Nielsen — Proxy Contest (April 2022)
71 slides from Nielsen's proxy contest presentation, Apr 26, 2022
Slide 1: Nielsen: The WindAcre Partnership View
Nielsen The WindAcre Partnership View April 26, 2022
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Slide 3: Who is WindAcre?
Who is WindAcre? Long only Concentrated (13 investments) Focus heavily on business quality Purely intrinsic value (DCF) based 10 year+ time horizon Not an activist firm First invested in Nielsen in 2013; currently own ~27% We oppose the take-private at $28 per share
Slide 4: We believe:
We believe: Nielsen has an unmatched ability to solve the hardest measurement problem in media ( Nielsen is a world class business ( Intrinsic value of the stock today is ~$50 ( There is a credible path to ~$80 by 2025 ( $28 per share isn’t even close to fair value
Slide 5: Agenda
I Why is Nielsen A World Class Business? Il. What is Nielsen Worth? 1. Revenue Growth 2. Multiple III. A Credible Path to ~$80 Per Share by 2025 1. Leverage 2. Timing IV. Further Thoughts on $28 per Share V. Appendix (9-6) (79-25) (09-29) 9.33) (m2) (3.48) (50) (n.54)
Slide 6: I. Why is Nielsen A World Class Business?
I. Why is Nielsen A World Class Business?
Slide 7: Hardest Measurement Problem in Media
Hardest Measurement Problem in Media What did 300 million people watch across 900 million screens for nearly 600 billion hours (annual)? And how many of those 300 million people were reached, with what frequency, by the $100+ billion spent on advertising? (And provide on a sub-minute basis, please)
Slide 8: Problem Requires Big Data + Panel
Problem Requires Big Data + Panel What did 300 million people watch across 900 million screens Requires for nearly 600 billion hours (annual)? Big Data And how many of those 300 million people F were reached, with what frequency, Requires by the $100+ billion spent on advertising? Panel
Slide 9: Competitive Landscape
Competitive Landscape Panel Robustness
Slide 10: Competitive Landscape
Competitive Landscape 10
Slide 11: Common Critique
Common Critique Tvision Se Mi comscore: Mies, a omens (Spot by MANIC Big DataCoverage “SIRT au meee est “Wrvattgtadespod Seon atonement enn dn, (iaapatdpr et peepee Soyo Spek ed) ‘tp staan dein rpt a
Slide 12: Competitive Landscape
Competitive Landscape Panel Robustness: LNiciceny tgs Tevision Sra | Mi comscore: Ces, ramen. Heit tiie Seu vege ee sce ogy ern hin dn, 2
Slide 13: Nielsen ONE Unmatched We Believe
Nielsen ONE Unmatched We Believe TRVISION o : iSpet.iv 3
Slide 14: Panel Robustness, Not Even Close
Panel Robustness, Not Even Close National People Panel Meter: Mobile Panel Headline Comparable _-Panel Panel Representative Size Size! Size? Size of Population? Annual Cost Nielsen 41k 41k 70k 18k Yes >$200m. oohe A eee 5k TVision amie rom 0 0 No ~$1m Nilsen) (/1600f Mets)
Slide 15: Data is Easy, Panel is Hard, Both are Required
Data is Easy, Panel is Hard, Both are Required Big data can be bought, but building a Nielsen-level panel is prohibitively expensive, we believe Very Hard & Expensive ~$200m / year Panel Robustness ~$20m ar Relatively Easy & Cheap ipod Big Data Coverage 45
Slide 16: Can Others Close the Gap?
Can Others Close the Gap? Nielsen dwarfs competitors in resources available to solve this measurement problem ‘Annual Revenues! Headcount? a frconscore viczodinp ispetiv $550 sisi ‘sim Sim Market Value (EV)? Data Scientists? st QHANIEISER — viczocitip MU comscore iSpetiv si sab som $0250 eo) ee pera
Slide 17: But Nielsen ONE Isn't Even Out Yet
But Nielsen ONE Isn’t Even Out Yet True, but logic can foretell the answer, we believe: = Advertisers care about demographics, not machines > Nielsen’s panel provides an unmatched ability to translate = Advertisers care about reach and frequency across the entire ecosystem > Only Nielsen’s panel is
Slide 18: Who Will Decide the Currency? Advertisers.
