Rentech — Proxy Contest (March 2014)
91 slides from Rentech's proxy contest presentation, Mar 27, 2014
Slide 1: A Case Study in Agency Costs
A Case Study in Agency Costs March 27, 2014 Concerned Rentech Shareholders
Slide 2: Disclaimer
Disclaimer THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR DISCUSSION AND GENERAL INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. IT DOES NOT HAVE REGARD TO THE SPECIFIC INVESTMENT OBJECTIVE, FINANCIAL SITUATION, SUITABILITY, OR THE PARTICULAR NEED OF ANY SPECIFIC PERSON WHO MAY RECEIVE IT, AND SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS ADVICE ON THE MERITS OF ANY
Slide 3: Table of Contents
Table of Contents Executive Summary 5 - 11 Rentech’s Operations Alternative Energy: Big ambition, zero success 12 - 17 East Dubuque: Break-even plant became a “piggybank” 18 - 22 Agrifos: An expensive acquired “headache” 23 - 29 Pellet Projects: High execution risk, minimal expertise 30 - 37
Slide 4: Concerned Rentech Shareholders ("CRS")
Concerned Rentech Shareholders (“CRS”) Engaged Capital, LLC, (“Engaged Capital”) was established in 2012 by a group of professionals with significant experience in activist investing in North America and was seeded by Grosvenor Capital Management, L.P., one of the oldest and largest global alternati
Slide 5: Executive Summary: Our History With Rentech
Executive Summary: Our History With Rentech (“RTK”) CRS has been a large shareholder of RTK since 2012 (currently owns 4.7%) Since late 2012, CRS has been in active dialogue with management, and more recently the Board, regarding various ways to improve shareholder returns Our decision to nomi
Slide 6: Executive Summary: Our Concerns With RTK
Executive Summary: Our Concerns With RTK Long track record of value destructive capital allocation and poor operational execution including: Spending close to $500 million on the failed alternative energy strategy Purchasing Agrifos for ~$160 million while fertilizer prices were near an all-ti
Slide 7: Executive Summary: Our Plan for RTK
Executive Summary: Our Plan for RTK Operational Changes Reduce corporate overhead costs Develop a credible plan to fix Agrifos and limit inventory risk going forward Independently evaluate the best risk-adjusted path to grow wood assets Realize maximum value for shareholders from wood assets
Slide 8: Executive Summary: Multiple Ways To Create Value For Shareholders
Executive Summary: Multiple Ways To Create Value For Shareholders Opportunity Current Leadership’s Approach Why Shareholder Representation is Needed • Maintain bloated cost structure • Management appears to benefit at the expense of shareholders Reduce • Excessive compensation • Current cost structu
Slide 9: Executive Summary: Board Reconstitution Required to Protect Shareholders
Executive Summary: Board Reconstitution Required to Protect Shareholders This Board and management team have, in our view, proven they are not credible stewards of shareholder capital Rentech is no longer an alternative energy venture – neither the Board nor management have the background to gov
Slide 10: Executive Summary: Significant Upside Is Available in RTK Shares
Executive Summary: Significant Upside Is Available in RTK Shares We believe the value of RTK’s assets is not reflected in today’s share price Multiple opportunities to create shareholder value by: Optimizing legacy cost structure Fixing capital allocation strategy Developing wood assets fo
Slide 11: Executive Summary: Our Nominees
Executive Summary: Our Nominees Jeffrey J. Brown Private equity background with extensive transaction experience Served on the Board of Directors of over 40 companies (Chairman of 10) Has served as Chairman of Audit, Compensation, and Finance Committees Jeffrey E. Eberwein Experienced invest
Slide 12: Alternative Energy: The Only Fuel Burned Was Shareholder Capital
Alternative Energy (“AE”) “The Only Fuel Burned Was Shareholder Capital” Concerned Rentech Shareholders 12
Slide 13: Management's Original Strategy for RTK Highlighted
