Buffalo Wild Wings

Buffalo Wild Wings — Proxy Contest (May 2017)

96 slides from Buffalo Wild Wings's proxy contest presentation, May 25, 2017

  1. Slide 1: Winning at Wild Wings – Vote the WHITE Proxy Card

    WINNING AT WILD WINGS (_) VOTE THE WHITE PROXY CARD Email SUBMIT HOME NOMINEES PRESENTATIONS & LETTERS PRESS RELEASES PROXY STATEMENT CONTACT Disclaimer This website (the “Website”) has been prepared by Marcato Capital Management LP (“Marcato Capital”), an SEC registered investment advisor based in

  2. Slide 2: Presentations & Letters

    Presentations & Letters May 11, 2017 Buffalo Wild Wings Investor Presentation May 11, 2017 Research Analyst Support For Strategic & Leadership Change Presentation May 11, 2017 Submissions to www.WinningAtWildWings.com Validate The Need For Change Presentation May 11, 2017 Setting the Record Straight

  3. Slide 3: Sohn San Francisco October 2016

    SOHN SAN FRANCISCO OCTOBER 2016

  4. Slide 4: Disclaimer

    DISCLAIMER This presentation (the ?Presentation?) has been prepared by Marcato Capital Management LP (?Marcato?), an SEC registered investment advisor based in San Francisco, California. Marcato provides investment advisory services to proprietary private investment funds (collectively, the ?Marcato

  5. Slide 5: Buffalo Wild Wings: A Growing, Distinctive Restaurant Brand

    BUFFALO WILD WINGS (?BWLD?): A GROWING, DISTINCTIVE RESTAURANT BRAND Differentiated concept focused on ?wings, beer, and sports? Long history of industry-leading SSS growth ~1,200 units with long-term potential to grow to Ticker: ?BWLD? 1,700 units in US & Canada and 400+ units Recent Stock Pric

  6. Slide 6: Why We Invested in Buffalo Wild Wings

    WHY WE INVESTED IN BUFFALO WILD WINGS Differentiated concept with long runway for growth SSS declines and capital allocation missteps have hurt shares Opportunity to create substantial shareholder value by: 1) Transitioning to a 90%+ franchised model 2) Improving ?4-wall? profitability and returns 3

  7. Slide 7: I. Highlights from Marcato's recent 13-D

    I. Highlights from Marcato?s recent 13-D

  8. Slide 8: Multiple Has Compressed as Traffic Has Slowed and Costs Continue to Rise

    MULTIPLE HAS COMPRESSED AS TRAFFIC HAS SLOWED AND COSTS CONTINUE TO RISE 1 PRICING POWER ? BEST-IN-CLASS SSS GROWTH ONCE DROVE EV / EBITDA MULTIPLE EXPANSION 9% 9% 8% 5-yr. Avg.: 5% 7% 7% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 5% 1% 4% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 2% 13x (2%) 11x (2%) Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q

  9. Slide 9: When Growth Slowed, BWLD Acquired Franchised Stores for High Multiples

    WHEN GROWTH SLOWED, BWLD ACQUIRED FRANCHISED STORES FOR HIGH MULTIPLES ESTIMATED ACQUISITION COST PER RESTAURANT | 2011 ? 2016 Total Acquisition $33.7m $43.6m $4.3m $30.5 $205.2m Expense # Units 18 18 3 15 59 Acquired: $3,478(1) Avg. Replacement $2,421 Cost: $2,300 $2,033 $1,875 $1,432 2011 2012 201

  10. Slide 10: Incentive Structure Rewards Growth at Any Cost

    INCENTIVE STRUCTURE REWARDS GROWTH AT ANY COST CASH INCENTIVE PROGRAM PERFORMANCE METRICS EQUITY INCENTIVE PROGRAM COMPOSITION Individual Objectives Total Revenue ($m) Stock Options 20% 25% 25% Restaurant Openings (Co. Op. + Franchised) 10% SSS Growth (# Positive Quarters) PRSUs—5% Net Income ($m) 3

  11. Slide 11: Underperformance Driven by SSS Slowdown and Poor Capital Allocation

    UNDERPERFORMANCE DRIVEN BY SSS SLOWDOWN AND POOR CAPITAL ALLOCATION TSR | 1-YEAR 10/28/15: 30% SSS & earnings miss Large acquisition to blame 20% Guidance lowered for 2015 Shares fell ~17% 10% ? (2%) (10%) (20%) (30%) (27%) (40%) Sep-15 Dec-15 Feb-16 Apr-16 Jul-16 Sep-16 S&P 600 Restaurants

