SEC
Important Information has been Filed with the SEC In connection with the proposed merger agreement, Topps has filed a definitive proxy statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Investors and security holders are advised to read the definitive proxy statement, because it contains importa
Slide 4: Table of Contents
Table of Contents Agenda I. Executive Summary II. Current Business Dynamics III. Valuation IV. The Process V. Why You Should Reject Crescendo Arguments VI. Conclusion
Slide 5: Executive Summary
Executive Summary
Slide 6: Transaction Overview
Transaction Overview Executive Summary $191 million (54% of acquisition financing) Equity Contribution $385.6 million Equity Value (1) $304.0 million Enterprise Value (2) EV/Sales = 0.93x EV/EBITDA = 13.1x P/E = 27.1x FY2007 Transaction Multiples (3) Buyer Group Madison Dearborn Partners, LLC (“MDP”
Slide 7: Board Recommendation
Board Recommendation Executive Summary The Board of Directors believes that the merger is in the best interest of stockholders and therefore recommends to vote FOR the proposed transaction. Management’s successful restructuring was instrumental in receiving the attractive $9.75 price Topps faces sig
Slide 8: The Topps Company
FY2007 Net Sales by Business FY2007 Net Sales by Geography The Topps Company Executive Summary Candy 43% Gum 2% Sports 42% Non-Sports 13% U.S. 72% Europe 23% Other 5% Confectionery Entertainment Founded in 1938, The Topps Company, Inc. (“Topps” or the “Company”), through its business segments, is a
Slide 9: Topps Businesses
ENTERTAINMENT CONFECTIONERY Topps Businesses Executive Summary Marketer of branded products, including trading cards, sticker album collections and branded collectible strategy games Sports products include trading cards for Major League Baseball, the National Basketball Association, and the Nationa
Slide 10: Current Business Dynamics
Current Business Dynamics Executive Summary In 2005, Topps launched a restructuring program Enhanced earnings and profitability Addressed headwinds facing both businesses Success of which was instrumental in receiving the attractive $9.75 per share offer Significant company-specific and broader indu
Slide 11: Background To The Merger
Background To The Merger The transaction is the result of an extensive and thorough process that started over two years ago. The $9.75 offer by Tornante/MDP is the ONLY binding and fully-financed offer received. Executive Summary 2004 2005 2006 2007 Strategic Review Confectionery Sale Process Sale P
Slide 12: Conducted Thorough Process
Executive Summary Conducted Thorough Process February 2005, Lehman Brothers engaged Study various strategic alternatives, including sale of all or part of Topps Conducted a sale process for the Confectionery business with an eye towards doing the same with the Entertainment business, if the process
Slide 13: Conducted Thorough Process (cont'd)
Executive Summary Conducted Thorough Process (cont’d) Tornante/MDP emerged as a very credible bidder through the sale process Negotiated Merger agreement through independent directors Offer remained at price levels higher than those of other parties involved On December 20, 2006, submitted a $9.24 p
Slide 14: Unsolicited Approach of Upper Deck
Unsolicited Approach of Upper Deck Executive Summary On May 24, 2007, Topps received an unsolicited approach from Upper Deck to acquire Topps for $10.75 per share Accompanied by “highly confident” letter NOT a commitment to provide financing Financing subject to significant number of material condit
Slide 15: Transaction Maximizes Stockholder Value
Transaction Maximizes Stockholder Value Executive Summary The transaction is the culmination of the Board’s extensive, multi-year process to maximize stockholder value. ___________________________ 1. Average closing price for the 2-weeks period that preceded the announcement of the settlement of the
Slide 16: Current Business Dynamics
Current Business Dynamics
Slide 17: Management Led Successful Restructuring
Management Led Successful Restructuring… Current Business Dynamics Management’s successful turnaround has driven top-line growth and margin expansion and ultimately resulted in the attractive $9.75 per share offer. In September 2005, Topps launched a restructuring program developed by management in
Slide 18: But Significant Business Risks Remain Going Forward
…But Significant Business Risks Remain Going Forward Current Business Dynamics Topps is facing significant company-specific and broader industry challenges. The management plan is based on several critical assumptions with substantial execution risk. Topps’ Confectionery business faces significant s
Slide 19: Strategic Challenges - Confectionery
U.S. Non Chocolate Confectionery Market (1) U.S. NCC Brands Ranking by Sales $0 $150 A B C D E F G H I J K ey Strategic Challenges - Confectionery Current Business Dynamics -9.9% -8.6% -7.6% -1.4% -0.7% 0.8% 5.9% 14.2% 14.7% 23.5% -20% 0% 20% 40% ___________________________ NOTE: Source: AC Nielsen.