Management’s Original Strategy for RTK Highlighted Ambitions to Grow But Failure to Execute Alternative Energy Project History Estimated Project Project Cost Current Status Natchez $4,700M Abandoned East Dubuque Conversion $900M Conversion stopped Olympiad $500M Abandoned Rialto $430M Abandoned Port
Slide 14: Asset Impairments Were Only A Fraction of the Total Investment
Asset Impairments Were Only A Fraction of the Total Investment in the Failed AE Strategy Cumulative Alternative Energy Cash Expenses $500 $482 $450 $438 AE Cash Expenses ($M) $400 $354 $350 $301 $300 $258 $250 $200 $150 $147 $100 $50 $40 $11 $ -- 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2012 Almost half
Slide 15: East Dubuque Has Been the Piggybank
East Dubuque Has Been the Piggybank Used to Fuel Management’s Various Business Ventures… Sources & Uses of Cash: 2007 - 2013 $1,200 High cost capital raised by AE $1,000 $984 Other Equity Sources and Uses of Cash ($M) $800 ($429) RNF IPO $600 ($288) Other AE Wood Fibers $400 RNF FCF Majority raised
Slide 16: AE Losses Continued Well After the Strategy Had Failed
AE Losses Continued Well After the Strategy Had Failed In our view, management enriched itself at the expense of shareholders by continuing to spend on AE while the strategy was clearly bankrupt Two months before RTK wrote down the majority of its AE assets, management was openly intent on spend
Slide 17: Rentech Response vs. Reality: Why AE Matters Today
Rentech Response vs. Reality: Why AE Matters Today Regulatory uncertainty made financing difficult Company’s The strategy failed because natural gas prices declined Defense This criticism is in the past…we shut down the AE business…why are we still talking about this? Planned AE projects wer
Slide 18: The Break-Even Plant That Became A Piggybank
East Dubuque Nitrogen Fertilizer Facility “The Break-Even Plant That Became A Piggybank” Concerned Rentech Shareholders 18
Slide 19: East Dubuque Was Purchased as Part of the AE Strategy
East Dubuque Was Purchased as Part of the AE Strategy “Rentech plans to convert REMC's natural gas fed ammonia fertilizer plant into a poly-generation facility that will use clean coal gasification technology to produce Rentech's ultra-clean diesel fuel, fertilizer and electricity from Illinois #6
Slide 20: An Unexpected Shift in Commodity Prices Made East Dubuque Highly Profitable
An Unexpected Shift in Commodity Prices Made East Dubuque Highly Profitable Ammonia Natural Gas $1,600 $16 Acquisition $1,400 announced $14 Natural Gas Price ($/MMBtu) $1,200 $12 Ammonia Price ($/t) $1,000 $10 $800 $8 $600 $6 $400 $4 $200 $2 $- $ -- In our view, East Dubuque was a fortunate accident
Slide 21: East Dubuque's Improving Profitability Led to Strategy Migration
East Dubuque’s Improving Profitability Led to A Significant Migration in RTK’s Business Strategy “We plan to convert the existing nitrogen fertilizer complex from natural gas to a coal fed integrated 2006 10K fertilizer and FT fuels production facility using coal gasification.” “We initially planned
Slide 22: Rentech Response vs. Reality: RTK Simply Got Lucky
Rentech Response vs. Reality: RTK Simply Got Lucky Company’s We deserve credit for purchasing the East Dubuque facility Defense Fertilizer MLP created significant shareholder value East Dubuque was purchased under the AE strategy and became profitable because of unanticipated changes in commod
Slide 23: The Headache Purchased for $160 Million
Agrifos Ammonium Sulfate Fertilizer Facility “The Headache Purchased for $160 Million” Concerned Rentech Shareholders 23
Slide 24: Agrifos Acquisition Was Loaded With Risk From the Start
Agrifos Acquisition Was Loaded With Risk From the Start The ammonium sulfate (“AS”) market is relatively new and still developing The large acquisition was led by the former AE management team with only limited fertilizer expertise When acquired by RNF, Agrifos had only produced AS for ~1.5 ye
Slide 25: Agrifos Was Misrepresented to Shareholders
Agrifos Was Misrepresented to Shareholders From company presentation on 11/1/2012 Management presentations hyped Agrifos as an “ammonia hedge” with sales and margins that were more “stable” and “less volatile” than those at East Dubuque Agrifos’ prices and margins have actually declined more tha