  12. Slide 12: Growth in AUVs and Unit Profits Mask Declining Returns on Capital

    GROWTH IN AUVs AND UNIT PROFITS MASK DECLINING RETURNS ON CAPITAL DEPLOYED BWLD points to ?dollar growth? without explaining greater capital intensity AVERAGE UNIT VOLUMES ($000s) NEW UNIT UPFRONT INVESTMENT ($000s) $3,252 +2.2x +3.1x $2,571 $1,465 $840 At IPO (c. 2003) FY 2015 At IPO (c. 2003) FY 2

  13. Slide 13: Not All Earnings Growth Is Created Equal

    NOT ALL EARNINGS GROWTH IS CREATED EQUAL High a Multiple Franchising + High Growth Declining ROIC will pressure multiple for any given Franchisee rate of acquisitions Opening growth at premium Company-Owned multiples Stores r a a Franchising + Low Growth Low Multiple Low High ROIC ROIC

  14. Slide 14: Franchise Businesses Command Higher Multiples

    FRANCHISE BUSINESSES COMMAND HIGHER MULTIPLES < 30% Franchised 30—70% Franchised >70% Franchised 70+% mix = higher L: 4.1x M: 8.1x H: 9.6x L: 8.1x M: 8.4x H: 11.5x L: 10.2x M: 13.2x H: 20.2x 20.5x multiples DPZ 19.0x BWLD is one of few 17.5x PZZA QSR ?in the middle? 16.0x DNKN BWLD?s growth wo

  15. Slide 15: II. Where do we stand?

    Il. Where do we stand? MARCATO

  16. Slide 16: Marcato's Key Recommendations to BWLD

    MARCATO?S KEY RECOMMENDATIONS TO BWLD STRATEGIC & FINANCIAL DRIVERS IMPACT TO VALUE I. Transition to a 90% Franchised Model Improve Returns on Capital II. Improve ?4-Wall? Profitability and Returns + Reduce III. Optimize Capital Structure Cost of Capital = Create Economic Value 13

  17. Slide 17: Status of Marcato's Proposal: Optimize Capital Structure

    STATUS OF MARCATO?S PROPOSAL III. Optimize Capital Structure Announced leverage target of 1.5x Debt / EBITDA; total of $375m in authorized share repurchases ?No timeline for reaching target or completing buybacks ?Focus on gross debt instead of net debt is puzzling ?Math does not work: with ~$350m o

  18. Slide 18: Status of Marcato's Proposal: Improve 4-Wall Profitability

    STATUS OF MARCATO?S PROPOSAL (CONT?D) II. Improve ?4-Wall? Profitability and Returns In June, we encouraged BWLD to engage operations consultants ?Estimated ?4-wall? margin opportunity of several hundred bps No observable plan or outside engagement yet disclosed Per Analyst Day, aspiring to 20% ?4-w

  19. Slide 19: Status of Marcato's Proposal: Transition to 90% Franchised Model

    STATUS OF MARCATO?S PROPOSAL (CONT?D) I. Transition to a 90% Franchised Model Management has questioned feasibility of achieving 90% mix by 2020 We have engaged multiple industry-leading refranchising advisors who have reinforced feasibility and market attractiveness: ?Market is deep, mature, and ea

  20. Slide 20: Marcato Has Engaged The Cypress Group

    MARCATO HAS ENGAGED THE CYPRESS GROUP FOR INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC GUIDANCE The Cypress Group has led the multi-unit franchise industry in M&A transactions, including refranchising programs, for more than 25 years Cypress has successfully executed refranchising and reorganization efforts for: ? Wendy?s

  21. Slide 21: Don't Take Marcato's Word For It

    DON?T TAKE MARCATO?S WORD FOR IT ?We are highly confident BWLD could refranchise their owned stores at a multiple of 6.0x or higher and estimate a refranchising process to 90% could take as few as 18-24 months? ? Cypress Group 18

  22. Slide 22: Cypress Feels BWLD Refranchising Would Be Well Received

    CYPRESS FEELS BWLD REFRANCHISING WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED Franchisee market is strong and has grown significantly in the last decade ? More than 150 companies with >$50m in revenue and purchasing power in excess of $100m per company ? Hundreds of additional entities with individual BWLD market acqu

