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Banque nationale de Belgique SA — Technical Presentation (May 2013)

54 slides from Banque nationale de Belgique SA's technical presentation, May 10, 2013

  1. Slide 1: Labour Market Policies and Unemployment Dynamics

    Labour Market Policies and Unemployment Dynamics A Cross-Country Comparison Fabrice Murtin 1 Jean-Marc Robin 2 1 OECD 2 Sciences-Po and UCL 10th May 2013 Murtin, Robin (OECD, ScPo & UCL) Labour Market Policies 10th May 2013 1 / 40

  2. Slide 2: Introduction

    Introduction <O> «f> «<=> «> Dae

  3. Slide 3: Question

    Question How much of unemployment dynamics can be accounted for by Labour Market Policies? We shall answer this classic question by constructing a small model of the labour market model such that � Aggregate shocks to GDP fuel the cycle � LMPs induce structural change. The model will be separately e

  4. Slide 4: Question

    Question How much of unemployment dynamics can be accounted for by Labour Market Policies? We shall answer this classic question by constructing a small model of the labour market model such that � Aggregate shocks to GDP fuel the cycle � LMPs induce structural change. The model will be separately e

  5. Slide 5: Question

    Question How much of unemployment dynamics can be accounted for by Labour Market Policies? We shall answer this classic question by constructing a small model of the labour market model such that � Aggregate shocks to GDP fuel the cycle � LMPs induce structural change. The model will be separately e

  6. Slide 6: The literature: reduced form studies

    The literature: reduced form studies Bruno and Sachs (1985), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Bertola, Blau and Khan (2007) Log UNR Log LDR Log JFR Log V Log Tightness Initial Replacement Rate 0.130 0.084 -0.062 -0.129 -0.260 ALMP: Placement -0.062 -0.041 0.018 -0.006 0.056 ALMP: Training -0.133 -0.059

  7. Slide 7: The literature: small structural models

    The literature: small structural models Small structural model focusing on one policy � Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) study welfare policies; � Prescott (2004) and Rogerson (2008) highlight the role of labour taxes. Murtin, Robin (OECD, ScPo & UCL) Labour Market Policies 10th May 2013 5 / 40

  8. Slide 8: Our approach

    Our approach We develop a hybrid approach that aims at bridging the gap between the two approaches: � Structural shocks to production � Search-matching framework à la Mortensen-Pissarides (RES, 1990) � Rent sharing à la Postel-Vinay-Robin (Ecta, 2002) � Worker heterogeneity as in Robin (Ecta, 2011)

  9. Slide 9: Theory

    Theory <O> «f> «<=> «>

  10. Slide 10: Aggregate shocks

    Aggregate shocks Time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ N. The global state of the economy is described by a Markov chain yt ∈ {y1 < ... < yN } with transition probability matrix Π = (πij ). Aggregate shocks accrue at the beginning of each period. Murtin, Robin (OECD, ScPo & UCL) Labour Market Policies

  11. Slide 11: Heterogeneity

    Heterogeneity There are M types of workers and �m workers of each type (with �M m=1 �m = 1). Each type is characterized by a time-invariant ability xm , m = 1, ..., M, with xm < xm+1 . Firms are identical. Murtin, Robin (OECD, ScPo & UCL) Labour Market Policies 10th May 2013 9 / 40

  12. Slide 12: Matches

    Matches Workers are paired with firms to form productive units. The per-period output of a job, if the worker is of ability xm and aggregate productivity is yi , is yi (m) = xm yi . Matches form and break at the beginning of each period, after realisation of the aggregate shock. Murtin, Robin (OECD,

  13. Slide 13: Unemployment and job destruction

    Unemployment and job destruction Let ut (m) denote the proportion of unemployed workers of ability xm at the end of period t − 1. �M Let ut = m=1 ut (m)�m denote the aggregate unemployment rate. I denote as Si (m) the surplus of a match (xm , yi ). Only matches with Si (m) > 0 are viable. At the beg

  14. Slide 14: Unemployment and job destruction

    Unemployment and job destruction Let ut (m) denote the proportion of unemployed workers of ability xm at the end of period t − 1. �M Let ut = m=1 ut (m)�m denote the aggregate unemployment rate. I denote as Si (m) the surplus of a match (xm , yi ). Only matches with Si (m) > 0 are viable. At the beg

  15. Slide 15: Unemployment and job destruction

    Unemployment and job destruction Let ut (m) denote the proportion of unemployed workers of ability xm at the end of period t − 1. �M Let ut = m=1 ut (m)�m denote the aggregate unemployment rate. I denote as Si (m) the surplus of a match (xm , yi ). Only matches with Si (m) > 0 are viable. At the beg

