SpartanNash — Proxy Contest (May 2022)
64 slides from SpartanNash's proxy contest presentation, May 10, 2022
Slide 1: Our Solution to Create Value for Long-Suffering SpartanNash Shareholders
May 2022 OUR SOLUTION TO CREATE VALUE FOR LONG- SUFFERING SPARTANNASH SHAREHOLDERS
Slide 2: Disclaimer
DISCLAIMER The materials contained herein (the “Materials”) represent the opinions of Macellum Home Fund, LP, Ancora Holdings Group, LLC and the other participants named in this proxy solicitation (collectively, the “Investor Group”) and are based on publicly available information with respect to Sp
Slide 3: Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY II. THE CASE FOR BOARDROOM CHANGE: POOR FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE III. THE CASE FOR BOARDROOM CHANGE: POOR GOVERNANCE IV. OUR NOMINEES V. THE PATH FORWARD VI. APPENDIX Macellum Advisors GP, LLC 3
Slide 4: Introduction and Executive Summary
INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4
Slide 5: About SpartanNash
ABOUT SPARTANNASH BUSINESS SUMMARY COMPANY SNAPSHOT ¾ SpartanNash derives roughly half its EBITDA from grocery and the ¾ Founded: Spartan Stores and Nash Finch combined in 2013 other half from food distribution. It also operates a military ¾ Headquarters: Grand Rapids, MI commissaries business that
Slide 6: We Have a Strong Record of Helping Create Value at Lagging Retail Companies
WE HAVE A STRONG RECORD OF HELPING CREATE VALUE AT LAGGING RETAIL COMPANIES TSR During Our Tenure 1 Macellum drove significant shareholder value by strongly advocating for a $725 million sale-leaseback. Big Lots, unfortunately, 135% chose to remove Macellum’s nominees the following year and an entre
Slide 7: Why We Are Here: A Credible Board Refresh Urgently Needed at SpartanNash
WHY WE ARE HERE: A CREDIBLE BOARD REFRESH URGENTLY NEEDED AT SPARTANNASH 1 SpartanNash is a U.S. food distributor, wholesaler and retailer that runs three sub-optimized, sub-scale businesses The Investor Group beneficially owns ~4.5% of the outstanding stock with significant concerns regarding 2 the
Slide 8: Overview: The Incumbents Initiated a Defensive and Insufficient Refresh
OVERVIEW: THE INCUMBENTS INITIATED A DEFENSIVE AND INSUFFICIENT REFRESH We believe the Board’s defensive refresh has installed directors with irrelevant technology, financial services and consumer brand experience rather than necessary industry expertise and shareholder perspectives x Following Mace
Slide 9: We See a Long-Tenured, Underqualified Board That Bears Responsibility
WE SEE A LONG-TENURED, UNDERQUALIFIED BOARD THAT BEARS RESPONSIBLITY ¾ The directors we are seeking to replace are underqualified and have presided over sobering value destruction, yet they have failed to voluntarily step off the Board Douglas Hacker William Voss Margaret Shan Atkins Director since
Slide 10: The Investor Group Is Offering Shareholders Superior Candidates
THE INVESTOR GROUP IS OFFERING SHAREHOLDERS SUPERIOR CANDIDATES ¾ Our nominees bring a shareholder perspective, operational knowhow, relevant grocery and food distribution expertise and successful track records – credentials incumbent nominees do not have Jonathan John Michael Duskin Fleming Lewis C
Slide 11: The Investor Group and Our Slate Have a Clear Vision for Value Creation
THE INVESTOR GROUP AND OUR SLATE HAVE A CLEAR VISION FOR VALUE CREATION We believe SpartanNash has significant opportunity to gain market share, increase margins, rationalize costs and more effectively allocate capital Our slate would seek to assess all paths to maximizing shareholder value, includi
Slide 12: The Case for Boardroom Change: Poor Financial Performance