Who Will Decide the Currency? Advertisers. “Reach and frequency is foundational for marketers - we need to understand reach and frequency, and we need to understand reach and frequency not within silos, not within just a platform, not just within a TV network - we must understand reach and frequency
Slide 19: Who Decides Is Not Who Is Talking
Who Decides Is Not Who Is Talking Media companies advocating for their own “currencies” for a reason, we believe Media Cos Advertisers Deduplication to identify “waste” No YES Ease of comparability across NO ons platforms and networks Efficient transactional system 2 YES “Special Snowflake” => Highe
Slide 20: Single vs Multi-Currency Future?
Single vs Multi-Currency Future?
Slide 21: Single vs Multi-Currency Future?
Single vs Multi-Currency Future? Alternative “currencies” exist for niche use cases. Dolla still the true “Foundational Currency”. Starbucks Points Bitcoin Community Airline Miles ‘Amex Points
Slide 22: A View on Multi-Currency Future
A View on Multi-Currency Future “We fundamentally cannot have six different currencies because there’s no bandwidth to deal with it, or practically speaking, everything from planning and optimization to building and even pitch cost templates depend on currencies - and if I have one client on X and a
Slide 23: "Foundational Currency" vs Analytics
“Foundational Currency” vs Analytics Analogs we see in other ecosystems between a “Foundational Currency” and analytics “Foundational Currency” Analytics Providers Pmistenes ug eeeMeSO care oeithis ASnikeiirentne paisa Pe Pl Universal Acceptance ¢ » C Specific Applications eacucamiie 2 “Single” Sour
Slide 24: In summary, we believe:
In summary, we believe: Nielsen has unmatched capability to solve the hardest measurement problem in media ~~ Advertisers will decide oe Nielsen ONE will be the Foundational Currency for this ecosystem tl Nielsen is a world class business 2
Slide 25: II. What is Nielsen Worth?
II. What is Nielsen Worth? 25
Slide 26: The "Status Quo" Case
The “Status Quo” Case Upfront Capital Structure Ongoing Capital Structure / Allocation Operating Assumptions + 35x Net Debt/ EBITDA (current) ‘+ Buyback ~$725m in 2022 + T%of shares outstanding @ $28 + Keep leverage pegged at 35x * Our analysis assumes 100% dividend 2023s, for simplicity + Stock buy
Slide 27: Status Quo Intrinsic Value - YE 2022
Status Quo Intrinsic Value - YE 2022 = 10-year DCF of levered Distributable Free Cash Flow! (“D-FCF”) = 10% cost of equity” = Terminal growth = revenue growth 3% Revenue growth 4% Revenue growth 5% Revenue growth (Low Case) (Base Case) (High Case) $36 $52 $68 2
Slide 28: $52 as a Base Case... Really? Yes.
$52 as a Base Case... Really? Yes. Discounted Cash Flow model of D-FCF per Share and Terminal Value results in $52 intrinsic value Status Quo Base Case! for YE 2022 78 17x D-FCF = 13x EV/EBITDA = 20x P/E ee) i ; j iI 20220820 200H_~=*«COT:=CSC«CONHSCSCi028 ES ‘Adjusted EPS! a D-FCEperShare’ © Termin
Slide 29: 1. Revenue Growth
1. Revenue Growth 29
Slide 30: Why We Believe Nielsen Should Grow GDP+
Why We Believe Nielsen Should Grow GDP+ US GDP (Nominal) ~4% Premium Video Advertising = / + Nielsen ONE Currency = Pricing Power ue International + Outcomes & Gracenote + Audio = — (Diminishing) Long Tail Cable — (Diminishing) Local = @iminishing) >4% 30
Slide 31: Nielsen Media Historical Growth Rate
Nielsen Media Historical Growth Rate 4.1% average revenue growth pre-COVID-19 Revenue Growth 10% 8% 6% 4% 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 el 2021 20228 1
Slide 32: Video Ad Market Likely to Grow
Video Ad Market Likely to Grow Mid-single digit growth in total video advertising supports GDP+ revenue growth Video Advertising ($b) $20 $0 TV +CTVAd Spend 44.3% CAGR 2022-26 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
Slide 33: 2. Multiple
1. Revenue Growth 2. Multiple 3
Slide 34: DCF Implied Multiples (x on 2023)
DCF Implied Multiples (x on 2023) Intrinsic Value supports mid-teens EBITDA multiple and 20x+ P/E multiple, we believe 1 1 (rg) = —(0%-4%)— i $18 $28 $52 $60 (unaffected) (take private) (intrinsic value) __(5% yield) P / D-FCF (~$3.00) 6x ‘9x 17x 20x D-FCF (=Div) yield 11% 6% 5% P/E (~$2.20) 8x 13x