Slide 26: Problems Are Not Entirely Due to Commodity Prices
Problems Are Not Entirely Due to Commodity Prices 2013 Est. Ammonium Sulfate Shipment Guidance 2013 Est. AS Shipments (000 tons) 600 550 544 544 529 500 482 450 428 400 350 4Q12 1Q13 2Q13 3Q13 Actual Hard to explain decline in shipment volumes based solely on the weak pricing environment Estimated d
Slide 27: Agrifos Represents Yet Another Costly Mistake
Agrifos Represents Yet Another Costly Mistake Agrifos has woefully underperformed management’s expectations1: 2013 2014 Original EBITDA Forecast $25 $32 Current EBITDA Forecast ($10) ~$5 Miss vs. Expectations ($35) ($27) Miss % (140%) ~(84%) To date, RTK has invested $191M in Agrifos and lost ($
Slide 28: Agrifos Significantly Increased Financial Leverage at RNF
Agrifos Significantly Increased Financial Leverage at RNF 3Q12 4Q13 Pro-forma Diff vs. Pre-Agrifos ex-Agrifos Actual Actual Debt $27 $105 $320 $215 Cash $55 $27 $34 $7 Net Debt (Cash) ($28) $78 $286 $208 LTM EBITDA $126 $77 $66 ($10) Net Debt/EBITDA (0.2x) 1.0x 4.3x 3.3x Distributable Cash Flow $89
Slide 29: Rentech Response vs. Reality: Clearly A Bad Deal
Rentech Response vs. Reality: Clearly A Bad Deal Problems primarily caused by an unexpected drop in commodity prices, not company-specific issues Company’s Defense Majority of underperformance due to lag between buying inputs and selling product Performance should recover if nitrogen pricing i
Slide 30: Execution Risk Multiplied By Limited Expertise
The Wood Pellets Strategy “Execution Risk Multiplied By Limited Expertise” Concerned Rentech Shareholders 30
Slide 31: The Wood Pellets Opportunity Could Be Attractive
The Wood Pellets Opportunity Could Be Attractive… Growing, unconsolidated industry Long term off-take agreements with sizable customers Stable cash flows Limited raw material cost exposure Ability to form an MLP with wood assets MLP could receive favorable valuation due to the above fact
Slide 32: However, Concerns Abound
…However, Concerns Abound Execution is critical – our conversations with industry experts indicate it is very difficult to successfully construct a pellet plant according to plan Current management team has an exceptionally poor track record of execution Growth requires significant additional
Slide 33: Project Economics Appeared Very Attractive for Graanul
Project Economics Appeared Very Attractive for Graanul Orignial Pellet Project Estimates Total Pellet EBITDA $15.0 RTK EBITDA $7.5 Graanul EBITDA $7.5 Total Project Cost $70.0 RTK Loan to JV $35.0 RTK Equity Contribution $17.5 Graanul Equity Contribution $17.5 Graanul Economics EBITDA Multiple 2.3x
Slide 34: Management Has A History of Serious Execution Issues
Management Has A History of Serious Execution Issues With Previous Construction Projects Estimated PDU Construction Cost $90 $83 $83 $80 $70 $66 RTK Estimate of PDU Cost ($M) $61 $60 $50 $45 $45 $40 $40 $40 $40 $30 $30 $23 $21 $20 $10 $00 4Q05 1Q06 2Q06 3Q06 4Q06 1Q07 2Q07 3Q07 4Q07 1Q08 2Q08 3Q08 C
Slide 35: Are Execution Issues Starting With The Canadian Pellet Projects?
Are the Execution Issues Already Starting With The Canadian Pellet Projects? Estimated Cost of Canadian Pellet Projects RTK Investment JV Partner Investment $100 Estimated Total Pellet Project Cost ($M) $90 $90 $80 $78 $70 $70 $70 $60 $18 $18 $50 $40 $53 $53 $30 1Q13 2Q13 3Q13 4Q13 Total Project Cos
Slide 36: Plans to Spend An Incremental $700M Are Reminiscent of Past Ambitions
Plans to Spend An Incremental $700M Are Reminiscent of Past Alternative Energy Ambitions…All of Which Failed Estimated Project Project Cost Natchez $4,700M East Dubuque Conversion $900M Olympiad $500M Rialto $430M Port St. Joe $225M Previous Projects/Acquisitions Result East Dubuque Conversion Spent
Slide 37: Rentech Response vs. Reality: Oversight is Sorely Needed
Rentech Response vs. Reality: Oversight is Sorely Needed Projects have always been on plan Graanul and RTK jointly decided to keep the Canadian pellet projects Company’s outside the JV Defense Using RNF shares as collateral does not present a material risk…in fact it was a smart financing tool
Slide 38: A Wilshire Blvd Industrial Company at $400k/head?
