Radius Health — Proxy Contest (June 2022)
112 slides from Radius Health's proxy contest presentation, Jun 21, 2022
Slide 1: Board Reconstitution is Necessary to Fix Radius Health, Inc.
June 2022 Board Reconstitution is Necessary to Fix Radius Health, Inc. Velan Velan Capital Capital Investment Investment Management Management LP LP & Repertoire & Repertoire Partners Partners LP LP – ALL – ALL RIGHTS RIGHTS RESERVED RESERVED 1
Slide 2: Disclosure & Disclaimer
Disclosure & Disclaimer This presentation and any of the information contained herein (this “Presentation”) is for discussion and general informational purposes only. This Presentation does not have regard for the specific investment objective, financial situation, suitability or the particular need
Slide 3: Table of Contents
Table of Contents ▪ Executive Summary 4 ▪ Stockholder & Governance Issues ― Poor Corporate Governance and Entrenchment Tactics 40 ― Shifting Business Strategy and Lack of Oversight 45 ― Highly Inter-Connected Board 49 ▪ Stagnating Commercial Performance for TYMLOS and Trapped Cash Flow ― Market Over
Slide 4: Executive Summary
Executive Summary Velan Capital Investment Management LP & Repertoire Partners LP – ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 4
Slide 5: The Velan-Repertoire Group
The Velan-Repertoire Group Velan Capital and Repertoire Partners (“Velan‐Repertoire,” the “Group,” or “we”) owns 7.7% of Radius Health, Inc. (“Radius,” “RDUS” or the “Company”) with economic exposure to approximately 10.1% of the outstanding shares, making us a top five stockholder As experienced in
Slide 6: Highly-Qualified, Independent Nominees
Highly-Qualified, Independent Nominees We believe Ms. MacDougall’s knowledge in corporate governance and operational matters will add experience that is critically lacking at the Board level for Radius ▪ Ms. MacDougall had a long career as a Partner managing legal, operational and strategy matters a
Slide 7: Overview of Radius Health
Overview of Radius Health Radius Health (NASDAQ: RDUS) is a global biopharmaceutical company focused on addressing unmet medical needs in the areas of bone health, neuroscience, and oncology ▪ In April 2017, the Company’s first commercial product, TYMLOS (abaloparatide) injection, was approved by th
Slide 8: Financial Snapshot
Financial Snapshot $ in Millions 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022(1) TYMLOS 12 99 173 208 219 232 Collaboration/License 10 0 0 30 11 0 Total Revenue $22 $99 $173 $239 $230 $232 Gross Profit $21 $91 $157 $221 $211 OpEx 68 88 108 153 128 SBC 15 12 9 7 6 R&D $83 $100 $117 $160 $135 OpEx 166 167 138 126 11
Slide 9: Stock Price: The Simplest Scorecard
Stock Price: The Simplest Scorecard STOCK PERFORMANCE SINCE BECOMING PUBLIC ▪ Radius has underperformed Catherine Friedman and across nearly every relevant Jean-Pierre Garnier measurable period since becoming public June 6, 2014 Andrew C. ▪ This underperformance is von Eschenbach applicable both on
Slide 10: Performance vs. Peer Group
Performance vs. Peer Group ▪ We analyzed the performance returns of Radius’ 2020 publicly traded peer group(1), which consists of 18 companies ▪ Since Mr. Martin assumed the role of CEO, the peer group’s average total return has significantly outperformed his track record ▪ Five of the 18 companies
Slide 11: Strategic Blunders by Radius Board
Strategic Blunders by Radius Board SUBPAR COMMERCIAL EXECUTION (despite only a single commercial product) DISPROPORTIONATELY HIGH ACCUMULATED LOSSES (bad operations management and bad capital allocation) DISMAL STOCK PERFORMANCE (both absolute and relative) FINANCIAL DECISIONS THAT DEFY BASIC PRINCI
Slide 12: Targeted Directors Failed Stockholders
Targeted Directors Failed Stockholders Andrew C. von Eschenbach, M.D. Catherine J. Friedman Jean-Pierre Garnier, Ph.D Date Joined as Director January 2021 August 2015 December 2015 (Tenure) (1.5 Years) (~7 Years) (6.5 Years) TSR During Tenure -54% -88% -85% % Share Ownership <0.1% <0.1% <0.1% (Exclu
Slide 13: Why we Believe Change is Needed at Radius
Why we Believe Change is Needed at Radius 1) Flawed commercialization strategy ▪ Radius is siphoning cash flow produced from TYMLOS and redirecting it towards RAD011 high‐risk programs that we believe lack strategic fit and financial merit ▪ In our view, TYMLOS remains an underutilized asset despite
