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Banque nationale de Belgique SA — Investor Presentation (September 2017)

49 slides from Banque nationale de Belgique SA's investor presentation, Sep 26, 2017

  1. Slide 1: The fiscal-monetary policy mix in the euro area: Challenges at the zero lower bound

    The fiscal-monetary policy mix in the euro area: Challenges at the zero lower bound Athanasios Orphanides MIT National Bank of Belgium Brussels, 26 September 2017 1

  2. Slide 2: The ongoing crisis: Sovereign default risk

    The ongoing crisis: Sovereign default risk 600 600 500 500 400 400 Basis Points 300 300 200 200 100 100 0 0 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Germany Italy Japan Five-year CDS spread on sovereign debt. 2

  3. Slide 3: Japanese frugality vs Italian profligacy?

    Japanese frugality vs Italian profligacy? Gross debt Primary fiscal balance 260 260 4 4 240 240 220 220 2 2 200 200 0 0 180 180 Percent of GDP Percent of GDP 160 160 -2 -2 140 140 -4 -4 120 120 100 100 -6 -6 80 80 -8 -8 60 60 40 40 -10 -10 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 1998 2000

  4. Slide 4: Outline

    Outline I The crisis: US vs EA. I The fiscal-monetary policy mix in the euro area. I What has hampered fiscal policy? I What has hampered monetary policy? I Monetary-fiscal interactions. I Distributional issues with ECB QE I The role of compromising the “safe asset” status of euro area sovereigns I

  5. Slide 5: The crisis: Real GDP per person

    The crisis: Real GDP per person 110 110 105 105 100 100 Index 2007=100 95 95 90 90 85 85 80 80 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 United States Euro area Annual real GDP per person. IMF WEO, April 2017. Euro area reflects EA12 aggregate 5

  6. Slide 6: Drifting apart: Real GDP per person

    Drifting apart: Real GDP per person 110 110 105 105 100 100 Index 2007=100 95 95 90 90 85 85 80 80 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 United States Germany Italy Spain Annual real GDP per person. IMF WEO, April 2017. 6

  7. Slide 7: The Fiscal-Monetary Policy Mix

    The Fiscal-Monetary Policy Mix I Crisis mismanagement in the euro area resulted in lower growth for euro area as a whole and greater divergence across member states. I Fiscal policy: Too tight overall. I Monetary policy: Too tight overall and implemented in a manner that contributes to divergence. I

  8. Slide 8: Fiscal policy: US vs EA

    Fiscal policy: US vs EA 4 4 2 2 0 0 Percent of GDP -2 -2 -4 -4 -6 -6 -8 -8 -10 -10 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 United States Euro area Primary balance ratio to GDP. IMF WEO, April 2017. 8

  9. Slide 9: Fiscal policy: US vs EA member states

    Fiscal policy: US vs EA member states 4 4 2 2 0 0 Percent of GDP -2 -2 -4 -4 -6 -6 -8 -8 -10 -10 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 United States Germany Italy Spain Primary balance ratio to GDP. IMF WEO, April 2017. 9

  10. Slide 10: What hampers fiscal policy?

    What hampers fiscal policy? I EU fiscal framework offers no meaningful instrument to coordinate fiscal policy among euro area member states. I SGP places limits on individual states. Member states that lack fiscal space cannot expand. Member states that have fiscal space may not need to. I Aggregate

  11. Slide 11: Monetary Policy? Fed vs ECB: Core Inflation

    Monetary Policy? Fed vs ECB: Core Inflation 3 3 2 2 Percent 1 1 0 0 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 United States (PCE) Euro Area (HICP) A sustained divergence in inflation outcomes since 2012. 11

  12. Slide 12: The zero lower bound: A constraint on policy?

    The zero lower bound: A constraint on policy? 7 7 6 6 5 5 4 4 Percent 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 0 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 United States (Federal funds rate) Euro Area (Eonia rate) Overnight interest rate. 12

  13. Slide 13: The zero lower bound: A constraint on policy?

    The zero lower bound: A constraint on policy? I The zero lower bound constrains “conventional” easing corresponding to reducing very short-term nominal interest rates. I But monetary policy remains supremely effective. I Focus turns on longer-term interest rates and asset prices. I Monetary policy e

  14. Slide 14: Legal challenges on bond purchases

    Legal challenges on bond purchases “Former German top judge says ECB could face more legal challenges” (Reuters, September 24, 2014) “ECB’s plans to buy rebundled debt draw criticism from Germany” (Reuters, October 5, 2014) “Europe’s Highest Court Hears Clash on ECB Policy” (WSJ, October 14, 2014) “

  15. Slide 15: Risk sharing in a monetary union

    Risk sharing in a monetary union I Monetary policy always involves taking some risk on the balance sheet. I In unual context of one CB and one corresponding fiscal authority not a big issue—can think of consolidated balance sheet. In monetary union? I At ZLB, monetary policy is fiscal policy. I Fail

