Banque nationale de Belgique SA · EURONEXT:BNB

Banque nationale de Belgique SA — Technical Presentation (May 2016)

47 slides from Banque nationale de Belgique SA's technical presentation, May 2016

  1. Slide 1: Whatever it takes: The Real Effects of Unconventional Monetary Policy

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Whatever it takes: The Real Effects of Unconventional Monetary Policy Viral V. Acharya, Tim Eisert, Christian Eufinger, Christian Hirsch May 2016

  2. Slide 2: Draghi’s Speech

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Draghi’s Speech Mario Draghi stated on 26 July 2012, during a conference in London: “Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough.” On 21 Novembe

  3. Slide 3: Draghi’s Speech

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Draghi’s Speech Three questions: Did the OMT announcement... 1 ...affect banks? And how? 2 ...impact bank lending? 3 ...revert negative financial and real effects caused by credit crunch (cash, low employment growth,

  4. Slide 4: Contribution

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Contribution Did the OMT announcement affect banks? And how? Periphery country banks benefited significantly due to their large holdings of GIIPS sovereign debt Capital gains on sovereign debt improved equity capitali

  5. Slide 5: Contribution

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Contribution Did the OMT announcement impact bank lending? Capital gains led to increase in loan supply mostly to below median quality borrowers (only at the intensive margin) Partly driven by zombie lending of banks

  6. Slide 6: OMT program

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion OMT program Buying a theoretically unlimited amount of government bonds with one to three years maturity in secondary markets 6 5 4 3 2 1 01jan2011 01jan2012 01jan2013 01jan2014 date Spread Italy Germany 10y Spread Sp

  7. Slide 7: Sample and Variables of Interest

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Sample and Variables of Interest Hand matched sample at the intersection of Amadeus and Dealscan for all EU countries and period 2009-2014 Loans issued to 980 private borrowers by 49 lead banks Relevant OMT announceme

  8. Slide 8: Outline

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Outline 1 OMT Announcement: Effect on Bank Health 2 Bank Lending 1 Overall Lending 2 Zombie Lending 3 Financial and Real Effects of Bank Lending Behavior 4 Zombie Distortions

  9. Slide 9: Effect on Banks: More Equity

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Effect on Banks: More Equity OMT program announcement has improved the equity capital of banks with large GIIPS sovereign debt holdings Gains on sovereign bonds held in the banks’ trading book are at least partly real

  10. Slide 10: Main Variable of Interest

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Main Variable of Interest ∆Value EU Sov. Debt bj OMT windfall gainbj = . Total Equity bj Gain on EU sovereign debt holdings as a fraction of a bank’s total equity CDS return OMT windfall gain GIIPS/Assets Non-GIIPS Ba

  11. Slide 11: Evolution of Bank Capitalization

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Evolution of Bank Capitalization Total Assets/Total Equity ratio pre-crisis crisis/pre-OMT post-OMT weakly-cap. GIIPS 16.29 24.74 21.21 well-cap. GIIPS 12.37 13.57 12.39 non-GIIPS European 21.88 16.53 15.87 U.S. Banks

  12. Slide 12: Outline

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Outline 1 OMT Announcement: Effect on Bank Health 2 Bank Lending 1 Overall Lending 2 Zombie Lending 3 Financial and Real Effects of Bank Lending Behavior 4 Zombie Distortions

  13. Slide 13: Bank Lending - Khwaja and Mian (2008): Our Approach

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Bank Lending - Khwaja and Mian (2008): Our Approach Aggregate firms into clusters to generate enough time-series bank lending heterogeneity Cluster firms such that firms in a given cluster have same demand for bank lo

  14. Slide 14: Bank Lending - Khwaja and Mian (2008)

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Bank Lending - Khwaja and Mian (2008) Unit of observation is at the firm cluster-quarter-bank level Intensive Margin: ∆Volumebmjt+1 = β1 · OMT windfall gainbj ∗ PostOMT + γ · Xbjt + Firm Cluster m · Quarter-Year t+1 +

  15. Slide 15: Bank Lending - Evolution of Loan Volume: All Firms

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Bank Lending - Evolution of Loan Volume: All Firms .2 .1 0 -.1 -.2 2011q3 2012q1 2012q3 2013q1 2013q3 dateq High Gain Bank Low Gain Bank

  16. Slide 16: Change in Loan Volume - Borrower Quality

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Change in Loan Volume - Borrower Quality Below country median 3-year interest coverage ratio 3-year median based on period 2009 to 2011 Classification 2009-2011: Intensive Margin All banks All banks All banks All bank

