Virtusa Corporation

Virtusa — Proxy Contest (September 2020)

112 slides from Virtusa's proxy contest presentation, Sep 1, 2020

  1. Slide 1: Improving Virtusa with New Mountain Vantage

    September 2020 Improving Virtusa with New Mountain Vantage Vote the Blue Proxy Card Exhibit 1

  2. Slide 2: Disclosure Statement and Disclaimers

    Disclaimer Disclosure Statement and Disclaimers Additional Information On August 19, 2020, New Mountain Vantage Advisers, L.L.C. and certain of the funds and investment vehicles it manages (collectively, “New Mountain Vantage”), together with other participants (collectively, the “Participants”) fil

  3. Slide 3: Path to Substantial Corporate Governance Improvement and Value Creation at Virtusa

    We Believe There is a Path to Substantial Corporate Governance Improvement and Value Creation at Virtusa Together, we can improve Virtusa’s corporate governance profile, increase accountability, and create significant value for all shareholders VOTE ON THE BLUE PROXY CARD FOR THE NEW MOUNTAIN VANTAG

  4. Slide 4: Shareholders Face a Choice

    Prasad Chintamaneni (NMC Employee) Shareholders Face a Choice… Significant Shareholder alignment through NMV’s ~11% economic stake in Virtusa Significant experience in areas critical to Virtusa’s future success such as Digital Transformation/IT Delivery, Healthcare IT, and Capital Allocation True in

  5. Slide 5: Table of Contents

    Table of Contents New Mountain Vantage – Who We Are Why We Invested in Virtusa & Our Efforts to Engage Virtusa’s History of Underperformance Virtusa’s New “Three Pillars” Strategy Is More of the Same Questionable Corporate Governance Practices A Lack of Alignment Between Pay and Performance The New

  6. Slide 6: New Mountain Capital Overview

    New Mountain Capital Overview New Mountain Vantage Public Equity (est. 2006) Concentrated long-only and long / short equity strategies Long-term focus in the public markets Seek to leverage broader firm’s operational expertise and knowledge in helping public companies succeed Selectively engage with

  7. Slide 7: New Mountain Vantage – Who We Are

    New Mountain Vantage – Who We Are $28BN+ Assets Under Management >177 Employees and Senior Advisors Founded in 1999 with a Core Focus on “Defensive Growth” New Mountain Vantage currently owns ~9.9% of the outstanding shares of Virtusa Corporation (“Virtusa”, “VRTU”, the “Company”) with total economi

  8. Slide 8: New Mountain Vantage Leverages the Full Firm's Knowledge and Resources

    New Mountain Vantage Leverages the Full Firm’s Knowledge and Resources When Evaluating and Executing Investments CURRENT AND FORMER PE PORTFOLIO COMPANIES Research capabilities built off of New Mountain’s strength as owner/operator of businesses Large current PE portfolio ~$20.3 billion of revenue w

  9. Slide 9: New Mountain Private Equity Has Created Significant Value

    New Mountain Private Equity Has Created Significant Value Through “Profitable Growth” and Multiple Expansion Revenue(1) $ in Millions Exit Year(3) Year Prior to Investment(2) +100% EBITDA(1) $ in Millions Exit Year(3) Year Prior to Investment(2) +122% Enterprise Value(1) $ in Millions At Exit(4) At

  10. Slide 10: Select New Mountain Capital Value Creation Case Studies

    Significant EBITDA Growth ($ millions) Select New Mountain Capital Value Creation Case Studies New Mountain has successfully supported value creation strategies with many portfolio companies through organic and inorganic growth opportunities New Mountain has substantial experience in building global

  11. Slide 11: Table of Contents

    Table of Contents New Mountain Vantage – Who We Are Why We Invested in Virtusa & Our Efforts to Engage Virtusa’s History of Underperformance Virtusa’s New “Three Pillars” Strategy Is More of the Same Questionable Corporate Governance Practices A Lack of Alignment Between Pay and Performance The New

  12. Slide 12: Virtusa at a Glance

    Virtusa at a Glance Source: Virtusa public filings, Bloomberg. (1) Shares Outstanding, Debt, Cash, and Series A Convertible Preferred values as of 6/30/20, the last reported quarter for Virtusa (2) Virtusa stock price as of 6/18/20, the day prior to the announcement of New Mountain Vantage’s engagem

  13. Slide 13: Why Did New Mountain Vantage Invest in Virtusa?

    Why Did New Mountain Vantage Invest in Virtusa? Virtusa is a high-quality, fast-growing, digitally-focused IT Services Provider with limited “old economy” or legacy exposure. Virtusa plays in the higher value-add, higher growth “digital transformation” area within IT Services. Combined with minimal

  14. Slide 14: Virtusa Is Well-Positioned To Be a Winner in Digital Transformation

    Design / UI / UX √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ Product Engineering √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ Advanced Engineering √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ Digital Engineering Hybrid IT + Digital Virtusa Is Well-Positioned To Be a Winner in Digital Transformation with Strong Capabi

