Chicos FAS — Proxy Contest (June 2016)
105 slides from Chicos FAS's proxy contest presentation, Jun 30, 2016
Slide 1: Presentation of the Barington Group
PRESENTATION OF THE BARINGTON GROUP June 2016 0 BARINGTON
Slide 2: Important Disclosures
Important Disclosures This presentation is for general informational purposes only and is not intended for distribution to or use by any person or entity in any jurisdiction or country where such distribution or use would be contrary to local law or regulation. The views expressed herein represent t
Slide 3: Important Disclosures
Important Disclosures Any assumptions, assessments, estimates, projections or the like contained herein (collectively, “Statements”) regarding future events or which are forward-looking in nature constitute only subjective views, outlooks or estimations, are based upon Barington’s expectations or be
Slide 4: Contents
Contents 1. Executive Summary 2. Background on the Barington Group 3. Background on Chico’s 4. The Case for Change at Chico’s 5. The Barington Group’s Plan for Value Creation at Chico’s 6. Background on the Barington Group’s Nominees Appendix A – Historical Financial and Share Price Performance Appe
Slide 5: Barington Has Helped Many Retail and Apparel Companies Improve Long-term Shareholder Value
Barington Has Helped Many Retail and Apparel Companies Improve Long-term Shareholder Value Barington has substantial experience and a successful track record investing in retail, apparel and other consumer focused companies, including: Each of the above companies has shown a meaningful improvement i
Slide 6: Barington's Investment in Chico's
Barington’s Investment in Chico’s As frequent investors in retail and apparel companies, we have been actively following Chico’s for many years and have made investments in the Company from time to time, beginning in December 2013. In September 2015, we began investing in Chico’s again because we be
Slide 7: Chico's Has Significantly Underperformed its Peers and the Market as a Whole
Chico’s Has Significantly Underperformed its Peers and the Market as a Whole The share price performance of Chico’s under its current Board of Directors has been extremely disappointing for stockholders. As indicated in the chart below, the Company has significantly underperformed its self-selected
Slide 8: Profitability Has Stagnated Despite an 88% Increase in Sales
Under the Board’s Watch, the Company’s Profitability Has Stagnated Despite an 88% Increase in Sales Chico’s has struggled to grow its EBITDA between 2006 and 2015 despite the fact that the Company’s overall sales have grown by about 88% during this period. – During this period, the Company’s selling
Slide 9: Despite Recent Initiatives, there is Clearly Much More Work that Needs to be Done
Despite Recent Initiatives, there is Clearly Much More Work that Needs to be Done Chico’s is spending approximately $6 million inundating stockholders with proxy solicitation materials (and even a video) claiming that the Company is “now on the right track to enhance shareholder value” and promising
Slide 10: We Have Attempted to Work Privately With the Board To No Avail
We Have Attempted to Work Privately With the Board To No Avail As detailed in our proxy statement, we attempted to work privately with representatives of management and the Board to no avail. We believe that the Company’s Board and its CEO failed to engage with us in good faith. – The Board did not
Slide 11: We Have Serious Concerns About the Board's Nominees, Bonnie Brooks and Janice Fields
We Have Serious Concerns About the Board’s Nominees, Bonnie Brooks and Janice Fields Bonnie Brooks Ms. Brooks is the Vice Chairman of Hudson’s Bay Company, which owns and operates three sizable department store chains that directly compete with the Company: Saks Fifth Avenue, Lord & Taylor and Hudso
Slide 12: The Barington Group Has Nominated Two Experienced, Independent, Stockholder-Focused Nominees
The Barington Group Has Nominated Two Experienced, Independent, Stockholder-Focused Nominees We believe that our nominees can help Chico’s realize its long-term value potential and ensure that stockholder interests are protected in the boardroom. Mr. Mitarotonda is the Chairman and CEO of Barington