Slide 35: Relative Value Peer Multiples
Relative Value Peer Multiples Relative Value also supports mid-teens EBITDA multiple and 20x+ P/E multiple Revenue Growth (2022-2025) P/E EV / EBITDA Info Services Peerst ™% 27x 19x. 5% Growth Adjusted? 5% 25x 17x 4% Growth Adjusted? 4% 3% Growth Adjusted? 3% 20x 14x Sr i ac HSL ele Thamar _ 3s
Slide 36: We Believe the Market has been Wrong
We Believe the Market has been Wrong 26
Slide 37: Dissecting History
Dissecting History When the business was working, the stock worked too AvgEV/ AvgD-FCFto Avg Stock. EBITDA AvgRevg Shareholders Price “Glory Years” : $39 2014-16 ae 4% ee) (18x D-FCF) “Troubled Years” $24 2017-21 oe 08%, anid (24x D-FCF) Status Quo = Base Case 1x 4% ~$3.30 : 2023-2026 (eee) Sarco ig
Slide 38: A Further Perspective on History
A Further Perspective on History Excluding the Connect/Buy business at the 6x EV/EBITDA it sold for, standalone Media traded at 16x EV/EBITDA in the “Glory Years” Adjusted Media Only EV / EBITDA? Total Company EV/EBITDA 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 38 Seren ig Bh on Wi
Slide 39: Disruption = Uncertainty = Opportunity
Disruption = Uncertainty = Opportunity Unprecedented Disruption in Underlying Significant Product & Business Ecosystem ‘Transformation Under-Appreciated Business Quality Severe “Regulatory"/ Customer Challenge 2
Slide 40: Disruption = Uncertainty = Opportunity
Disruption = Uncertainty = Opportunity Multiples have doubled in situations that we consider similar Unprecedented Disruption in Underlying Significant Product & Business Ecosystem ‘Transformation etoreoig 1 ™ Re ser ox > 40x DBE. ase > 30x Severe “Regulatory"/ Customer Challenge anys oe Des co (Pos
Slide 41: "Status Quo" case is status quo
“Status Quo” case is status quo ( We estimate intrinsic value to be ~$50 per share ( D-FCF of $3.00 in 2023, and growing ( Why sell at $28? a
Slide 42: III. A Credible Path to ~$80 Per Share by 2025
III. A Credible Path to ~$80 Per Share by 2025 2
Slide 43: The "Public LBO" Case
The “Public LBO” Case Upfront Recap Ongoing Capital Structure / Allocation Operating Assumptions + Recap to 5.5x Net Debt / EBITDA ‘+ ~$3.8b capital to redeploy (including 2022 free cash flow) + Buyback 37% of shares outstanding @ $28 + Keep leverage pegged at 55x * Our analysis assumes 100% dividen
Slide 44: Immediate Impact of Public LBO
Immediate Impact of Public LBO We believe: 1. Floors the stock at $28 (nearly 40% buyback) 2. ~20% accretive to 2023 Adjusted EPS (to ~$2.50) 3. ~$4.40 of distributable FCF per share 4, Even at 10x D-FCF > $44 stock price
Slide 45: Stock Price Could Be $44 by YE 2022
Stock Price Could Be $44 by YE 2022 10x 2023 D-FCF = $44 stock price 2023 gerne” Lowe StreCount, 2023 Releeang FEF er 2078 stats Quo from 2022 Buyback? Pro Forma Distributable Adjusted EPS: Adjusted ES Free cash Flow. per share (-FCF) Seong fingen Minden Heat npr a0 8 Ren Gre “Ahmar compen ig ‘rn me
Slide 46: Public LBO Intrinsic Value - YE 2022
Public LBO Intrinsic Value - YE 2022 = 10-year DCF of levered Distributable Free Cash Flow! (D-FCF) = 11% cost of equity? = Terminal growth = revenue growth 3% Revenue growth 4% Revenue growth 5% Revenue growth (Low Case) (Base Case) (High Case) $44 $65 $86
Slide 47: Public LBO YE 2024 Intrinsic Value
Public LBO YE 2024 Intrinsic Value We believe stock price could be $80+ within 3 years, including dividends... ~3x in 3 years $120 we $108 High Case $100 $80 $60 $40 $20 s YE2019 -YE2020 -YE2021. ©»: YE2022. © E2023. «YE 2024 Se Baer angen Winder nen hr shew vp 228 EI ale me P18 mo eA EC tre Scr lsh
Slide 48: 1. Leverage
1. Leverage 2. Timing 8
Slide 49: EBITDA Headroom in Historical Context
EBITDA Headroom in Historical Context Media EBITDA ($m) With 55x leverage, Nielsen’s business can sustain a ~45% drop in EBITDA ‘With 3.5x leverage, Nielsen’s business can sustain a ~60% drop in EBITDA 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 20228 Seog fing ETD 6 en ETA 2085
Slide 50: 2. Timing
1. Leverage 2. Timing 50
Slide 51: How Long Until Stock = Intrinsic Value?