  16. Slide 16: Meetings

    Meetings Matching is random and firms with a vacancy can either meet an unemployed worker or an employed worker. Let λt denote the meeting rate. The relative search intensity of employees is set as k = 0.12. At the beginning of period t, � A fraction λt 1{Si (m) > 0}ut (m)�m of unemployed workers me

  17. Slide 17: Meetings

    Meetings Matching is random and firms with a vacancy can either meet an unemployed worker or an employed worker. Let λt denote the meeting rate. The relative search intensity of employees is set as k = 0.12. At the beginning of period t, � A fraction λt 1{Si (m) > 0}ut (m)�m of unemployed workers me

  18. Slide 18: Meetings

    Meetings Matching is random and firms with a vacancy can either meet an unemployed worker or an employed worker. Let λt denote the meeting rate. The relative search intensity of employees is set as k = 0.12. At the beginning of period t, � A fraction λt 1{Si (m) > 0}ut (m)�m of unemployed workers me

  19. Slide 19: Rent sharing

    Rent sharing We assume that employers have full monopsony power with respect to unemployed workers. So they keep all the surplus in this case. However, employed workers search on the job, and Bertrand competition transfers all the surplus to the poached employees. Murtin, Robin (OECD, ScPo & UCL) La

  20. Slide 20: Rent sharing

    Rent sharing We assume that employers have full monopsony power with respect to unemployed workers. So they keep all the surplus in this case. However, employed workers search on the job, and Bertrand competition transfers all the surplus to the poached employees. Murtin, Robin (OECD, ScPo & UCL) La

  21. Slide 21: Vacancy creation

    Vacancy creation Firms posts vacancies vt until ex ante profits are exhausted (free entry). The total vacancy cost is cvt . For yt = yi , free entry ensures that M � cvt = λt ut (m)�m Si (m)+ m=1 where we denote x + = max(x, 0). A matching function relates the job finding rate λt to tightness θt : v

  22. Slide 22: Vacancy creation

    Vacancy creation Firms posts vacancies vt until ex ante profits are exhausted (free entry). The total vacancy cost is cvt . For yt = yi , free entry ensures that M � cvt = λt ut (m)�m Si (m)+ m=1 where we denote x + = max(x, 0). A matching function relates the job finding rate λt to tightness θt : v

  23. Slide 23: Vacancy creation

    Vacancy creation Firms posts vacancies vt until ex ante profits are exhausted (free entry). The total vacancy cost is cvt . For yt = yi , free entry ensures that M � cvt = λt ut (m)�m Si (m)+ m=1 where we denote x + = max(x, 0). A matching function relates the job finding rate λt to tightness θt : v

  24. Slide 24: Turnover rates

    Turnover rates The following turnover rates can then be computed: Exit rate from unemployment: � 1{St (m) > 0}ut (m)�m ft = λt m ut Job destruction rate: � m 1{St (m) ≤ 0}(1 − ut (m))�m st = δ + (1 − δ) 1 − ut Murtin, Robin (OECD, ScPo & UCL) Labour Market Policies 10th May 2013 15 / 40

  25. Slide 25: Unemployment dynamics

    Unemployment dynamics The law of motion of individual-specific unemployment rates is such that, at the end of period t, ut+1 (m) = 1 − [(1 − δ)(1 − ut (m)) + λt ut (m)]1{St (m) > 0} � 1 if St (m) ≤ 0, = ut (m) + δ(1 − ut (m)) − λt ut (m) if St (m) > 0. Note that ut+1 − ut = st (1 − ut ) − ft ut . Mu

  26. Slide 26: Unemployment dynamics

    Unemployment dynamics The law of motion of individual-specific unemployment rates is such that, at the end of period t, ut+1 (m) = 1 − [(1 − δ)(1 − ut (m)) + λt ut (m)]1{St (m) > 0} � 1 if St (m) ≤ 0, = ut (m) + δ(1 − ut (m)) − λt ut (m) if St (m) > 0. Note that ut+1 − ut = st (1 − ut ) − ft ut . Mu

  27. Slide 27: The match surplus

    The match surplus The surplus of a match (xm , yi ) solves the following (nearly linear) Bellman equation: 1−δ � Si (m) = yi (m) − z + πij Sj (m)+ , 1+r j where we denote x + = max(x, 0) and z is the flow utility of unemployment. � After a productivity shock from i to j the continuation surplus is z

  28. Slide 28: The match surplus

    The match surplus The surplus of a match (xm , yi ) solves the following (nearly linear) Bellman equation: 1−δ � Si (m) = yi (m) − z + πij Sj (m)+ , 1+r j where we denote x + = max(x, 0) and z is the flow utility of unemployment. � After a productivity shock from i to j the continuation surplus is z