  15. Slide 15: Key Drivers of Value Creation for IT Services Companies

    To Succeed, We Believe Virtusa Needs to Focus on the Key Drivers of Value Creation for IT Services Companies Stable / Growing Margin Revenue AND Earnings Growth Consistency Diversified Revenue Base What We Believe Drives Value for IT Services Companies IT Services is a global growth industry with a

  16. Slide 16: How We Got Here: Virtusa's Claims of Working Constructively Misleading

    How We Got Here: Virtusa’s Claims of “Working Constructively” with NMV Have Been Misleading and Its Actions Concerning April 2020 – May 2020: NMV engages with Virtusa and delivers an in-depth presentation to management on value creation, requesting Board representation to help drive change. Over num

  17. Slide 17: Table of Contents

    Table of Contents New Mountain Vantage – Who We Are Why We Invested in Virtusa & Our Efforts to Engage Virtusa’s History of Underperformance Virtusa’s New “Three Pillars” Strategy Is More of the Same Questionable Corporate Governance Practices A Lack of Alignment Between Pay and Performance The New

  18. Slide 18: Why Is Change Warranted?

    Why Is Change Warranted? History of sustained Total Shareholder Return (TSR) underperformance: Virtusa’s share price declined by -35% in the five-year period ending 6/18/201, compared to a return of +57% for the Russell 3000 in the same period and +38% for Virtusa’s Direct Peers2. Since our involvem

  19. Slide 19: Virtusa Has Failed to Deliver on Its Main Value Drivers

    Virtusa Has Failed to Deliver on Its Main Value Drivers for a Long Time Source: Virtusa Company Filings (1) Virtusa segment abbreviation: BFSI: Banking, Financial Services, Insurance. C&T: Communications & Technology. M&I: Media & Information (2) Return on Invested Capital calculated as NOPAT / Inve

  20. Slide 20: Virtusa's TSR Has Significantly Underperformed Peers and Index

    As a Result, Virtusa’s TSR Has Significantly Underperformed Peers and the Relevant Index Over the Last Five Years Source: CapitalIQ, Bloomberg (1) Total shareholder return (“TSR”) including dividends ending on 6/18/20, the day before NMV’s involvement was made public by the Company. (2) Direct Peer

  21. Slide 21: Contradicting Philosophies on Diversification Strategy

    Virtusa Has Had Contradicting Philosophies When It Comes to Its Diversification Strategy Source: Virtusa Public Company Filings & Transcripts, emphasis added by NMV The Result: Diversification Hasn’t Improved Management has Shown No Consistent Strategy in Addressing Revenue Concentration – No Wonder

  22. Slide 22: Highest Client Concentration Among Peers

    Top Client Top 10 Clients (total) Despite Years of Working on Diversification, Poor Execution and Lack of Strategy Have Resulted in the Highest Concentration Among Peers Source: Public Company Filings and presentations. Note: Last available disclosure | Note: Perficient Inc. does not report any mate

  23. Slide 23: Over-Concentrated Revenue Leads to Volatile Results

    Unaddressed, Over-Concentrated Revenue Leads to Client and Industry Level Spending Exposure, Resulting in Volatile Results Source: Virtusa Transcripts and public company filings (1) One Day stock decline after announcement, unless otherwise noted. Relative vs. Russell 3000 (2) Decline took two days

  24. Slide 24: Revenue Concentration Leads to Volatility and Poor Margins

    Revenue Concentration Issues Lead to Volatility, Making It Difficult to Manage Expenses, a Key Reason For Virtusa’s Poor Margins Source: CapitalIQ, Bloomberg, and Company filings | (1) Last prior fiscal year announced for all companies. Adjusted Operating Income defined as GAAP Operating Margin + Am

  25. Slide 25: Scale Is Not the Problem

    Scale is Not The Problem, as There Are Many Smaller Players in this Industry With “Mid-Teens or Higher” Margins Source: Public Company filings. Conversion rates used for non-USD reporting companies: GBP: 1.32, EUR: 1.2, INR: 75 Last Fiscal Year Adj. Operating Margin Last Fiscal Year Revenue (USDmm)

  26. Slide 26: Current Margin Promises Look Similar to Past Promises

    Virtusa’s Current Promises Regarding Future Margin Potential Look Eerily Similar to Past Promises – Why Believe Them Today? Source: Virtusa Public Company filings & transcripts, emphasis added by NMV “Our own financial model in terms of reaching to the mid-teens is accreting margins by 100, 150 basi

  27. Slide 27: No Progress on Mid-Teens Margins Despite Promises

    Despite Promising Mid-Teens Margins for Years, Virtusa has Made No Progress Yet Continues to Cite the Same Margin Levers as its Focus Source: Virtusa Public Company Filings and Transcripts Gross Margins Haven’t Improved… Virtusa Has Attempted to Reduce Its Use of Subcontractors and Improve Utilizati

  28. Slide 28: Pattern of Reduced Earnings Expectations

    Revenue Concentration Issues and Poor Margin Management have Contributed to a Pattern of Reduced Earnings Expectations Source: Bloomberg consensus estimates (1) Another management promise from their 8/25/20 Letter to Shareholders FY2016 Street Earnings Projections FY2017 Street Earnings Projections