THE CASE FOR BOARDROOM CHANGE: POOR FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 12
Slide 13: The Board Has Overseen Substantial Long-Term Underperformance
THE BOARD HAS OVERSEEN SUBSTANTIAL LONG-TERM UNDERPERFORMANCE ¾ SpartanNash’s TSR has underperformed all relevant peers over the last five years ¾ The one-year TSR is materially helped by COVID-induced tailwinds and mirrors the performance of the Company’s retail peers ¾ The three-year TSR benefits
Slide 14: The Board's Focus on Short-Term Outperformance Is Misleading
THE BOARD’S FOCUS ON SHORT-TERM OUTPERFORMANCE IS MISLEADING SPARTANNASH STOCK PRICE SINCE 2014 ¾ The Board ignores a long period of $45.00 consistently poor stock price 2019 Lowest Stock Pandemic performance $40.00 Price Since Merger (08/14/19) Grocery $35.00 $8.94 Growth ¾ SpartanNash’s stock pric
Slide 15: The Board's Version of Short-Term Performance Still Underperforms Relevant Peers
THE BOARD’S VERSION OF SHORT-TERM PERFORMANCE STILL UNDERPERFORMS RELEVANT TO PEERS TSR STARTING AT THE HIRING OF CEO TONY SARSAM (09/14/2020 – 03/17/2022) SPTN Retail Peers Food Distribution Peers Proxy Peers ISS Peers S&P 500 158% 151% 101% 88% 78% 33% Source: Bloomberg, Macellum Estimates. Data a
Slide 16: Short-Term Underperformance vs. Most Relevant Food Distribution Peer
THE BOARD HAS PRESIDED OVER SHORT-TERM UNDERPERFORMANCE VS. MOST RELEVANT FOOD DISTRIBUTION PEER SPTN TSR vs. UNFI TSR SPTN UNFI ¾ The attempt by the Board to focus shareholders’ attention on TSR since two 402 historically low points is misguided ¾ SpartanNash’s performance since August of 2019, and
Slide 17: Short-Term Underperformance Compared to Relevant Grocery Peers
THE BOARD HAS OVERSEEN SHORT-TERM UNDERPERFORMANCE COMPARED TO RELEVANT GROCERY PEERS 300 $ Value if $100 was invested in each 250 company on 09/14/2020 200 150 100 50 0 SpartanNash Albertsons Ingles SPARTANNASH HAS UNDERPERFORMED ITS CLOSEST GROCERY PEERS, WITH INGLES UP +164% AND ALBERTSON’S UP +1
Slide 18: Persistent Inability to Grow Sales and Declining Operating Profit
THE BOARD HAS DEMONSTRATED A PERSISTENT INABILITY TO GROW SALES AND PRESIDED OVER A DECLINING OPERATING PROFIT ¾ Macellum believes these problems can be remedied, but require a properly reconstituted Board with relevant expertise and experience that will hold management accountable ¾ The Board has a
Slide 19: Sustained Operational Underperformance - Revenue
THE BOARD HAS OVERSEEN SUSTAINED OPERATIONAL UNDERPERFORMANCE - REVENUE ¾ SPTN’S revenue growth has underperformed both retail and food distribution peers ¾ SPTN acquired Caito in 2017 and Martin’s in 2018, which added roughly $450 million in annual revenue Revenue ($ in millions) % Chg. % Chg. 2014
Slide 20: Sustained Operational Underperformance - Comparable Store Sales
THE BOARD HAS OVERSEEN SUSTAINED OPERATIONAL UNDERPERFORMANCE – COMPARABLE STORE SALES (ID SALES) ¾SPTN’S comparable store sales have significantly underperformed its relevant peers, excluding fuel, since 2014 • Relevant peers have seen 28% compounded growth from 2014-2021, while SPTN increased 2% C
Slide 21: Underperformance Compared to Closest Peers - EBITDA
THE BOARD HAS OVERSEEN SUSTAINED OPERATIONAL UNDERPERFORMANCE COMPARED TO ITS CLOSEST PEERS – EBITDA ¾Retail EBITDA growth has significantly underperformed its two closest retail competitors since 2014 ¾Ingles (IMKTA) and Weis Markets (WMK) each operate ~200 grocery stores Adjusted EBITDA ($ in mill
Slide 22: Sustained Operational Underperformance - EBITDA