  29. Slide 29: Empirical analysis

    Empirical analysis <O> «f> «<=> «>

  30. Slide 30: Data construction

    Data construction Our own calculations from BLS (2011), Eurostat (2011), OECD Employment Outlook (2010). Compare with Murtin, De Serres and Hijzen (2011), Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008), Elsby et al. (2008). Although unemployment data allow for monthly frequency in some countries, the time unit is

  31. Slide 31: Structural parameters

    10 structural parameters 1 Markov chain for yt = yi for i = 1, ..., N = 100. Discretization of an AR(1) process for log-wages with autocorrelation ρ and variance σ 2 . 2 Exogenous job destruction rate δ 3 Matching function: f (θ) = φθη 4 Ability: � 500 equidistant nodes in [C , C + 1]. � The distrib

  32. Slide 32: Labour Market Policies (LMPs)

    Labour Market Policies (LMPs) 1 UI benefit 2 Initial replacement rate (RR) 3 ALMP expenditure (ALMP expenditure per unemployed wkr/GDP per employee): 1 Employment & Placement Services 2 Training 3 Incentives (e.g. payroll tax reduction for low wage workers) 4 Product market regulation OECD index (PM

  33. Slide 33: How LMP enters the model

    How LMP enters the model We assume that LMP changes are not anticipated: Individuals observe the change when it occurs and incorporate it in the surplus calculations with myopic expectations on future changes. Crude intervention mechanisms: Each government intervention shifts structural parameters φ

  34. Slide 34: Estimation

    Estimation 1 Estimate parameters by matching moments of detrended series of GDP, unemployment rates, job finding rates, job destruction rates and ‘tightness’ (V /U). 2 Filter productivity shocks by minimising the SSR of GDP. 3 Estimate LMP effects by fitting GDP cycle and actual series (trend and cyc

  35. Slide 35: Estimation

    Estimation 1 Estimate parameters by matching moments of detrended series of GDP, unemployment rates, job finding rates, job destruction rates and ‘tightness’ (V /U). 2 Filter productivity shocks by minimising the SSR of GDP. 3 Estimate LMP effects by fitting GDP cycle and actual series (trend and cyc

  36. Slide 36: Estimation

    Estimation 1 Estimate parameters by matching moments of detrended series of GDP, unemployment rates, job finding rates, job destruction rates and ‘tightness’ (V /U). 2 Filter productivity shocks by minimising the SSR of GDP. 3 Estimate LMP effects by fitting GDP cycle and actual series (trend and cyc

  37. Slide 37: Remarks on estimation

    Remarks on estimation We use GDP instead of GDP per worker because of negative correlation between productivity and employment in AUS and SWE! We arbitrarily set the matching elasticity η in [0, 1]. Surprisingly, for any choice of η there seems to be a choice of the other parameters that fits as wel

  38. Slide 38: Remarks on estimation

    Remarks on estimation We use GDP instead of GDP per worker because of negative correlation between productivity and employment in AUS and SWE! We arbitrarily set the matching elasticity η in [0, 1]. Surprisingly, for any choice of η there seems to be a choice of the other parameters that fits as wel

  39. Slide 39: Results: The Business Cycle model

    Results The Business Cycle model

  40. Slide 40: Estimated parameters

    Estimated parameters C < z ⇒ endogenous job destruction AUS FRA DEU JAP PRT ESP SWE GBR USA Productivity ρ 0.970 0.938 0.933 0.942 0.842 0.972 0.961 0.970 0.959 σ 0.017 0.020 0.024 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.029 0.023 0.015 C 0.701 0.679 0.527 0.514 0.826 0.705 0.700 0.695 0.663 E(α) 0.993 0.990 0.980 0.98

  41. Slide 41: Moments fit

    Moments fit AUS DEU ESP FRA true sim. true sim. true sim. true sim. Mean GDP 1.002 1.000 1.001 1.000 1.001 0.993 1.000 0.997 Std log GDP 0.017 0.018 0.021 0.024 0.028 0.029 0.019 0.022 Autocorr. log GDP 0.927 0.980 0.925 0.942 0.963 0.982 0.972 0.954 Mean unemployment 0.074 0.075 0.091 0.092 0.159 0

  42. Slide 42: Moments fit

    Moments fit GBR JPN PRT SWE USA true sim. true sim. true sim. true sim. true sim. Mean GDP 1.006 0.995 1.005 0.992 1.007 1.003 1.004 0.995 1.005 1.000 Std log GDP 0.023 0.026 0.027 0.029 0.029 0.027 0.029 0.031 0.017 0.018 Autocorr. log GDP 0.977 0.980 0.946 0.963 0.965 0.859 0.979 0.973 0.960 0.978