Slide 14: Our Nominees Bring Diverse Skill Sets
Our Nominees Bring Diverse Skill Sets ✓ Our Nominees would bring much-needed skills to the Radius Board from operational experience to governance expertise and are fully independent of Velan-Repertoire and Radius ✓ Our Nominees’ backgrounds are highly complementary with each adding unique insight wi
Slide 15: Our Nominees’ Experience with Activism
Our Nominees’ Experience with Activism Our Nominees are familiar with activism and changes in the boardroom, and their ability to lead during these times has generated significant returns for stockholders ▪ Board change began in early 2019 – new ▪ Dr. Ende and Ms. MacDougall joined the Chairman of t
Slide 16: Our Engagement with Radius
Our Engagement with Radius ➔ Since 2020, we have engaged extensively with the Company (more than 10 telephonic meetings) ― Consistent with our approach as long-term investors in the healthcare sector, we trust boards and management teams until they have given us a compelling reason not to ➔ Unfortun
Slide 17: Stockholder Support for Board Change
Stockholder Support for Board Change ▪ On June 16th, Rubric Capital Management LP (Radius’ second largest stockholder) publicly endorsed our Nominees while outlining value enhancing initiatives and expressing significant concerns regarding the Company and its corporate governance ― Our strategic pla
Slide 18: Culture of Entrenchment
Culture of Entrenchment ▪ The Board lacks alignment with stockholders which we believe is exemplified by the lack of direct stock ownership ― ~0.20%(1) SHARE OWNERSHIP FOR TOTAL BOARD ▪ Despite this lack of alignment with stockholders, the incumbents have insulated themselves ― Radius maintains a cl
Slide 19: Lack of Oversight of CEO Martin
Lack of Oversight of CEO Martin OCTOBER 2020 $30 DECEMBER 8, 2021 Strategy Committee, of APRIL 28, 2020 which Ms. Friedman and Announced transdermal patch Dr. Garnier represent two phase 3 results did not meet CEO Martin joined of the three members, is primary endpoint $25 Radius; receives dissolved
Slide 20: Current Situation for TYMLOS
Current Situation for TYMLOS 1 TYMLOS’ growth profile is rapidly decelerating 2 We are confident having spoken with numerous medical experts that TYMLOS is a differentiated asset, yet it is losing market share 3 Radius has significantly cut its commercial headcount (lack of support/resources) since
Slide 21: The Illusion of Productivity
The Illusion of Productivity We believe the Company is reducing headcount to provide the illusion of increased productivity; we find this disingenuous since this metric should show an increasing ramp when a commercial product is in growth mode to drive sales for a company vs. what Radius is doing by
Slide 22: TYMLOS Growth Strategy Under the Board
TYMLOS Growth Strategy Under the Board ▪ Radius claims “The Velan and Repertoire ‘Path Forward’ is, in fact, all things that Radius has already initiated under the current leadership team”, but let’s look at their execution of this strategy ― TYMLOS’ commercialization has been abysmal since CEO Mart
Slide 23: Changing Business Strategy with RAD011
Changing Business Strategy with RAD011 ▪ Once grounded in its endocrinology expertise (TYMLOS), Radius’ focus shifted to neurology with RAD011 ― The Board has permitted Radius to move away from the strength of TYMLOS and into new areas that instead cater to CEO Martin’s background in neurodegenerati
Slide 24: Capital Invested vs. Current EV
Capital Invested vs. Current EV 1 Capital invested under Radius’ leadership has resulted in meaningful value destruction over the long term 2 The Company has spent over $1 billion in R&D and produced only one approved product 3 We have zero confidence in the Board’s ability to strategically deploy c
Slide 25: Financial Mismanagement
Financial Mismanagement TRANSACTION OVERVIEW ▪ In March 2021, Radius announced a $175M financing to repurchase $112.2M of principal amount of convertible notes due September 2024 ▪ The convertible note initial conversion rate was $48.81 per share of common stock ― At the time of the deal, the stock
Slide 26: Accumulated Deficit and NOLs