Slide 20: Strategic Challenges - Entertainment
U.S. Sports Trading Cards Market Topps - U.S. Sports Net Sales Growth % (FY’93-FY’07) K ey Strategic Challenges — Entertainment Current Business Dynamics -25% 0% 25% 50% '93 '94 '95 '96 '97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 ___________________________ NOTE: SCA Annual Data; Company data. 1,000
Slide 21: Financial Projections
MANAGEMENT Case ADJUSTED Case Financial Projections Financial Projections Current Business Dynamics ___________________________ Source: Company filings; Management estimates. Notes: Financials are adjusted for pre-tax exceptional items; FY2006 financials correspond to the internal reporting of the C
Slide 22: Historical and Projected Financials - Management Case
Historical and Projected Financials 217.0 188.7 159.2 148.1 144.3 143.8 147.2 146.9 152.1 170.7 129.7 95.2 84.5 MANAGEMENT Case Current Business Dynamics The MANAGEMENT Case predicts very significant top-line growth and margin expansion across both the Confectionery and the Entertainment businesses.
Slide 23: Key Underlying Assumptions - Management Case
Key Underlying Assumptions MANAGEMENT Case - Key Assumptions Current Business Dynamics CONFECTIONERY ENTERTAINMENT ___________________________ 1. North American market; Gross Sales for existing products are as of FY2007; Gross Sales for new products are as of FY2010. 2. Line indicates EBITDA Margin
Slide 24: Historical and Projected Financials - Adjusted Case
Historical and Projected Financials 191.2 172.1 154.4 148.1 144.3 143.8 147.2 146.9 152.1 170.7 129.7 95.2 84.5 Historical and Projected Financials ADJUSTED Case Current Business Dynamics The ADJUSTED Case predicts strong top-line growth and margin expansion across both the Confectionery and the Ent
Slide 25: Key Underlying Assumptions - Adjusted Case
Key Underlying Assumptions FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 ADJUSTED Case — Key Assumptions Current Business Dynamics CONFECTIONERY ENTERTAINMENT FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 Base Business New Products North American Gross Sales Evolution A B C D E F G H Product Portfolio Evolution (1) Existing Products New Pro
Slide 26: Valuation
Valuation
Slide 27: Considerations On Value
Summary Considerations On Value Valuation The $9.75 cash offer offers stockholders certainty of value at attractive valuation multiples and premium. The proposed transaction offers investors certainty of value $9.75 per share cash offer High probability of closing shortly after stockholders’ approva
Slide 28: Historical 5-Year Stock Price Performance
Historical 5-Year Stock Price Performance Historical Stock Price Performance Valuation 3/1/2002 10/15/2002 5/30/2003 1/15/2004 8/30/2004 4/15/2005 11/30/2005 7/14/2006 3/2/2007 $6.00 $7.00 $8.00 $9.00 $10.00 $11.00 $12.00 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 Price Volume Volume Traded Topps Co. OFFER: $9.75 MAX:
Slide 29: 1-Year Stock Performance
1-Year Stock Performance 1 2 3 4 1 4 3 2 Analysis of Premium — Market Speculation Valuation +12.2% share price appreciation since July 2006 (1) driven by market speculation on a potential sale in the months leading to the announcement of the merger. “Considering that management is waging a fierce pr
Slide 30: Analysis of Historical Trading Multiples
Analysis of Historical Trading Multiples Equity Value ($m) 222.7 382.3 409.9 427.1 358.4 382.4 363.4 319.1 385.6 EV ($m) 196.8 306.5 251.1 306.0 244.1 288.6 257.0 237.6 304.0 EBITDA ($m) 142.7 151.5 6.0 28.1 98.9 126.3 39.7 27.4 21.9 21.5 5.6 23.2 Historical Trading Multiples Valuation _____________
Slide 31: Comparable Trading Companies
15.7x 15.4x 13.6x 12.4x 12.0x 11.5x 11.2x 11.0x 11.0x 10.9x 10.2x 10.1x 10.0x 9.6x CONFECTIONERY – Comparable Trading Companies 22.9x 18.6x 11.3x 9.7x 8.3x 6.2x 5.2x ENTERTAINMENT – Comparable Trading Companies 13.1x 0.0x 5.0x 10.0x LTM EV/EBITDA 15.0x 20.0x ($9.75 Offer) Median 11.0x Comparable Tra
Slide 32: Comparable Transactions
17.0x 8.5x 12.8x 12.8x 14.8x 10.6x 22.6x CONFECTIONERY – Comparable Transactions Entertainment – Comparable Transactions 8.5x 7.8x 3.4x 7.5x 7.2x 7.6x 7.5x 7.0x 5.0x 3.9x 10.6x 8.7x 13.1x 0.0x 5.0x 10.0x 15.0x EV/EBITDA 20.0x 25.0x N/A N/A ($9.75 Offer) Median 12.8x Comparable Transactions Valuation
Slide 33: Break-Up Value
Analysis of Break–Up Value $8.66 Break-Up Value — Considered But Not Practical Valuation The $9.75 offer is at the top of the valuation range implied by a break-up scenario. ___________________________ NOTES: Source: Company filings, management projections as per the Adjusted Case discussed in the ‘
Slide 34: Historical Share Price and Evolution of Target Prices
Historical Share Price and Evolution of Target Prices Consensus Estimates ? Valuation ___________________________ Source: Factset; Bloomberg; Reported data points reflect changes in target Price, Recommendation or both. 1. Initial data point for Jefferies & Co. (03/01/2004, Not Rated, $11.00) not re
Slide 35: The Process
The Process
Slide 36: Background To The Merger