Corporate Cost Structure “A Wilshire Blvd Industrial Company at $400k/head?” ≠ Concerned Rentech Shareholders 38
Slide 39: SG&A Expense Largely Unchanged Despite Closing AE Business
SG&A Expense Largely Unchanged Despite Closing the Alternative Energy Business… Cash SG&A Stock Compensation $40 Oct 2011: RTK revises AE strategy; impairs $35 remaining projects $34 RTK ex-RNF Corporate & AE SG&A ($M) $32 $29 $29 $30 $30 $26 $25 $28 $25 $24 $27 $25 $24 $20 $19 $22 $21 $19 $15 $16 $
Slide 40: ~80% of Alternative Energy SG&A Was Corporate Expense
…Primarily Because ~80% of Alternative Energy SG&A Was Actually Corporate/Unallocated Expense SG&A Expense: Fiscal 2012 Previous Financials Fertilizer $18,376 Alternative Energy $29,864 RTK Total SG&A $48,240 Restated Financials Fertilizer $18,376 Fulghum Fibers $ -- Wood Pellets $1,919 Energy Techn
Slide 41: Most Recent SG&A Disclosures Are Also Misleading
Most Recent SG&A Disclosures Are Also Misleading Pellet EBITDA outlook excludes significant business development costs Management has focused investors on “plant level” EBITDA which excludes “segment level” SG&A expense Source: RTK presentation from 3/11/2014 Concerned Rentech Shareholders 41
Slide 42: Business Development Expenses Must Be Counted
Business Development Expenses Must Be Counted Either pellet SG&A is subtracted from Wood Fibres earnings… Pellet Wood Fibre Business Business Development Outlook $5MM $32 - 35MM SG&A EBITDA From company presentation on 2/12/2014 …or it is an additional Corporate/Unallocated expense CASH SG&A EXPENSE
Slide 43: We Believe True Corporate Expense Is Higher Than Reported
We Believe True Corporate Expense Is Higher Than Reported We consider pellet “business development” costs to be a corporate expense Typically “business development” is considered a corporate function and is not allocated to a segment; RTK essentially does neither Operating SG&A for pellets is
Slide 44: RTK's Corporate Expense Margin Is >8x Peers
At $27M, RTK’s Corporate Expense Margin Is >8x Peers Corporate Expense % of Sales 25% 23% 20% 2013 Corporate Expense % of Sales 15% 10% 5% Median: 2.6% -- See slide 52 and Appendices H, I, & J for details Concerned Rentech Shareholders 44
Slide 45: Revenue of ~$1B Required to Justify This Cost Structure
Revenue of ~$1B Required to Justify This Cost Structure! Sales $3,500 $3,000 $2,500 2013 Sales ($M) Required revenues for RTK’s $2,000 corporate cost structure to be in-line with peers $1,500 $1,000 RTK today $500 $ -- We do not believe this is an overhead structure that RTK can simply grow into and
Slide 46: Racing to Spend Significant Capital to Justify Corporate Structure
To Avoid Cutting Costs, the Way to Justify Today’s Corporate Structure Is Racing to Spend Significant Capital Corporate Required Expense Capital Sales % of Sales Investment $1,200 2.3% $1,381 $1,000 2.7% $1,111 Acceptable corporate expense $800 3.4% $841 % of sales $600 4.5% $571 $400 6.8% $301 $200
Slide 47: How Did Rentech Land in West L.A.?