How Long Until Stock = Intrinsic Value? Catalysts to close the gap to intrinsic value can be realized in the next 2-3 years, we believe MRC re-accreditation MSD growth Commitment to shareholder distributions Nielsen ONE “Normalized” margins & FCF conversion Major contracts renewed “post-noise” YE202
Slide 52: Public LBO Considerations
Public LBO Considerations = Higher leverage = higher financial risk (but less than Private LBO) = UK statutory limitations on distributions likely require procedural steps (capital reduction, scheme of arrangement) = BUT, we believe: = Achievable * Less disruptive than full take-private = FAR better
Slide 53: Public LBO allows for ~40% buyback immediately
Public LBO allows for ~40% buyback immediately ——S ~$4.40 D-FCF per share in 2023, and growing oa Stock price can be ~$45 within a year, ~$80 in three years — Why sell at $28? $3
Slide 54: IV. Further Thoughts on $28 Per Share
IV. Further Thoughts on $28 Per Share st
Slide 55: Illustrative 5-Year LBO IRRs
Illustrative 5-Year LBO IRRs ‘APrivate LBO at $28 transfers ~$13b of value from today’s shareholders to the consortium versus a Public LBO by our estimate < a = a a — S is} 1 a ee fl = * Sg 10x 13x Entry Price $28 $30 $35 $40 27% 21% 12% 5% 35% 31% 23% 16% 41% 37% 29% 23%
Slide 56: 60% Premium but off Historically Low Price
60% Premium but off Historically Low Price ee ee ee Mov Avs. —_ Events " af My S2Aoffer price y= Soc bern 08
Slide 57: Unaffected $17.51 in Context
Unaffected $17.51 in Context Even clearer to us now that market was wrong to price Nielsen at $17.51... ~$111b ses 95% of EV was debt financeable when stock price was $1751 Private LBO Unaffected Nielsen EV Committed Debt Financing at $1751 Sarco igen Witt 57
Slide 58: $28 Isn't Close to Our Estimate of Fair Value
$28 Isn’t Close to Our Estimate of Fair Value We believe Nielsen’s intrinsic value is well north of $40 per share $28 offer price $55 average YE2022 DCF - Public LBO 5.5x Lev? YE2022 DCF - Public Recap 4.5x Lev? $52 ‘YE2022 DCF - Status Quo 3.5x Lev? $53 $48 @ se
Slide 59: Nor Close to Even Low End of Our Ranges
Nor Close to Even Low End of Our Ranges We believe Nielsen’s intrinsic value is well north of $40 per share $28 offer price $55 average YE2022 DCF - Public LBO 5.5x Lev* YE2022 DCF - Public Recap 4.5x Lev? YE2022 DCF - Status Quo 3.5x Lev? Comps - Info Services - P / E* ge Copmefiten Winder ‘i Sonic
Slide 60: For $28 to be Intrinsic Value
For $28 to be Intrinsic Value We estimate you have to believe: = 2% revenue growth = Flat margins = 8% capex to revenue = 3.0x leverage peg = No value from buybacks or capital deployment We don't believe a single one of those assumptions is appropriate, let alone all ©
Slide 61: Why We Don't Fear the Deal Break
Why We Don’t Fear the Deal Break If the business can support a 7x leverage Private LBO, it can support a 5.5x leverage Public LBO = ~40% Buyback @ $28 > should floor the stock = ~$4.40 D-FCF per share in 2023 = ~16% yield on $28, and growing = Credible path to ~$80 stock by 2025 = This is not a brok