Slide 13: This Proxy Solicitation is Not a Referendum on the Company's CEO
This Proxy Solicitation is Not a Referendum on the Company’s CEO, but the Board’s Incumbent Directors Despite what Chico’s would have stockholders believe, this proxy solicitation is not a referendum on Ms. Broader, the Company’s new CEO. Ms. Broader will continue as the CEO and as a director of the
Slide 14: Contents
Contents 1. Executive Summary 2. Background on the Barington Group 3. Background on Chico’s 4. The Case for Change at Chico’s 5. The Barington Group’s Plan for Value Creation at Chico’s 6. Background on the Barington Group’s Nominees Appendix A – Historical Financial and Share Price Performance Appe
Slide 15: Background on the Barington Group
2. Background on the Barington Group Barington Capital Group, L.P. (“Barington” or “we”) is an investment firm that, through its affiliates, manages a value-oriented, activist investment fund that was established by James A. Mitarotonda in January 2000. Barington’s investment team, advisors and netw
Slide 16: Barington Has Helped Many Retail and Apparel Companies Improve Long-term Shareholder Value
Barington Has Helped Many Retail and Apparel Companies Improve Long-term Shareholder Value Barington has substantial experience and a successful track record investing in retail, apparel and other consumer focused companies, including: Each of the above companies has shown a meaningful improvement i
Slide 17: Barington has a Record of Helping Improve Value as a Long-term, Value-added Shareholder
Barington has a Record of Helping Improve Value as a Long-term, Value-added Shareholder “I do think [Mitarotonda] was very helpful in challenging the Dillard’s board and the Dillard’s way…He’s helped the Dillard’s company, the Dillard’s family….If you have a company that’s not doing well and it has
Slide 18: Barington has a Record of Helping Improve Value (cont'd)
Barington has a Record of Helping Improve Value as a Long-term, Value-added Shareholder (cont’d) “[Barington] remains one of the longest-running governance-focused activist hedge funds in action today and has had a major impact on dozens of corporations….[Barington’s] tactics typically differ drasti
Slide 19: Contents
Contents 1. Executive Summary 2. Background on the Barington Group 3. Background on Chico’s 4. The Case for Change at Chico’s 5. The Barington Group’s Plan for Value Creation at Chico’s 6. Background on the Barington Group’s Nominees Appendix A – Historical Financial and Share Price Performance Appe
Slide 20: Background on Chico's
3. Background on Chico’s Chico’s FAS, Inc. (the “Company” or “Chico’s”) is a Financials specialty retailer of women’s apparel, accessories and related products. ($ millions except per share data) Stock Price (06/27/2016) $10.15 As of April 30, 2016, the Company operated 1,517 52 - Week High $17.09 s
Slide 21: Chico's has a long list of positive attributes
Chico’s has a long list of positive attributes We believe that Chico’s has a long list of positive attributes, including: – a strong market position in an attractive, underserved market with a loyal customer base; – industry-leading store productivity; – high gross margins; – a healthy balance sheet
Slide 22: The Company's Brands Have a Strong Market Position and a Loyal Customer Base
The Company’s Brands Have a Strong Market Position and a Loyal Customer Base The Company’s brands have a strong market position in the apparel market for women ages 35 and older. The Company’s Soma brand has established a strong presence in lingerie and sleepwear and is a clear alternative to Victor
Slide 23: The Company's Stores Are Highly Productive
The Company’s Stores Are Highly Productive As illustrated in the table below, the Company’s stores (Chico’s, White House Black Market and Soma) all have industry-leading sales productivity. 65% of the Company’s stores are located in premium off-mall locations. Store Productivity ($ Sales Per Sq. Ft.