  29. Slide 29: Earnings Misses Have Led to Loss of Management Credibility

    Ultimately, We Believe Virtusa’s String of Earnings Misses and Negative Announcements Has Led to a Loss of Management Credibility Source: Bloomberg and Company filings. Note: One day stock price reaction after event Virtusa’s Recent History with Investors Since Q1 FY2019, Virtusa has given investors

  30. Slide 30: Subpar Capital Allocation: Acquisition of Polaris

    Virtusa’s Issues Have Been Compounded by Subpar Capital Allocation Decisions Such as the Acquisition of Polaris Ltd. Source: Bloomberg, Virtusa transcripts, Virtusa public filings, emphasis added by NMV (1) Wedbush Securities report 9/8/16 Polaris Acquisition “Rhetoric” Polaris Acquisition Reality I

  31. Slide 31: Polaris Took Virtusa in Every Wrong Strategic Direction

    The Acquisition of Polaris Took Virtusa in Every Wrong Strategic Direction Source: Virtusa public filings, transcripts and equity research reports, emphasis added by NMV 40% Reduction in Adj. EPS ~700 Bps Reduction in Adj. Operating Margin 52% Increase in Top Client Concentration 17% Increase in Top

  32. Slide 32: Incohesive M&A Strategy Has Failed to Create Value

    Virtusa’s Board Has Overseen an Incohesive M&A Strategy that Has Failed to Create Value for Shareholders Source: Virtusa Public Filings, emphasis added by NMV. (1) Maximum ROI would assume that growth at Virtusa has only been created via capital expenditure or M&A spend and that no other organic gro

  33. Slide 33: Poor Capital Allocation Has Weakened ROIC

    All-in-all, Poor Capital Allocation in Recent Years Has Resulted in a Weakened ROIC Source: Virtusa public filings (1) Return on Invested Capital calculated as NOPAT / Invested Capital where NOPAT is adj. Operating Income plus SBC tax effected by constant 30% rate and Invested Capital is Net Debt +

  34. Slide 34: Reduced Credibility and Lower Valuation Multiple

    Poor Performance and the Inability to Follow Through on Promises Has Resulted in Reduced Credibility and a Lower Valuation Multiple Source: Bloomberg. Note: Direct Peer group from p. 17 has been broken into “Pure Digital Peers” consisting of EPAM, GLOB, and DAVA and “Hybrid Peers” of PRFT, CAP FP, I

  35. Slide 35: Table of Contents

    Table of Contents New Mountain Vantage – Who We Are Why We Invested in Virtusa & Our Efforts to Engage Virtusa’s History of Underperformance Virtusa’s New “Three Pillars” Strategy Is More of the Same Questionable Corporate Governance Practices A Lack of Alignment Between Pay and Performance The New

  36. Slide 36: Management Has Failed to Disclose a Concrete Plan

    Management Has Failed to Disclose a Concrete Plan to Investors The New Mountain Vantage Nominees have compelling skill sets and alignment to bring the required change to the Virtusa Boardroom In re-branding the “Three Pillars” strategy, Virtusa ironically codified the list of failed promises to inve

  37. Slide 37: No Evidence Three Pillars Were a Strategic Plan for a Year

    While Management is Making a Claim that the Three Pillars Have Been a Strategic Plan for a Year, There is No Evidence of This Source: Virtusa public company filings and transcripts A “History” of the “Three Pillars” “However, along with the challenges, it has revealed unique opportunities, especiall

  38. Slide 38: When Did Virtusa First Articulate the Three Pillars Strategy?

    When Did Virtusa First Articulate the “Three Pillars” Strategy? After NMV Privately Presented Our Value Creation Plan to Virtusa Management Source: New Mountain Vantage Presentation to Virtusa Management on April 29, 2020, reproduced in the appendix, Virtusa FY20 earnings call transcript w/ emphasis

  39. Slide 39: Components of the Three Pillars Are Not New

    Management Will Say It Is Doubling Down on the New “Three Pillars”, but the Components of this Strategy are Not New Source: Company Transcripts, emphasis added by NMV. For the full list of “soft” management commitments over time, please see our Letter to Virtusa Shareholders dated 8/19/20 Profitable

  40. Slide 40: Very Little Progress Against Any of the Pillars

    Taking a Longer Look, Management Has Made Very Little Progress Against Any of the Pillars Source: Company Transcripts, Company Filings Revenue Diversification Margin Improvement Profitable Revenue Growth Long-Term Track Record

  41. Slide 41: Very Little Progress Made on Three Pillars to Date

    Even if this Were a Strategy in Place for the Last Year, Very Little Progress Has Been Made on the Three Pillars to Date Source: Virtusa Public Filings Virtusa’s Recent Performance Does Not Match Their Rhetoric Client concentration has gotten worse Margins have been extremely volatile Growth has bee

  42. Slide 42: First Half Performance Underperformed Peers

    While Touting “Progress”, Virtusa’s First Half Performance Significantly Underperformed Peers Source: Public Company Filings, Virtusa filings & transcripts, emphasis added by NMV (1) YTD return in local currency from 12/31/19 – 8/19/20, the day NMV filed its definitive proxy statement. (2) See NMV’s

