Clearwire — Merger or Acquisition (May 2013)
51 slides from Clearwire's merger presentation, May 1, 2013
Slide 1: Investor Presentation May 2013
1 Investor Presentation May 2013
Slide 2: Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements
2 Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements This presentation includes “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the securities laws. The words “may,” “could,” “should,” “estimate,” “project,” “forecast,” “intend,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “target,” “plan,” “provid
Slide 3: I. Sprint Offer Provides a Compelling Value to Clearwire Minority Shareholders
3 I. Sprint Offer Provides a Compelling Value to Clearwire Minority Shareholders
Slide 4: Sprint Transaction Provides Significant Benefits to Clearwire Minority Shareholders
4 Sprint Transaction Provides Significant Benefits to Clearwire Minority Shareholders $2.97/share in cash $2.2 billion equity purchase price $10 billion total Clearwire enterprise value Attractive spectrum value of $0.21 / MHz-POP ~130% premium to Clearwire’s price on October 10 (Date prec
Slide 5: Clearwire Historical Stock Price Performance
5 $3.37 $2.97 $0.00 $0.50 $1.00 $1.50 $2.00 $2.50 $3.00 $3.50 Dec-11 Jan-12 Feb-12 Mar-12 Apr-12 May-12 Jun-12 Jul-12 Aug-12 Sep-12 Oct-12 Nov-12 Dec-12 Clearwire Historical Stock Price Performance CLWR Historical Share Price – Prior to Sprint Transaction Announcement (12/13/11): Capital Raise - $73
Slide 6: Centerview Partners Valuation Summary
6 Centerview Partners Valuation Summary Methodology Implied Share Price Source: Schedule 13E-3, Exhibit (c)(7) filed with the SEC on February 1, 2013. Pre-Leak Historical Trading Ranges 52-Week Closing Low - 7/25/12 52-Week Closing High - 10/15/12 Analyst Price Targets Precedent Spectrum Acquisition
Slide 7: Evercore Partners Valuation Summary
7 Evercore Partners Valuation Summary Source: Schedule 13E-3, Exhibit (c)(6) filed with the SEC on February 1, 2013. Methodology Implied Share Price Selected Range Implied Share Price Low High For Reference Purposes Only 52 Week Low / 52 Week High Share Price Analyst Share Price Targets Public Peer
Slide 8: Sprint Transaction Implies an Attractive Value for Clearwire Spectrum
8 Sprint Transaction Implies an Attractive Value for Clearwire Spectrum Frequency 2.5 GHz 2.5 GHz 2.5 GHz 2.5 GHz 2.3 GHz 2 - 2.2 GHz 2 - 2.2 GHz 1.5 - 1.6 GHz Band EBS/BRS EBS/BRS EBS/BRS BRS WCS S S L Transaction Value $2,183 $9,897 $7,400 $300 $600 $1,382 $1,364 $1,849 Total MHz-POPs 11,367 47,00
Slide 9: II. Company Background and Review of Clearwire Business Plan
9 II. Company Background and Review of Clearwire Business Plan
Slide 10: Clearwire Background and History
10 Clearwire Background and History Formed November 2008 through merger of Sprint’s mobile WiMAX business with Clearwire Legacy LLC (fka Clearwire Corporation), and concurrent investment by Comcast, Time Warner Cable, Intel, Google, and Bright House, together with Eagle River (a shareholder of Cle
Slide 11: Business Overview
11 Business Overview Deployed and operates 4G wireless broadband network WiMAX network completed in 2010 covers ~134 million POPs in 71 markets in the U.S. Currently deploying TDD-LTE network with plans to complete 8,000 sites by the end of 2014 4G Network Wholesale Business Retail Business
Slide 12: Business Plan Requires $2Bn - $4Bn in Additional Funding and Prospects of Securing Funding are Highly Uncertain
12 Business Plan Requires $2Bn - $4Bn in Additional Funding and Prospects of Securing Funding are Highly Uncertain Clearwire management prepared two sets of financial projections, both of which were considered by the Special Committee in its evaluation and recommendation of the Merger Single-Cus
Slide 13: Business Plan Requires $2Bn - $4Bn in Additional Funding (cont'd)
13 Business Plan Requires $2Bn - $4Bn in Additional Funding and Prospects of Securing Funding are Highly Uncertain (cont’d) Any delay in signing up a second large wholesale customer will increase the MCC funding gap Timing is dependent on completion of network and development of device ecosystem