Accumulated Deficit and NOLs IT IS APPARENT RADIUSRADIUS’ IS NOT NOL STRATEGYTHE RIGHT STRATEGIES PRIORITIZING ▪ During the 4Q 2021 earnings announcement, Mr. Martin stated that the Company wanted to “crystalize the value of the previously generated $1.7 billion in NOLs for the company through the P
Slide 27: Thoughts from Investors and Analysts
Thoughts from Investors and Analysts The XBI (SPDR S&P Biotech ETF) will be rebalanced in June based on the closing of values on May 31, 2022 – Radius is at risk of being excluded from the index given the decline of its market cap (an exclusion criteria when the float-adjusted market cap falls below
Slide 28: Minimal Value Attributed to RAD011
Minimal Value Attributed to RAD011 ▪ We believe our viewpoint is backed up with the de minimis to negative value ascribed to RAD011 by sell side research analysts ▪ In our view the limited data and lack of strategic fit does not justify the R&D expense or clinical risk Bank of America research note
Slide 29: Value Destroyed Under Incumbent Board
Value Destroyed Under Incumbent Board LEADERSHIP UNDER THE INCUMBENT BOARD 2015 PEAK MARKET CAPITALIZATION vs. CURRENT DAY(1) ▪ Ms. Friedman and Dr. Garnier have been on $ in Millions the Board since 2015 ▪ Both have been members of the Board for over 6 years ▪ Given our experience as investors and
Slide 30: The Board is Highly Inter-Connected
The Board is Highly Inter-Connected FIVE OF EIGHT(1) TOTAL BOARD MEMBERS HIGHLY INTER-CONNECTED FROM PAST EXPERIENCES Current director Current director Current Chairman Owen Hughes Chairman Andrew C. von Eschenbach(2) Director G. Kelly Martin President & CEO Former CEO Machelle Sanders(2) Sean Murph
Slide 31: Problematic Board Needing Refreshment
Problematic Board Needing Refreshment ▪ It is apparent the Board is in need of fresh perspectives and stockholder alignment ― Directors up for re-election: Catherine Friedman, Jean-Pierre Garnier, and Andrew C. von Eschenbach ▪ Low stock ownership levels and a history of seeming complacency or dropp
Slide 32: How Our Strategy Differs From Radius
How Our Strategy Differs From Radius ▪ Radius continues to boast that net revenue per commercial employee is increasing, but Radius is achieving this by cutting commercial headcount ― Feedback from physicians highlights that a starved commercial organization is hurting Radius ▪ Cash flow produced fr
Slide 33: Our Strategic Initiatives
Our Strategic Initiatives WE BELIEVE CHANGE IS NEEDED TO MAXIMIZE STOCKHOLDER VALUE Areas of Focus Our Perspective ▪ Focus on commercialization efforts to increase patient conversion rates and prolong duration of therapy Reinvigorate TYMLOS ▪ Strengthen and improve marketing efforts to highlight the
Slide 34: Reinvigorating TYMLOS
Reinvigorating TYMLOS CURRENT SITUATION FOR TYMLOS ▪ Patient conversion rates – the conversion rate today is suboptimal, a 1% improvement in this metric would drive an additional $4.5M in revenue (potential revenue upside of an additional $90M) ▪ Duration of therapy – the average number of pens is c
Slide 35: Path to Monetizing Elacestrant
Path to Monetizing Elacestrant ▪ Management has stated the intent of directing future cash flows to Radius creditors and stockholders ▪ However, we believe the Company must now be more transparent on outlining and defining potential scenarios to monetizing this asset ― CEO Martin has stated(1) that
Slide 36: Pivot Away from RAD011
Pivot Away from RAD011 ▪ We do not want the Company to focus all its efforts on a single commercial product (TYMLOS) and we fully believe in proper diversification, but from a R&D standpoint, RAD011 does not appear to be the solution for Radius or its stockholders ▪ RAD011 is a pivot away from endoc
Slide 37: $100M+ of Annual Adjusted EBITDA
$100M+ of Annual Adjusted EBITDA ▪ The goal of reaching what we believe Radius can produce from an annual adjusted EBITDA standpoint may not even require TYMLOS’ annual revenue to scale near-term to $300M ― The table below was presented by the Company during the second quarter earnings conference ca
Slide 38: Maximizing Value for Stockholders
Maximizing Value for Stockholders 1 We believe there are opportunities to reinvigorate TYMLOS – this will drive significant stockholder value by maximizing the full potential of the asset 2 By monetizing Elacestrant, Radius will pivot its capital structure towards a position of strength moving forwa
Slide 39: Vote the White Card