THE BOARD HAS OVERSEEN SUSTAINED OPERATIONAL UNDERPERFORMANCE - EBITDA ¾EBITDA growth has been disappointing ¾We believe this is particularly worrisome given revenue grew 13% while EBITDA dollars declined 7% from 2014 to 2021 Adjusted EBITDA ($ in millions) % Chg. % Chg. 2014A 2015A 2016A 2017A 2018
Slide 23: Sustained Operational Underperformance - EBT
THE BOARD HAS OVERSEEN SUSTAINED OPERATIONAL UNDERPERFORMANCE - EBT ¾Going further down the income statement, EBT has declined even further than EBITDA EBT ($ in millions) % Chg. % Chg. 2014A 2015A 2016A 2017A 2018A 2019A 2020A 2021A '19-'21 '14-'21 Retail Peer Average — 7% (3%) (1%) 215% 79% 172% 3
Slide 24: Guidance Assumes Increasing Capital Expenditures and Flat to +5% EBITDA
GUIDANCE ASSUMES INCREASING CAPITAL EXPENDITURES AND FLAT TO +5% EBITDA Yearly CapEx ($ mms) $120 $77mm Avg. $105 $100 $90 $86 $79 $80 $73 $75 $71 $71 $67 2022 ESTIMATES REPRESENT A $60 37% INCREASE OVER EIGHT- YEAR AVERAGE CAPEX SPENDING $40 $20 $0 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022E Year
Slide 25: Company Struggles to Forecast and Has History of Overly Optimistic Projections
THE COMPANY STRUGGLES TO FORECAST THE BUSINESS AND HAS A HISTORY OF OVERLY OPTIMISTIC PROJECTIONS ¾Prior to the COVID benefit, the Company missed guidance six years in a row ¾The Company has historically not provided investors with a long-term roadmap for growth Miss Miss Miss Miss Miss Miss Source:
Slide 26: Loss of Confidence from a Consensus of Industry Analysts
LOSS OF CONFIDENCE FROM A CONSENSUS OF INDUSTRY ANALYSTS ¾ The analyst community evidently does not hold much confidence in SpartanNash’s current strategy and direction, yet leadership continues to promote the Company’s performance and prospects ¾ As of 05/6/2022: • There were seven Holds and one Bu
Slide 27: Cumulative Result Is Reflected in a Valuation That Lags Peers
THE CUMULATIVE RESULT IS REFLECTED IN A VALUATION THAT LAGS PEERS FV/EBITDA LTM N12M Retail Peer Average Food/Drug Avg. 7.2x 7.7x Food Distribution Peer Average Food Dist. Avg. 11.8x 9.6x Other Distributors/Wholesalers Peer Average Other Avg. 8.4x 7.7x Proxy Peer Group Companies Average Proxy Peers
Slide 28: The Case for Boardroom Change: Poor Governance
THE CASE FOR BOARDROOM CHANGE: POOR GOVERNANCE 28
Slide 29: The Current Board Has Lost Credibility
THE CURRENT BOARD HAS LOST CREDIBILITY SpartanNash has misrepresented several key facts pertaining to its performance and Macellum’s campaign for change: x MYTH: SpartanNash’s total shareholder return has significantly 9 THE REALITY: SpartanNash cherry-picked two timeframes for its TSR at low outper
Slide 30: The Board Has Presided Over Abysmal Corporate Governance
THE BOARD HAS PRESIDED OVER ABYSMAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Poor Governance and Oversight FAILURE TO CONSTRUCTIVELY DEFENSIVE, INEFFECTIVE SELF- FAILED ACQUISITIONS AND ENGAGE WITH SHAREHOLDERS REFRESH DILUTIVE STRATEGIC & LACK OF DISCLOSURE TRANSACTION MISALIGNED EXECUTIVE POOR SUCCESSION SIGNIFICANT
Slide 31: Issue #1: The Board Failed to Constructively Engage with Macellum
ISSUE #1: THE BOARD FAILED TO CONSTRUCTIVELY ENGAGE WITH MACELLUM MACELLUM BELIEVES THE BOARD HAS TAKEN PURPOSEFUL MEASURES TO NOT ENGAGE CONSTRUCTIVELY, DATING BACK TO BEFORE WE HAD PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED OUR INTENTION TO RUN A CAMPAIGN The Board revised its initial counter- proposal and offered to app
Slide 32: Issue #1 (Cont.): The Board Has a History of Poor Investor Disclosure
ISSUE #1 (CONT.): THE BOARD HAS A HISTORY OF POOR INVESTOR DISCLOSURE ¾ The Board has not disclosed a detailed strategic plan or long-term operating goals with investors since combining the two predecessor companies in November 2013 ¾ The Company delayed an analyst day in the fall of 2021 and has no