Slide 24: Chico's Has High Gross Margins
Chico’s Has High Gross Margins Chico’s has one of the highest gross margins among its specialty retailer peers. Adjusted Gross Margin Excluding Rent (%) 49.4% 48.6% 48.4% 45.7% 45.4% 44.5% 42.4% 42.1% 39.4% 38.6% 37.0% 28.7% Buckle Chico's L Brands AEO Children's The Gap Foot Locker Urban Finish Lin
Slide 25: Despite High Gross Margins, the Company's EBITDA Margin is Low
Despite High Gross Margins, the Company’s EBITDA Margin is Low Chico’s has one of the lowest EBITDA margins among its specialty retail peers despite having one of the highest gross margins as a result of the Company’s high SG&A expenses. EBITDA Margin (%) 23.4% 21.4% 17.5% 16.7% 14.4% 13.4% 11.0% 10
Slide 26: The Company Has a Healthy Balance Sheet and Generates Strong Cash Flow
The Company Has a Healthy Balance Sheet and Generates Strong Cash Flow Chico’s generates a significant amount of free cash flow. Net cash position as of April 30, 2016: $107 million of cash and $90 million of debt. Since 2006, the Company has bought back $1.1 billion of stock which is more than 81%
Slide 27: Contents
Contents 1. Executive Summary 2. Background on the Barington Group 3. Background on Chico’s 4. The Case for Change at Chico’s 5. The Barington Group’s Plan for Value Creation at Chico’s 6. Background on the Barington Group’s Nominees Appendix A – Historical Financial and Share Price Performance Appe
Slide 28: The Case For Change At Chico's
4. The Case For Change At Chico’s We strongly believe that the Company’s value potential is not being realized under its current Board of Directors. Despite the Company’s long list of positive attributes, its common stock has significantly underperformed its peers and the market as a whole over the
Slide 29: The Case For Change At Chico's (cont'd)
4. The Case For Change At Chico’s (cont’d) Given the Company’s long period of underperformance under its current Board of Directors, as well as the Board’s failure to engage with us in good faith, we lack confidence in the ability of the incumbent directors and their hand-picked successors to create
Slide 30: The Case For Change At Chico's (cont'd)
4. The Case For Change At Chico’s (cont’d) We have serious concerns about the Board’s nominees. Bonnie Brooks’ service on the board would create a material conflict of interest given her role as the Vice Chairman of Hudson’s Bay Company, which owns and operates three sizable department store chains
Slide 31: Chico's Has Significantly Underperformed its Peers
Chico’s Has Significantly Underperformed its Peers The share price performance of Chico’s under its current Board of Directors has been extremely disappointing for stockholders. As indicated in the chart below, the Company has significantly underperformed its self-selected peers over the past one, t
Slide 32: Chico's Has Also Significantly Underperformed the Market as a Whole
Chico’s Has Also Significantly Underperformed the Market as a Whole The Company has also significantly underperformed the market as a whole over the past one, three, five and ten-year periods: Total Shareholder Return Percent change 1 Year 3 Years 5 Years 10 Years 6/29/15-6/27/16 6/28/13-6/27/16 6/2
Slide 33: Profitability Has Stagnated Despite an 88% Increase in Sales
Under the Board’s Watch, the Company’s Profitability Has Stagnated Despite an 88% Increase in Sales Chico’s has struggled to grow its EBITDA between 2006 and 2015 despite the fact that the Company’s overall sales have grown by about 88% during this period. – During this period, the Company’s selling
Slide 34: Chico's Has Suffered from Declining Comparable Store Sales
Chico’s Has Suffered from Declining Comparable Store Sales Chico’s has reported flat to declining comparable store sales at its core Chico’s and White House Black Market brands in each of the past three years. – This trend continued in the first quarter of 2016, with Chico’s reporting negative compa
Slide 35: The Company Has Disproportionately High SG&A Expenses
The Company Has Disproportionately High SG&A Expenses The Company’s SG&A as a percentage of its sales is currently one of the highest among its specialty retailer peers: 33.0% for Chico’s vs. a 24.8% median for its peers (excluding occupancy costs) – The Company has a sizeable headquarter-level cost
Slide 36: We Believe Chico's Has Become Too Centralized
We Believe Chico’s Has Become Too Centralized We believe that the Company has centralized too many functions. – The Company maintains a 504,000 square foot headquarters in Fort Myers, Florida. – Only just recently, following our suggestions to Ms. Broader, has the Company begun to take steps to dece
Slide 37: Chico's Has One of the Highest Headquarter-level Expenses
Chico’s Has One of the Highest Headquarter-level Expenses A significant portion of Chico’s SG&A spending is on headquarter-level expenses. – Based on our estimates,(1) we believe the Company spends about $130 million or about ~5% of its sales on headquarter-level expenses (accounting for approximate
Slide 38: Chico's Has Outsized Advertising Spending Compared to its Peers
Chico’s Has Outsized Advertising Spending Compared to its Peers Chico’s spends about 6.0% of its sales on advertising while the median specialty retailer spends about 2.6% of its sales on advertising. – Chico’s advertising spend as a percent of revenue has been growing, which implies that increased