  43. Slide 43: Caution on Selectively Disclosed Metrics Such as Pipeline

    We Caution Investors to Take Selectively Disclosed and Poorly Defined Metrics such as “Pipeline” as Evidence of Success Source: Company Filings, emphasis added by NMV Virtusa’s “Evidence” of Progress “As we work toward more profitable revenue growth, the key driver is a larger and higher quality pip

  44. Slide 44: Table of Contents

    Table of Contents New Mountain Vantage – Who We Are Why We Invested in Virtusa & Our Efforts to Engage Virtusa’s History of Underperformance Virtusa’s New “Three Pillars” Strategy Is More of the Same Questionable Corporate Governance Practices A Lack of Alignment Between Pay and Performance The New

  45. Slide 45: Flawed Governance Structure Lacks Management Accountability

    Flawed Governance Structure à Lack of Management Accountability = Underperformance Source: Virtusa proxy materials and New Mountain Vantage analysis Virtusa has maintained a deficient and suboptimal corporate governance structure, leading to a strongly entrenched Board and Management team Structural

  46. Slide 46: Deficient Corporate Governance Profile

    Virtusa Has Maintained a Significantly Deficient Corporate Governance Profile for Too Long, Stifling Shareholder Voice Source: Virtusa public company filings. Note: Corporate Governance Best Practices are the opinion of NMV and contain elements of subjectivity Corporate Governance Best Practices Vir

  47. Slide 47: Board Appears to Have Interlocking Issues

    Virtusa's Board Appears to Have a Myriad of Interlocking Issues Source: Bloomberg, Wikipedia, LinkedIn, Virtusa Proxy Materials. Note: PWC=PricewaterhouseCoopers, Citi=Citigroup Inc., Staples=Staples Inc. Tenure (years) 0.2 11.8 3.3 16.3 14.1 1.9 9.5 4.4 3.5 24.6 Age 52 75 63 56 73 65 66 62 67 54 St

  48. Slide 48: Board Drawn from One Place

    For a Global Business, This Is a Board That Has Drawn an Immense Amount of Its Members from One Place Source: Crunchbase, Wikipedia, LinkedIn, Google, Bloomberg Rowland Moriarty (Lead Ind. Director) Izhar Armony Kris Canekeratne Barry Nearhos William O’Brien (Retiring) Joe Doody (Up for election) NM

  49. Slide 49: What Is the Virtusa Director Recruitment Process?

    What Is the Virtusa Director Recruitment Process? Only Friends and Former Colleagues? Source: Crunchbase, Wikipedia, LinkedIn, Google, Bloomberg Connections to Staples, Inc. Martin Trust Fmr. Lead Independent Director Known as the “Father of Modern Sri Lankan Apparel Industry” Virtusa delivers out o

  50. Slide 50: O'Brien and Nearhos Have Near Identical Backgrounds

    William O’Brien and Barry Nearhos Have Near Identical Backgrounds, Yet Were on the Board for 4+ Years Source: Crunchbase, Wikipedia, LinkedIn, Bloomberg Overlapping Careers and Directorships William O’Brien (Not Standing for Election) Barry Nearhos Biography / Roles Biography / Roles Director, Mercu

  51. Slide 51: Two Former Citigroup Executives on the Board

    How Did We Get Two Former Citigroup Executives Less Than Two Years Apart? Is This What Virtusa Considers a “Process”? Source: Crunchbase, Wikipedia, LinkedIn, Bloomberg Recruitment Concerns Vikram Pandit (joined Board in 2017) Deborah Hopkins (joined Board in 2018) Biography / Roles Biography / Role

  52. Slide 52: Relationship Between Virtusa's Clients and Its Board

    There Appears to Be a Fairly Direct Relationship Between Virtusa’s Clients and Its Board Source: Crunchbase, Wikipedia, LinkedIn, Bloomberg, Virtusa public filings & transcripts, emphasis added by NMV Recruitment Concerns Al-Noor Ramji, Vikram Pandit, Deborah Hopkins Virtusa’s Strategic Focus? Al-No

  53. Slide 53: Deborah Hopkins Appears to Have an Undisclosed Conflict

    Deborah Hopkins Appears to Have a Significant Undisclosed Conflict Source: LinkedIn, Bloomberg, Virtusa Proxy Materials Deborah Hopkins (joined Board in 2018) Also on Board of Parent Company of “The compensation committee has retained Mercer, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Marsh & McLennan Companies,

  54. Slide 54: Vikram Pandit Is Not a True Shareholder Representative

    Vikram Pandit Is Not a True Shareholder Representative Due to His Ownership through a Convertible Preferred Source: Virtusa Public Filings, Bloomberg. Period for investment return from May 2, 2017 through 6/18/2020, the day NMV’s involvement was made public Orogen Group Series A Convertible Preferre