  43. Slide 43: Unemployment Cycle

    Unemployment Cycle AUS DEU ESP 10 12 unemployment 10 20 Cyclical 8 8 15 6 6 10 1985 1995 2005 1985 1995 2005 1985 1995 2005 FRA GBR JPN 10 unemployment 11 4 8 Cyclical 10 3 9 6 8 4 2 1985 1995 2005 1985 1995 2005 1985 1995 2005 PRT SWE USA 10 8 unemployment 10 8 Cyclical 8 6 6 6 4 2 4 4 1985 1995 20

  44. Slide 44: Correlation Between Actual and Simulated Unfiltered Series

    Correlation Between Actual and Simulated Unfiltered Series AUS FRA DEU JAP PRT ESP SWE GBR USA Average Productivity 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Unemployment 0.83 0.68 0.88 0.87 0.73 0.92 0.77 0.87 0.75 0.81 Job Finding Rate 0.70 0.64 0.70 0.79 0.74 0.77 0.31 0.85 0.82 0.70 Job

  45. Slide 45: Conclusions on BC model

    Conclusions on BC model Right amplification of productivity shocks In many countries the fit is good beyond unemployment fluctuations. However, some (relative) failure regarding tightness and employment/unemployment flows. This may be an artifact of the HP-filtering procedure as the following analys

  46. Slide 46: Trends

    Trends <O> «f> «<=> «>

  47. Slide 47: LMP effects

    LMP effects Effect of a one-std increase in policy. We a priori shunt certain channels for identification. φ δ c Initial replacement rate -0.036 ALMP Placement and Employment Services 0.025 -0.114 ALMP Training -0.037 -0.095 ALMP Incentives 0.063 -0.167 Product Market Regulation -0.026 0.112 Employmen

  48. Slide 48: LMP effects on unemployment

    LMP effects on unemployment AUS FRA DEU JAP PRT ESP SWE GBR USA Mean IRR (−1 sd) -0.29 -0.40 -0.25 -0.16 -0.24 -0.61 -0.22 -0.32 -0.22 -0.30 Placement (+1 sd) -0.93 -1.25 -0.74 -0.47 -0.69 -1.95 -0.70 -0.99 -0.72 -0.94 Training (+1 sd) -0.35 -0.45 -0.24 -0.16 -0.21 -0.72 -0.25 -0.36 -0.27 -0.33 Incen

  49. Slide 49: Unemployment trends

    Unemployment trends AUS DEU ESP 12 Unemployment 10 20 10 8 5 10 6 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 FRA GBR JPN 14 14 Unemployment 12 6 12 10 10 8 6 4 8 4 2 2 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 PRT SWE USA 12 8 Unemployment 8 10 8 6 6 6 4 4 4 2 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990

  50. Slide 50: JFR trends

    JFR trends AUS DEU ESP Job finding rate 25 60 40 20 40 20 15 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 FRA GBR JPN Job finding rate 50 60 35 30 40 50 25 20 30 40 15 30 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 PRT SWE USA Job finding rate 35 90 30 25 60 80 20 15 40 70 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000

  51. Slide 51: LDR trends

    LDR trends AUS DEU ESP Job destruction rate 5 4.5 2.2 4 2 4 3.5 1.8 3 1.6 1.4 3 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 FRA GBR JPN Job destruction rate 4 5 2 3 4 3 1.5 2 2 1 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 PRT SWE USA Job destruction rate 5 2 6 4 1.5 5 3 2 4 1 1 3 1990 2000 2010 1

  52. Slide 52: Market tightness trends

    Market tightness trends AUS DEU ESP 0.4 0.2 Market tightness 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.05 0.1 0.05 0 0 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 FRA GBR JPN Market tightness 0.15 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.05 0.2 0 0.1 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 PRT SWE USA 0.08 Market tightness 1.2 0.06 0.

  53. Slide 53: Correlation Between Actual and Simulated Unfiltered Series

    Correlation Between Actual and Simulated Unfiltered Series AUS FRA DEU JAP PRT ESP SWE GBR USA Average Productivity 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Unemployment 0.96 0.77 0.68 0.98 0.76 0.82 0.98 0.89 0.49 0.81 Job Finding Rate 0.87 0.89 0.60 0.84 0.41 0.86 0.88 0.92 0.71 0.77 Job

  54. Slide 54: Conclusion

    Conclusion One (simple) model of LMP intervention fits them all. Main lessons: � ALMP - Placement and Employment Services: most important (+1sd = -1% UNR). � Other LMPs are less effective (+1 sd = between .2 and .33 pct points). Extension: firm heterogeneity. Work in progess with Jeremy Lise. More ac

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