How Did Rentech Land in West L.A.? CEO Hunt Ramsbottom's Prior Employment History Previous Employer Years Location M2 Automotive 1997 - 2004 Santa Monica, CA Thompson PBE 1989 - 1997 Marina del Rey, CA Kellow Brown Carson, CA December 2005 Ramsbottom named CEO 2004 2005 2006 … 2014 RTK Executive Off
Slide 48: West L.A. Headquarters Drive Corporate Expense
West L.A. Headquarters Drive Corporate Expense, While Money Is Made In Less Glamorous Places LEGEND Corporate HQ: Wilshire Blvd., West L.A. Fulghum Fibres mills RNF facilities Wood pellet mills Corporate HQ Source: company SEC filings, presentation, and website Concerned Rentech Shareholders 48
Slide 49: Management Offers Multiple Defenses of RTK's Cost Structure
Management Offers Multiple Defenses of RTK’s Cost Structure…Each With Major Flaws We have discussed RTK’s cost structure with management for the past year We have yet to hear an explanation that makes sense Last summer, management even hired advisors from an investment bank to help defend the
Slide 50: Rentech Defense #1: Only Consolidated Costs Matter
Rentech Defense #1: Only Consolidated Costs Matter Benchmarking RTK Consolidated against peers is the best way to Company’s analyze RTK’s cost structure Defense SG&A costs at RTK Consolidated are in-line with peers because RNF benchmarks are below peers The Company’s logic hides the problem by
Slide 51: Company's Defense for Using RTK Consolidated Appears Contradictory
Company’s Defense for Using RTK Consolidated Appears Contradictory and Flawed The investment banking advisor’s defense cited an allocation issue, claiming that RTK ex-RNF’s costs included expenses to support RNF This contradicts management, who have adamantly and consistently maintained that cos
Slide 52: Peeling the Onion
Consolidated Financials Conveniently Hide An Indefensible Corporate Structure “Peeling the Onion” RTK Consolidated Revenue: $491 SG&A: $53 SG&A % Sales = 11% RNF RTK ex-RNF Revenue: $376 Revenue: $115 SG&A: $20 SG&A: $33 SG&A % Sales = 5% SG&A % Sales = 29% 72 employees = ~$400K/head Fulghum Fibres
Slide 53: Rentech Defense #2: Total SG&A Is Relevant Metric
Rentech Defense #2: Total SG&A Is Relevant Metric More appropriate to analyze SG&A than corporate expense Company’s Different segment allocation methodologies could result in Defense inconsistent corporate allocations As a subset of operating expenses, corporate expense is a more granular meas
Slide 54: Different Operating Models Are Present in RTK's Peer Group
Different Operating Models Are Clearly Present in RTK’s Peer Group SG&A % of Sales Cash Gross Margin 40% 60% 35% 50% 30% 2013 Cash Gross Margin 40% 2013 SG&A % of Sales 25% 20% 30% 15% 20% Median: 10% 10% 10% 5% -- -- CLNE ENOC RTK MXWL AVD WPP LXU AEIS ADES IPI ZOLT HWKN MTX NP BCPC PENX KS REX FF
Slide 55: Executive Compensation: Mediocrity Has Its Rewards
Executive Compensation “Mediocrity Has Its Rewards” Concerned Rentech Shareholders 55
Slide 56: RTK Has Underperformed Peers By Over 250% Under Current CEO
RTK Has Underperformed Peers By Over 250% Under Current CEO Hunt Ramsbottom... RTK Peers 250% = 218% 200% 150% Indexed Total Return 100% 50% -- (50%) (48%) (100%) 12/15/05 12/15/06 12/15/07 12/15/08 12/15/09 12/15/10 12/15/11 12/15/12 12/15/13 2013 Peer Group as listed in RTK’s 2013 10K. Returns thr
Slide 57: While Management Has Been Handsomely Compensated
…While Management Has Been Handsomely Compensated… RTK Executive Compensation (2006 - 2013) $70 $63 $60 $54 2006-2013 Cumulative Total ($M) $50 $44 $40 $30 $29 $22 $20 $18 $14 $10 $10 $ -- 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2012 2013 * 2011 includes fiscal 2011 plus quarter ended Dec. 2011. All other pe
Slide 58: Earning Well In Excess of Peers
…Earning Well In Excess of Peers… Cumulative Executive Compensation (2006-2012) RTK RTK Peer Median 20% RTK <peers 82% >peers RTK $47.3M 96% $422M >peers RTK $336M 77% $30.6M >peers $25.9M RTK 77% $16.7M >peers $15.6M $9.4M $2.4M $1.3M CEO Avg. Total Other Top 5 Avg. Annual Comp. CEO comp. NEO comp.