  55. Slide 55: Board Change Relationship Driven Rather Than Skill Driven

    Virtusa’s “Board Change” Since 2016 Looks to Be More Relationship Driven than Skill Set Driven Source: Virtusa Proxy filings and New Mountain Vantage opinions Director Candidate IT Services Delivery? Digital Transformation? Capital Allocation? Healthcare Experience? Pre-Existing Ownership? Objective

  56. Slide 56: Governance Action #1: Board Further Entrenches

    Recent Concerning Governance Action #1 - Rather than Working with a Credible Investor, the Board Further Entrenches Source: Virtusa SEC filings & press releases, Bloomberg, Wipro public filings, LinkedIn, Wikipedia, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/wipros-chief-executive-officer-abidali-z-neemuchwala

  57. Slide 57: Why Was Mr. Neemuchwala Not Added to Nearest Director Class?

    Why Was Mr. Neemuchwala Not Added to the Nearest Director Class Up for Election Like the Three Prior Additions? Source: Virtusa Annual Proxy Filings Board “Refreshment” Since FY2016 Barry Nearhos Joe Doody Deborah Hopkins Abid Neemuchwala Appointed to the Board March 2016 February 2017 June 2018 Jun

  58. Slide 58: Governance Action #2: Virtusa Changes Board Size Again

    William O’Brien Recent Concerning Governance Action #2 – Virtusa Changes Board Size Once Again, This Time in the Midst of a Contested Election Source: Bloomberg, Virtusa Proxy Materials Virtusa History of Board Appointment Changes The past three new common elected directors were all up for election

  59. Slide 59: Table of Contents

    Table of Contents New Mountain Vantage – Who We Are Why We Invested in Virtusa & Our Efforts to Engage Virtusa’s History of Underperformance Virtusa’s New “Three Pillars” Strategy Is More of the Same Questionable Corporate Governance Practices A Lack of Alignment Between Pay and Performance The New

  60. Slide 60: Board Has Not Enforced Pay-for-Performance Philosophy

    Virtusa’s Board Has Not Implemented or Enforced a Pay-for-Performance Philosophy Joe Doody and Al-Noor Ramji, the two Virtusa Board Members up for election this year, have been on the Compensation Committee during this period of underperformance and allowed it to continue on their watch Virtusa’s Ma

  61. Slide 61: Virtusa Refuses to Align Payment with Performance

    Virtusa Refuses to Align Payment with Performance Source: Virtusa Company filings, Bloomberg, Proxy Filings. Note: TSR from periods from 3/31/20. With the exception of LiveRamp Holdings (fiscal year end of 3/31), Nutanix (fiscal year end 7/31), and Verint Systems (fiscal year end of 1/31), all peers

  62. Slide 62: Failed to Align Pay with Performance for Years

    Virtusa Has Failed to Align Pay with Performance for Years Source Bloomberg, annual proxy filings. Note: TSR from periods from 3/31/20. With the exception of LiveRamp Holdings (fiscal year end of 3/31), Nutanix (fiscal year end 7/31), and Verint Systems (fiscal year end of 1/31), all peers have a De

  63. Slide 63: Proxy Peer Set Does Not Reflect Virtusa's Reality

    Virtusa’s Proxy Peer Set Does Not Reflect Virtusa’s Reality Source Bloomberg, company filings. (1) Enterprise ex. Operating leases as per 8.19.20 as per Bloomberg Virtusa’s FY2020 Proxy Peer Set While similar in revenue size, Virtusa’s Board has chosen significantly more profitable and valuable comp

  64. Slide 64: Constant Peer Group Changes Over Five Years

    In Fact, Virtusa’s Constant Peer Group Changes Over the Last Five Years Raise Questions as to the Selection Process Virtusa vs. Proxy Peer Sets Over the Last Five Years In three of the last four years, Virtusa’s Compensation Committee has remixed the peer group to companies with higher paid CEOs. No

  65. Slide 65: What Is Wrong with Virtusa's Compensation Structure?

    What is Wrong with Virtusa’s Compensation Structure? Source: Virtusa Proxy Filings, Virtusa transcripts Compensation Issue Virtusa's overall compensation structure highly incentivizes revenue growth, and does not align with the Three Pillars As a result, Virtusa’s management team has been incentiviz

  66. Slide 66: Board Has Played Games with Compensation: FY2017

    This Is a Board and Compensation Committee that Has Played Games with Compensation – a Look at FY2017 Source: Virtusa Annual Proxy Filings, Bloomberg (1) Virtusa FY16 Adj. Operating income of $80m + Polaris Profit before exception items and tax of $30mm (conv. At avg. USDINR 64) - ~$3mm of contribut

  67. Slide 67: Directors Responsible for Flawed Compensation Structure

    The Current Directors Up for Election are Largely Responsible for the Flawed Compensation Structure What Shareholders Got for Polaris and FY17 Source: Virtusa Annual Proxy Filings, emphasis added by NMV, Bloomberg. Stock price measured from 11/4/15 to 5/16/17, the day before the Polaris announcement

  68. Slide 68: Poor Compensation Practices Continued After Failed Say-on-Pay Vote

    These Poor Compensation Practices Continued Even After the Egregious FY2017 Performance and a Failed Say-on-Pay Vote Source: Virtusa Annual Proxy Filings Citing high stock price returns, Management was compensated nearly 2x what they were paid in FY2016 despite Adj. EPS being down 21% from F16 to F1