Vote the White Card ▪ To Fight… ▪ To Support… Dismal share price performance and Our superior path forward which looks to significant value destruction redefine and optimize the current trajectory The status quo and poor track record of the of Radius in order to unlock substantial incumbent Bo
Slide 40: Poor Corporate Governance and Entrenchment Tactics
Stockholder & Governance Issues Poor Corporate Governance and Entrenchment Tactics Velan Capital Investment Management LP & Repertoire Partners LP – ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 40
Slide 41: Board Has No Real Skin in the Game
Board Has No Real Skin in the Game ▪ The Board(1) lacks alignment with stockholders which we believe is exemplified by the lack of direct stock ownership through open market buying ▪ ~0.20%(2) OWNERSHIP FOR TOTAL BOARD… Board Member Director Since Approximate Age Ownership (% of Total)(2) Committees
Slide 42: Corporate Entrenchment
Corporate Entrenchment ▪ Stockholders are prohibited from calling special meetings or acting by written consent ― Stockholders cannot seek Board change between annual meetings ― In addition, certain stockholder-unfriendly provisions in the Charter and all Bylaw provisions may only be amended by a pr
Slide 43: Entrenchment Tactics
Entrenchment Tactics ▪ On May 18, 2022, Radius unilaterally appointed two new directors ― Jennifer A. Jarrett (Class I) and Susan Vissers Lisa (Class III) ▪ The expanded Board now consists of ten directors, nine of which the Company claims are independent ― “Six of the Company’s current directors, i
Slide 44: Compensation Plan for Mr. Martin
Compensation Plan for Mr. Martin ▪ On February 21, 2022, the Board, upon the recommendation of the Compensation Committee of the Board, approved an increase in the base salary and an award of performance-based restricted stock units (PSU) to Mr. Martin ― The new compensation plan includes 960,000 PS
Slide 45: Shifting Business Strategy and Lack of Oversight
Stockholder & Governance Issues Shifting Business Strategy and Lack of Oversight Velan Capital Investment Management LP & Repertoire Partners LP – ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 45
Slide 46: Mr. Martin’s World
Mr. Martin’s World SHIFTING STRATEGY TO SUIT MR. MARTIN’S EXPERTISE ▪ We believe the Board has positioned the Company to suit Mr. Martin’s interests at the expense of the Company’s best interests ▪ We find it concerning that what was once a company grounded in its endocrinology expertise (TYMLOS) wh
Slide 47: Changing Business Strategy
Changing Business Strategy ▪ TYMLOS overlaps between RAD011 ACQUISITION – JANUARY 2021 endocrinology, rheumatology, and orthopedics ― PWS was the only indication that was clearly disclosed at the time of the acquisition of RAD011 in January 2021 ― The Company positioned RAD011 and the PWS indication
Slide 48: 2020 Corporate Goals
2020 Corporate Goals ▪ Completing the acquisition of RAD011 helped to satisfy the goal of “execute in-licensing, partnership, or acquisition to expand endocrinology pipeline” ― We find RAD011 significantly misrepresented as an “endocrinology” asset in order to satisfy corporate goals and to extract
Slide 49: Highly Inter-Connected Board
Stockholder & Governance Issues Highly Inter-Connected Board Velan Capital Investment Management LP & Repertoire Partners LP – ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 49
Slide 50: Kelly Martin’s Resume
Kelly Martin’s Resume ▪ When Mr. Martin joined the Company in 2020, his experience read well on paper ― Chief Executive Officer of Elan Corporation plc from 2003 to 2012 ― Chief Executive Officer of Malin Corporation PLC from August 2015 to October 2017 ― Chief Executive Officer of Novan, Inc. from
Slide 51: What is “Independence”
What is “Independence” THE BOARD ROOM IS FULL OF FRIENDS Definitive proxy (DEF14) – Filed 04/22/2021 “Our Board has affirmatively determined that each of Willard H. Dere, M.D., Catherine J. Friedman, Jean-Pierre Garnier, Ph.D., Owen Hughes, Sean Murphy, Machelle Sanders and Andrew C. von Eschenbach,
Slide 52: Mr. Martin’s Poor Track Record at Other Companies
Mr. Martin’s Poor Track Record at Other Companies MALIN TAKEAWAYS ▪ Mr. Martin was a co-founder of Malin and became the company’s CEO in August 2015 in order to be responsible for the day-to-day operations ▪ The Belfast Telegraph reported “When Irish people hear the world 'Malin', they think 'North'