Slide 39: Disastrous Acquisition of Boston Proper Represents Poor Capital Allocation
The Company’s Disastrous Acquisition of Boston Proper Represents Poor Capital Allocation The Company failed to build a 2011-2015 Return on Equity profitable business model for Boston Proper after acquiring it for $205 million in 2011. 20.00% 18.00% 16.00% In January 2016, Chico’s sold Boston Proper
Slide 40: Board Has Failed to Properly Align CEO Pay with Performance
We Believe the Board Has Failed to Properly Align CEO Pay with Performance The realized compensation of the Company’s previous CEO, David Dyer, increased by 65% in 2015 while the Company’s EBITDA declined by 6.5% compared to 2014. His realized compensation in 2015 was also 14% higher than it was in
Slide 41: Corporate Governance Concerns
Corporate Governance Concerns We believe the Company’s recent decision to declassify its board is reactionary in nature and would not have been made without our involvement. Barington has a long history of pushing for corporate governance improvements including the declassification of boards, having
Slide 42: The Board Has Little Equity Ownership
The Board Has Little Equity Ownership The Company’s incumbent independent directors that will be remaining on the Board after the 2016 Annual Meeting will own approximately 0.35% of the Company’s outstanding shares, virtually all of which was granted to the Directors pursuant to the Company’s Omnibu
Slide 43: We Question the Board's Director Nomination Process
We Question the Board’s Director Nomination Process We were extremely disappointed that the Nominating Committee was only open to interviewing two of the five highly qualified candidates that we presented, and failed to interview or meet with James Mitarotonda. We also question the independence of t
Slide 44: This Proxy Solicitation is Not a Referendum on the Company's CEO
This Proxy Solicitation is Not a Referendum on the Company’s CEO, but the Board’s Incumbent Directors Despite what Chico’s would have stockholders believe, this proxy solicitation is not a referendum on Ms. Broader, the Company’s new CEO. Ms. Broader will continue as the CEO and as a director of the
Slide 45: Contents
Contents 1. Executive Summary 2. Background on the Barington Group 3. Background on Chico’s 4. The Case for Change at Chico’s 5. The Barington Group’s Plan for Value Creation at Chico’s 6. Background on the Barington Group’s Nominees Appendix A – Historical Financial and Share Price Performance Appe
Slide 46: The Barington Group's Plan for Value Creation
5. The Barington Group’s Plan for Value Creation While the Company has announced that it is implementing some of the suggestions we shared with them – particularly with respect to expense reductions – we do not believe that the measures that have been announced are sufficient to unlock the Company’s
Slide 47: The Barington Group's Plan for Value Creation (cont'd)
5. The Barington Group’s Plan for Value Creation (cont’d) The Barington Group’s plan is focused on: A. Improving merchandising and understanding of the customer at each of the Company’s three brands; B. Growing the Soma brand; C. Reducing the Company’s high overhead and advertising costs by at least
Slide 48: A. Improve Merchandising and Understanding of the Customer
A. Improve Merchandising and Understanding of the Customer We believe that Chico’s can regain its lost market share through better merchandising and a renewed focus on meeting the demands of its customers. We believe that each of the brands should have its own Brand President as well as Creative Dir
Slide 49: B. Grow the Soma Brand
B. Grow the Soma Brand We believe Soma is still at an early stage in its growth trajectory with only 291 stores. – Most intimate brands target younger consumers, while Soma is the only new entrant that focuses on a more mature consumer. – Large opportunity to convert customers who currently shop in
Slide 50: Victoria's Secret Continues to Open More Stores than Soma
Victoria’s Secret Continues to Open More Stores than Soma The largest player in the intimate apparel market is Victoria’s Secret, which has 1,118 stores in the United States (nearly 4x as many as Soma) and continues to open new stores which are much larger than Soma stores. Total Number of Stores 1,
Slide 51: Growth of the Store Footprint Is a Key to Growing Soma's Customer Base
Growth of the Store Footprint Is a Key to Growing Soma’s Customer Base Retail stores are where customers can experience the Company’s customer service and are key to growing the brand’s loyal customer base. We believe that Soma needs to have a larger physical store footprint in addition to an effect
Slide 52: C. Reduce SG&A Expenses
C. Reduce SG&A Expenses Reduce Overhead Expenses: We believe that Chico’s has numerous available opportunities to reduce its operating expenses. Our analysis shows that a significant portion of Chico’s SG&A spending is on headquarter-level expenses. Chico’s has one of the highest SG&A margins (exclu
Slide 53: Barington's SG&A Cost Rationalization Plan is Conservative