Slide 14: Business Plan Requires $2Bn - $4Bn in Additional Funding (cont'd)
14 Business Plan Requires $2Bn - $4Bn in Additional Funding and Prospects of Securing Funding are Highly Uncertain (cont’d) $1.7+ billion cash shortfall in 2014 reflects less certain revenues and high fixed costs Total revenue in 2014 projected to be ~$1 billion during transition from WiMAX to L
Slide 15: Business Plan Requires $2Bn - $4Bn in Additional Funding (cont'd)
15 Business Plan Requires $2Bn - $4Bn in Additional Funding and Prospects of Securing Funding are Highly Uncertain (cont’d) Clearwire is limited in its ability to obtain additional capital at reasonable terms and any new capital could potentially decrease value to existing shareholders: Authoriz
Slide 16: Competitor landscape
16 Consolidated spectrum position in the 700 MHz and WCS bands through recent transactions with Verizon and NextWave LTE rollout expected to be completed by end of 2014 Focused on Project VIP to enhance network capabilities Has led other carriers in spectrum position Leveraging 700 MHz and
Slide 17: III. Board and Special Committee Process
17 III. Board and Special Committee Process
Slide 18: Sprint Transaction Represents Culmination of Rigorous Multi-Year Strategic Review
18 Sprint Transaction Represents Culmination of Rigorous Multi-Year Strategic Review Board and management have performed comprehensive review of alternatives to maximize shareholder value over past two years Formed Strategic Committee of the Board in September 2010 Engaged Kirkland & Ellis LLP
Slide 19: Special Committee Formed to Pursue Best Interests of Unaffiliated Class A Shareholders
19 Special Committee Formed to Pursue Best Interests of Unaffiliated Class A Shareholders Special Committee formed in November 2012 upon first indication of Sprint interest in current transaction Comprised of 3 Directors independent from Sprint Board of Directors delegated to Special Committee
Slide 20: Special Committee Process Generated Material Improvements in Sprint Proposal
20 Special Committee Process Generated Material Improvements in Sprint Proposal for the Benefit of Unaffiliated Class A Shareholders • • • • • • • • • • • •
Slide 21: Sprint Transaction Unanimously Recommended by Special Committee and Board
21 Sprint Transaction Unanimously Recommended by Special Committee and Board of Directors Special Committee made unanimous recommendations to Board that the offer is fair to and in the best interest of unaffiliated Class A shareholders Received a fairness opinion from its financial advisor Alo
Slide 22: Dish Offer for Clearwire
22 Dish Offer for Clearwire Preliminary, non-binding indication of interest, subject to numerous material uncertainties and conditions $2.2 billion for ~11.4 billion MHz-POPs Portfolio comprised of ~40 MHz of primarily owned spectrum Dish would tender for Clearwire shares at $3.30, subject t
Slide 23: Dish Offer for Sprint
23 Dish Offer for Sprint On April 15, Dish made an unsolicited offer to acquire Sprint During their conference call discussing the offer, Dish re-affirmed offer for Clearwire Under the merger agreement, Sprint would remain obligated to acquire Clearwire if it entered into an agreement with res
Slide 24: Verizon Offer
24 Verizon Offer On April 8, Clearwire received an unsolicited non-binding offer from Verizon to acquire leased spectrum licenses Generally located in large markets that cover approximately 5 billion MHz-POPs Gross price of approximately $1.0 to $1.5 billion, less the present value of the unde
Slide 25: Financing Offers
25 Financing Offers On April 3 and 9, Clearwire received unsolicited non-binding offers from Crest and Aurelius Capital to provide $240 million and $80 million, respectively, in financing through exchangeable notes which would be exchangeable at $2.00 per share Under the terms of the Merger Agre
Slide 26: IV. Board and Special Committee Rigorously Explored Other Alternatives