Slide 53: History at Elan
History at Elan ▪ Mr. Martin’s tenure at Elan is exemplified by a volatile and problematic history ― Elan faced a long-running history of stockholder dissatisfaction with management along with serious concerns for conflicts of interest, poor corporate governance, lack of transparency, and the board’
Slide 54: Key Takeaways
Key Takeaways 1 The Board’s recent addition of new members demonstrates that there was a need for a change; however, the incumbents have further entrenched themselves to the detriment of stockholders by making unilateral decisions on the future of the Company 2 By expanding the Board from eight to t
Slide 55: Market Overview
Stagnating Commercial Performance for TYMLOS and Trapped Cash Flow Market Overview Velan Capital Investment Management LP & Repertoire Partners LP – ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 55
Slide 56: Market Overview & TYMLOS Introduction
Market Overview & TYMLOS Introduction ▪ In May 2017, Radius launched TYMLOS (Abaloparatide), its first commercial product in the U.S. for postmenopausal women with osteoporosis at high risk for fracture ― TYMLOS is a once-daily subcutaneous (commonly referred to as “SQ” or “SC”) injection ― With the
Slide 57: Patient Journey for TYMLOS
Patient Journey for TYMLOS ▪ The chart to the right shows a simplified version of key components involved in driving TYMLOS net revenue ▪ Beginning at the top of the funnel, (1) new patient enrollments is one of the key metrics involved in the assessment of the business ▪ From there, the funnel prog
Slide 58: Market Landscape
Market Landscape ▪ TYMLOS has continued to MAINTAIN its share in the market over the past few years even with the strong launch of EVENITY in 2019 ― In our view, simply MAINTAINING is not enough ― Our conversations with medical experts lead us to believe that TYMLOS is a unique asset when compared a
Slide 59: U.S. Anabolic Market
U.S. Anabolic Market ▪ Since its launch, EVENITY has expanded the U.S. anabolic market, highlighted by the increase in number of patient months on therapy (PMOT) and YoY growth rates ― This strong launch has decreased the growth outlook for TYMLOS as new patient enrollments are being siphoned off to
Slide 60: TYMLOS vs. FORTEO
TYMLOS vs. FORTEO ▪ Based on conversations with numerous medical experts, we are confident that TYMLOS is a differentiated asset ― Every doctor we spoke with mentioned that they would prefer to use TYMLOS over FORTEO given the significant difference in pricing ― We see further opportunity to scale r
Slide 61: TYMLOS vs. EVENITY
TYMLOS vs. EVENITY ▪ Amgen’s commercial execution is driving significant revenue growth for EVENITY since its launch ― EVENITY’s success and penetration into the anabolic market has become a headwind for TYMLOS ▪ While there are nuances with different coverage categories that can play a role in the
Slide 62: Current Situation Under the Incumbent Board
Stagnating Commercial Performance for TYMLOS and Trapped Cash Flow Current Situation Under the Incumbent Board Velan Capital Investment Management LP & Repertoire Partners LP – ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 62
Slide 63: Current Situation at Radius
Current Situation at Radius CURRENT TRAJECTORY FOR TYMLOS AND RADIUS ▪ Radius guided to TYMLOS net revenue of $232M in 2022 ― This implies a ~5.9% YoY growth compared to the ~5.1% growth rate experienced from 2020 to 2021 ▪ Takeaway: TYMLOS net revenue growth is in steady state under the current Boa
Slide 64: Lack of Commercial Focus
Lack of Commercial Focus WE QUESTION THE BOARD’S OVERSIGHT OF MR. MARTIN’S COMMERCIAL EXECUTION ▪ During the RAD011 R&D day in April 2022, Mr. Martin stated that he spends roughly 50% of his time on TYMLOS and the remainder of his time is spent focusing on RAD011 and Elacestrant (R&D program that wa
Slide 65: TYMLOS’ Trapped Potential
TYMLOS’ Trapped Potential ▪ It has been almost five years since the commercial launch of TYMLOS….yet there is still significant room for improvement in key operating metrics ▪ While we are disappointed that Mr. Martin did not understand osteoporosis before joining as CEO, what is even more concernin
Slide 66: How Can Radius Scale TYMLOS’ Revenue?