Slide 59: And Well In Excess of RTK's Relative Size
…And Well In Excess of RTK’s Relative Size Executive Compensation % of Market Value (2006-2012) RTK RTK Peer Median 112% RTK <peers 82% >peers RTK 89% 14.1% >peers 87% RTK 86% 9.1% >peers 7.7% RTK 86% 5.0% 4.8% >peers 2.7% 0.7% 0.4% (25%) CEO Avg. Total Other Top 5 Annual Comp. CEO comp. NEO comp. N
Slide 60: Management Has Benefited At The Expense of Shareholders
Management Has Benefited At The Expense of Shareholders Executive Compensation Adj. Free Cash Flow* $75 $63 $54 Profits for Management $44 $29 $25 $18 $22 $10 $14 2006-2013 Cumulative Total ($M) ($25) ($32) ($75) ($104) ($125) ($149) ($175) ($166) ($175) ($200) ($208) ($225) ($227) Losses for Shareh
Slide 61: Excessive Executive Compensation Highlights Pervasive Corporate Cost Issues
Excessive Executive Compensation Highlights Pervasive Corporate Cost Issues Top 5 NEO Compensation % of FY 2012 Avg. Market Value 14.0% 2012 NEO Comp. % of FY Avg. Market Value 12.0% 12.0% 10.0% 8.0% 6.0% 4.0% 2.0% Median: 1.0% -- See Appendix M for details. Concerned Rentech Shareholders 61
Slide 62: The Path Forward
THE PATH FORWARD “Oversight drives accountability, accountability drives performance, performance drives the stock price” Concerned Rentech Shareholders 62
Slide 63: Shareholders Have Been Materially Diluted
Under Current Leadership, Shareholders Have Been Materially Diluted, Receiving Little In Return… RTK Diluted Share Count 350 ??? 300 ??? Avg. Diluted Shares (mil) 250 223 223 226 216 200 174 165 151 150 127 100 93 50 -- 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014E 2015E Recent comments from ma
Slide 64: While Financial Risk Has Also Materially Increased
…While Financial Risk Has Also Materially Increased Change 12/31/2011 12/31/2012 12/31/2013 2011-2013 CASH RTK ex-RNF $193 $86 $72 ($120) RNF $45 $56 $34 ($11) RTK Consolidated $237 $142 $106 ($131) DEBT RTK ex-RNF $49 $ -- $102 $53 RNF $ -- $193 $320 $320 RTK Consolidated $49 $193 $422 $373 NET CAS
Slide 65: Reconstitution of the Board Is The Only Credible Solution
A Reconstitution of the Board Is The Only Credible Solution to Protecting Shareholders’ Interests This Board and management team have proven they are not credible stewards of shareholder capital Rentech is no longer an alternative energy venture – neither the Board nor management have the backgr
Slide 66: Our Plan
Our Plan Operational Changes Reduce corporate overhead costs Develop a credible plan to fix Agrifos and limit inventory risk going forward Independently evaluate the best risk-adjusted path to grow wood assets Realize maximum value for shareholders from wood assets, including a possible MLP
Slide 67: Potential Tax Restructuring Could Create Significant Shareholder Value
Potential Tax Restructuring Could Create Significant Shareholder Value… Currently there is sizable tax leakage between RTK and RNF Distributions and value of RTK’s stake in RNF are taxed at corporate rates A proposed restructuring plan (the “tax plan”) exists that would: Redirect all fertili
Slide 68: Opportunity Needs To Be Evaluated Objectively and Independent of Management
…But the Opportunity Needs To Be Evaluated Objectively and Independent of Management Under the proposed new corporate structure: RTK shareholders would exchange common shares for new MLP units Fertilizer distributions would flow through directly to current RTK shareholders without (or with a r