  17. Slide 17: Outline

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Outline 1 OMT Announcement: Effect on Bank Health 2 Bank Lending 1 Overall Lending 2 Zombie Lending 3 Financial and Real Effects of Bank Lending Behavior 4 Zombie Distortions

  18. Slide 18: Zombie Lending

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Zombie Lending “...the zombie problem is chiefly focused in the peripheries of Europe rather than the core. In Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece, banks have been reluctant to pull the plug on companies as it would h

  19. Slide 19: Zombie Lending

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Zombie Lending Similar to Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008), we identify zombie firms as firms that receive subsidizied credit (i.e., loans at very advantageous interest rate) Benchmark: interest expense that highe

  20. Slide 20: Detecting Zombies

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Detecting Zombies Several criteria have to be met for a private firm to be classified as zombie 1 Interest payments below benchmark (subsidized credit), 2 Firm has to be of low quality (i.e., low interest coverage rat

  21. Slide 21: Benchmark Interest Rates

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Benchmark Interest Rates Amadeus Benchmark Dealscan Benchmark 2.5 Interest Rate (%) 2 1.5 1 .5 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Year Short-term Benchmark Long-term Benchmark Interest Rate paid by Medi

  22. Slide 22: Benchmark examples

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Benchmark examples Examples of benchmark firms Amadeus ID Name Country Average IC Allindrawn Maturity Benchmark GB00719885 Rio Tinto Plc GB 26.72 22.5 Short-term DE7270000251 Hugo Boss AG Germany 13.34 95 Long-term LI

  23. Slide 23: Asset-weighted zombie fraction

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Percentage of firms receiving subsidized loans in Europe .12 Asset-weighted zombie fraction .06 .04.08 .1 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Year Benchmark Dealscan Benchmark Amadeus Percentage of zombie firms increases post-OM

  24. Slide 24: Breakdown zombies by country

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Breakdown zombies by country Panel A: Amadeus Benchmark Country Number of Zombies Number of private firms in sample Germany 4 119 (3.4%) Spain 29 177 (16.3%) France 10 137 (7.2%) UK 23 235 (9.8%) Italy 35 172 (20.3%)

  25. Slide 25: Comparison within High Indirect Gain firms

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Comparison within High Indirect Gain firms Panel A: Amadeus Benchmark High Quality Low Quality Non-Zombie Zombie Difference (3)-(4) Total Assets (mn) 1390 1730 900 830 (1.19) Tangibility 0.544 0.614 0.665 -0.051 (-1.3

  26. Slide 26: Zombie Loans/Total Loans

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Evolution of Zombie Lending Volume - GIIPS Banks Fraction Zombie Loans GIIPS Banks .2 Zombie Loans/Total Loans .1 .05.15 2011q3 2012q1 2012q3 2013q1 2013q3 Date Still Undercap Well Capitalized

  27. Slide 27: Zombie Loans/Total Loans

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Evolution of Zombie Lending Volume - GIIPS Banks Fraction Zombie Loans Italian Banks Fraction Zombie Loans Span/Port Banks .25 .25 Zombie Loans/Total Loans Zombie Loans/Total Loans .2 .2 .15 .15 .1 .1 .05 .05 2011q3 2

  28. Slide 28: Zombie Firms - Example: Feltrinelli

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Zombie Firms - Example: Feltrinelli Feltrinelli is a private Italian publishing company and operates bookstores throughout the country Came under severe stress during the sovereign crisis La Repubblica wrote in 2013:

  29. Slide 29: Zombie Firms - Example: Benetton

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Zombie Firms - Example: Benetton Benetton is an Italian textiles and clothing retailer that faced increasing pressure from competition from fast-fashion houses After a decade of zero sales and earnings growth, Benetto

  30. Slide 30: Bank Lending - Khwaja and Mian (2008)

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Bank Lending - Khwaja and Mian (2008) Unit of observation is at the firm cluster-quarter-bank level Intensive Margin: ∆Volumebmjt +1 = β1 · OMT windfall gainbj ∗ PostOMT + β2 · OMT windfall gainbj ∗ PostOMT ∗ Still Un

  31. Slide 31: ∆Loan Volume to Zombie Borrower - Amadeus Benchmark

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion ∆Loan Volume to Zombie Borrower - Amadeus Benchmark ∆ Loans ∆ Loans ∆ Loans ∆ Loans Loan Increase ∆ Loans ∆Loans ∆ Loans All banks All banks All banks All banks All banks GIIPS banks Span/Port. banks Italian banks OMT

  32. Slide 32: Outline

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Outline 1 OMT Announcement: Effect on Bank Health 2 Bank Lending 1 Overall Lending 2 Zombie Lending 3 Financial and Real Effects of Bank Lending Behavior 4 Zombie Distortions