  23. Slide 23: BWLD Units Should Receive Attractive Multiples

    BWLD UNITS SHOULD RECEIVE ATTRACTIVE MULTIPLES BASED ON BEST IN CLASS METRICS # of Stores ~175 1,139 479 380 664 Refranchised Year 2014 2013 2007 2007 NA Commenced Program ~1 yr. 3.5 yrs. ~5 yrs. ~6 yrs. ~2-5 yrs. Duration EBITDA Multiples ~5-6x ~5-6x ~5-6x ~6x ~6-7x Received SSS Growth NA 1.2% (0.5

  24. Slide 24: Pool of Interested Buyers Nearly 30x the Size of Stores to Be Sold

    POOL OF INTERESTED BUYERS NEARLY 30x THE SIZE OF BWLD STORES TO BE SOLD ?The universe of potential buyers is highly acquisitive and scaled: a BWLD refranchising would be an attractive and financeable investment for both existing franchisee operating companies and institutional buyers with proven tra

  25. Slide 25: Refranchising Is a Small Portion of the Franchised Universe

    BWLD?S REFRANCHISING IS A SMALL PORTION OF THE TOTAL FRANCHISED UNIVERSE BWLD?s multi-year refranchising would represent just 1.4% of the estimated $153bn of domestic franchise system sales in 2014 for the top 100 chains DOMESTIC SALES OF FRANCHISE SYSTEMS| 2014/15 REVENUES ($bn) Domestic 131,898 66

  26. Slide 26: Franchise Industry Bank Lending Is 35x Amount Required

    FRANCHISE INDUSTRY BANK LENDING IS 35x AMOUNT REQUIRED TO FINANCE BWLD REFRANCHSING ?There is more-than-ample lending capacity to finance a BWLD refranchising? ? Cypress Group ESTIMATED CURRENT FRANCHISEE BANK DEBT OUTSTANDING $68.5bn Add?l $25.0bn Generalist Lenders Top 14 Franchise- Focused $43.5b

  27. Slide 27: Industry Diligence Confirms Refranchising Is Highly Feasible

    INDUSTRY DILIGENCE CONFIRMS A REFRANCHISING IS HIGHLY FEASIBLE Marcato has engaged multiple industry experts, including dedicated investment bankers who specialize in refranchising M&A Experts are consistently confident in BWLD?s ability to refranchise: ?Strong market appetite for refranchised r

  28. Slide 28: BWLD's Stock Price Could Rise by More Than 2-3x Under Marcato's Proposal

    WE BELIEVE BWLD?S STOCK PRICE COULD RISE BY MORE THAN 2-3x UNDER MARCATO?S PROPOSAL POTENTIAL VALUE CREATION FOR BUFFALO WILD WINGS| 2015A ? 2021E 90% Franchised $475 High: $458 @ 14.5x EBITDA $400 Mid: $402 @ 13.0x EBITDA Low: Status $346 Quo @ 11.5x EBITDA $325 High: $311 @ 10.0x EBITDA $250 Mid:

  29. Slide 29: Buffalo Wild Wings August 2016

    BUFFALO WILD WINGS AUGUST 2016

  30. Slide 30: Disclaimer

    DISCLAIMER Marcato Capital Management LP (?Marcato?) is an SEC registered investment advisor based in San Francisco, California. Marcato provides investment advisory services to its proprietary private investment funds (collectively, the ?Marcato Funds?). The views expressed in this presentation (th

  31. Slide 31: Reactions to BWLD's Analyst Day

    REACTIONS TO BWLD?S ANALYST DAY We have compiled a summary of concerning quotes and presentation slides taken from BWLD?s Analyst Day held on August 16, 2016 BWLD?s executives repeatedly made statements during their remarks that underscore the conceptual shortcomings of their approach to managing th

  32. Slide 32: BWLD's Capital Priorities Highlight Poor Understanding of Capital Allocation

    BWLD?S ?CAPITAL PRIORITIES? HIGHLIGHT POOR UNDERSTANDING OF CAPITAL ALLOCATION ?The amount of free cash flowthat we are generating allows us to enhance our capital strategy guided by three key priorities: -First, growth. We will maintain a balance sheet that provides us with financial flexibility to

  33. Slide 33: BWLD's Comprehensive Plan Is Incomplete and Inconsistent

    BWLD?S ?COMPREHENSIVE? PLAN IS INCOMPLETE AND INCONSISTENT ?Our Board and management team has added another way to create value for our shareholders with a comprehensive capital plan? ?[W]e benchmarked ourselves versus peers and the median for book debt is 1.3x debt-to-EBITDA? ?[W]e?ve targeted a le