Stagnating Commercial Performance for TYMLOS and Trapped Cash Flow How Can Radius Scale TYMLOS’ Revenue? Velan Capital Investment Management LP & Repertoire Partners LP – ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 66
Slide 67: TYMLOS: An Asset Taken for Granted
TYMLOS: An Asset Taken for Granted 1) We believe that TYMLOS is a differentiated and durable asset in the marketplace with true demand from a patient and demographic standpoint – but the Board is asleep at the wheel 2) Instead of maximizing TYMLOS’ value for stockholders, the Board has let CEO Marti
Slide 68: TYMLOS Revenue Opportunity
TYMLOS Revenue Opportunity INCREMENTAL REVENUE OPPORTUNITY 1 Patient Conversion Rate ▪ Based on Mr. Martin’s comments that show the conversion rate today is suboptimal, a 1% improvement in this metric would drive an additional $4.5M in revenue ― Assuming TYMLOS currently stands at 55-60% today and a
Slide 69: Reinvigorating TYMLOS
Reinvigorating TYMLOS ▪ We believe management is not pushing to maximize the full potential of this asset, exemplified by its 2022 single digit growth outlook for revenue while FORTEO is losing market share and EVENITY is growing rapidly ― We want the future of TYMLOS to go from MAINTAIN to REINVIGO
Slide 70: Commercial Analysis and Improvements
Commercial Analysis and Improvements Management has highlighted that the patient journey is very administrative, but this process is foundational to improving the conversion rate of getting patients on TYMLOS and prolonging the duration of therapy Radius Pass(1) and the specialty pharmacy distributi
Slide 71: Path to Significant Cash Flow
Path to Significant Cash Flow FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE ▪ Based on financials provided from Radius, the Company has shown that the TYMLOS business can already produce $100M+ of annual adjusted EBITDA ― This is not the current reality today since management is also pursuing RAD011, which we believe is
Slide 72: NOL Value Realization
Stagnating Commercial Performance for TYMLOS and Trapped Cash Flow NOL Value Realization Velan Capital Investment Management LP & Repertoire Partners LP – ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 72
Slide 73: Crystallizing NOLs
Crystallizing NOLs WHAT DOES PRIORITIZING PRIORITIZING TYMLOS RADIUS’ ALSO TYMLOS NOL STRATEGY ALLOW ACCOMPLISHES RADIUSGOAL ANOTHER TO ALSO FORDO? RADIUS ▪ During the 4Q 2021 earnings announcement, Mr. Martin stated that the Company wanted to “crystalize the value of the previously generated $1.7 b
Slide 74: Crystallizing NOLs (cont.)
Crystallizing NOLs (cont.) We believe the simplest and most certain way to crystallize an NOL strategy, especially when Radius has such a large NOL balance, is to produce significant cash flow in order to realize the maximum benefits THIRD QUARTER EARNINGS CALL – 11/05/2020 Jessica Fye (JPM) asked,
Slide 75: Background and History
Misguided Corporate Strategy for RAD011 Background and History Velan Capital Investment Management LP & Repertoire Partners LP – ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 75
Slide 76: RAD011 Background
RAD011 Background DEAL ECONOMICS AND INITITAL EXPECATATIONS ▪ In January 2021, the Company acquired a synthetic cannabidiol (CBD) oral solution from Benuvia Therapeutics “On an operating basis, the Company believes ― Under the terms of the agreement, the program was the combination of a rationalized
Slide 77: Contentious History
Contentious History BACKGROUND ON THE ASSET ▪ Benuvia Therapeutics acquired the CBD asset out of Insys Therapeutics, Inc’s bankruptcy ▪ Insys filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in June 2019 ▪ After this, Benuvia acquired the CBD asset and the manufacturing plant in August 2019 ▪ We believe that Benuvia
Slide 78: Takeaways from R&D Day
Misguided Corporate Strategy for RAD011 Takeaways from R&D Day Velan Capital Investment Management LP & Repertoire Partners LP – ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 78
Slide 79: RAD011 R&D Day
RAD011 R&D Day ▪ Given the strategic pivot towards RAD011, Radius hosted an R&D day on April 5, 2022 to provide an overview on Prader-Willi syndrome and Angelman syndrome as well as the science, regulatory, and clinical translation progress since the acquisition ▪ Prior to this event, we conducted a
Slide 80: RAD011 Intellectual Property
RAD011 Intellectual Property ▪ Radius has painted the picture that RAD011 will have a straightforward IP path ▪ “IP and exclusivity positioning indicates freedom to operate in RAD011 target indications” OUR PERSPECTIVE ▪ Based on our discussions with IP experts, we believe the IP position for RAD011
Slide 81: Our Conclusions of RAD011
Our Conclusions of RAD011 1 In our view, Radius can unlock significant stockholder value by focusing on true synergistic areas to TYMLOS and avoiding further cash burn on indications with low-probability weighted expected returns 2 We believe the data produced to date does not justify committing ten
Slide 82: Significant Lack of Confidence in PWS
Misguided Corporate Strategy for RAD011 Significant Lack of Confidence in PWS Velan Capital Investment Management LP & Repertoire Partners LP – ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 82
Slide 83: Our Thoughts on PWS
Our Thoughts on PWS PWS HAS FACED MANY CHALLENGES ▪ We acknowledge that within the PWS market, there is an unmet medical need to treat hyperphagia ― However, we believe that the likelihood of success in a timely fashion at a reasonable cost is very low given the paucity of data from the Phase 2 stud
Slide 84: PWS Placebo Response
PWS Placebo Response LOW CONVICTION DIRECTIONAL TREND ▪ In the case of the previous Phase 2 PWS study, Radius needed to exclude the placebo responder to promote that the placebo group experienced a 0.0-point reduction vs. the 6.5-point reduction in the treatment arm ― The new Phase 2/3 (SCOUT-015)(1
Slide 85: PWS Placebo Response (cont.)