26 IV. Board and Special Committee Rigorously Explored Other Alternatives
Slide 27: Clearwire Rigorously Explored Possible Strategic Alternatives to Maximize Shareholder Value
27 Clearwire Rigorously Explored Possible Strategic Alternatives to Maximize Shareholder Value Clearwire Board and management have performed a comprehensive review of strategic alternatives to maximize shareholder value over the past two years Special Committee also independently evaluated all t
Slide 28: Unsuccessful at Attracting Second Major Wholesale Customer
28 Unsuccessful at Attracting Second Major Wholesale Customer Ability to attract additional major customers is the primary factor in the long-term viability of our business Since formation, Sprint has been the largest wholesale customer, accounting for substantially all wholesale revenue Witho
Slide 29: Spectrum Sale Does Not Address Long-Term Challenges
29 Spectrum Sale Does Not Address – And May Exacerbate – Long-Term Challenges Hired an investment bank to conduct an auction in 2010 – contacted 37 potential buyers Resulted in a handful of bids with spectrum values well below those speculated by some shareholders, analysts and reporters Not s
Slide 30: Spectrum Sale Does Not Address Long-Term Challenges (cont'd)
30 Spectrum Sale Does Not Address – And May Exacerbate – Long-Term Challenges (cont’d) Even a sale of a meaningful block of spectrum would leave Clearwire exposed to significant risks and challenges Does not address the fundamental issue: inability to attract second major wholesale customer Si
Slide 31: Additional Financing Limited And Increases Challenges
31 Additional Financing Limited And Increases Challenges Debt financing, if available, would increase leverage and may have onerous terms (e.g. rate, covenants, etc.) Currently no additional secured debt capacity under existing indentures Uncertainty over market reaction if transaction is reje
Slide 32: Lack of Other Available Strategic Transactions
32 Lack of Other Available Strategic Transactions Held extensive discussions with potential strategic partners and investors Strategic discussions included commercial agreements, joint network builds, network hosting arrangements, equity and debt investments, and combinations thereof Unable to
Slide 33: Outcome of a Financial Restructuring is Highly Uncertain for Clearwire Shareholders
33 Outcome of a Financial Restructuring is Highly Uncertain for Clearwire Shareholders Spent significant time with advisors to understand implications / risks of restructuring Engaged Blackstone Advisory Partners and Kirkland & Ellis LLP to explore possibility of a financial restructuring in Fal
Slide 34: Outcome of a Financial Restructuring is Highly Uncertain (cont'd)
34 Outcome of a Financial Restructuring is Highly Uncertain for Clearwire Shareholders (cont’d) Value shareholders could receive in a restructuring subject to many uncertainties including: Existence of buyers in an auction for the entire company or ability to sell entire spectrum portfolio witho
Slide 35: V. Implications of Shareholders Rejecting Sprint Offer
35 V. Implications of Shareholders Rejecting Sprint Offer
Slide 36: Implications if Shareholders Vote to Reject the Sprint Transaction
36 Implications if Shareholders Vote to Reject the Sprint Transaction If the transaction is not completed, Clearwire expects to run out of liquidity in Q1 2014 Sprint interim financing will not be available post-rejection of transaction by shareholders, vote assumed to be in May Without altern
Slide 37: Implications if Shareholders Vote to Reject the Sprint Transaction (cont'd)
37 Implications if Shareholders Vote to Reject the Sprint Transaction (cont’d) In the absence of other alternatives, Management and the Board may have to take immediate actions to preserve liquidity given cash flow trajectory and anticipated inability to source external capital Such actions may
Slide 38: Implications if Shareholders Vote to Reject the Sprint Transaction (cont'd)