Slide 33: Issue #2: Defensive Refresh Failed to Add Relevant Grocery Experience
ISSUE #2: THE BOARD’S DEFENSIVE REFRESH FAILED TO ADD RELEVANT GROCERY AND FOOD DISTRIBUTION EXPERIENCE ¾Despite a nomination deadline 6 months before the Annual Meeting, the Board chose not to make proactive outreach with a shareholder who had nominated 5 highly qualified candidates and did not req
Slide 34: Issue #3: The Board Has Overseen Failed M&A
ISSUE #3: THE BOARD HAS OVERSEEN FAILED M&A ¾The initial combination of Spartan Stores, Inc. and Nash Finch Company generated $230.8 million in EBITDA in 20141 ¾The Company outlined a plan to achieve an additional $32 million in cost synergies 1 ¾As such, the Company should have been on a run rate o
Slide 35: Issue #3 (Cont.): The Board Has Overseen Failed M&A
ISSUE #3 (CONT.): THE BOARD HAS OVERSEEN FAILED M&A ¾ Following three large acquisitions, the Company’s “So, we feel like we've got a great pipeline of organic growth and we profits declined materially continually build and evaluate our capacity and our network to support it. However, we can also co
Slide 36: Issue #3 (Cont.): Failed Strategic Partnerships
ISSUE #3 (CONT.): THE BOARD HAS OVERSEEN FAILED STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS ¾ It would appear the Amazon deal only led to ~$1.1 million in EBIT uplift, while the warrant shares would dilute current shareholders by ~4%. The initial tranche of warrants are about 4%. ¾ If SpartanNash meets a multi-year targ
Slide 37: Issue #4: Misaligned Executive Compensation
ISSUE #4: THE BOARD HAS OVERSEEN MISALIGNED EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION ¾ On December 27, 2021, SpartanNash announced it had entered into employment agreements, which included higher payouts for President and CEO Mr. Sarsam, EVP and CFO Mr. Monaco and EVP and Chief Human Resources Officer Ms. Yvonne Trup
Slide 38: Issue #4 (Cont.): Misaligned Executive Compensation
ISSUE #4 (CONT.): THE BOARD HAS OVERSEEN MISALIGNED EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION ¾The CEO was paid more in 2021 than in 2014 despite 2021’s EBIT being 16% lower than 2014’s figure ¾The top five executives were also paid more in 2021 despite lower EBIT SpartanNash CEO & Top 5 Executives’ Total Compensation
Slide 39: Issue #4 (Cont.): Insufficient Ownership, Lack of Shareholder Alignment
ISSUE #4 (CONT.): THE BOARD HAS OVERSEEN INSUFFICIENT OWNERSHIP, LEADING TO A LACK OF SHAREHOLDER ALIGNMENT ¾The Board and management own a very small amount of stock • The current independent directors collectively own just 0.87% of the Company • Mr. Sarsam, the CEO, owns 0.06% • Alarmingly, most B
Slide 40: Issue #5: Failure to Oversee Effective Succession Planning
ISSUE #5: THE BOARD HAS FAILED TO OVERSEE EFFECTIVE SUCCESSION PLANNING Pandemic SpartanNash Stock Price Since 2014 Grocery Growth Dennis Eidson David M serves as CEO Staples hired until as CEO $45.00 (05/23/17) (05/23/17) $36.08 Tony Sarsam is $36.08 hired as CEO $40.00 (09/21/20) $17.32 $35.00 Den
Slide 41: Issue #5: Failure to Oversee Effective Succession Planning
ISSUE #5: THE BOARD HAS FAILED TO OVERSEE EFFECTIVE SUCCESSION PLANNING ¾After making three CEO changes in as many years, the Board chose to hire executives from outside of the industry with questionable track records and experience ¾Many elements that led to Borden’s bankruptcy filing in January 20
Slide 42: Issue #6: Significant Boardroom Gaps