PWS Placebo Response (cont.) CHANGES TO STUDY THAT WE DO NOT BELIEVE WILL MAKE A MEANINGFUL DIFFERENCE ▪ For the new Phase 2/3 study, Radius hopes to reduce placebo response and variability in the new study by focusing patient recruitment on more severe patients who have an HQ-CT ≥ 13, lengthening t
Slide 86: PWS Safety Concerns
PWS Safety Concerns ▪ In the previous Phase 2 study, two out of seven patients had to be dose titrated given tolerability issues(1) ― These two patients were in the treatment arm and the dose was lowered to 30 mg/kg/day ▪ The Company’s new Phase 2 safety and tolerability study will focus the doses o
Slide 87: PWS Timeline Expectations
PWS Timeline Expectations ▪ We believe Radius has misled investors with false expectations from a timing standpoint ― During the acquisition, top-line readout was initially targeted for 2023 ▪ Top-line results are now projected to occur in 4Q 2024 (first patient to be dosed in 3Q 2022) ▪ Along with
Slide 88: Costs for PWS Study
Costs for PWS Study ▪ We believe when Radius announced the acquisition of RAD011, the Company was not transparent as it relates to future R&D spend for RAD011 (see table below presented by the Company during the initial acquisition) ▪ At the time of the deal, looking forward to 2022 and 2023, R&D sp
Slide 89: Too Late to the Game
Misguided Corporate Strategy for RAD011 Too Late to the Game Velan Capital Investment Management LP & Repertoire Partners LP – ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 89
Slide 90: Our Thoughts on Angelman Syndrome
Our Thoughts on Angelman Syndrome TOO LATE TO THE GAME ▪ In the case of Angelman syndrome (AS), the clinical rationale is based on more of the general effects that CBD’s have on various epilepsies ― This is being extrapolated to AS ▪ The failure of a proof-of-concept (POC) study with CBD in Infantil
Slide 91: Infantile Spasms Failure
Infantile Spasms Failure ▪ In addition to PWS and AS, the third indication Radius is planning to target is Infantile Spams (IS) ― The Company is targeting a Phase 2 study in IS, with the primary goal of spasm resolution ― Costs: unspecified program costs currently ▪ Cole Ikkala (Business Operations,
Slide 92: Our Takeaways for AS
Our Takeaways for AS ▪ RAD011 has never been studied before in patients with Angelman syndrome ― Again, we question what has given Radius the confidence to leap-frog into a Phase 3 study and spend millions of dollars given this alarming reality ▪ Lack of dose finding study that looked specifically a
Slide 93: Costs and Timing for AS Study
Costs and Timing for AS Study ▪ During the R&D day call, Radius stated that the AS study would represent a $25M investment over the next two years based on the timeline for the Phase 3 study ― Again, we are left disappointed by the lack of transparency as it relates to R&D costs ― Does this represen
Slide 94: Credit Mismanagement and Financial Blunder
Inefficient Financial Management Credit Mismanagement and Financial Blunder Velan Capital Investment Management LP & Repertoire Partners LP – ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 94
Slide 95: Financial Mismanagement
Financial Mismanagement TRANSACTION OVERVIEW ▪ In March 2021, Radius announced a $175M financing to repurchase $112.2M of principal amount of convertible notes due September 2024, representing approximately 37% of the outstanding 2024 notes ― $175M facility, consisting of $150M term loan, which incl
Slide 96: Poor Decision Making
Poor Decision Making WHY WE VIEW THIS FINANCING AS A STRATEGIC BLUNDER 1) Radius took on guaranteed and secured debt with substantially all of the assets and any future subsidiaries 2) The convertible notes that were repurchased were unsecured obligations 3) The term loan matures (June 2024) before
Slide 97: One Step at a Time
One Step at a Time WE BELIEVE RADIUS MUST PRIORITIZE PRODUCING SIGNIFICANT CASH FLOW ▪ The strategy we have outlined to REINVIGORATE TYMLOS and DISCONTINUE RAD011 DEVELOPMENT/SPEND also puts Radius in a position to service its financial obligations (a near term issue given the strategic blunder) ▪ T
Slide 98: Appendix: Our Nominees
Appendix Our Nominees Velan Capital Investment Management LP & Repertoire Partners LP – ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 98
Slide 99: Ann MacDougall
Ann MacDougall Ann MacDougall, age 69, currently serves as the Chief Executive Officer of The Dunollie Fund, a family impact investment fund that she co-founded in January 2018. She has served as a Senior Advisor to Encore.org (“Encore”), a national non-profit that promotes second act careers, since
Slide 100: Cynthia L. Flowers
Cynthia L. Flowers Cynthia L. Flowers, age 62, currently serves as a Principal of EIR Advisory LLC, a life sciences strategic advisory and investment firm, since May 2018. Ms. Flowers served as the President and Chief Executive Officer of the North America division of Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc.