  34. Slide 34: Earnings Target Lacks Explanation for How It Will Be Achieved

    EARNINGS TARGET LACKS IMPORTANT EXPLANATION FOR HOW IT WILL BE ACHIEVED ?We have shared previously that we expect to deliver earnings per share growth of 15% or more on an annual basis? ?We will drive our earnings per share growth as we have before through unit growth, driving sales, continuous impr

  35. Slide 35: Capital Benchmarking Based on Selected Peers Makes Little Sense

    CAPITAL BENCHMARKING BASED ON SELECTED PEERS MAKES LITTLE SENSE ?As we continually evolve our capital plan, we also benchmark ourselves against how others in the industry and others with a similar ownership mix are deploying their capital? ?The median for share repurchase over [the last 3 years] is

  36. Slide 36: Framework for New Store Openings Is Vague

    FRAMEWORK FOR NEW STORE OPENINGS IS VAGUE DESPITE INSISTENCE OF ?RIGOR? ?[A]s we assess our company new restaurant opening opportunities, we go through a very rigorous analysis and diligent process. Weapply the principles of capital allocation discussed by Sally when we?re looking at restaurant deve

  37. Slide 37: Consistent Avoidance of Concrete Targets

    CONSISTENT AVOIDANCE OF CONCRETE TARGETS WHILE REAFFIRMING ?CONFIDENCE? ?We?re confident that we?ll get to the 20% restaurant-level cash flow that we have historically seen. Our starting point is the leverage that comes from positive same-store sales? ?We have opportunities to centralize the monitor

  38. Slide 38: Expectations of Future Profit Improvement Neither Explained Nor Committed To

    EXPECTATIONS OF FUTURE PROFIT IMPROVEMENT NEITHER EXPLAINED NOR COMMITTED TO ?[W]e are well positioned to take advantage of continued softness in commodity markets in 2017. As we work to mitigate our commodity exposure in 2017, we expect to have all our major commodities booked at lower levels in 20

  39. Slide 39: Inability to Communicate a Coherent Marketing Strategy

    INABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY COMMUNICATE A COHERENT MARKETING STRATEGY ?[W]e felt we had a greater purpose. And we found that in the universe of sports fans that are out there, a segment that is 6x larger than our MVP target. And while sports is important to us, there wouldn?t be any sports if there wer

  40. Slide 40: Most Frequently-Visiting Guests Contribute Most to Sales – Is That an Insight?

    ?MOST FREQUENTLY-VISITING GUESTS CONTRIBUTE MOST TO SALES??IS THAT AN INSIGHT? ?Really talking about building frequency, getting people back into the restaurant more, you can see how that?s working through the loyalty program. And when we roll this nationally, it?s going to have a huge effect on sal

  41. Slide 41: Disconnect Between Management Initiatives and Economic Benefits

    DISCONNECT BETWEEN MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS ?Beer insights are also important. And you can see that [the top] 10% of the beer purchasers order the same brand 80% of the time? ?But when you have 30 brands on tap on average within our restaurants, you want them to explore. You want

  42. Slide 42: Appendix: Marcato's Recommended Capital Allocation Framework

    Appendix: Marcato?s Recommended Capital Allocation Framework 13

  43. Slide 43: Capital Allocation Best Practices

    CAPITAL ALLOCATION BEST PRACTICES Buffalo Wild Wings needs to be disciplined in how it allocates its capital and focus on risk-adjusted returns relative to both its cost of capital as well as all other alternatives Forecast long-term growth and return targets; STEP 1 Establish valuation based on bus

  44. Slide 44: Company Should Focus on Risk-Adjusted Returns

    COMPANY SHOULD FOCUS ON RISK-ADJUSTED RETURNS BWLD should cease investing in high risk initiatives that have earned low returns Acquisition of Inherent difficulty ?handicapping? future success given constantly-changing consumer New tastes Risk Concepts Restaurant space is highly competitive, especia

  45. Slide 45: Buffalo Wild Wings June 2016

    BUFFALO WILD WINGS JUNE 2016 MARCATO |5

  46. Slide 46: Disclaimer

    DISCLAIMER Marcato Capital Management LP (?Marcato?) is an SEC registered investment advisor based in San Francisco, California. Marcato provides investment advisory services to its proprietary private investment funds (collectively, the ?Marcato Funds?). The views expressed in this presentation (th

  47. Slide 47: I. Introduction

    |. Introduction MARCATO

  48. Slide 48: Why We Invested in Buffalo Wild Wings

    WHY WE INVESTED IN BUFFALO WILD WINGS Buffalo Wild Wings? core restaurant business is a proven, differentiated concept that generates strong cash flow with continued system growth potential Significant share price underperformance driven by declining same-store sales and recent store repurchases tha

