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31 slides from Nomura's investor presentation, January 2026
Slide 1: Japan in the World: Outlook for the Japanese Economy
Japan in the World Outlook for the Japanese Economy (1) Things Accomplished in 2025 (2) Things Not Accomplished in 2025 (and Left to Do in 2026) (3) The Takaichi Administration’s First Cabinet Decision on an Economic Policy Package See Appendix A-1 for analyst certification, important disclosures an
Slide 2: The Japanese economy: Heading into 2026
The Japanese economy: Heading into 2026 1. Things accomplished in 2025 ① The three hikes: Price hikes, wage hikes, and rate hikes all in play now. ② Changes in the nature of capex: Increased investments in software and other capital goods that lessen the dependence on people for labor. ③ Establishme
Slide 3: Japan's economy: Recovery will slow without falling into a recession
Japan’s economy: Recovery will slow without falling into a recession; core CPI to fall under 2% in 2026 BOJ’s outlook (as of October 2025) We expect Japan to slow in 2025 H2 Real GDP: +0.7 in FY25, +0.7% in FY26, +1.0% in FY27 2025 2026 2027 FY (Apr-Mar) CY (Jan-Dec) Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
Slide 4: Japan's economy: 'Three types of hikes' leading to an increase in revenue
Japan’s economy: 'Three types of hikes' leading to an increase in revenue of all the four macroeconomic entities Finally heading to a normal economy Price hikes Not fully Wage hikes Rate hikes inter- (4th year) connected (3rd year) (2nd year) Corporate Household Financial Government institutions’ re
Slide 5: Inflation: Japan's CPI has a higher weighting towards food
Inflation: Japan’s CPI has a higher weighting towards food Drivers of Japan’s inflation are food and energy, while rent and services are the drivers for the US and services are the drivers for the Euro area Inflation based on CPI (% y-o-y) Japan US Euro area 11 Service inflation 10 Rent and service
Slide 6: Capex: Reduced labor dependence leading to improved labor productivity
Capex: Reduced labor dependence leading to improved labor productivity ◼ While capex in machinery and construction faces constraints on the supply side (shortages of labor, parts, and materials, and a resulting rise in costs), software orders have been rising rapidly. Rapid increase in orders for so
Slide 7: Wages (1): Synchronized wage hikes are emerging as a trend
Wages (1): Synchronized wage hikes are emerging as a trend ◼ The way companies determine wage hikes is starting to evolve, as they are increasingly letting their decisions be informed by what their peers are doing, leading to a greater level of intra-company synchronization. As a result, the Nash eq
Slide 8: Wages (2): Key events to watch ahead of 2026 shunto
Wages (2): Key events to watch ahead of 2026 shunto ◼ Final months of 2025: Labor unions indicate their position. ◼ Early-to-mid January 2026: Management-side organizations indicate their position. ◼ Mid-March 2026: Climax of shunto negotiations (when most major companies issue their response). Key
Slide 9: Wages (3): Base pay growth likely to be above 3% in 2026 and 2027
Wages (3): Base pay growth likely to be above 3% in 2026 and 2027 ◼ In the 2024 shunto, wage hikes (including seniority) were 5.10% with base pay growth of 3.56%. ◼ In the 2025 shunto, wage hikes (including seniority) proved to be 5.32% with base pay growth of 3.75%. ◼ In the 2026 shunto, we expect
Slide 10: Wages and prices: Four channels comprising interconnectivity between wages and prices
Wages and prices: Four channels comprising interconnectivity between wages and prices Four major channels for a virtuous cycle between wages and prices(the term” virtuous cycle” disappeared the BOJ’s Outlook Report in May 2025 and hasn’t been used since) Labor shortage Labor-saving Higher labor (ext
Slide 11: Inflation (1): Inflation excluding food and energy not above 2%
Inflation (1): Inflation excluding food and energy not above 2% ◼ Both core CPI inflation (excluding fresh food) and core-core CPI inflation (excluding fresh food and energy) are driven upwards by rice and other foods. ◼ When excluding food (ex. alcoholic beverages), the CPI inflation rate remains l
Slide 12: Inflation (2): Underlying inflation to edge up
Inflation (2): Underlying inflation to edge up ◼ Market inflation expectations (BEI) are rising, along with corporate and household inflation expectations. ◼ While the composite index for five year-ahead inflation expectations based on principal component analysis (composite of corporate, household,
Slide 13: Inflation (3): 2026 CPI forecasts clearly show effects of policy measures
Inflation (3): 2026 CPI forecasts clearly show effects of policy measures ◼ Various policy measures are directly suppressing CPI for FY2025-2026. However, the BOJ’s Outlook Report only factors in measures that have been official enacted. ◼ Currently anticipated measures would depress FY2026 core CPI
Slide 14: Inflation (4): Rice prices look likely to settle down early in 2026