Slide 69: Multiple Ways To Create Value For Shareholders
Multiple Ways To Create Value For Shareholders Opportunity Current Leadership’s Approach Why Shareholder Representation is Needed • Maintain bloated cost structure • Management appears to benefit at the expense of shareholders Reduce • Excessive compensation • Current cost structure incentivizes man
Slide 70: Material Upside With Prudent Oversight
Material Upside With Prudent Oversight Value per Share Segment Our Plan Improve profitability at Pasadena Ownership of RNF Prevent future acquisition blunders (like Agrifos) $1.33 - $1.82 (After Tax) More prudently manage debt balance Evaluate potential sale to strategic buyer Ensure focus
Slide 71: Our Nominees: True Stewards of Shareholders' Capital
Our Nominees “True Stewards of Shareholders’ Capital” Concerned Rentech Shareholders 71
Slide 72: Our Nominees: Jeffrey J. Brown
Our Nominees: Jeffrey J. Brown Mr. Brown, age 52, is the Chief Executive Officer and founding member of Brown Equity Partners, LLC (“BEP”), which provides capital to management teams and companies needing equity. Prior to founding BEP in January 2007, Mr. Brown served as a founding partner and prima
Slide 73: Our Nominees: Jeffrey E. Eberwein
Our Nominees: Jeffrey E. Eberwein Mr. Eberwein, age 43, is the founder and Chief Executive Officer of Lone Star Value Management, an investment firm. Prior to founding Lone Star Value Management in January 2013, Mr. Eberwein was a private investor from December 2011 to December 2012. He was a portfo
Slide 74: Our Nominees: Larry Holley
Our Nominees: Larry Holley Mr. Holley, age 65, is currently the President and Chief Operating Officer of The CBM Group, LLC (“CBM”). Mr. Holley formed CBM in February 2006 primarily as a consulting vehicle to engage with private equity in company valuations in the fertilizer sector. Mr. Holley was m
Slide 75: Our Nominees: Glenn W. Welling
Our Nominees: Glenn W. Welling Mr. Welling, age 43, is the Founder and Chief Investment Officer of Engaged Capital, a California based activist investment firm and registered advisor with the SEC focused on investing in small and mid-cap North American equities. Prior to founding Engaged Capital in
Slide 76: Appendix
APPENDIX Concerned Rentech Shareholders 76
Slide 77: Appendix A: Alternative Energy Cost Estimate Details
Appendix A: Alternative Energy Cost Estimate Details Project Company Cost Estimate Source “The engineering, design, procurement of materials, and construction necessary to build Phase I of the Natchez Project is currently estimated to cost approximately $450 million Natchez and be completed by 2011
Slide 78: Appendix B: Agrifos Margin & Price Volatility
Appendix B: Agrifos Margin & Price Volatility Change: 4Q12 1Q13 2Q13 3Q13 4Q13 4Q13 vs 4Q12 EAST DUBUQUE Ammonia Price ($/t) $676 $739 $741 $530 $582 (14%) UAN Price ($/t) $301 $301 $360 $269 $264 (12%) Revenue $55.0 $34.5 $96.3 $50.6 $30.9 Natural Gas Cost $9.3 $6.6 $11.4 $12.3 $11.7 Raw Material C
Slide 79: Appendix C: RNF Leverage Without Agrifos
Appendix C: RNF Leverage Without Agrifos Pro-Forma RNF Estimates ex-Agrifos 3Q12 4Q12 1Q13 2Q13 3Q13 4Q13 Cash $55 $111 $90 $98 $68 $27 Debt $27 $105 $105 $105 $105 $105 Net Debt (Cash) ($28) ($6) $15 $7 $37 $78 LTM EBITDA $126 $130 $125 $117 $108 $77 Net Debt / LTM EBITDA (0.2x) (0.0x) 0.1x 0.1x 0.
