Forest Laboratories — Proxy Contest (July 2012)
84 slides from Forest Laboratories's proxy contest presentation, Jul 17, 2012
Slide 1: Forest Laboratories Shareholder Presentation July 2012
Forest Laboratories Shareholder Presentation July 2012
Slide 2: Disclaimer
Disclaimer Special note regarding this presentation • This presentation includes information based on data found in filings with the SEC, independent industry publications and other sources. Although we believe that the data is reliable, we do not guarantee the accuracy or completeness of this infor
Slide 3: Key Conclusions of Report
Key Conclusion Pages Today, We Believe Forest is in Crisis - CEO Solomon Was Wrong in the Past With His Overly Optimistic Predictions Results: Forest’s stock is down 11% in the past 10 years and more than 50% from the peak - The company was completely unprepared for the Lexapro patent cliff since ea
Slide 4: Presentation Summary
Presentation Summary • We believe Change is Needed as the Board has overseen: – significant stock underperformance (p. 7 - 11) and massive destruction of value (p. 12) – an inadequate and flawed company strategy (p. 15 - 28) – significant corporate waste and cost structure inefficiency (p. 27 - 28)
Slide 5: Company Background
Company Background • Founded in 1956 - Howard Solomon has been CEO since 1977 • Develops, manufactures and markets drugs with sales derived primarily from neurology • FY12A total revenues of $4.6 B; FY13E total revenues of $3.3 B; FY16E total revenues of $3.7 B • Lexapro for depression/anxiety was ~
Slide 6: Why We Believe Meaningful & Sustainable Change is Needed at Forest Labs
Why We Believe Meaningful & Sustainable Change is Needed at Forest Labs
Slide 7: Forest's Stock Has Underperformed For Years
Forest’s Stock Has Underperformed For 10 Years
Slide 8: Forest's Stock Has Underperformed For Years
Forest’s Stock Has Underperformed For 5 Years
Slide 9: Forest's Stock Has Underperformed Against Most Measures For 3 Years
Forest’s Stock Has Underperformed Against Most Measures For 3 Years Notes: Data from 5/29/09 - 5/29/12 (the day before Icahn announced he may seek Board representation); excludes the benefits of dividends on total return; FRX = Forest Labs; DRG = AMEX Pharmaceutical Index; Large Pharma: AstraZeneca,
Slide 10: Forest's Stock Has Underperformed Against Most Measures For 1 Year
Forest’s Stock Has Underperformed Against Most Measures For 1 Year Notes: Data from 5/29/11 - 5/29/12 (the day before Icahn announced he may seek Board representation); excludes the benefits of dividends on total return; FRX = Forest Labs; DRG = AMEX Pharmaceutical Index; Large Pharma: AstraZeneca,
Slide 11: And It Hasn't Gotten Better Since Last Year's Annual Meeting
…And It Hasn’t Gotten Better Since Last Year’s Annual Meeting Notes: Data from 8/18/11 - 5/29/12 (the day before Icahn announced he may seek Board representation); excludes the benefits of dividends on total return; FRX = Forest Labs; DRG = AMEX Pharmaceutical Index; Large Pharma: AstraZeneca, Eli L
Slide 12: Share Buyback Masked True Extent of Value Destruction Over 10 Years
Share Buyback Masked True Extent of Value Destruction Over 10 Years Source: Company documents; all data measured from fiscal YE02 to fiscal YE12; Enterprise value = Market Cap + Debt-Cash
Slide 13: While Shareholders Lost Billions of Dollars, CEO Solomon Made A Fortune
While Shareholders Lost Billions of Dollars, CEO Solomon Made A Fortune Paid Over $80 MM Sold Stock Worth $572 MM; Ownership Reduced by 82% Source: Company documents
Slide 14: Management Claims it Has Done a Great Job
Management Claims it Has Done a Great Job Then, (1) Why has the stock underperformed its peer indices for 1, 3, 5 and 10 years? And, (2) Why has so much value been destroyed during that same period of time? We believe the answer is: Strategic Failure by the Management & Board
Slide 15: We Believe Forest Had an Inadequate & Flawed Strategy That Destroyed Shareholder Value