  69. Slide 69: FY2020 Promise to Change Compensation

    This Poor Alignment Continues Even in the Face of Resistance A Look at the FY2020 “Promise” to Change Compensation for the Better Source: Virtusa Annual Proxy Filings, emphasis added by NMV What We Were Promised What We Got Benchmarking CEO Pay from the 75th to the 50th percentile Performance Based

  70. Slide 70: Executives Have Been Sellers of Virtusa Stock

    The Executive Suite Has Collectively Been a Seller of Virtusa Stock as It Has Gone Down, Not a Buyer Total Executive Ownership of Virtusa Stock Has Declined as Virtusa Stock Has Sunk Lower Source: Virtusa Annual Proxy Filings, Bloomberg -42% -35% Management has also not bought a single share on the

  71. Slide 71: Table of Contents

    Table of Contents New Mountain Vantage – Who We Are Why We Invested in Virtusa & Our Efforts to Engage Virtusa’s History of Underperformance Virtusa’s New “Three Pillars” Strategy Is More of the Same Questionable Corporate Governance Practices A Lack of Alignment Between Pay and Performance The New

  72. Slide 72: New Mountain Nominees Will Help Implement Framework

    If Elected to the Board, the New Mountain Nominees Will Work to Help Implement the Following Framework New Mountain recommends that Virtusa adopt/execute the below strategies: Formation of a Business Optimization Committee within the Board with a discrete mandate to formulate concrete, long-term, va

  73. Slide 73: Business Optimization Committee Summary

    Business Optimization Committee Summary We believe that a small working group within the Board, populated with both existing directors and the NMV Board nominee(s), if elected, would be the most effective way to formulate and drive a new and improved strategic direction of Virtusa This small group w

  74. Slide 74: Framework to Fix Revenue Diversification Issues

    Business Optimization Committee: New Mountain Vantage Framework to Fix Revenue Diversification Issues 1 Disproportionally invest in high growth, newer verticals (healthcare, technology, e.g.) relative to mature industries such as BFSI Move top talent in sales, P&L & client management from mature ver

  75. Slide 75: Framework to Fix Margin Issues

    Business Optimization Committee: New Mountain Vantage Framework to Fix Margin Issues 1 Initiate a broad, industry-wide study for the Board to fully understand the granular cost baselines for the IT Services industry Radically drive utilization up and subcontractor use down. This should be at the hea

  76. Slide 76: Path to Mid-Teens Margins in Three Years

    With the Right Alignment and Accountability, NMV Believes Virtusa Can Achieve Its Self-Stated Goals of Mid-Teens Margins 1 Source: Virtusa Public filings. See Disclaimer regarding estimates Three -Year Timeframe

  77. Slide 77: Addressing the Current Environment: COVID-19

    Addressing the Current Environment: COVID-19 NMV understands that the current global health crisis is unprecedented, and we believe we can add value as Virtusa navigates through the crisis and positions itself for the next leg of growth and evolution During the Global Financial Crisis, Prasad Chinta

  78. Slide 78: Improve Capital Allocation and Deal Underwriting

    Improve Capital Allocation / Deal Underwriting & Selection Develop a firm framework for M&A at the Board and C-suite level à Virtusa’s track record for M&A has no pattern or long-term strategic direction & exhibits low returns Scrutinize potential deals against Virtusa’s stand- alone options à ask:

  79. Slide 79: Improve Named Executive Officer Compensation

    Improve Named Executive Officer Compensation New Mountain Vantage has engaged Compensation Strategies, Inc., a leading compensation consultant to advise on building the most value creative compensation plan for Virtusa Create a “grid modifier” system for short-term compensation metrics, where the ac

  80. Slide 80: Enhance Investor Relations and Outreach

    Enhance Virtusa’s Investor Relations & Outreach functions 4 Build out / hire additional dedicated Investor Relations personnel to strengthen relationships with Wall Street banks / investors Investor Relations personnel are key components of successfully managing a public company. In addition to ensu

  81. Slide 81: Framework to Improve Corporate Governance

    New Mountain Vantage Framework to Improve Corporate Governance New Mountain Vantage has been a corporate governance investor through its entire 14+ year history. We believe that good corporate governance is imperative for delivering top tier returns Evaluate the de-staggering of the Virtusa Board ov

  82. Slide 82: Prasad Chintamaneni Brings Outside Accountability and IT Expertise

    The NMV Nominees: Prasad Chintamaneni Brings Outside Accountability and Specific IT Expertise to the Board Source: Virtusa Annual Proxy Filings. Note: Period from 9/6/99 to 7/31/19 We believe that Prasad Chintamaneni’s extensive leadership experience, knowledge of IT Services, Digital Transformation

  83. Slide 83: Chintamaneni: Experience in Digital Transformation and Healthcare IT

    Prasad Chintamaneni, NMV Candidate, Has Extensive Experience in Digital Transformation and Healthcare IT Source: Virtusa Public Filings, using Virtusa’s revised digital definition, William Blair equity research Virtusa’s Choppy Digital Growth? Virtusa appears to need assistance in growing its Digita