Barington’s SG&A Cost Rationalization Plan is Conservative Our analysis shows that Barington’s cost cutting plans are conservative and that there is further room for Chico’s to reduce additional expenses. – Even after implementing Barington’s $100 million cost reduction plan, the Company’s SG&A cost
Slide 54: D. Repurchase Stock
D. Repurchase Stock We believe that the Company’s stock is more undervalued now than it has been in the past five years and therefore recommend that the Company increase its share repurchases. We believe that further share repurchases at this time would be highly accretive and would help the Company
Slide 55: E. Improve Executive Compensation
E. Improve Executive Compensation We support a CEO receiving a competitive compensation package provided that package closely ties pay to the achievement of appropriate short and long-term performance goals so that management and shareholder interests are properly aligned. We therefore strongly reco
Slide 56: F. Enhance Board of Directors
F. Enhance Board of Directors Given the disappointing share price performance of Chico’s under its current Board, we strongly believe that new independent directors are needed who have the background and experience necessary to oversee the implementation of our plan. – Janet Grove has strong apparel
Slide 57: We Have Attempted to Work Privately With the Board To No Avail
We Have Attempted to Work Privately With the Board To No Avail 5/20: Co. 5/24: Barington informs publicly 04/25: Co. 05/03: Barington Barington that it announces its 04/08: Company announces writes private has chosen to intention to announces decentralization of letter to Co. nominate Bill nominate
Slide 58: We Have Attempted to Work Privately With the Board To No Avail
We Have Attempted to Work Privately With the Board To No Avail As detailed in our proxy statement, we attempted to work privately with representatives of management and the Board to no avail. We believe that the Company’s Board and its CEO failed to engage with us in good faith. – The Board did not
Slide 59: The Board Interviewed Only One of Our Nominees
The Board Interviewed Only One of Our Nominees The Board only interviewed only one of our nominees, Janet Grove. – She was flown to the Company’s headquarters on May 16 on a private jet. – Ms. Grove was pre-screened over dinner by CEO Shelley Broader before being interviewed by members of the Board.
Slide 60: Contents
Contents 1. Executive Summary 2. Background on the Barington Group 3. Background on Chico’s 4. The Case for Change at Chico’s 5. The Barington Group’s Plan for Value Creation at Chico’s 6. Background on the Barington Group’s Nominees Appendix A – Historical Financial and Share Price Performance Appe
Slide 61: The Barington Group Has Nominated Two Experienced, Independent, Stockholder-Focused Nominees
The Barington Group Has Nominated Two Experienced, Independent, Stockholder-Focused Nominees We believe that our nominees can help Chico’s realize its long-term value potential and ensure that stockholder interests are protected in the boardroom. Mr. Mitarotonda is the Chairman and CEO of Barington
Slide 62: Barington Group Nominee: James A. Mitarotonda
Barington Group Nominee: James A. Mitarotonda Chairman of the Board, President and CEO of Barington Companies Investors, LLC, the general partner of Barington Companies Equity Partners, L.P., a value-oriented activist investment fund, since January 2000. Co-Founder, Chairman, President and CEO of Ba
Slide 63: James A. Mitarotonda (cont.)
James A. Mitarotonda (cont.) “[James Mitarotonda] was great with other board members, and it was a Mr. Mitarotonda has represented very good experience as we looked to make some very important strategic shareholder interests on more than a decisions at Jones.” dozen public company boards. – Robert M
Slide 64: Barington Group Nominee: Janet E. Grove
Barington Group Nominee: Janet E. Grove 40 years of retail industry experience In addition to serving as the Corporate Vice Chairman of Macy’s, Inc., she also served as Chairman and CEO of Macy’s Merchandising Group for over ten years. In this role, Ms. Grove was responsible for establishing the str
Slide 65: Janet E. Grove (cont.)
Janet E. Grove (cont.) Since retiring from Macy’s Ms. Grove has served as an advisor to the CEO and senior management team of Karstadt Department Stores, one of the largest department store chains in Germany. She also served on the Board of Directors of Aeropostale, Inc., a specialty retailer of tee
Slide 66: We Have Serious Concerns About the Board's Nominee Janice Fields
We Have Serious Concerns About the Board’s Nominee Janice Fields While Janice Fields is highly knowledgeable about the fast food industry given her experience as President of McDonald’s USA, we do not believe this experience is relevant to the apparel industry. Ms. Fields has been part of the incumb
Slide 67: Bonnie Brooks' Service Would Create a Material Conflict of Interest
Bonnie Brooks’ Service on the Company’s Board Would Create a Material Conflict of Interest We believe that if the Board’s nominee Bonnie R. Brooks were elected at the Annual Meeting, her service as a director would create a material conflict of interest, if not a potential violation of antitrust law
Slide 68: Bonnie Brooks' Service Would Create a Material Conflict of Interest (cont.)