We Believe Forest Had an Inadequate & Flawed Strategy That Destroyed Shareholder Value • Inadequate Strategy: Management and the Board implemented a strategy that we believe was inadequate to offset declining revenues and profits due to generic competition for Lexapro and Namenda – The strategy was
Slide 16: Management Had Plenty of Time to Prepare For the Patent Cliff, But Started Too Late
Management Had Plenty of Time to Prepare For the Patent Cliff, But Started Too Late Source: Company documents and analyst estimates Note: Peer specialty pharmaceutical companies consist of Valeant, Teva, Shire, Endo, Warner Chilcott & Allergan ; Peer large pharmaceutical companies consist of AstraZe
Slide 17: More Capital Had to be Put at Risk to Obtain Each Additional Product
More Capital Had to be Put at Risk to Obtain Each Additional Product Source: Company documents Notes: Capital at-risk is calculated for each product based on up-front payments + acquisition payments; Each year is calculated based on a cumulative capital at-risk divided by the cumulative number of pr
Slide 18: Despite All the Money Spent on Products, Massive Value Has Been Destroyed
Despite All the Money Spent on Products, Massive Value Has Been Destroyed During the last 10 years, Forest spent $8.3 B on R&D, licensing/milestone payments and product/rights acquisitions. At the same time, $7.9 B of Enterprise Value was destroyed During the last 5 years, Forest spent more than $6.
Slide 19: It's Hard For Us to See How the Next Nine Drugs Will Fill the Revenue Holes
It’s Hard For Us to See How the “Next Nine” Drugs Will Fill the Revenue Holes Source: Company documents Notes: Combined product launch curves are measured for the combined drugs assuming that the 1 st year is for the 1 st product launched; additional launches are added as they occur -$554 MM
Slide 20: Even If All Pipeline Drugs Were Successful, Sales Probably Wouldn't Have Been Enough in FY2013
Even If All Pipeline Drugs Were Successful, Sales Probably Wouldn’t Have Been Enough in FY2013 Source: Company documents and analyst estimates; Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development for average peak drug sales, average time to peak sales and average clinical development time by therapeutic
Slide 21: It Doesn't Appear to Us That Pipeline Planning for FY2016 Was Much Better
It Doesn’t Appear to Us That Pipeline Planning for FY2016 Was Much Better… Source: Company documents and analyst estimates; Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development for average peak drug sales, average time to peak sales and average clinical development time by therapeutic class; FDAReview.org
Slide 22: According to Analysts, Sales from Next Nine Pipeline Products Not Projected to Offset Revenue Declines
According to Analysts, Sales from “Next Nine” Pipeline Products Not Projected to Offset Revenue Declines Source: Company documents and analyst estimates; Quote from presentation filed by company during 2011 proxy contest Note: Lexapro sales decline is measured from FY12; Namenda sales decline is mea
Slide 23: Revenues Are Projected to Decline But Profits Are Expected to Get Hit Even Harder
Revenues Are Projected to Decline But Profits Are Expected to Get Hit Even Harder Source: Company documents and analyst estimates; Frank Perrier quote from Oct. 13, 2011 Total revenues are not expected by analysts to regain the FY12 peak until after FY17 Even worse, net income is not expected by ana
Slide 24: While Forest Has Launched Multiple Products, They Have Consistently Missed Guidance
While Forest Has Launched Multiple Products, They Have Consistently Missed Guidance Source: Company documents; company press releases for fiscal year end results, which provide next fiscal year product sales guidance; See APPENDIX A for actual sales guidance for each product
Slide 25: We Believe Opportunistic Business Development Has Led to a Lack of Focus
We Believe “Opportunistic” Business Development Has Led to a Lack of Focus TTP399 Dutogliptin FY13 Sales: $0 MM Linaclotide FY13 Sales: $40 MM GRT6005/6006 RGH-896 FY13 Sales: $0 MM Teflaro Avibactam BC-3781 Faropenam FY13 Sales: $58 MM Daliresp Colostin Aclidinium LAS100977 Oglemilast FY13 Sales: $