  84. Slide 84: Patty Morrison: Track Record of Value Creation

    The NMV Nominees: Patty Morrison Brings an Incredible Track Record of Value Creation & Healthcare IT Experience to the Board Source: Virtusa Annual Proxy Filings, Bloomberg (1) Baxter Int’l: 2/8/2019 – 8/19/20, Splunk Inc.: 4/9/2013 – 8/19/20 We believe that Ms. Morrison’s significant experience as

  85. Slide 85: Patty Morrison Would Provide Healthcare Industry Knowledge

    “With respect to industry group diversification, we have increased our investments in attractive high-growth verticals, and strategic M&A, in industries such as high-tech and healthcare” -Virtusa Letter to Shareholders 8/17/20 Patty Morrison, NMV Candidate, Would Provide Much Needed Knowledge of the

  86. Slide 86: Board Mischaracterizing the NMV Candidates and Dialogue

    Virtusa’s Board of Directors Is Intentionally Mischaracterizing the NMV Candidates and the History of our Dialogue Source: Virtusa’s Letter to Shareholder, 8/25/2020, Virtusa Public Company filings Virtusa False Narratives? NMV Facts “A recent investor, New Mountain Capital (NMC), is trying to force

  87. Slide 87: Why Shareholders Should Elect Both Nominees

    Why New Mountain Believes Shareholders Should Elect Both of Our Highly Qualified Nominees We believe that the level of accountability needed to improve Virtusa is only achieved by more change at the Board level, rather than less The current Virtusa Board has frequently acted to disenfranchise shareh

  88. Slide 88: Table of Contents

    Table of Contents New Mountain Vantage – Who We Are Why We Invested in Virtusa & Our Efforts to Engage Virtusa’s History of Underperformance Virtusa’s New “Three Pillars” Strategy Is More of the Same Questionable Corporate Governance Practices A Lack of Alignment Between Pay and Performance The New

  89. Slide 89: Shareholders Face a Choice

    Prasad Chintamaneni (NMC Employee) Shareholders Face a Choice… Significant Shareholder alignment through NMV’s ~11% economic stake in Virtusa Significant experience in areas critical to Virtusa’s future success such as Digital Transformation/IT Delivery, Healthcare IT, and Capital Allocation True in

  90. Slide 90: Path to Substantial Corporate Governance Improvement and Value Creation

    We Believe There is a Path to Substantial Corporate Governance Improvement and Value Creation at Virtusa Together, we can improve Virtusa’s corporate governance profile, increase accountability, and create significant value for all shareholders VOTE ON THE BLUE PROXY CARD FOR THE NEW MOUNTAIN VANTAG

  91. Slide 91: Table of Contents

    Table of Contents New Mountain Vantage – Who We Are Why We Invested in Virtusa & Our Efforts to Engage Virtusa’s History of Underperformance Virtusa’s New “Three Pillars” Strategy Is More of the Same Questionable Corporate Governance Practices A Lack of Alignment Between Pay and Performance The New

  92. Slide 92: Appendix

    Appendix NMV’s Initial Engagement with Virtusa Citigroup Relationship: A Case Study on Concentration Issues Polaris Acquisition Execution: A Case Study on Poor Capital Allocation Timeline of Engagement Select Quotes Related to Historical Promises of Virtusa Peer Selection

  93. Slide 93: The Path Forward to Maximizing Shareholder Returns

    The Path Forward to Maximizing Shareholder Returns New Mountain Vantage believes that by partnering with Virtusa management and the Board of Directors, we can help Virtusa achieve its long-term operational goals and the realization of significant shareholder value Additionally, we believe New Mounta

  94. Slide 94: Appendix

    Appendix NMV’s Initial Engagement with Virtusa Citigroup Relationship: A Case Study on Concentration Issues Polaris Acquisition Execution: A Case Study on Poor Capital Allocation Timeline of Engagement Select Quotes Related to Historical Promises of Virtusa Peer Selection

  95. Slide 95: History with Largest Customer Citigroup: Case Study on Concentration

    Virtusa’s History with Its Largest Customer, Citigroup, Is a Relevant Case Study on Revenue Concentration Issues Source: Virtusa Public Company filings & transcripts, emphasis added by NMV. (1) As estimated by JPMorgan research (2) Pro Forma Citi FY16 revenue as disclosed in company transcript datin

  96. Slide 96: Appendix

    Appendix NMV’s Initial Engagement with Virtusa Citigroup Relationship: A Case Study on Concentration Issues Polaris Acquisition Execution: A Case Study on Poor Capital Allocation Timeline of Engagement Select Quotes Related to Historical Promises of Virtusa Peer Selection

  97. Slide 97: Polaris Transaction: Case Study in Poor Capital Allocation

    The Execution and Financing of the Polaris Transaction Is a Case Study in Poor Capital Allocation Source: Bloomberg, Virtusa company filings. (1) Calculated as total amount paid for tranche / total % purchased (2) Calculated as cumulative implied value / Virtusa Market Cap at time of transaction Vir