  49. Slide 49: II. A Review of Buffalo Wild Wings

    II. A Review of Buffalo Wild Wings 4

  50. Slide 50: Recent Share Price Underperformance

    RECENT SHARE PRICE UNDERPERFORMANCE 5-YEAR TOTAL SHAREHOLDER RETURN LAST 9 MONTHS TOTAL SHAREHOLDER RETURN 10/28/15: 275% 25% Q3?15 earnings miss on SSS, EPS headwinds due to higher D&A & margin dilution from franchisee acquisitions (labor, low sales, training) Guided to ?single digit? net e

  51. Slide 51: Growth, Profitability, and Capital Allocation Drive BWLD's Multiple

    GROWTH, PROFITABILITY, AND CAPITAL ALLOCATION DRIVE BWLD?S MULTIPLE Multiple compression driven by growth deceleration, margin compression, and store repurchases that earn a return below BWLD?s cost of capital 1 WEAK RECENT SAME-STORE SALES GROWTH EV / EBITDA (NTM) MULTIPLE 9% 9% 8% 6% 7% 7% 6% 6% 5

  52. Slide 52: Company-Owned Same-Store Sales Growth

    1 COMPANY-OWNED SAME-STORE SALES GROWTH Recent same-store sales growth has been below BWLD?s 10-year average of 5.3% BWLD?s indexed menu price adjustments have increased 36% over the past 10 years, implying a 3.1% CAGR 10 YEAR SAME-STORE SALES GROWTH COMPOSITION Menu Prices: +36% 13% CPI: +19% 12% 9

  53. Slide 53: Pricing Wall + Higher Costs = Expected Future Margin Compression

    2 PRICING ?WALL? + HIGHER COSTS = EXPECTED FUTURE MARGIN COMPRESSION ?Our pricing in November [2015] really tried to price in some of the labor costs that we anticipate and that are happeningbut if you?re not going to add some price with, whether it?s minimum wage, whether it?s overtimeyou are going

  54. Slide 54: Questions Surrounding Capital Allocation

    3 QUESTIONS SURROUNDING CAPITAL ALLOCATION ESTIMATED ACQUISITION COST PER RESTAURANT | 2011 ? 2016 Total Acquisition $33.7m $43.6m $4.3m $30.5 $205.2m Expense No. of Restaurants Acquired: —Existing BWW 18 18 3 13 54 —Existing R Taco ? ? ? 2 1 —BWW under ? ? ? ? 4 Construction $3,478(1) Purchase Pric

  55. Slide 55: Questions Surrounding Capital Allocation (Cont'd)

    3 QUESTIONS SURROUNDING CAPITAL ALLOCATION (CONT?D) Despite remaining relatively stable from 2009 ? 2014, BWLD?s returns on average invested capital have declined significantly over the past ten years BWLD?s ROIC in 2015 represented the most significant year-over-year decline in ten years, reflectin

  56. Slide 56: Questions Surrounding Capital Allocation (Cont'd)

    3 QUESTIONS SURROUNDING CAPITAL ALLOCATION (CONT?D) Sell side analysts are also concerned about capital allocation decisions ANALYSTS SEE SUPERIOR ALTERNATIVES FOR CAPITAL AND PREFER TO AVOID HIGH-RISK GROWTH INITIATIVES ?We?d like to see FCF funneled ?[W]e are less enthusiastic about toward buyback

  57. Slide 57: III. Marcato's Proposal

    Ill. Marcato’s Proposal MARCATO

  58. Slide 58: A Multi-Level Plan to Create Value for BWLD Shareholders

    A MULTI-LEVEL PLAN TO CREATE VALUE FOR BWLD SHAREHOLDERS A. FRANCHISING Sell stores to new and existing franchisees to unlock capital currently earning STRATEGY sub-optimal returns Target 90% mix of franchised stores by 2020 Invest in resources to accelerate international franchise growth B. REINVIG

  59. Slide 59: A. Franchising Strategy

    A. Franchising Strategy MARCATO

  60. Slide 60: Franchise Businesses Command Higher Multiples

    Franchising Operations FRANCHISE BUSINESSES COMMAND HIGHER MULTIPLES Capital Framework Incentives < 30% Franchised 30—70% Franchised >70% Franchised Even with fewer ?high L: 5.0x M: 8.6x H: 11.6x L: 7.6x M: 8.5x H: 13.0x L: 10.3x M: 13.7x H: 18.2x growth? concepts in the 19.0x category, restau