Slide 26: We Believe Lack of Therapeutic Focus is Hurting Sales Rep Productivity
We Believe Lack of Therapeutic Focus is Hurting Sales Rep Productivity Source: Company documents and analyst estimates Note: Peer specialty pharmaceutical companies include Valeant, Shire, Endo & Allergan; other peers are not available in SEC filings; FRX operates on a March fiscal year (FY12 ended
Slide 27: Loss of Lexapro Sales Has Further Exposed Massive Corporate Inefficiency
We Believe Loss of Lexapro Sales Has Further Exposed Massive Corporate Inefficiency & Lack of Cost Synergies SG&A/Revenues (Forest vs. Peers) Lack of Critical Mass Source: Company documents and analyst estimates Note: Peer specialty pharmaceutical companies include Valeant, Teva, Shire, Endo, Warner
Slide 28: Operating Margins Are Trending in the Wrong Direction
Operating Margins Are Trending in the Wrong Direction Operating margins have been and analysts expect them to continue getting compressed as SG&A and R&D as a percentage of revenues increases Source: Company documents; analyst estimates; FRX operates on a March fiscal year (FY12 ended in March 2012)
Slide 29: Management & Board Have a Poor Track Record of Allocating Capital
We Believe Management & Board Have a Poor Track Record of Allocating Capital Cash used for share repurchases Cash used for licensing or acquiring products Source: Company documents; 10 year values measured from YE 2002 through YE 2012; 5 Year values measured from YE07 through YE12; Enterprise Value
Slide 30: Management & Board Have Not Efficiently Used Forest's Balance Sheet
We Believe Management & Board Have Not Efficiently Used Forest’s Balance Sheet Management Is Not Efficiently Using Leverage To Create Value Source: Company documents and analyst estimates Note: Peer spec pharmaceutical companies include Valeant, Teva, Shire, Endo, Warner Chilcott & Allergan ; Peer l
Slide 31: We Are Concerned About How Management May Use the Cash Given Its Track Record
We Are Concerned About How Management May Use the Cash Given Its Track Record • Given its history of destroying significant value during the last 10 years, we are very concerned about how management may choose to use the company’s $3.2 B of cash • Because of the current & projected revenue shortfall
Slide 32: We Remain Concerned About Corporate Governance Issues
We Remain Concerned About Corporate Governance Issues • At least 50% of the Board continues to lack true independence, in our opinion – The Presiding “Independent” Director (Kenneth Goodman) lacks true independence yet he still remains in this important role – The Chair of the Compensation Committee
Slide 33: At Least 50% of the Board Continues to Lack True Independence
We Believe At Least 50% of the Board Continues to Lack True Independence (5 out of 10 Directors) Source: Company documents
Slide 34: Compensation Policies Have Been Flawed But Chairman Remains at Helm
Compensation Policies Have Been Flawed But Chairman Remains at Helm • Chair of Compensation Committee (Dan Goldwasser - Board member for 35 years) presided over serious problems related to compensation policy • Policy changes during the last year confirm these problems – Vesting schedules of equity
Slide 35: CEO's Preferential Option & Stock Vesting Schedule
CEO’s Preferential Option & Stock Vesting Schedule Source: 2011 proxy statement; CEO = Howard Solomon; CFO = Frank Perier; CCO (chief commercial officer) = Elaine Hochberg
Slide 36: Fortunately Timed Stock Sales by CEO
Fortunately Timed Stock Sales by CEO Nov ‘04: CEO Solomon sold 2.5 MM shares at $43.26 per share for proceeds of $108.2 MM Feb ‘07: CEO Solomon sold 4.3 MM shares at $52.60 per share for proceeds of $226.2 MM Source: SEC filings; three largest sales by CEO during period
Slide 37: CEO Stock Sales Alongside Optimistic Company Guidance
