Perot Systems — Technical Presentation (July 2002)
18 slides from Perot Systems's technical presentation, Jul 2, 2002
Slide 1: Unintended Consequences of the Imbalance Energy Market Protocols
Unintended Consequences of the Imbalance Energy Market Protocols
Slide 2: Impact of the Structure of the Imbalance Energy Market
Impact of the Structure of the Imbalance Energy Market The ISO's protocols for buying, selling, and pricing imbalance energy may invite strategies that could destabilize the market. Points covered in this presentation: The operation of the market A simple example of a strategy to take advantage of t
Slide 3: ISO Real Time Dispatch
ISO Real Time Dispatch To minimize the cost of providing imbalance energy: If additional energy output ... is needed, the ISO shall dispatch additional output or reduce demand from generating units, loads or system resource in ascending order of their incremental ... bids. If the ISO is required to
Slide 4: Pricing Imbalance Energy
Pricing Imbalance Energy The five minute ex post price shall be based on the bid of the marginal generating units, loads and system resources dispatched by the ISO ... in each five minute period. The marginal generating unit, load or system resource dispatched in the five minute period is: if genera
Slide 5: Merit Order Stack
Merit Order Stack Decremental Supplemental Energy Bids If ISO must reduce energy output $/MWh +MWh - -MWh Incremental Supplemental Energy Bids and Energy from Reserves If ISO must increase energy output
Slide 6: Ex Post Price when Output is Increased
Ex Post Price when Output is Increased Additional energy (DQ MWh) is needed: ISO dispatches the incremental supplemental bids and reserves with available energy in order of increasing bid price. Ex post price is price of most expensive resource dispatched. $/MWh +MWh - -MWh +DQ Ex Post Price
Slide 7: Ex Post Price when Output is Decreased
Ex Post Price when Output is Decreased Reduction of energy (-DQ MWh) is needed: ISO dispatches the decremental supplemental energy bids with available reduction in order of decreasing bid price. Ex post price is price of least expensive resource dispatched downward. $/MWh +MWh - -MWh - -DQ Ex Post P
Slide 8: Output Increases then Decreases in Hour
Output Increases then Decreases in Hour Increased output of +DQ1 followed by decrease of - DQ2 within the hour, with DQ1 < DQ2. $/MWh +MWh - -MWh +DQ1 (-DQ2 + DQ1)
Slide 9: Controlling the Real-Time Market
Controlling the Real-Time Market The structure of the real-time imbalance energy market permits strategies by which a participant can: control the ex post price dump power on the real time market cause wild swings in the ex post price.
Slide 10: Simplified Example
Simplified Example Participant P1 has three generation units: Unit 1 with operating limits of [100 MW, 2000 MW] Unit 2 with operating limits of [100 MW, 2000 MW] Unit 3 with operating limits of [50 MW, 100 MW]. P1 bids to sell 2150 MWh in the forward market (for 1 hour). P1 intentionally forgoes the
Slide 11: Schedule and Supplemental Bids
Schedule and Supplemental Bids Supplemental Energy Bids: Unit 1: Decremental only $10,000/MWh for 100 £ x £ 2000 Unit 2: No Bid Unit 3: Incremental Micro Bids $ 0/MWh for 50 £ x £ 55 $10/MWh for 55 £ x £ 60 · · · Suppose that Unit 1 submits highest priced decremental bid to ISO. MWh Unit 1 Unit 2 Un
Slide 12: Case 1: ISO Needs Additional Energy
Case 1: ISO Needs Additional Energy Suppose ISO needs 1,000 MW more. ISO will use incremental bids (including Unit 3 which gives P1 information). P1 starts to increment Unit 2 on its own. ISO first backs down previously incremented units. Unit 2 reaches a point at which ISO will have decremented all
Slide 13: Case 2: ISO Must Reduce Output
Case 2: ISO Must Reduce Output Suppose ISO must reduce by 1,000 MW. ISO will use decremental bids and back Unit 1 down by 1000 MW. P1 would have to pay the ISO $10,000,000 to replace Unit 1's output. P1 eliminates this risk by simultaneously increasing Unit 2 by 1000 MW. P1's total real-time output
Slide 14: Disguising the Strategy
Disguising the Strategy P1 can disguise this strategy, for example: P1 can schedule more load in the forward market than it expects to serve in real-time. P1 can schedule increased generation in the forward market to serve the "phantom" increased load. If P1 wants to dump energy on the real-time imb
Slide 15: Effects on Market Participants
Effects on Market Participants Suppose that a participant usually experiences appreciable error in forecasting its real-time load. The participant may have to buy and sell an appreciable amount of energy on the imbalance energy market due to forecasting errors. If the ex post price can rise to very
Slide 16: Effects on PX
Effects on PX PX participants are exposed to swings in ex post price. PX participants can insure themselves against effects, but at a cost. By grouping participants (some of whom will likely over-forecast and some under-forecast), the amount of extra energy that must be scheduled in a forward market
Slide 17: Effects on ISO
Effects on ISO Parties may at times try to dump considerable energy on the ISO's imbalance energy market. ISO will need to decrement energy production more than anticipated. Decremental supplemental energy bids are voluntary. No concept of the ISO buying "negative reserves" to ensure that it will ha
Slide 18: Possible Basis for Correction
Possible Basis for Correction Clear the real-time imbalance energy market. Dispatch all supplemental energy bids and reserves to minimize costs in real-time while respecting the operating constraints of the resources. Ensure that the ISO will have sufficient decremental supplemental energy bids to p