ISSUE #6: SIGNIFICANT BOARDROOM GAPS ¾We believe a lack of grocery and food distribution sector expertise on the incumbent Board has contributed to poor oversight, persistent underperformance compared to peers and a series of strategic missteps Hacker Voss Atkins Grocery Sector Expertise Food Distri
Slide 43: Issue #6 (Cont.): Significant Boardroom Gaps
ISSUE #6 (CONT.): SIGNIFICANT BOARDROOM GAPS Margaret Shan Douglas Hacker William Voss Atkins Tenure: 17 years Tenure: 24 years Tenure: 19 years NO GROCERY OR NO GROCERY OR NO GROCERY OR DISTRIBUTION EXPERIENCE DISTRIBUTION EXPERIENCE DISTRIBUTION EXPERIENCE Chairman of the Board Chair of the Nomina
Slide 44: Why We Are Seeking to Remove Chairman Hacker
WHY WE ARE SEEKING TO REMOVE CHAIRMAN HACKER (17-YEAR TENURE) x Extremely long tenure of 17 years, including his board service at Nash Finch prior to its merger with SpartanNash x Lack of relevant food distribution and grocery sector expertise x Lack of meaningful ownership in the Company, despite l
Slide 45: Why We Are Seeking to Remove Director Voss
WHY WE ARE SEEKING TO REMOVE DIRECTOR VOSS (24-YEAR TENURE) x Extremely long tenure of 24 years, including his board service at Nash Finch, where he also served as its Chairman x Lack of relevant food distribution and grocery sector expertise x Lack of meaningful ownership in the Company x Has serve
Slide 46: Why We Are Seeking to Remove Director Atkins
WHY WE ARE SEEKING TO REMOVE DIRECTOR ATKINS (19-YEAR TENURE) x Extremely long tenure of 19 years, including her board service at Spartan Stores prior to its merger with Nash Finch x Lack of relevant food distribution and grocery sector expertise x Lack of meaningful ownership in the Company x Has s
Slide 47: Our Nominees
OUR NOMINEES 47
Slide 48: Our Nominees Bring a Shareholder Perspective and Relevant Expertise
OUR NOMINEES BRING A SHAREHOLDER PERSPECTIVE, RELEVANT GROCERY AND FOOD DISTRIBUTION EXPERTISE AND SUCCESSFUL TRACK RECORDS Jonathan John Michael Duskin Fleming Lewis Current CEO of Macellum Current board member of Bed Bath & Former President of the Midwest Capital Management Beyond Inc. (NASDAQ: BB
Slide 49: How Our Nominees Stack Up
HOW OUR NOMINESS STACK UP ¾Macellum has nominated a slate of three highly qualified and experienced director candidates, who collectively possess the right skills, experience and perspectives to help drive long-term value at SpartanNash Duskin Fleming Lewis Grocery Sector Expertise Food Distribution
Slide 50: Jonathan Duskin
JONATHAN DUSKIN ¾We believe Mr. Duskin’s capital markets acumen, significant retail sector investing experience and independent shareholder perspective can help the Board pursue and evaluate all paths to maximizing value for shareholders 9 Chief Executive Officer of Macellum Capital Management, an i
Slide 51: John E. Fleming
JOHN E. FLEMING ¾We believe Mr. Fleming's retail sector and e-commerce expertise and relevant grocery and food distribution experience would fill important gaps in the boardroom and help the Board develop a viable operating plan for delivering enhanced value 9 Previously held several executive roles
Slide 52: Michael J. Lewis
MICHAEL J. LEWIS ¾We believe Mr. Lewis' experience as a retail sector executive and his extensive knowledge of the consumer goods and food service industries would help the Board improve the Company's operations and corporate structure 9 Former Executive Vice President and President of Retail for Of
Slide 53: The Path Forward
THE PATH FORWARD 53
Slide 54: Our Nominees Could Help Oversee Development of a Turnaround Strategy
OUR NOMINEES COULD HELP OVERSEE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TURNAROUND STRATEGY ¾We believe SpartanNash has significant opportunity to gain market share, increase margins, rationalize costs and more effectively allocate capital Grocery Opportunity • Consolidate the 13 different banners currently being run,