“Our financial performance for the remainder of the fiscal year ending March 31, 2004 should result in earnings per share for the year at the high end of our previously issued guidance [$1.92]. Regarding fiscal 2005 EPS, we continue to project a range of $2.30 - $2.50.” - Jan 20, CEO Howard Solomon
Slide 38: CEO Sells Stock Worth $226 MM All On One Day in 2007
CEO Sells Stock Worth $226 MM All On One Day in 2007 And Says It Was For Estate Planning Purposes CEO Howard Solomon sells 4.3 MM shares at $52.60 for proceeds of $226 MM on 2/12/07 ; Solomon states, “I have reached an age when it is necessary for me to further an estate plan ... These share disposi
Slide 39: CEO Succession Is Long Overdue & Should Equitably Include External Candidates
We Believe CEO Succession Is Long Overdue & Should Equitably Include External Candidates • Howard Solomon is currently 84 years old, has been CEO for 35 years and the government considered excluding Solomon from government contracts as recently as 1 year ago so succession planning is long overdue •
Slide 40: CEO's Son Promoted to Key Role of Strategic Planning
CEOs Son Promoted to Key Role of Strategic Planning • Business development and strategic planning involve building the company’s pipeline for future growth • In Forest’s case, because of the huge revenue holes being generated by the patent expirations of Lexapro and Namenda, which represent 80% of r
Slide 41: Poor Risk Management & Compliance Has Resulted in $423 MM in Legal Settlements
Poor Risk Management & Compliance Has Resulted in $423 MM in Legal Settlements • We do not see how Lester Salans, a Clinical Professor and physician, as Chair of the Compliance Committee has any qualifications as a compliance expert • These payments may be representative of a lax culture and complac
Slide 42: What They Said … What Happened …
What They Said … What Happened … Management said, they were “in a good place in managing the next two patent expirations in Lexapro and Namenda…“ -- Frank Perrier, CFO quote from Oct. 13, 2011 FY13 guidance was for revenues to decline by more that $1 B from FY12 and EPS to decline by almost 80% and
Slide 43: Icahn Nominee Plan For Meaningful Change at Forest Labs
Icahn Nominee Plan For Meaningful Change at Forest Labs
Slide 44: Icahn Recommendations
Icahn Recommendations How to Get the Forest Growing Again • Independently evaluate current business development strategy, which we believe is unfocused • Develop a clear strategy focused on creating shareholder value • Assess potential divestiture of non-core assets • Evaluate ways to reduce SG&A sp
Slide 45: Independently Evaluate and Potentially Change Current Business Development Strategy
Independently Evaluate and Potentially Change Current Business Development Strategy • We believe the “Opportunistic” approach by the company has caused it to lose its focus and has resulted in an inefficient cost structure • Engage an independent consultant to evaluate the company’s business strateg
Slide 46: Focus on Specific Therapeutic Categories Likely to Provide The Best Returns
Focus on Specific Therapeutic Categories Likely to Provide The Best Returns Source: company documents; analyst projections; capital at risk = upfront cash payments as part of licensing deals and cash acquisitions of companies or product rights
Slide 47: SG&A Efficiencies Could Increase EBITDA By Almost $500 MM
SG&A Efficiencies Could Increase EBITDA By Almost $500 MM • Greater focus within a few key therapeutic categories should allow for greater cost synergies • Potential G&A cuts including procurement efficiencies, head count reductions and consolidation of existing properties • Increase efficiency of s
Slide 48: Evaluate Current Pipeline for Potential Development Program Rationalization
Evaluate Current Pipeline for Potential Development Program Rationalization • Identify existing projects that do not fit within the new business development strategy or do not achieve pre- determined return on investment (IRR) criteria • Reduce R&D spending – Terminate poorly performing R&D programs