  16. Slide 16: An unusual divergence in balance sheet policy

    An unusual divergence in balance sheet policy 4.5 4.5 4 4 3.5 3.5 Trillion dollars or euro 3 3 2.5 2.5 2 2 1.5 1.5 1 1 .5 .5 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Fed assets ECB assets Size of balance sheet, in dollars/euro, respectively. 16

  17. Slide 17: Inflation projections before ECB QE

    Inflation projections before ECB QE ECB Forecast Forecast Date 2014 2015 2016 Sept. 2013 1.3 Dec. 2013 1.1 1.3 Mar. 2014 1.0 1.3 1.5 June 2014 0.7 1.1 1.4 Sept 2014 0.6 1.1 1.4 Dec. 2014 0.5 0.7 1.3 ECB balance sheet contraction despite declining inflation forecasts. 17

  18. Slide 18: Inflation projections after ECB QE

    Inflation projections after ECB QE ECB Forecast Forecast Date 2016 2017 2018 2019 Mar. 2015 1.5 1.8 June 2015 1.5 1.8 Sept. 2015 1.1 1.7 Dec. 2015 1.0 1.6 Mar. 2016 0.1 1.3 1.6 June 2016 0.2 1.3 1.6 Sept. 2016 0.2 1.2 1.6 Dec. 2016 0.2 1.3 1.5 1.7 Mar. 2017 0.2 1.7 1.6 1.7 June 2017 0.2 1.5 1.3 1.6

  19. Slide 19: Fed vs ECB: Outlook for headline inflation

    Fed vs ECB: Outlook for headline inflation September 2017 projections 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Fed 1.4 1.6 1.9 2.0 2.0 ECB 0.2 1.5 1.2 1.5 Implications of tight ECB monetary policy: I Inflation projected to remain too low well into the future. I Unnecessary harm to real economy in most member states

  20. Slide 20: Core Inflation

    Core Inflation 3 3 2 2 Percent 1 1 0 0 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Notably below and not close to 2% for several years. 20

  21. Slide 21: Long-term inflation expectations

    Long-term inflation expectations 2.1 2.1 2 2 Percent 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Mean Median Density Mean ECP SPF. Surveys after May 2003 clarification of ECB inflation objective. An unhelpful disanchoring of inflation expectations. 21

  22. Slide 22: The ECB's low inflation problem

    The ECB’s low inflation problem I Costs of too low inflation in the environment of a depressed euro area economy well understood: I “Lowflation” (IMF and others, since 2014) I Eggertsson, Ferrero and Raffo (2014), Arias, Erceg, Trabandt (2016) (interactions with ZLB) I Eurosystem research acknowledg

  23. Slide 23: Two issues with ECB QE

    Two issues with ECB QE I Problem with quantity: Insufficient balance sheet expansion. I Problem with implementation: It reinforces divergence in yields. 23

  24. Slide 24: Two issues with the implementation of ECB QE

    Two issues with the implementation of ECB QE I Eligibility I Loss sharing 24

  25. Slide 25: The single monetary policy and loss sharing

    The single monetary policy and loss sharing “Members discussed the appropriate modalities of risk sharing related to the purchases of securities issued by euro area governments and agencies and European institutions. On the one hand, arguments were made in favour of full risk sharing so as to counte

  26. Slide 26: The ECB's self-imposed restriction on eligibility

    The ECB’s self-imposed restriction on eligibility I The ECB has imposed a restriction that it will only purchase government debt with an investment-grade rating (unless a country is in a program). I This policy raises the financing costs of governments facing market pressure and elevates importance

  27. Slide 27: Effectiveness of unconventional policy easing

    Effectiveness of unconventional policy easing 8 8 7 7 6 6 Percent 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 United States Germany Ten-year government bond yield 27

  28. Slide 28: Effectiveness of unconventional policy easing

    Effectiveness of unconventional policy easing 8 8 7 7 6 6 Percent 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Germany Italy Belgium Ten-year government bond yield 28

  29. Slide 29: Unintended consequences of discretionary operational decisions

    Unintended consequences of discretionary operational decisions I Multiple expectational equilibria in sovereign debt markets. I Credit ratings and collateral eligibility. 29

  30. Slide 30: Debt dynamics and multiple expectational equilibria

    Debt dynamics and multiple expectational equilibria ∆bt = (r − g )bt −1 + dt bt , debt (ratio to GDP). dt , primary deficit (ratio to GDP). r , real interest rate. g , real GDP growth. I Within a range of fundamentals for growth and projected primary deficits, multiple expectational equilibria are p

  31. Slide 31: The snowball effect: Japan vs Italy

    The snowball effect: Japan vs Italy Japan Italy 4 4 6 6 3 3 5 5 2 2 4 4 1 1 3 3 0 0 2 2 Percent Percent -1 -1 1 1 -2 -2 0 0 -3 -3 -1 -1 -4 -4 -2 -2 -5 -5 -3 -3 -6 -6 -4 -4 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 GDP growth Interest rate on