Bonnie Brooks’ Service on the Company’s Board Would Create a Material Conflict of Interest (cont.) In response, the Company has argued that “Neither Hudson’s Bay Company nor any of the department stores within its portfolio, including Saks Fifth Avenue and Lord & Taylor, are competitors in any pract
Slide 69: The Company Directly Competes with Saks Fifth Avenue and Lord & Taylor
The Company Directly Competes with Saks Fifth Avenue and Lord & Taylor We believe that even a casual shopper recognizes that Hudson’s Bay Company’s department stores – including Saks Fifth Avenue and Lord & Taylor – directly compete with the Company’s three brands in virtually every product category
Slide 70: The Company Directly Competes with Saks Fifth Avenue and Lord & Taylor
The Company Directly Competes with Saks Fifth Avenue and Lord & Taylor Soma Saks Fifth Avenue Soma Lord & Taylor 69 BARINGTON
Slide 71: The Company Directly Competes with Saks Fifth Avenue and Lord & Taylor
The Company Directly Competes with Saks Fifth Avenue and Lord & Taylor White House Black Market Lord & Taylor White House Black Market Lord & Taylor 70 BARINGTON
Slide 72: The Company Directly Competes with Saks Fifth Avenue and Lord & Taylor
The Company Directly Competes with Saks Fifth Avenue and Lord & Taylor Chico’s Lord & Taylor Lord & Taylor Chico’s 71 BARINGTON
Slide 73: Vote the BLUE Proxy Card to Elect the Barington Group's Nominees
Vote the BLUE Proxy Card to Elect the Barington Group’s Independent, Highly Qualified Nominees To protect your interests as a Chico’s stockholder, we encourage you to vote the Barington Group’s BLUE proxy card today! If you have any questions or need assistance voting your shares, please contact Oka
Slide 74: Appendix A – Historical Financial and Share Price Performance
Appendix A – Historical Financial and Share Price Performance 73 BARINGTON
Slide 75: Shares Have Lagged Peers and Market Over the Past One-Year Period
The Company’s Shares Have Lagged its Peers and the Market as a Whole Over the Past One-Year Period The Company has underperformed the S&P 500 Index by 37.1 percentage points and the S&P 500 Apparel Retail Index by 34.8 percentage points over the past one year. 1-Year Change in Total Shareholder Retu
Slide 76: Shares Have Lagged Peers and Market Over the Past Three-Year Period
The Company’s Shares Have Lagged its Peers and the Market as a Whole Over the Past Three-Year Period The Company has underperformed the S&P 500 Index by 69.4 percentage points and the S&P 500 Apparel Retail Index by 64.6 percentage points over the past three-year period. 3-Year Change in Total Share
Slide 77: Shares Have Lagged Peers and Market Over the Past Five Year
The Company’s Shares Have Lagged its Peers and the Market as a Whole Over the Past Five Year The Company has underperformed the S&P 500 Index by 100.4 percentage points and the S&P 500 Apparel Retail Index by 142.6 percentage points over the past five-year period. Gap to 5-Year Change in Total Share
Slide 78: Shares Have Lagged Peers and Market Over the Past Ten-Year Period
The Company’s Shares Have Lagged its Peers and the Market as a Whole Over the Past Ten-Year Period The Company has underperformed the S&P 500 Index by 156.1 percentage points and the S&P 500 Apparel Retail Index by 296.1 percentage points over the past ten-year period, during which time the Company
Slide 79: First Quarter 2016 Earnings
First Quarter 2016 Earnings The Company’s financial results for the first quarter of fiscal 2016 were extremely disappointing: Sales for the first quarter of fiscal 2016 decreased -7.9% from the comparable quarter last year (or -4.4% excluding the impact of Boston Proper); Comparable store sales for
Slide 80: Appendix B – Case Studies of Barington Impact
Appendix B – Case Studies of Barington Impact The Children’s Place, Inc. (PLCE) Darden Restaurants (DRI) Dillard’s Inc. (DDS) The Warnaco Group, Inc. (Formerly WRC) Steve Madden, Ltd. (SHOO) Nautica Enterprises, Inc. (Formerly NAUT) Lancaster Colony Corporation (LANC) Gerber Scientific, Inc. (Former
Slide 81: Case Study: The Children's Place, Inc.