Slide 49: Evaluate Capital Allocation Decisions and Optimize Balance Sheet
Evaluate Capital Allocation Decisions and Optimize Balance Sheet • Potentially increase company leverage while maintaining strong Net Debt/EBITDA and EBITDA/Interest Expense ratios • Evaluate the best potential uses for excess cash on the balance sheet that are most likely to enhance shareholder val
Slide 50: Corporate Governance Changes
Corporate Governance Changes • Replace four current Board members with Icahn Nominees who we believe will continually hold management accountable • Split CEO and Chairman roles • Appoint new Chairs to Compensation and Compliance Committees • Replace the current Presiding “Independent” Director with
Slide 51: Four Directors That We Believe Have Trouble Seeing the FOREST For the Trees
Four Directors That We Believe Have Trouble “Seeing the FOREST For the Trees” Source: Company documents • Potential lack of independence due to length of Board tenure • Need for fresh perspective after 35 years on the Board • Lack of any biopharma experience outside of Forest • Oversaw flawed compen
Slide 52: Icahn Nominees Are Highly Qualified to Help Produce Positive Change
Icahn Nominees Are Highly Qualified to Help Produce Positive Change
Slide 53: Collective Experience of Icahn Slate Will Help Create Shareholder Value
We Believe the Collective Experience of Icahn Slate Will Help Create Shareholder Value • A history of helping create shareholder value & stock price appreciation • Value-enhancing capital allocation & efficient use of balance sheet • Successful turnarounds of underperforming business operations • Im
Slide 54: Nominee Background and Experience
Nominee Background and Experience Eric J. Ende, MD ü As biopharmaceutical analyst for 11 years, he analyzed hundreds of companies with respect to financial statements, cost structure, drug markets, acquisitions & divestitures, clinical data, competitive landscape & product licensing ü As Director of
Slide 55: Our Issues with Forest Labs, Potential Solutions, Relevant Experience
Our Issues with Forest Labs Our Potential Solutions Relevant Experience Long-tenured Directors that lacked independence Replace long tenured Directors and work constructively with remaining Board ü Genzyme Board contained many long tenured directors ü Worked constructively, objectively and independe
Slide 56: Our Issues with Forest Labs, Potential Solutions, Relevant Experience
Our Issues with Forest Labs Our Potential Solutions Relevant Experience Business development strategy is not enhancing shareholder value Evaluate current business development strategy for potential modification ü Identified and executed valuable transactions that enhanced CLDA’s strategic turnaround
Slide 57: Our Issues with Forest Labs, Potential Solutions, Relevant Experience
Our Issues with Forest Labs Our Potential Solutions Relevant Experience Business development strategy is not enhancing shareholder value Evaluate current business development strategy for potential modification ü Set successful strategy and negotiated the sales of companies Prosidion to Royalty Phar
Slide 58: Our Issues with Forest Labs, Potential Solutions, Relevant Experience
Our Issues with Forest Labs Our Potential Solutions Relevant Experience Long-tenured Directors that lacked independence Replace long tenured Directors and work constructively with remaining Board ü Worked with existing Boards of several companies to help enact productive change, including CIT Group,
Slide 59: Icahn's Track Record of Board Representation in Biopharma Shows Impressive Creation of Shareholder Value
Icahn’s Track Record of Board Representation in Biopharma Shows Impressive Creation of Shareholder Value Note: All time periods are measured from the day that Icahn gained (or announced gaining) Board representation until the most recent date of update or when an acquisition price was revealed; This
Slide 60: Icahn is Fully Aligned With Shareholders