  61. Slide 61: Not All Earnings Growth Is Created Equal

    Franchising Operations NOT ALL EARNINGS GROWTH IS CREATED EQUAL Capital Framework Incentives For a given level of expected earnings growth, the ? expected returns on capital drive the multiple placed High Multiple on those earnings Franchising + High Growth While investments that drive more rapid gr

  62. Slide 62: A Franchise Model Provides Significant Economic Benefits

    Franchising Operations A FRANCHISE MODEL PROVIDES SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC BENEFITS Capital Framework Incentives BWLD?s franchise operation = a high margin royalty stream that grows without capital Restaurant Operator Restaurant Franchisor Contribution Margins Mid-teens 70%+ Earnings Sensitivity to High

  63. Slide 63: Growth as a Franchisor Is More Stable, Profitable, and Capital-Efficient

    Franchising Operations GROWTH AS A FRANCHISOR IS MORE STABLE, PROFITABLE, AND CAPITAL-EFFICIENT Capital Framework Incentives System growth is significantly less capital intensive Profits are more stable because brand royalty streams are a percentage of revenue as opposed to operating cash flow Corpo

  64. Slide 64: Franchising Today Can De-Risk Labor Cost Headwinds

    Franchising Operations FRANCHISING TODAY CAN DE-RISK LABOR COST HEADWINDS Capital Framework Incentives As a percentage of sales, labor costs are the only level of BWLD?s restaurant-level expenses to have increased over the last decade We believe that steeper increases in future labor costs can be av

  65. Slide 65: Significant Opportunity to Grow Internationally Through Franchising

    Franchising Operations SIGNIFICANT OPPORTUNITY TO GROW INTERNATIONALLY THROUGH FRANCHISING Capital Framework Incentives NON-US & CANADA UNITS AS A % OF TOTAL SYSTEM Among peers with any international presence, BWLD has 57% 59% the lowest percentage of its system outside of the U.S. and Canada ?

  66. Slide 66: International Opportunity Creates Significant Long-Term Value

    Franchising Operations INTERNATIONAL OPPORTUNITY CREATES SIGNIFICANT LONG-TERM VALUE Capital Framework Incentives ILLUSTRATIVE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION Based on management?s disclosed target of 400 international franchise stores, we believe ~3% ~5% ($ in thousands, unless otherwis

  67. Slide 67: Refranchising Creates Shareholder Value: Jack in the Box

    Franchising Operations REFRANCHISING CREATES SHAREHOLDER VALUE: JACK IN THE BOX CASE STUDY Capital Framework Incentives Following a sustained period of strategic refranchising, JACK?s shares have outperformed the industry JACK IN THE BOX INDEXED STOCK PRICE PERFORMANCE| 2006 ? 2016 400% 350% 300% 31

  68. Slide 68: Refranchising Creates Shareholder Value: Burger King

    Franchising Operations REFRANCHISING CREATES SHAREHOLDER VALUE: BURGER KING CASE STUDY Capital Framework Incentives Following its 2006 IPO, Burger King increased its franchise mix from ~89% to ~100% by 2013, resulting in significant multiple expansion, even during a period of negative comps and low

  69. Slide 69: Refranchising Creates Shareholder Value: Domino's Pizza

    Franchising Operations REFRANCHISING CREATES SHAREHOLDER VALUE: DOMINO?S PIZZA CASE STUDY Capital Framework Incentives Domino?s Pizza?s dividend-adjusted stock price has increased over 17x since 2004, driven by refranchising and international growth of franchisees DPZ TOTAL SHAREHOLDER RETURN SINCE

  70. Slide 70: Evaluating BWLD's Cash-on-Cash Returns

    Franchising Operations EVALUATING BWLD?S ?CASH-ON-CASH? RETURNS Capital Framework Incentives Buffalo Wild Wings? store growth WHAT ARE THE TRUE RETURNS ON COMPANY-OWNED STORES? plan is based on the notion that New 2015 Company- New its new stores earn 20+% ?cash- Franchisee Owned Franchised on-cash?