  33. Slide 33: Financial and Real Effects - Main Variable

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Financial and Real Effects - Main Variable Compute the Average OMT windfall gain for all the banks that act as lead arranger in a given syndicate. Defined for firm i in country j in industry h at time t as: ∑l∈Lijht A

  34. Slide 34: Financial and Real Effects - Specification

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Financial and Real Effects - Specification yijht+1 = β1 · Indirect OMT windfall gains ijh · PostOMTt + γ · Xijht + Firmijh + Industry h · Country j · Year t+1 + uijht+1 + ForeignBankCountry k6=j · Year t+1 . Indicator

  35. Slide 35: Cash and Leverage - Within High Indirect Gain Firms

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Cash and Leverage - Within High Indirect Gain Firms CASH Leverage High Ind. OMT Windfall Gain Borrower High Ind. OMT Windfall Gain Borrower .07 .64 .62 .06 Cash/Assets Leverage .6 .05 .58 .56 .04 2006 2008 2010 2012 2

  36. Slide 36: Real Effects - Within High Indirect Gain Firms

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Real Effects - Within High Indirect Gain Firms Investment Employment Growth High Ind. OMT Windfall Gain Borrower High Ind. OMT Windfall Gain Borrower .25 .06 .04 .2 EMP Growth .02 CAPX .15 0 .1 -.02 .05 -.04 2006 2008

  37. Slide 37: Financial and Real Effects - All Firms

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Financial and Real Effects - All Firms ∆Cash ∆Debt ∆Debt-∆Cash Emp. Growth CAPX ROA Indirect OMT windfall gains*PostOMT 0.376*** 0.368*** -0.008 0.070 -0.248 0.051 (2.82) (2.87) (-0.04) (0.15) (-0.59) (0.43) R2 0.485

  38. Slide 38: Financial and Real Effects - Zombie

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Financial and Real Effects - Zombie Panel A: Zombie Lending - Amadeus Benchmark ∆ Cash ∆ Debt ∆ Debt-∆ Cash Emp. Growth CAPX ROA Indirect OMT windfall gains*PostOMT*Low IC 0.519** 0.557** 0.038 -0.418 -0.618 0.185 (2.

  39. Slide 39: Financial and Real Effects - Zombie

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Financial and Real Effects - Zombie “The concern is that these companies - which spend so much of their cash servicing interest payments that they are unable to invest in new equipment or future growth areas - could b

  40. Slide 40: Outline

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Outline 1 OMT Announcement: Effect on Bank Health 2 Bank Lending 1 Overall Lending 2 Zombie Lending 3 Financial and Real Effects of Bank Lending Behavior 4 Zombie Distortions

  41. Slide 41: Zombie Distortions - Theory (Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap, 2008)

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Zombie Distortions - Theory (Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap, 2008) Two potential channels through which non-zombie firms could be negatively affected by zombies Lower loan supply Undercapitalized banks might shift loan

  42. Slide 42: Industry effects on Non-zombie Firms - Method

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Industry effects on Non-zombie Firms - Method Investigate effect of rising fraction of zombie firms on healthy (non-zombie) firms in the same industry. Similar to Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008), we run the follo

  43. Slide 43: Industry effects on Non-zombie Firms - Results

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Industry effects on Non-zombie Firms - Results Panel A: Amadeus Benchmark (1) (2) (3) (4) Interest Emp. Growth CAPX Productivity Industry Frac Zombie*Non-Zombie -0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.001 (-1.44) (1.57) (1.36) (-0.39)

  44. Slide 44: Industry effects on Non-zombie Firms - Results

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Industry effects on Non-zombie Firms - Results Interest Emp. Growth CAPX Productivity Panel A: Dealscan Benchmark - Competitive Industries Industry Frac Zombie*Non-Zombie -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 (-0.60) (1.28) (0.58)

  45. Slide 45: Industry effects on Non-zombie Firms - Results

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Industry effects on Non-zombie Firms - Results Average increase in zombie fraction in GIIPS countries was 8.9 pp, this implies High quality non-zombie firms invest between 11.6% and 13.3% of capital less High quality

  46. Slide 46: Industry effects on Non-zombie Firms - Results

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Industry effects on Non-zombie Firms - Results Panel A: Investment Industry Avg. ∆ Fraction Investment Investment Investment Zombie Loss Years lost (% of Capital) (% of Capital) Construction 9.58% 23.26pp 34.89% 3.7 M

  47. Slide 47: Conclusion

    Introduction OMT Data Bank Health Bank Lending Real Effects Distortions Conclusion Conclusion OMT program announcement led to increase in bank health Banks with improved health increase credit supply to low quality borrower Partly driven by zombie lending Cash and leverage increase significantly alm

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