Background To The Merger The transaction is the result of an extensive and thorough process that started over two years ago. The $9.75 offer by Tornante/MDP is the ONLY binding and fully-financed offer received. The Process 2004 2005 2006 2007 Strategic Review Confectionery Sale Process Sale Process
Slide 37: The 2005 Confectionery Sale Process
The Process The 2005 Confectionery Sale Process In 2004, Topps retained strategic consulting firm Parthenon to conduct a strategic review of Topps' domestic operations and develop opportunities to increase stockholders’ value In February 2005, Lehman Brothers was engaged to study various strategic a
Slide 38: The Sale Process
The Process The Sale Process In May and June 2006, Topps received unsolicited approaches from Bidder A, Bidder B and Tornante/MDP to acquire all shares Decision of the Board to let bidders conduct diligence review of the Company View toward receiving a firm offer and negotiate a Go-Shop right Altern
Slide 39: The Tornante/MDP Transaction
The Process The Tornante/MDP Transaction Tornante/MDP emerged as a very credible bidder through the sale process Thorough due diligence review of the business Their offer remained at price levels higher than those of other parties involved On December 20, 2006, submitted an indication to acquire all
Slide 40: The Go-Shop Process
The Go-Shop Process The Process During the Go-Shop period, Topps performed a thorough market check of Tornante/MDP’s offer Lehman Brothers contacted 107 potential buyers (strategic and financial), including all parties proposed by all Board members parties declined interest due to: (i) high transact
Slide 41: Ad Hoc Committee and Board Members
Managing Director, Crescendo Partners Arnaud Ajdler Founder and Portfolio Manager, Pembridge Value Opportunity Fund Timothy Brog Managing Director, Allen & Co. and previously Chairman of Fusient Media Ventures Stephen Greenberg Chairman and CEO, The Topps Company Arthur Shorin Executive Committee In
Slide 42: Unsolicited Approach of Upper Deck
Unsolicited Approach of Upper Deck The Process On May 24, 2007, Topps received an unsolicited approach from Upper Deck to acquire Topps for $10.75 per share Accompanied by “highly confident” letter NOT a commitment to provide financing Financing subject to significant number of material conditions,
Slide 43: Unsolicited Approach of Upper Deck (cont'd)
Unsolicited Approach of Upper Deck (cont’d) The Process On June 5, 2007, Upper Deck filed a lawsuit to seek release from its standstill obligation under the confidentiality agreement with Topps The confidentiality agreement with Upper Deck is substantially the same as the confidentiality agreements
Slide 44: Why You Should Reject Crescendo Arguments
Why You Should Reject Crescendo Arguments
Slide 45: Key Considerations
Key Considerations Why You Should Reject Crescendo Arguments We believe Crescendo’s motives are self-serving and NOT in the best interest of all of Topps’ stockholders Stated intention to take over the Company WITHOUT paying a premium to stockholders Crescendo does NOT possess any relevant operation
Slide 46: Unlikely Value Creation From Dutch Auction Buyback
Modified Dutch Auction Tender Share Buybacks 2006-2007 YTD Today's date Unlikely Value Creation From Dutch Auction Buyback Why You Should Reject Crescendo Arguments Crescendo’s proposed buyback is at the top end of precedent transactions in terms of size. Likely negligible share price appreciation w
Slide 47: Crescendo's Plan Is Vague And Offers Nothing New
Crescendo’s Plan Is Vague And Offers Nothing New … Why You Should Reject Crescendo Arguments Crescendo’s turnaround plan is vague and many of the initiatives have already been successfully implemented by Topps’ incumbent management. CONFECTIONERY Business “opportunities” COGS reduction is based on f
Slide 48: Its Margin and Price Expectations Are Unrealistic
… And Its Margin and Price Expectations Are Unrealistic Why You Should Reject Crescendo Arguments Crescendo’s margin and price per share expectations reflect a l ack of understanding of the Company’s strategic positioning and industry economics. ___________________________ 1. 2. 3. Assuming a residu
Slide 49: Crescendo Statements Raise Questions On Credibility
Crescendo Statements Raise Questions On Credibility Why You Should Reject Crescendo Arguments Crescendo’s inconsistent statements raise questions about their credibility and ultimately highlight their true intentions: to take over Topps without paying a premium to shareholders In November 2006, Arna
Slide 50: Why Doesn't Crescendo Make An Offer For Topps?
Why Doesn’t Crescendo Make An Offer For Topps? Why You Should Reject Crescendo Arguments The Topps Board is TRULY committed to maximizing value for all Topps stockholders – Crescendo is not Crescendo has made wild claims that Topps stock will be worth $16-$18 per share in two years If Crescendo TRUL
Slide 51: Conclusion
Conclusion
Slide 52: Board Recommendation
Board Recommendation Conclusion The Board of Directors believes that the merger is in the best interest of stockholders and therefore recommends to vote FOR the proposed transaction. Management’s successful restructuring was instrumental in receiving the attractive $9.75 price Topps faces significan