  98. Slide 98: Appendix

    Appendix NMV’s Initial Engagement with Virtusa Citigroup Relationship: A Case Study on Concentration Issues Polaris Acquisition Execution: A Case Study on Poor Capital Allocation Timeline of Engagement Select Quotes Related to Historical Promises of Virtusa Peer Selection

  99. Slide 99: How We Got Here to Putting Forward Our Own Slate

    How We Got Here to Putting Forward Our Own Slate of Highly Qualified Directors Fall 2019: NMV initiates position in Virtusa Corp. April 23, 2020: NMV reaches out to CEO Kris Canekeratne to inform we are a large shareholder, provide background on NMV and request a formal meeting to share our thoughts

  100. Slide 100: How We Got Here (continued)

    How We Got Here to Putting Forward Our Own Slate of Highly Qualified Directors (continued) May 30 – June 2, 2020: NMV receives and responds to 9 detailed questions provided by Virtusa’s Board June 9, 2020: Chad and Prasad have separate conversations with Board members Izhar Armony and Deborah Hopkin

  101. Slide 101: How We Got Here (continued)

    How We Got Here to Putting Forward Our Own Slate of Highly Qualified Directors (continued) June 17, 2020: Given the lack of progress towards a reasonable settlement, NMV privately nominates 3 highly qualified candidates to the Virtusa board June 19, 2020: Despite the significant effort by NMV to kee

  102. Slide 102: Appendix

    Appendix NMV’s Initial Engagement with Virtusa Citigroup Relationship: A Case Study on Concentration Issues Polaris Acquisition Execution: A Case Study on Poor Capital Allocation Timeline of Engagement Select Quotes Related to Historical Promises of Virtusa Peer Selection

  103. Slide 103: Long History of Failed Promises – Margins

    Virtusa’s Long History of Failed Promises – Margins Source: Virtusa Earnings and Conference Transcripts “We are focusing efforts on resource optimization initiatives to improve our gross and operating margins.” – Tom Holler, EVP & CFO (7/30/2008, Q1 FY2009 Earnings) “We believe the progress we have

  104. Slide 104: Long History of Failed Promises – Margins (cont.)

    Virtusa’s Long History of Failed Promises – Margins (cont.) “We've built… a scalable business model, which calls us getting to operating margin in the midteens over the next two to five years. We get that we believe by accreting our gross margin.” -Ranjan Kalia, CFO (1/16/2013, Needham Conference) “

  105. Slide 105: Long History of Failed Promises – Margins (cont.)

    Virtusa’s Long History of Failed Promises – Margins (cont.) “Virtusa stand-alone operating margins are expected to continue to expand. Polaris operating margins are lower than Virtusa, but we anticipate driving Polaris margin expansion going forward, which will result in a combined company operating

  106. Slide 106: Long History of Failed Promises – Margins (cont.)

    Virtusa’s Long History of Failed Promises – Margins (cont.) “This year, the guidance calls for margin accretion of 130 basis points year-over-year. Our goal continues to be to try to drive margin accretion over the next few years in the 100 to 150 basis point range.” -Ranjan Kalia, CFO (8/8/2018, Q1

  107. Slide 107: Long History of Failed Promises – Diversification

    Virtusa’s Long History of Failed Promises – Diversification “We have also been very focused on making sure that we diversify our revenue concentration.” -Kris Canekeratne, Chairman & CEO (10/27/2011, Q2 FY2011 Earnings) “We have been very focused on bringing that concentration down over time.”-Tom H

  108. Slide 108: Long History of Failed Promises – Profitable Revenue Growth

    Virtusa’s Long History of Failed Promises – Profitable Revenue Growth “We continue to optimize our cost structure and make selective investments to support long-term sustainable profitable growth.” -Ranjan Kalia, CFO (7/30/2009, Q1 FY2010 Earnings) “industry analysts are calling for mid-teens market

  109. Slide 109: Long History of Failed Promises – Profitable Revenue Growth (cont.)

    Virtusa’s Long History of Failed Promises – Profitable Revenue Growth (cont.) “We believe these actions will strengthen Virtusa's position to capitalize on the areas of significant growth in our industry and enhance long-term profitable growth.”-Kris Canekeratne, Chairman & CEO (8/8/2017, Q1 FY2018

  110. Slide 110: Appendix

    Appendix NMV’s Initial Engagement with Virtusa Citigroup Relationship: A Case Study on Concentration Issues Polaris Acquisition Execution: A Case Study on Poor Capital Allocation Timeline of Engagement Select Quotes Related to Historical Promises of Virtusa Peer Selection

  111. Slide 111: NMV Virtusa Direct Peer Comparison

    NMV Virtusa Direct Peer Comparison Cognizant Technology Solutions (CTSH): Disclosed by the company in the FY20 as a competitive peer HCL Technologies (HCLT IN): Disclosed by the company in the FY20 as a competitive peer Infosys Ltd. (INFO IN): Disclosed by the company in the FY20 as a competitive pe

  112. Slide 112: INIMIV

    INIMIV

Virtusa — Proxy Contest (September 2020) on 6ix