Slide 80: Appendix D: RNF Leverage With Agrifos
Appendix D: RNF Leverage With Agrifos Actual RNF Results 3Q12 4Q12 1Q13 2Q13 3Q13 4Q13 Cash $55 $56 $50 $113 $85 $34 Debt $27 $193 $207 $320 $320 $320 Net Debt (Cash) ($28) $137 $157 $207 $235 $286 EBITDA $33 $28 $21 $38 $16 ($9) LTM EBITDA $126 $128 $127 $120 $104 $66 Net Debt / LTM EBITDA (0.2x) 1
Slide 81: Appendix E: PDU Estimated Conversion Cost History
Appendix E: PDU Estimated Conversion Cost History Source Cost Estimate Commentary “Rentech expects the PDU to be operating by the end of calendar 2006, and to 2005 10K $21 million cost approximately $21 million.” “We expect construction of the PDU to be completed by the third calendar 2006 10K $40 m
Slide 82: Appendix F: Pellet Project Cost Estimate History
Appendix F: Pellet Project Cost Estimate History Source Cost Estimate Commentary “We estimate that the total cost to acquire and convert the Wawa and Atikokan Projects will be approximately $70.0 million, of which approximately $65.0 1Q13 10Q $70 million million is expected to be expended during 201
Slide 83: Appendix G: Impairment History
Appendix G: Impairment History Project Impairment Source Commentary East “During fiscal 2008 and 2007, the Company recognized impairment losses Dubuque $48 MM 2008 10K of $9,482,000 and $38,197,000, respectively, on assets associated with the Conversion suspended development of the conversion at the
Slide 84: Appendix H: SG&A Expense Details
Appendix H: SG&A Expense Details COMPANY ESTIMATES Adjustments EC ASSUMPTIONS 2014E SG&A 2014E SG&A Alternative Energy $5 Pro-forma for shutdown Alternative Energy $ -- Wood Pellets $7 ~5% of sales; ex $1M start-up costs Wood Pellets $1 Corporate $22 Includes $5M pellet biz. dev. expense Corporate $
Slide 85: Appendix I: Corporate Cost Details
Appendix I: Corporate Cost Details COMPANY ESTIMATES EC ASSUMPTIONS - PRO-FORMA 2014E RTK ex-RNF SG&A Biz. Dev. 2014E RTK ex-RNF SG&A considered Corporate Cash Expense $15.0 corporate expense Corporate Cash Expense $15.0 Stock Compensation $7.0 Pellet Business Development Cash Expense $5.0 Total Cor
Slide 86: Appendix J: Methodology for Peer Corporate Expense Analysis
Appendix J: Methodology for Peer Corporate Expense Analysis Peer group consists of companies which have a comparable reported corporate segment and are members of either the 2010, 2012, or 2013 peer groups listed in RTK’s 10-K’s or proxy statements or the Alternative Energy Peer Group referenced i
Slide 87: Appendix K: Methodology for SG&A % of Sales Analysis
Appendix K: Methodology for SG&A % of Sales Analysis Peer group used is “2013 Peer Group” from Rentech’s 2013 10-K filing Financial information directly from company SEC filings All peer financial figures based on 2013 fiscal year, other than ADES, REX, and HWKN, which have not yet filed fisca
Slide 88: Appendix L: Methodology for Executive Compensation Analysis
Appendix L: Methodology for Executive Compensation Analysis All compensation figures directly from company SEC filings Peer group used is “2013 Peer Group” from Rentech’s 2013 10-K filing Executive compensation based on grant date fair value for options and stock awards Compensation for othe
Slide 89: Appendix M: RTK ex-RNF Executive Compensation Analysis
Appendix M: RTK ex-RNF Executive Compensation Analysis All compensation figures directly from company SEC filings Peer group used is “2013 Peer Group” from Rentech’s 2013 10-K filing Executive compensation based on grant date fair value for options and stock awards Compensation for other nam
Slide 90: Appendix N: Valuation Walk Key Assumptions
Appendix N: Valuation Walk Key Assumptions All potential equity valuations are CRS’s good faith estimates based on reasonable assumptions detailed below and are conditional upon the successful execution of a strategic plan along the lines proposed by CRS Ownership of RNF: based on $2.00 - $2.60 no
Slide 91: Key Contacts
Key Contacts Investors: Media: Okapi Partners LLC Bayfield Strategy, Inc. Bruce Goldfarb, Chuck Garske, or Lisa Patel Riyaz Lalani 212-297-0720 416-907-9365 [email protected] [email protected] Concerned Rentech Shareholders 91