  71. Slide 71: High Opportunity Cost of Foregoing Franchise Royalty Stream

    Franchising Operations HIGH OPPORTUNITY COST OF FOREGOING FRANCHISE ROYALTY STREAM Capital Framework Incentives The opportunity cost of a CHOOSING TO BUY OR BUILD BEARS AN ?OPPORTUNITY COST? corporate-owned store must be Opp. Cost considered: the capital-light, of higher margin earnings stream Owner

  72. Slide 72: Franchising Creates More Economic Value with Less Risk

    Franchising Operations FRANCHISING CREATES MORE ECONOMIC VALUE WITH LESS RISK Capital Framework Incentives Company-owned stores earn COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC VALUE PER SYSTEM STORE higher ?dollar? profits, but the New superior multiples achieved by 2015 Company- New Franchisee Owned Franchised franchise

  73. Slide 73: 90% Franchised System Would Significantly Improve Operating Metrics

    WE BELIEVE A 90% FRANCHISED SYSTEM WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY Franchising Operations IMPROVE OPERATING METRICS WITH SIMILAR NET INCOME Capital Framework Incentives ROIC| 2021E EBITDA MARGIN | 2021E NET INCOME | 2021E 27.4% 31.3% $148.2m $140.6m 17.4% 16.2% BASIC EPS | 2021E CUM. FCF + PROCEEDS | ?16E ? ?21

  74. Slide 74: B. Reinvigorate Core Business

    B. Reinvigorate core business 29

  75. Slide 75: Areas of Opportunity

    Franchising AREAS OF OPPORTUNITY Operations Capital Framework Incentives SAME STORE SALES COST SG&A CAPITAL Pricing & Menu Address Food Costs Spans & Layers Store Development Addressing pricing, Menu design, protein Operational control bands Optimal structure for bundling, beverage and m

  76. Slide 76: A Number of Value Metrics Have Declined Over the Last Five Years

    Franchising Operations A NUMBER OF VALUE METRICS HAVE DECLINED OVER THE LAST FIVE YEARS Capital Framework Incentives BUFFALO WILD WINGS CONSUMER SURVEY RESULTS HAVE DECLINED Buffalo Wild Wings currently ranks near the ?bottom of the pack? in the Nation?s Interestingly, value Restaurant News consumer

  77. Slide 77: High-Margin Alcohol Mix Declining

    Franchising Operations HIGH-MARGIN ALCOHOL MIX DECLINING Capital Framework Incentives ALCOHOL MIX HAS DECLINED CONCURRENTLY WITH MARGINS Alcohol as a percentage of restaurant sales declined to 19% in 24% the most recent quarter versus 24% five years ago and ~29% at IPO 22% 22% 21% We view this as po

  78. Slide 78: Mix Shift to Takeout Raises Questions

    Franchising Operations MIX SHIFT TO TAKEOUT RAISES QUESTIONS Capital Framework Incentives If truly incremental, takeout can be an attractive contributor to sales growth However, it is possible that takeout is cannibalizing core sales?and could undermine profitability ? Tends to provide an inferior c

  79. Slide 79: C. Establish Explicit Capital Allocation Strategy

    C. Establish explicit capital allocation strategy 34

  80. Slide 80: BWLD's Capital Structure Is Among Most Conservative in Its Peer Group

    Franchising Operations BWLD?S CAPITAL STRUCTURE IS AMONG MOST CONSERVATIVE IN ITS PEER GROUP Capital Framework Incentives Excluding operating leases, Buffalo Wild Wings is among the least levered in its peer set NET DEBT / LTM EBITDA < 30% Franchised 30—70% Franchised >70% Franchised L: (0.2x)

  81. Slide 81: Funding Growth Through 100% Equity Is Dilutive to ROE

    Franchising Operations FUNDING GROWTH THROUGH 100% EQUITY IS DILUTIVE TO ROE Capital Framework Incentives ?EXCESS? RETURNS ON NEW STORES BELOW CURRENT ROE AND COE The low ?excess? returns on new company-New owned stores fail to exceed BWLD?s cost of 2015 Company- Franchisee Owned equity and are dilu

  82. Slide 82: Using the Balance Sheet to Create Value: Domino's Pizza

    Franchising Operations USING THE BALANCE SHEET TO CREATE VALUE: DOMINO?S PIZZA CASE STUDY Capital Framework Incentives Over time, Domino?s has continually re-levered to high multiples and DOMINO?S NET DEBT / EBITDA (LTM) returned capital to shareholders 7.8x 7.6x 8.0x 7.4x 100% In addition to consis

  83. Slide 83: $1.4BN of Excess Capital Is Trapped in Company-Owned Store Base

    Franchising Operations $1.4BN OF EXCESS CAPITAL IS TRAPPED IN COMPANY-OWNED STORE BASE Capital Framework Incentives Marcato proposes that BWLD refranchise its existing stores, targeting a 90% mix of franchised restaurants by 2020 At a market multiple of 6x post-royalty EBITDA per Company store, we b