Case Study: The Children’s Place, Inc. Situation Overview Strong brand with stable business model and low-cost sourcing. $1.2bn market cap, $200mm cash and no debt. Trading significantly below peers. Stock price up only 15% 3 years ending Jan 2015 vs 150% for nearest peer Carter’s. Growing online re
Slide 82: Case Study: The Children's Place, Inc.
Case Study: The Children’s Place, Inc. Active Strategy Change CEO compensation metrics to include return on invested capital. Improve corporate governance and ensure increased board engagement. Company beat FY2015 EPS estimates and authorized new $250mm share repurchase program. Jan 2016 Company ann
Slide 83: Case Study: The Children's Place, Inc.
Case Study: The Children’s Place, Inc. Stock performance of The Children’s Place versus the S&P 500 and Russell 2000 Indices (starting at initial purchase date) 38.5% See Important Disclosures on page 1. This case study is being provided for discussion purposes only to illustrate the investment proc
Slide 84: Case Study: Darden Restaurants, Inc.
Case Study: Darden Restaurants, Inc. Situation Overview $6.8bn market cap company with portfolio of eight restaurant brands Stock had underperformed peers and broad market Acquisitions had created revenue growth but hurt operating margins Failure to capture economies of scale from acquisitions Compa
Slide 85: Case Study: Darden Restaurants, Inc.
Case Study: Darden Restaurants, Inc. Active Strategy Mar 2013: Second letter released calling for Darden to allow shareholders to vote on proposed Red Lobster sale, begin search for new CEO, improve corporate governance and appoint independent board Chair May 2014: Stock falls in response to Darden’
Slide 86: Case Study: Darden Restaurants, Inc.
Case Study: Darden Restaurants, Inc. Stock performance of Darden Restaurants versus the S&P 500 and Russell 2000 Indices (starting at initial purchase date) 40% See Important Disclosures on page 1. This case study is being provided for discussion purposes only to illustrate the investment process ut
Slide 87: Case Study: Dillard's Inc.
Case Study: Dillard’s Inc. Situation Overview Market cap of approximately $2.4 billion. Company traded at a discount to its tangible book value of $33 per share and held a substantial portfolio of owned real estate (approximately 75% of its locations). Company had poor corporate governance and was u
Slide 88: Case Study: Dillard's Inc.
Case Study: Dillard’s Inc. Active Strategy In June and August 2007, Barington issued press releases disclosing its desire to meet with the management of Dillard’s to discuss ways to maximize shareholder value, as Barington was unable reach the CEO by telephone to schedule a meeting. In November 2007
Slide 89: Case Study: Dillard's Inc.
Case Study: Dillard’s Inc. Stock performance of Dillard’s versus the S&P 500 and Russell 2000 Indices (starting at initial purchase date) 150% 125% 100% 75% 50% 25% 0% -25% -50% -75% -100% May-07 Jan-08 Sep-08 May-09 Jan-10 Sep-10 May-11 Jan-12 Sep-12 DDS S&P 500 Russell 2000 See Important Disclosur
Slide 90: Case Study: The Warnaco Group, Inc.
Case Study: The Warnaco Group, Inc. Situation Overview Market cap of approximately $850 million. The Company had outstanding brands such as Speedo, Calvin Klein and Chaps, as well as underperforming intimate apparel and swimwear brands such as J.Lo and Ocean Pacific. A string of operational disappoi
Slide 91: Case Study: The Warnaco Group, Inc.
Case Study: The Warnaco Group, Inc. Active Strategy In September 2006, Barington met with Warnaco’s management team to discuss measures to improve shareholder value and improve execution in light of the Company’s past operating disappointments. Among other things, Barington made specific operational
Slide 92: Case Study: The Warnaco Group, Inc.
Case Study: The Warnaco Group, Inc. Stock performance of Warnaco versus the S&P 500 and Russell 2000 Indices (starting at initial purchase date) 180% 155% 130% 105% 80% 55% 30% 5% -20% Jul-03 Jan-04 Jul-04 Jan-05 Jul-05 Jan-06 Jul-06 Jan-07 Jul-07 WRC S&P 500 Russell 2000 See Important Disclosures o
Slide 93: Case Study: Steve Madden, Ltd.
Case Study: Steve Madden, Ltd. Situation Overview Market cap of approximately $250 million. Strong fashion brand poorly managed by an under-qualified management team while Steven Madden was serving a prison term for securities law violations. Healthy balance sheet with a large cash position. Corpora
Slide 94: Case Study: Steve Madden, Ltd.