Slide 62: We believe:
We believe: Nielsen has an unmatched ability to solve the hardest measurement problem in media ( Nielsen is a world class business ( Intrinsic value of the stock today is ~$50 ( There is a credible path to ~$80 by 2025 ( $28 per share isn’t even close to fair value a
Slide 63: V. Appendix
V, Appendix e
Slide 64: DCF Methodology
DCF Methodology = 10-year Discounted Cash Flow of Distributable Free Cash Flow per share = Our calculation of Distributable Free Cash Flow (D-FCF): = Starts with Adjusted Net Income as defined by Company filings * Deducts capex instead of depreciation * Deducts stock compensation, restructuring and
Slide 65: "Status Quo" & 3% Revenue Growth
“Status Quo”! & 3% Revenue Growth? Discounted Cash Flow model of D-FCF per Share and Terminal Value results in $36 intrinsic value at YE 2022 ‘Terminal Forward Multipiest $19 Lax D-FCR 2 11x EV/EBITDA 15xP/E 5259 78 9280 296 S304 ii i 2082004, 20620272028 702908) 2032 = Adjusted EPS* FperShare* "Ter
Slide 66: "Status Quo" & 4% Revenue Growth
“Status Quo”! & 4% Revenue Growth” Discounted Cash Flow model of D-FCF per Share and Terminal Value results in $52 intrinsic value at YE 2022 ‘Terminal Forward Multipies* $78 ieD-Fcr 2 13x V/EB1TDA = 20xP/8 5 Siz S10 ys ee ee 2082004, 2026 202720282029 2080 i | = Adjusted EPS* FFperShare® Terminal V
Slide 67: "Status Quo" & 5% Revenue Growth
“Status Quo”! & 5% Revenue Growth? Discounted Cash Flow model of D-FCF per Share and Terminal Value results in $68 intrinsic value at YE 2022 ‘Terminal forward Multinles* $113 20x D-FCR 16x EV/EB1TDA 2 25x P/E 202004, 2026 2027,=2028 202908) a= 2032 Adjusted FFperShare* "Terminal Value Snoopy ingen
Slide 68: "Public LBO" & 3% Revenue Growth
“Public LBO”! & 3% Revenue Growth” Discounted Cash Flow model of D-FCF per Share and Terminal Value results in $44 intrinsic value at YE 2022 es) 13eD-Fcr 2 11x EV/EBITDA 2 16x P/E 202004, 2026 2027,=2028 202908) a= 2032 = Adjusted EPS™ FFperShare* Terminal Value erm nied Pcp ponent rote ‘Aileen pon
Slide 69: "Public LBO" & 4% Revenue Growth
“Public LBO”! & 4% Revenue Growth? Discounted Cash Flow model of D-FCF per Share and Terminal Value results in $65 intrinsic value at YE 2022 7) Lax D-FCR = 14x EV/EB1TDA 2 UxP/E il I ‘ | | 202004, 2026 2027,=2028 202908) a= 2032 = Adjusted EPS™ FperShare* Terminal Value erm nied Peep pon ree ote ‘A
Slide 70: Exhibit
Exhibit 2 The WindAcre Partnership LLC April 26, 2022 Corporate Speakers: Snehal Amin; The WindAcre Partnership LLC; Founder PRESENTATION Snehal Amin: Good morning, everyone. And thank you for joining. I'm Snehal Amin, founder of The WindAcre Partnership and I welcome the chance to share our view of
Slide 71: Exhibit
Exhibit 4 Item 4. PURPOSE OF THE TRANSACTION Item 4 of the Schedule 13D is hereby amended and supplemented to add the following: On April 26, 2022, WindAcre hosted an investor webcast to outline the business and valuation case for the Issuer and why it opposes the proposed acquisition of the Issuer