38 Implications if Shareholders Vote to Reject the Sprint Transaction (cont’d) If shareholders reject the deal, Sprint may exercise its exchange privilege on the Sprint financing notes, and may acquire the SIG shares at the time it closes the Softbank or alternate transaction Sprint pro forma ow
Slide 39: VI. Addressing Investor Misperceptions
39 VI. Addressing Investor Misperceptions
Slide 40: Addressing Investor Misperceptions
40 Addressing Investor Misperceptions 1. MCC Case is Achievable Significant uncertainty in ability and timing of signing an additional large wholesale customer after years of pursuing strategy and due to current industry dynamics Uncertainty in achieving volume of revenue per customer in plan
Slide 41: Misperception #1: MCC is Achievable
41 Misperception #1: MCC is Achievable MCC is only viable with another major wholesale customer in addition to Sprint Clearwire has extensively pursued, but has been unsuccessful in attracting a second large wholesale customer Current industry dynamics reduce prospect of any major carrier sign
Slide 42: Misperception #2: Implied Spectrum Valuation is Below Market
42 Misperception #2: Implied Spectrum Valuation is Below Market Sale process in 2010 (contacted 37 parties) did not result in agreement with any parties Resulted in a handful of bids with spectrum values well below those recently speculated by some shareholders, analysts and reporters Not succ
Slide 43: Misperception #3: Terms of Sprint Notes are Unfavorable
43 Misperception #3: Terms of Sprint Notes are Unfavorable The Note Purchase Agreement with Sprint was entered into as a part of the merger transaction in order to provide sufficient liquidity to Clearwire to continue operations and build out its network during the pendency of the merger The ter
Slide 44: Misperception #4: Bankruptcy Would Result in Higher Value for Shareholders
44 Misperception #4: Bankruptcy Would Result in Higher Value for Shareholders Significant uncertainty for shareholders in a bankruptcy filing Process could take 24 months or longer to auction the company or sell entire spectrum portfolio – shareholders unlikely to receive any value prior to comp
Slide 45: Misperception #5: Clearwire Should Breach the Merger Agreement Now
45 Misperception #5: Clearwire Should Breach the Merger Agreement Now to Pursue Path to Independence Offered by Recent Proposals The Special Committee is evaluating the proposals and engaging with Dish and Verizon, as well as reviewing multiple unsolicited alternate financing proposals These off
Slide 46: Misperception #5 (cont'd)
46 Misperception #5: Clearwire Should Breach the Merger Agreement Now to Pursue Path to Independence Offered by Recent Proposals (cont’d) Spectrum sale proceeds have restricted uses, and may only provide limited liquidity to fund ongoing operations A spectrum transaction could take 6-12 months o
Slide 47: Misperception #5 (cont'd)
47 Misperception #5: Clearwire Should Breach the Merger Agreement Now to Pursue Path to Independence Offered by Recent Proposals (cont’d) Additional financing may be challenging, expensive and dilutive to shareholders, if available at all The financing offers from Crest and Aurelius may provide
Slide 48: VII. Conclusion
Clearw're VII. Conclusion
Slide 49: Sprint Merger Provides Fair Attractive Value with Certainty
49 Sprint Merger Provides Fair Attractive Value with Certainty $2.97/share in cash $2.2 billion equity purchase price $10 billion total Clearwire enterprise value Attractive spectrum value of $0.21 / MHz-POP ~130% premium to Clearwire’s price on October 10 (Date preceding confirmation of S
Slide 50: Appendix
Clearw're Appendix
Slide 51: Transaction Value Calculation
51 Transaction Value Calculation Merger Consideration ($ / share) $2.97 Fully Diluted Shares Outstanding (mm)(1) 1,495 Aggregate Equity Value $4,440 Plus: Debt(2) 4,486 Plus: NPV of Spectrum Leases 1,800 Less: Cash and Short-Term Investments(2) (828) Aggregate Enterprise Value (A) $9,897 Clearwire M