  32. Slide 32: The ECB and the snowball effect: Germany vs Italy

    The ECB and the snowball effect: Germany vs Italy Germany Italy 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 Percent Percent 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2 -2 -3 -3 -3 -3 -4 -4 -4 -4 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 GDP growth Inter

  33. Slide 33: The central bank as a backstop against adverse equilibria

    The central bank as a backstop against adverse equilibria I A CB can eliminate adverse self-fulfilling expectational equilibrium by serving as a backstop to a government with sound fundamentals. I This requires the willingness of the CB to maintain collateral eligibility of government debt for monet

  34. Slide 34: Actual ECB practice? An example from Summer 2012

    Actual ECB practice? An example from Summer 2012 I Debt sustainability analysis for Spain and Italy (ECB, 2012). I In July 2012, ten-year government yields for Spain and Italy were 6-7%. For the baseline simulation, the ECB adopted the prevailing market rates, stating: “It is assumed that nominal ma

  35. Slide 35: Alternative benchmark

    Alternative benchmark I A country’s central bank should not validate/support adverse equilibria. I ECB should not rely on market rates to perform DSA when market rates reflect outsized credit premia. I An alternative benchmark for analysis could be based on OIS rates or equivalent near-safe rates, p

  36. Slide 36: What is the ECB DSA methodology?

    What is the ECB DSA methodology? I Recent ECB publication generates concerns: “The sovereign yields beyond the short-term (EC) forecast horizon can be derived from the implied forward rates from national yield curves for the available countries. For these countries, the country-specific long-term in

  37. Slide 37: This is an important reason why . . .

    This is an important reason why . . . “Turning to fiscal policy, since 2010 the euro area has suffered from fiscal policy being less available and effective, especially compared with other large advanced economies. This is not so much a consequence of high initial debt ratios-public debt is in aggre

  38. Slide 38: Government debt as a safe asset

    Government debt as a safe asset I Key feature of euro area crisis has been the compromising of the safe asset status of government debt. I ECB did not serve as backstop to sovereigns facing roll-over risk and tolerated unnecessarily high credit risk premia. I OMT partially reduced damage—demonstrati

  39. Slide 39: Credit ratings in the ECB collateral framework

    Credit ratings in the ECB collateral framework I Before the creation of euro, the eligibility of government debt as collateral for monetary policy operations was beyond questioning. I With euro adoption, ECB accepted all government debt as eligible collateral within its collateral framework. I Priva

  40. Slide 40: The cliff effect

    The cliff effect I During a panic, credit-ratings based eligibility thresholds are destabilzing. I Fears of downgrades and potential default become self-fullfilling as investors project that the ECB may refuse to accept government debt as collateral, even for sovereigns with sound fundamentals. I Re

  41. Slide 41: Quantifying the fiscal transfer: Government bond yields vs OIS

    Quantifying the fiscal transfer: Government bond yields vs OIS Two-year maturity Ten-year maturity 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 Percent Percent 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

  42. Slide 42: Government bond yield spread over OIS

    Government bond yield spread over OIS Two-year maturity Ten-year maturity 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 Percent Percent 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Ge

  43. Slide 43: A question of legitimacy and unintended consequences

    A question of legitimacy and unintended consequences I In 2005, ECB reliance on credit ratings was encouraged by commentators as welcome pressure on governments to reduce debts and deficits. I Similar to 2015 decision to deviate from loss sharing for QE, decision could be “rationalized” by referring

  44. Slide 44: A warning before the crisis

    A warning before the crisis “It has been recently argued that the ECB should use its collateral policy as a sanction to exert fiscal discipline . . . Although superficially appealing, this suggestion would be misguided. . . . Third, and most importantly, it is clear that the design of the Stability

  45. Slide 45: The ECB mandate for "misbehaving" governments?

    The ECB mandate for “misbehaving” governments? I Police? I Prosecutor? I Judge? I Executioner? 45

  46. Slide 46: The ECB mandate

    The ECB mandate “The primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability.” (Article 127(1), 2012). 46

  47. Slide 47: The ECB mandate

    The ECB mandate “The primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down

  48. Slide 48: The ECB mandate: Article 3 of the Treaty

    The ECB mandate: Article 3 of the Treaty 1. The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples. 2. The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice . . . 3. The Union . . . shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balance

  49. Slide 49: Towards a positive contribution by the ECB

    Towards a positive contribution by the ECB I Calibrate QE as appropriate for the euro area as a whole. I Reaffirm symmetry of 1.9% inflation goal. I Commit to continue QE purchases until inflation and inflation expectations are firmly reanchored at 1.9%. I Eliminate self-imposed restrictions for QE,

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