  84. Slide 84: Capital Allocation Best Practices

    Franchising Operations CAPITAL ALLOCATION BEST PRACTICES Capital Framework Incentives Buffalo Wild Wings needs to be disciplined in how it allocates its capital and focus on risk-adjusted returns relative to both its cost of capital as well as all other alternatives Forecast long-term growth and ret

  85. Slide 85: Company Should Focus on Risk-Adjusted Returns

    Franchising Operations COMPANY SHOULD FOCUS ON RISK-ADJUSTED RETURNS Capital Framework Incentives BWLD should cease investing in high risk initiatives that have earned low returns Acquisition of Inherent difficulty ?handicapping? future success given constantly-changing consumer New tastes Risk Conc

  86. Slide 86: D. Realign Management Incentives

    D. Realign management incentives 41

  87. Slide 87: Incentive Compensation Structure Heavily Weighted Towards Growth

    INCENTIVE COMPENSATION STRUCTURE HEAVILY WEIGHTED TOWARDS GROWTH Franchising Operations WITHOUT CAPITAL CHARGE OR RETURN METRIC Capital Framework Incentives Management has historically been compensated on the basis of overall growth, irrespective of returns or profitability KPIs used to determine co

  88. Slide 88: How Do the Best-Performing Restaurant Peers Incentivize Executives?

    Franchising HOW DO THE BEST-PERFORMING RESTAURANT PEERS INCENTIVIZE EXECUTIVES? Operations Capital Framework Incentives Among top-performing restaurant companies, Buffalo Wild Wings is one of the only companies whose OPERATING METRICS compensation is entirely independent Franchise Mix 49% 89% 91% 97

  89. Slide 89: IV. Creating Shareholder Value

    IV. Creating Shareholder Value 44

  90. Slide 90: 90% Franchise Model Combined with Repurchases Drives EPS ~100% Higher

    A 90% FRANCHISE MODEL COMBINED WITH SHARE REPURCHASES DRIVES EPS ~100% HIGHER THAN THE CURRENT PLAN COMPARING EPS TRAJECTORIES FOR MARCATO?S PLAN VS. STATUS QUO ? $19.96 ?15A ? ?21E: +302% +4.0x $16.06 $11.83 ? ?15A ? ?21E: $9.80 +97% $9.09 $9.14 $8.57 +2.0x $7.88 $8.16 $8.02 $6.94 $6.73 $4.97 $4.97

  91. Slide 91: BWLD's Stock Price Could Rise by More Than 2-3x Under Marcato's Proposal

    WE BELIEVE BWLD?S STOCK PRICE COULD RISE BY MORE THAN 2-3x UNDER MARCATO?S PROPOSAL POTENTIAL VALUE CREATION FOR BUFFALO WILD WINGS| 2015A ? 2021E $475 90% Franchised High: $458 @ 14.5x EBITDA Mid: $402 @ 13.0x EBITDA $400 Low: $346 @ 11.5x EBITDA Status Quo $325 High: $311 @ 10.0x EBITDA Mid: $265

  92. Slide 92: Current Trajectory Versus Marcato's Proposal

    CURRENT TRAJECTORY VERSUS MARCATO?S PROPOSAL Status Quo 90% Franchised 2021E Business Profile We believe our proposal can create Total System Stores 1,739 1,739 Stores Owned 842 178 substantially more value for Stores Franchised 897 1,561 % Franchised 52% 90% shareholders than management?s 2021E Met

  93. Slide 93: Recommendations

    RECOMMENDATIONS Implement long-term plan to transition to 90% franchised store mix Arrest high-priced acquisitions of franchisees and investment in new concepts which dilute returns and management focus Engage qualified consultants to identify operational improvements Accelerate international growth

  94. Slide 94: Appendix

    Appendix MARCATO

  95. Slide 95: Summary of Additional Key Model Assumptions

    SUMMARY OF ADDITIONAL KEY MODEL ASSUMPTIONS Franchise mix of 90% by year-end 2020 Restaurant-level profit margins kept flat from Q2?16E ? 2021E Same-store sales growth of 1.5% across the system G&A expenses of $105m by 2021E, assuming savings from higher franchise mix Construction of 40 Company-

  96. Slide 96: Financial Projection Summary: 90% Franchised by 2020

    FINANCIAL PROJECTION SUMMARY | 90% FRANCHISED BY 2020 ($ in millions, except for per share values) 2015A 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E Total Stores 1,175 1,289 1,379 1,469 1,559 1,649 1,739 % Growth 8.6% 9.7% 7.0% 6.5% 6.1% 5.8% 5.5% Company-Owned 596 597 515 416 301 169 178 % Growth 21.4% 0.2

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