Case Study: Steve Madden, Ltd. Active Strategy As a result of management’s refusal to meet, Barington engaged in public letter-based dialogue with the Company. Filed Schedule 13D to make specific recommendations regarding management, cost cutting, corporate governance, stock buybacks, dividends and
Slide 95: Case Study: Steve Madden, Ltd.
Case Study: Steve Madden, Ltd. Stock performance of Steve Madden, Ltd. versus the S&P 500 and Russell 2000 Indices (starting at initial purchase date) 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% -10% -20% 3/18/2004 5/31/2004 8/31/2004 11/30/2004 2/28/2005 5/31/2005 8/31/2005 11/30/2005 SHOO S&P 500 Russell 2000 See
Slide 96: Case Study: Nautica Enterprises, Inc.
Case Study: Nautica Enterprises, Inc. Situation Overview Market cap of approximately $360 million. Strong free cash flow generation. Company traded at modest premium to net tangible assets, excluding value of the brand. Poor operating performance resulted in EBITDA multiple discount to peers. Potent
Slide 97: Case Study: Nautica Enterprises, Inc.
Case Study: Nautica Enterprises, Inc. Active Strategy Barington recommended that the Company improve brand management and reduce operating costs, including executive compensation; also encouraged the Company to explore strategic alternatives. In June 2003, Barington filed a preliminary proxy stateme
Slide 98: Case Study: Nautica Enterprises, Inc.
Case Study: Nautica Enterprises, Inc. Stock performance of Nautica versus the S&P 500 and Russell 2000 Indices (starting at initial purchase date) 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% -10% 4/17/2003 4/30/2003 5/30/2003 6/30/2003 7/31/2003 8/29/2003 NAUT S&P 500 Russell 2000 See Important Disclosures on page 1
Slide 99: Case Study: Lancaster Colony Corp.
Case Study: Lancaster Colony Corp. Situation Overview Market cap of ~$1.2 billion Conglomerate with three diverse operating business segments Ability to realize higher value from operational improvements and efficiencies Opportunity to divest capital-intensive Glassware and Automotive businesses Cas
Slide 100: Case Study: Lancaster Colony Corp.
Case Study: Lancaster Colony Corp. Active Strategy The Company agreed with Barington to form a task force to improve the Company’s operations, productivity and profitability. The Company also agreed to implement certain corporate governance initiatives, establish a goal to repurchase more common sto
Slide 101: Case Study: Lancaster Colony Corp.
Case Study: Lancaster Colony Corp. Stock performance of Lancaster Colony versus the S&P 500 Index (starting at initial purchase date) 180% 160% 140% 120% 100% 80% 60% 40% Jan- Jul- Jan- Jul- Jan- Jul- Jan- Jul- Jan- Jul- Jan- 06 06 07 07 08 08 09 09 10 10 11 LANC S&P 500 See Important Disclosures on
Slide 102: Case Study: Gerber Scientific, Inc.
Case Study: Gerber Scientific, Inc. Situation Overview Enterprise Value of ~$177 million. Significant opportunity for margin improvement. Company was performing poorly versus its peers. The Company’s portfolio of small, loosely related and technology dependent businesses that Barington believed lack
Slide 103: Case Study: Gerber Scientific, Inc.
Case Study: Gerber Scientific, Inc. Active Strategy Reduced the size of corporate-level expenses and R&D. Initiated a strategic review to determine the long-term viability and return on equity potential of each of the Company’s businesses. In March 2010 the Company reported that in the third quarter
Slide 104: Case Study: Gerber Scientific, Inc.
Case Study: Gerber Scientific, Inc. Stock performance of Gerber Scientific versus the S&P 500 Index (starting at initial purchase date) 180% 160% 140% 120% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% -20% Aug-09 Oct-09 Dec-09 Feb-10 Apr-10 Jun-10 Aug-10 Oct-10 Dec-10 Feb-11 See Important Disclosures on page 1. This cas
Slide 105: Okapi Partners LLC contact information
For additional information and updates leading up to the 2016 Annual Meeting, please visit the Barington Group’s website at www.barington.com/chicos.html. If you have any questions, or need any assistance voting the Barington Group’s BLUE proxy card, please contact: OKAPI PARTNERS LLC 1212 Avenue of