Icahn is Fully Aligned With Shareholders Despite the Board and executive officers having a combined 197 years at the company, they only own 1.95% of the company versus Icahn’s 9.81%. Who do you think is better aligned with the best interests of shareholders? Source: Company documents; proxy statemen
Slide 61: Ende Agreement Fully Aligns Performance With All Shareholders
We Believe Ende Agreement Fully Aligns Performance With All Shareholders Source: SEC filings; Howard Solomon and Lawrence Olanoff are not considered independent directors by the Company
Slide 62: Appendix A: Pipeline Strategy
Appendix A: Pipeline Strategy
Slide 63: New Pipeline Drug Sales vs. Guidance
New Pipeline Drug Sales vs. Guidance Source: Company documents and SEC Filings
Slide 64: Average Drug Development Timelines By Therapeutic Class
Average Drug Development Timelines By Therapeutic Class Source: Tufts Center for the Study of Drug development
Slide 65: Average Peak Sales by Therapeutic Class
Average Peak Sales by Therapeutic Class Source: Tufts Center for the Study of Drug development
Slide 66: Average Time (years) Until Peak Sales by Therapeutic Class
Average Time (years) Until Peak Sales by Therapeutic Class Source: Tufts Center for the Study of Drug development
Slide 67: Clinical Development Probabilities
Clinical Development Probabilities Source: FDAReview.org; odds of product approval assuming entrance into each stage of development
Slide 68: Savella 58% | 4.7 | Fv09 37| aas| 203, 203,
Savella 58% | 4.7 | Fv09 23 58 37| 116 aas| 174 203, 203, CCR 17% [9.2 | FvI5 46 92 ‘Oglemilast 21% | 8.2 | FYI4 46 92 137 Cariprazine 21% | 8.8 | FYia 35 70 255, Desmoteplase 58% | 4.3 | FYI0 e2 | aoa | i87 zag [311 373 435 RGH-896 21% | 3.4 | Fyi4 23 58. 87 RGH-618 21% | 8.8 | FYI5 85 170 Bystolic
Slide 69: Appendix B: Capital Deployment
Appendix B: Capital Deployment
Slide 70: Capital Put At-Risk By Year
Capital Put At-Risk By Year Source: SEC filings Notes: All products licensed FY04 - FY13; Capital At-Risk defined as up-front payments and acquisition of products or product rights
Slide 71: Number of Products Licensed By Year
Number of Products Licensed By Year Notes: All products licensed FY04 - FY13; SEC filing and company documents
Slide 72: At-Risk defined as up-front payments and acquisition of products or product rights
Source: SEC filings Notes: All products licensed FY04 - FY13 (includes Lexapro and Namenda, which were licensed 1998 and 2000, respectively); Capital At-Risk defined as up-front payments and acquisition of products or product rights
Slide 73: Capital Put At-Risk By Product
Capital Put At-Risk By Product Source: SEC filings Notes: All products licensed FY04 - FY13 (includes Lexapro and Namenda, which were licensed 1998 and 2000, respectively); Capital At-Risk defined as up-front payments and acquisition of products or product rights
Slide 74: Share Repurchases
Share Repurchases Source: SEC filings
Slide 75: Owned and Leased Properties
‘Owned properties (US) ‘Commack, NY Commack, NY ‘Commack, NY ‘Commack, NY Hauppauge, NY Hauppauge, NY Cincinnati, OH Cincinnati, OH St-Louis, MO St.Louis, MO Total Owned US Ireland: CClonshaugh, Dublin Baldoyle, Dublin Total Owned ex-US Leased properties United States: New York, NY JerseyCity, NI ‘C
Slide 76: Appendix C: CEO Compensation & Stock Sales
Appendix C: CEO Compensation & Stock Sales
Slide 77: CEO Stock Sales
CEO Stock Sales Shares Sold (& Price) By Year Total Proceeds ($MM) Source: SEC filings
Slide 78: CEO Compensation by Year
CEO Compensation by Year Source: SEC filings
Slide 79: Appendix D: Comparative Companies
Appendix D: Comparative Companies
Slide 80: SG&A/Revenues
SG&A/Revenues Specialty Pharmaceuticals Large Pharmaceuticals Source: SEC filings
Slide 81: R&D/Revenues
R&D/Revenues Specialty Pharmaceuticals Large Pharmaceuticals Source: SEC filings
Slide 82: Operating Margins
Operating Margins Specialty Pharmaceuticals Large Pharmaceuticals Source: SEC filings
Slide 83: Revenues/Sales Rep
Revenues/Sales Rep Source: SEC filings
Slide 84: Cash as a Percent of Market Cap
Cash as a Percent of Market Cap Source: SEC filings