Slide 101: Dr. Eric Ende
Dr. Eric Ende Dr. Eric J. Ende, age 54, currently serves as the President of Ende BioMedical Consulting Group, Inc., a privately- held consulting company which is focused on helping life sciences companies raise capital, identify licensing partners, and optimize corporate structure as well as analyz
Slide 102: Appendix: Background to Solicitation
Appendix Background to Solicitation Velan Capital Investment Management LP & Repertoire Partners LP – ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 102
Slide 103: Background to Solicitation
Background to Solicitation The following is a chronology of material events leading up to this proxy solicitation: ▪ In early 2020, Velan and Repertoire became interested in a potential investment in the Company and began conducting investment due diligence with respect to the Company. ▪ On March 4,
Slide 104: Background to Solicitation (cont.)
Background to Solicitation (cont.) ▪ On November 23, 2020, Mr. Sarpangal met telephonically with Messrs. Dolan and Schwartzman to discuss the Company’s capital structure and financing considerations. ▪ On December 18, 2020, the Company announced the appointment of James Chopas as the Company’s Princ
Slide 105: Background to Solicitation (cont.)
Background to Solicitation (cont.) ▪ Later on March 10, 2022, Ms. Clarke emailed Group Counsel explaining that the Company wants an executed NDA before extending the nomination deadline. The Velan-Repertoire Group believed that the Company was attempting to run out the clock on the nomination window
Slide 106: Background to Solicitation (cont.)
Background to Solicitation (cont.) ▪ On May 20, 2022, the Company announced the unilateral appointments to the Board of Jennifer A. Jarrett and Susan Vissers Lisa as Class I and Class III directors, respectively, neither class of which is up for election at the Annual Meeting. The Company also annou
Slide 107: Appendix: Our Perspective on Radius’ Peers
Appendix Our Perspective on Radius’ Peers Velan Capital Investment Management LP & Repertoire Partners LP – ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 107
Slide 108: Our Perspective on Radius’ Peers
Our Perspective on Radius’ Peers ▪ We selected commercial-stage companies similar in size, scale, and strategy to Radius ― Catalyst, Collegium, Harmony, Travere and Vanda are commercial-stage specialty pharmaceutical companies ▪ These peers have overcome their own challenges during this period but t
Slide 109: Appendix: Feedback from Proxy Advisory Firms
Appendix Feedback from Proxy Advisory Firms Velan Capital Investment Management LP & Repertoire Partners LP – ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 109
Slide 110: ISS Feedback
ISS Feedback ▪ Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS) is a leading proxy advisory firm focused on corporate governance ▪ In 2019, ISS recommended voting AGAINST Catherine Friedman and Jean-Pierre Garnier ▪ The report highlights the level of Board entrenchment that has taken place at Radius an
Slide 111: ISS Feedback (cont.)
ISS Feedback (cont.) ▪ The 2021 ISS report continues to show similar trends from previous reports ― Entrenchment and negative impacts to stockholders ▪ Radius continues to neglect recommendations from a leading proxy advisor ― We find this extremely disappointing and contrary to good corporate gover
Slide 112: Glass Lewis Feedback
Glass Lewis Feedback ▪ Ms. Friedman and Dr. Garnier have demonstrated that their participation on the Compensation Committee was more important than driving long-term business strategy ― Dr. Garnier is also the Chair of the Compensation Committee ▪ Given their shortfall on the Strategy Committee, we