Slide 55: We Believe Operational Improvements Can Create Real Value
WE BELIEVE OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS CAN CREATE REAL VALUE Estimated Impact Dollar Impact1 Initiatives (bps) Low, $mm High, $mm Pricing & Promotion Strategy 12-23 11 21 Vender Negotiation Optimization 30-63 26 57 Private Label Penetration 22-28 20 25 Digital / BOPIS Value Prop 4-7 4 6 Wholesale Optim
Slide 56: Projections - Base Case Assumptions
PROJECTIONS – BASE CASE ASSUMPTIONS ¾ Base assumptions include: • $780mm of Proceeds from a $950 million sale-leaseback o Incremental rent expense of $67 million on a 7% cap rate • Repurchase stock at $35 average ¾ Fundamentals excluding a sale-leaseback: • Sales growth 1.2% annually o Retail same-s
Slide 57: Projections - Base Case Excluding a Sale-Leaseback
PROJECTIONS – BASE CASE EXCLUDING A SALE-LEASEBACK $ in thousands except for percentages Income Statement Analysis 2021A 2022E 2023E 2024E 21-24E Retail Net Sales $2,581,286 2,579,777 2,579,777 2,579,777 (0%) Food Distribution Net Sales $4,456,800 4,590,504 4,728,219 4,870,066 9% Military Net Sales
Slide 58: A Sale-Leaseback Appears to Offer a Significant Opportunity to Unlock Value
A SALE-LEASEBACK APPEARS TO OFFER A SIGNIFICANT OPPORTUNITY TO UNLOCK VALUE $950mm Sale-Leaseback Transaction $s in thousands 2022E Adj. Pro Forma Chg. ¾If the Company were to pursue a $950 Sales 8,968,586 0 8,968,586 0% million sale-leaseback transaction, we Rent Expense 70,335 66,500 136,835 95% e
Slide 59: Significant Opportunity to Pursue Strategic Alternatives
WE BELIEVE THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT OPPORTUNITY TO PURSUE STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES ¾ The entire Company is trading at a significant discount compared to traditional food distribution and grocery businesses ¾ We believe there are numerous buyers for both the distribution and grocery businesses that would
Slide 60: Vote the BLUE Proxy Card for Change
VOTE THE BLUE PROXY CARD FOR CHANGE ¾Shareholders can help inject relevant food and grocery distribution sector experience and ownership perspectives in the boardroom to create enduring value at SpartanNash, while overseeing a strategic review process to be weighed against SpartanNash’s standalone p
Slide 61: Appendix
APPENDIX 61
Slide 62: Other Consumer/Retail Companies Have Completed Sale-Leaseback Transactions
OTHER CONSUMER/RETAIL COMPANIES HAVE COMPLETED SALE-LEASEBACK TRANSACTIONS TO CREATE VALUE OTHER SIMILAR COMPANIES HAVE CAPITALIZED ON THEIR REAL ESTATE RATHER THAN LETTING IT REMAIN IDLE ON THEIR BALANCE SHEETS Source: Company SEC Filings, Bloomberg LP, Real Estate Industry Experts. Macellum Adviso
Slide 63: SpartanNash Is 18% More Expensive for Key Value Items Than Its Peers
SPARTANNASH IS 18% MORE EXPENSIVE FOR KEY VALUE ITEMS THAN ITS PEERS KVI (Key Value Items) Basket - Walmart Price Index - Ticket Price 1.80 1.67 1.58 1.60 1.49 1.40 1.31 1.26 1.32 1.18 1.20 1.12 1.08 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.03 0.95 1.00 0.92 0.80 0.73 0.63 0.60 0.40 0.20 0.00 American C
Slide 64: SpartanNash Is 16% More Expensive for Key Value Items Than Its Peers
SPARTANNASH IS 16% MORE EXPENSIVE FOR KEY VALUE ITEMS THAN ITS PEERS Weekly Basket - Walmart Price Index - Ticket Price 2.50 2.04 2.00 1.74 1.82 1.58 1.57 1.52 1.42 1.48 1.40 1.38 1.50 1.28 1.28 1.23 1.10 1.17 1.17 1.18 1.18 1.16 1.12 1.10 1.09 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.06 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.05 1.00