Inflation (4): Rice prices look likely to settle down early in 2026 ◼ Rice prices started rising again in October (after settling back previously) as rice harvested in 2025 hit the market. ◼ The associated boost to y-y inflation is generally shrinking. As of November, higher rice prices are pushing
Slide 15: Inflation (5): Core CPI inflation likely to fall below 2% in 2026
Inflation (5): Core CPI inflation likely to fall below 2% in 2026, and come closer to 2% in 2027 ◼ Japan’s core CPI inflation (less fresh food) will likely come down to below 2% with the contribution of food declining. ⇒ We think the BOJ will pause as long as inflation remains below 2%. ◼ Inflation
Slide 16: BOJ (1): We forecast a pause in rate hikes in 2026
BOJ (1): We forecast a pause in rate hikes in 2026, followed by additional hikes in January and July of 2027 BOJ monetary policy: Expecting policy rate to reach 1.25% in July 2027 (1) Expecting real core CPI inflation to fall below 2% y-y in 2026 ⇒ Our forecasts have core CPI inflation (all items, l
Slide 17: BOJ (2): Risks to our forecasts
BOJ (2): Risks to our forecasts Risks to our monetary policy forecasts (1) Bigger-than-expected upside moves in the output gap and longer-run inflation expectations ⇒ A succession of stimulus packages, for example, could drive up the output gap and longer-run inflation expectations. ⇒ Bigger-than-ex
Slide 18: BOJ (3): Monetary policy under the Takaichi administration
BOJ (3): Monetary policy under the Takaichi administration and changes in BOJ policy board members Monetary policy under the Takaichi administration (1) Demand-pull inflation, not cost-push inflation, is key ⇒ The central bank’s monetary policy mainly addresses demand-pull inflation (while exchange
Slide 19: BOJ (4): Real policy rate will likely approach r* in 2027
BOJ (4): Real policy rate will likely approach r* in 2027 ◼ The most recent OIS curve factors in more of the BOJ’s rate hikes within a twelve-month period. ◼ Nomura believes the BOJ’s policy rate will reach the terminal rate of 1.25% in July 2027, bringing the real policy rate into the estimated ran
Slide 20: Fiscal policy (1): The general election holds the key to Takaichi's fiscal policy
Fiscal policy (1): The general election holds the key to the Takaichi administration’s fiscal policy Following the general election, the Takaichi administration’s fiscal policy (“Sanaenomics”) will shift to a longer-term vision (1) Pre-election Sanaenomics ⇒ Focus on supporting household (voter) bud
Slide 21: Fiscal policy (2): Large economic packages adopted even under inflation
Fiscal policy (2): Large economic packages adopted even under inflation ◼ The Takaichi cabinet officially determined the first economic package on 21 November 2025, whose project scale amounts to JPY 42.8trn or 6.7% of GDP. ◼ Japan has adopted large economic packages even under inflation and with th
Slide 22: Fiscal policy (3): Japan's output gap is already almost zero
Fiscal policy (3): Japan’s output gap is already almost zero ◼ Japan’s output gap is almost zero by now, suggesting Japan needs to enhance not actual but potential GDP. ◼ Moreover, the Phillips curve suggests the intercept reflecting longer-term inflation expectations may have risen since 2022, furt
Slide 23: Fiscal policy (4): Will nonfinancial corporations move to a savings shortfall?
Fiscal policy (4): Will nonfinancial corporations move from a position of excess savings to a savings shortfall? ◼ One of the arguments used to justify economic stimulus is the goal of encouraging non-financial corporations to move from excess savings toward a savings shortfall. ⇒ Even in the US, co
Slide 24: Politics (1): The Prime Minister premium has skyrocketed
Politics (1):The “Prime Minister premium” has skyrocketed under the Takaichi administration ◼ The “Prime Minister premium” can be used as an index to gauge the sustainability of an administration (premium = Cabinet approval rate - approval rate of the largest ruling party) ⇒ Following the Hashimoto
Slide 25: Politics (2): Lower house dissolution never before June since 1992
Politics (2): Lower house dissolution never before June since 1992 ◼ The opening of the ordinary Diet session was shifted to January in 1992. The lower house has never been dissolved before June since that year. ◼ Should PM Takaichi dissolve the lower house in April 2026, i.e., after the FY26 initia
Slide 26: Author Biography
Author Biography As Nomura’s Chief Economist, Kyohei Morita analyzes macroeconomic trends across countries and regions, and financial markets across asset classes, to predict what lies ahead for Japan’s economy. He is particularly well-versed in monetary policy, having written on the subject for his
Slide 27: Appendix A-1
Appendix A-1 This report has been produced by Nomura Securities Co., Ltd. (NSC), Japan. See Disclaimers for Nomura Group entity details. Analyst Certification I, Kyohei Morita , hereby certify (1) that the views expressed in this Research report accurately reflect my personal views about any or all
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